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`Case 2:21-cv-00912-BJR Document 49 Filed 08/25/22 Page 1 of 13
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` The Honorable Barbara J. Rothstein
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
`AT SEATTLE
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`MARY AND MATTHEW STREET,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC, a
`Delaware Limited Liability Company, and
`AMAZON DIGITAL SERVICES, LLC, a
`Delaware Limited Liability Company,
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`Defendants.
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` NO. 2:21-cv-0912-BJR
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`ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
`AMEND
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`I.
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`INTRODUCTION
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`This matter comes before the Court on a Motion to Amend, Dkt. No. 44, filed by Plaintiffs
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`Mary and Matthew Street (“Plaintiffs” or the “Streets”). Plaintiffs filed this Motion after the Court
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`granted the Motion to Dismiss, filed by Defendants Amazon.com Services, LLC and Amazon
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`Digital Services, LLC (collectively “Defendants” or “Amazon”). The Order Granting the Motion
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`to Dismiss was “grounded in the insufficiency of Plaintiffs’ allegations,” and was without
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`prejudice, providing Plaintiffs the opportunity to cure the deficiencies in their complaint by
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`amendment. Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 43, at 11.
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`Having reviewed the parties’ briefs and supporting material filed in support of and
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`opposition to the motion, including the Proposed Second Amended Complaint (“PSAC”), and the
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`ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND
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`Case 2:21-cv-00912-BJR Document 49 Filed 08/25/22 Page 2 of 13
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`relevant case law, the Court finds and rules as follows.
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`II.
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`BACKGROUND
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`This proposed class action challenges an Amazon technology called Sidewalk, which is
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`enabled on certain newer models of Amazon’s Echo smart speakers (“Sidewalk Devices”). The
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`technology “enables those Sidewalk Devices to connect to other Sidewalk-enabled devices nearby
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`through their Bluetooth connections, creating a new, shared network.” PSAC, ¶ 3. Using this
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`network, nearby third-party devices such as pet trackers like Tile can connect to the internet and
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`send small amounts of data (concerning, for example, their location) using the private residential
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`internet accounts belonging to owners of the Sidewalk Devices. Id., ¶¶ 3, 4. Use of these internet
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`accounts is capped at 500 megabytes. Id., ¶ 42. Echo owners are not compensated for use of their
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`internet, but can opt out of Sidewalk by disabling the feature on their devices. Opting out requires
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`owners to “take several steps to disable Sidewalk on their devices.” Id., ¶ 43.
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`Plaintiffs own a Sidewalk-compatible Echo Dot smart speaker, which they purchased in
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`2018. PSAC, ¶ 14. Sidewalk launched on June 8, 2021, and Plaintiffs disabled the Sidewalk
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`feature on their Echo on June 27, 2021. Id., ¶¶ 46, 50. The Streets have alleged “on information
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`and belief” that during that 19-day period, Sidewalk provided third parties access to the internet
`using Plaintiffs’ personal internet account, which “consumed data from the Streets’ limited
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`Internet data allocations.” Id., ¶¶ 16, 53. The Streets pay for internet access, with a data limit of
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`1.2 terabytes1 a month, but do not allege that they incurred any overage charges or other fees
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`during the period that Sidewalk was enabled on their device. They also do not claim that their
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`1 A terabyte is equal to one million megabytes.
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`ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND
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`Case 2:21-cv-00912-BJR Document 49 Filed 08/25/22 Page 3 of 13
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`internet speed was slowed or otherwise affected, or that their privacy was somehow invaded.2 The
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`only other putative injury they claim to have suffered relates to the “significant time” they spent
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`learning about how to disable Sidewalk on their Echo. Id., ¶ 50.
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`On March 21, 2022, the Court granted Amazon’s Motion to Dismiss, finding several
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`critical deficiencies in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. The Court found, among other
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`things, that Plaintiffs had failed “to include in their FAC any allegation their Echo ever actually
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`connected through Sidewalk, or that their data and bandwidth were ever actually shared,” and that
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`Plaintiffs “fail[ed] . . . to allege facts supporting [a] required element of their theft claim.” Order
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`Granting Mot. to Dismiss, p. 5. In their opposition to Amazon’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs
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`requested leave to amend their FAC. The Court granted Plaintiffs leave to file a motion to amend,
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`setting a deadline of April 22, 2022. On that day, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion.
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`Like the First Amended Complaint, the Proposed Second Amended Complaint includes
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`three claims: (1) for violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”), RCW
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`19.86.010, et seq.; (2) for Theft of Telecommunications Services (“TTS”), under RCW §
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`9A.56.268 and .262; and (3) for unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs seek an award of damages and
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`injunctive relief, and propose to represent a class of “[a]ll persons in the United States who
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`bought or acquired and use an Amazon Sidewalk Device.” PSAC, ¶ 55.
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`///
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`///
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`2 The PSAC does make reference to a potential “increased risk to the security of [Plaintiffs’] personal data,” PSAC,
`¶ 8, but Plaintiffs have not argued that this caused them injury, and the facts as alleged here would not support them
`if they did. See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (increased risk of future harm is an
`injury for Article III standing only where plaintiffs “alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm.”).
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`ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND
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`Case 2:21-cv-00912-BJR Document 49 Filed 08/25/22 Page 4 of 13
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`III. DISCUSSION
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`A. Standard on a Motion to Amend: Whether Amendment Would Be Futile
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`Under Federal Rule 15, leave to amend a complaint “shall be freely given when justice so
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`requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). However, leave need not be granted when the proposed
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`amendment is futile.3 See Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara, 894 F.3d 1046, 1059 (9th Cir. 2018). A
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`proposed amended complaint is futile if it would be immediately “subject to dismissal.” Steckman
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`v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir.1998). Thus, the “proper test to be applied
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`when determining the legal sufficiency of a proposed amendment is identical to the one used
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`when considering the sufficiency of a pleading challenged under Rule 12(b)(6).” Miller v. Rykoff–
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`Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir.1988).
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`To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
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`accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
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`662, 678 (2009); see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-570 (2007).4 “A claim has
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`facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court draw the
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`reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
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`678. “Plausibility” means less than “probability,” but “more than a sheer possibility,” and facts
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`that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability stop “short of the line between possibility
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`3 Defendants do not raise any of the other recognized grounds for denying a motion to amend a complaint, such as
`bad faith or prejudice.
`4 Both Plaintiffs and Defendants assert that “[a] proposed amendment is futile if no set of facts can be proven under
`the amended pleading that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim.” Defs.’ Opp. at 3; Pls.’ Rep. at 2 (citing
`Miller, 845 F.2d at 214). However, “Twombly retired the Conley no-set-of-facts test.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In the
`wake of Twombly and Iqbal, therefore, “it might more appropriately be said that an amendment is futile when the
`proposed amended complaint fails to allege ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
`Fulton v. Advantage Sales & Mktg., LLC, 2012 WL 5182805, at *2–3 (D. Or. Oct. 18, 2012) (citations omitted)
`(acknowledging that Twombly abrogated Conley’s “no set of facts” standard for purposes of evaluating the futility of
`a motion to amend a complaint).
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`ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND
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`Case 2:21-cv-00912-BJR Document 49 Filed 08/25/22 Page 5 of 13
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`and plausibility.” Id. at 678; Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir.2013). All allegations of
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`material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
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`Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs., 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013). However, the Court is not
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`required “to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact,
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`or unreasonable inferences.” Wilson v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1145 n. 4 (9th Cir.
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`2012); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).
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`B. Whether Plaintiffs’ Amendments Would Be Futile
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`Defendants argue that the claims in the Proposed Second Amended Complaint fail
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`because the Streets have not alleged enough facts to support a reasonable inference that they
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`sustained any injury. “In a class action, the named plaintiffs attempting to represent the class
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`‘must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered
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`by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to
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`represent.’” In re Zappos.com, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 949, 953–54 (D. Nev. 2015) (quoting Warth
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`v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975)). Adequately alleging injury is necessary to establish both
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`standing in this Court under Article III to the U.S. Constitution, and a required element of each
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`of Plaintiffs’ three claims. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (to
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`establish standing “the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally
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`protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not
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`conjectural or hypothetical”) (citations omitted); Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 166
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`Wn.2d 27, 57 (2009) (“Washington requires a private CPA plaintiff to establish the deceptive act
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`caused injury.”) (citing Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105
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`Wn.2d 778, 794 (1986)); Young v. Young, 164 Wn.2d 477, 484–85 (“A claim of unjust
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`ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND
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`Case 2:21-cv-00912-BJR Document 49 Filed 08/25/22 Page 6 of 13
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`enrichment requires proof of three elements—”(1) the defendant receives a benefit, (2) the
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`received benefit is at the plaintiff’s expense, and (3) the circumstances make it unjust for the
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`defendant to retain the benefit without payment.”); RCW 9A.56.268(2) (theft of
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`telecommunications services private cause of action may be brought only by “[a] person who
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`sustains injury to his or her person, business, or property.”).
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`In this case, Plaintiffs have alleged “on information and belief, Amazon’s use of the
`Street Plaintiffs’ bandwidth through Sidewalk consumed data from the Streets’ limited Internet
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`data allocations and also exposed them to possible overage charges for exceeding their data
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`allocation.” PSAC, ¶ 16. In connection with their CPA claim, Plaintiffs allege that their damages
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`amount to “the value of their personal Internet bandwidth, time spent learning about the
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`Sidewalk network, time spent disabling the Sidewalk function on Sidewalk Devices, costs of
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`Internet data use overages charged by Internet service providers, and other fees, expenses, and
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`costs to be proven at trial.” PSAC, ¶ 76. On closer examination of their proposed amended
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`complaint, the Court concludes that the Streets have failed to allege facts in the PSAC that would
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`give rise to an inference that they have been injured, and that their proposed amendments would
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`therefore be futile.
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`1. Plaintiffs’ Pleading That They Suffered Injury “On Information and Belief” Is
`Inadequate to Confer Standing
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`According to the facts alleged in the PSAC, use of Plaintiffs’ internet account would have
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`occurred when “Amazon’s partner companies’ Bluetooth devices like Tile send packets of data
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`through Sidewalk to Amazon’s servers.” PSAC ¶ 83. But the PSAC does not sufficiently allege
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`facts that support a reasonable inference regarding when, how often, or even if this ever
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`occurred.
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`ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND
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`Case 2:21-cv-00912-BJR Document 49 Filed 08/25/22 Page 7 of 13
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`Instead, the Streets have pleaded only “on information and belief” that “third parties
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`connected to the Street Plaintiffs’ Echo device over the Sidewalk network and used the Street
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`Plaintiffs’ limited Internet bandwidth.” PSAC, ¶ 53. Plaintiffs argue that whether the Sidewalk
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`technology was ever used on their device is information known only to Defendants, and that
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`pleading on information and belief is appropriate when facts are in the “peculiar possession” of a
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`defendant or otherwise unavailable to the plaintiff. See Park v. Thompson, 851 F.3d 910, 928
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`(9th Cir. 2017). Even where information and belief pleading is appropriate, however, it must still
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`be “based on factual information that makes the inference of culpability plausible.” Arista Recs.,
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`LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010). Furthermore, in the highly unusual case in
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`which a plaintiff pleads an injury on information and belief, such as here, the concern is not
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`merely whether the plaintiff has adequately pleaded a necessary element of its claims, but
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`whether it has even suffered a “concrete and particularized” injury necessary to confer standing.
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`See Brickstructures, Inc. v. Coaster Dynamix, Inc., No. 16 CV 10969, 2017 WL 4310671, at *4
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`(N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2017) (“[I]nformation and belief allegations are perfectly fine in appropriate
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`circumstances . . . But where something is alleged which should be within a plaintiff’s personal
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`knowledge, an information and belief allegation thrusts the complaint into the realm of
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`speculation. . . . If plaintiff has nothing on which it can base a clear and direct allegation that it
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`has suffered an injury, this litigation is grounded on pure speculation, something that [Twombly
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`and Iqbal] prohibit. . . . But the problem in the [context of plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim] is even
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`more significant. Without an adequate allegation that it has sustained an injury within the reach
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`of the Lanham Act, it is unclear that plaintiff has articulated an Article III case or controversy.”).
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`ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND
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`Case 2:21-cv-00912-BJR Document 49 Filed 08/25/22 Page 8 of 13
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`Here, the facts that Plaintiffs have alleged supporting an inference that they were injured
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`are sparse. Sidewalk was activated on June 8, 2021. PSAC, ¶ 46. The Streets disabled the feature
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`on their Echo on June 27, 2021. PSAC, ¶ 50. For Sidewalk to have provided access to the
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`Streets’ internet account, third-party devices would have had to connect through their Echo
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`during that 19-day period. The only such third-party device that Plaintiffs identify by name is the
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`Tile brand tracker, which was not connected to the Sidewalk network until June 14, 2021,
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`narrowing the period a Tile could have accessed the Streets’ Echo to 13 days. PSAC ¶ 46.5 The
`Streets live in a “densely populated area near downtown Miami,” which they allege, with no
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`factual support, “likely contains other Sidewalk devices and Amazon partner company devices
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`like Tile.” Id., ¶ 49. Apart from this allegation, the Court is provided no facts that support a
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`plausible inference that a Tile device connected through the Streets’ Echo in that 13-day period,
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`such as an estimate of how many Tile devices were in circulation nationally at the time, let alone
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`in the Miami area;6 a description of how and when a Tile device might connect through a nearby
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`Sidewalk device (for example, do such devices automatically and continuously connect through
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`and draw data from any and all nearby Echoes as a pet walks down the street? Or do they use
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`data only episodically, as when a pet owner activates a function to find a lost pet?); how close a
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`5 Plaintiffs do not provide any information regarding any device, other than the Tile, that would have used the
`Streets’ Echo. They do reference partnerships Amazon may have with two other companies—Level and
`CareBand—but do not provide any details regarding when (or even if) those devices might have joined the Sidewalk
`network, or under what circumstances such devices might have been activated to send data through the Streets’ (or
`anyone’s) Sidewalk device. PSAC, ¶ 39.
`6 In their briefing, Plaintiffs state that “the number of Sidewalk-enabled devices that are in consumer hands indicates
`that they are likely in use in just about every neighborhood across the country.” Rep. at 3. But the PSAC does not
`contain any allegations supporting this conclusory claim, including what that number (even roughly) might be.
`Instead, the PSAC alleges only that “at least tens of millions of Sidewalk Devices have been sold nationwide, with
`more than 100 million Echo devices sold.” Id. at ¶ 57 (emphasis added). The phrase “Sidewalk Devices” refers to
`Echoes and other Amazon smart speakers that enable access to the putative class’s internet accounts; not to Tile
`trackers and other similar devices, which are what would theoretically have caused Plaintiffs’ injury. See PSAC, ¶ 2.
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`ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND
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`Case 2:21-cv-00912-BJR Document 49 Filed 08/25/22 Page 9 of 13
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`passing Tile device must be to an Echo to access the internet through Sidewalk, or the distance
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`from the Plaintiffs’ Echo to the nearest public space, such as a street or sidewalk, where a Tile
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`device might have passed by; or other tangible, real-world facts supporting Plaintiffs’ conclusory
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`assertion that “Sidewalk-enabled devices most likely connected to their Echo and used their
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`bandwidth without their consent.” Rep. at 1. The Court is provided almost no facts to assess just
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`how “likely” this event truly was. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent
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`with’ a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
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`‘entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). In the
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`absence of such facts giving rise to a reasonable inference that a third-party device accessed and
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`used the Streets’ internet in the short period of time during which Sidewalk was activated on
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`their Echo, Plaintiffs have failed to articulate a “concrete and particularized” injury and thus their
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`pleading not only inadequately states any claim; it also fails to establish that these Plaintiffs have
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`standing.
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`2. Even Assuming Sidewalk Accessed Plaintiffs’ Internet as Claimed, Plaintiffs
`Have Not Articulated a Cognizable Injury
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`The Court also concludes that even if one could reasonably infer from Plaintiffs’
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`allegations that third-party devices connected through their Echo, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently
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`pleaded a cognizable injury supporting any of their three claims.
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`a. Washington Consumer Protection Act Claim
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`Under Washington’s CPA, “[n]o monetary damages need be proven so long as there is
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`some injury to property or business.” Sorrel v. Eagle Healthcare, Inc., 110 Wn. App. 290, 298
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`(2002). Nevertheless, a plaintiff must allege and prove facts showing that he was at least
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`“deprived of the use of his property as a result of an unfair or deceptive act or practice.” Id.
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`ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND
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`Case 2:21-cv-00912-BJR Document 49 Filed 08/25/22 Page 10 of 13
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`(emphasis added). Here, Plaintiffs not only fail to claim any monetary damages in the form of
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`overage or other fees; they have not even alleged that they were “deprived of the use of their
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`property” as a result of Sidewalk accessing their internet connection. They have not alleged, for
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`example, that Sidewalk caused an interruption—or even a perceptible slowdown—in their
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`internet connectivity. Compare In re: Lenovo Adware Litig., No. 15-MD-02624-RMW, 2016
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`WL 6277245, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2016) (“[P]laintiffs in the instant case plausibly allege
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`that the operation of VisualDiscovery significantly degraded the performance of the Lenovo
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`computers. Plaintiffs describe VisualDiscovery as running “constantly,” and allege that while
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`VisualDiscovery was operational, it decreased battery life, slowed internet upload speeds by as
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`much as 55 percent and download speeds by as much as 16 percent, and caused certain webpages
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`to fail to load correctly or not load at all. Plaintiffs allege that consumers complained that
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`VisualDiscovery interfered with watching videos online, caused the computers to run slow,
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`blocked or slowed connections to certain websites, and caused security issues.”) (citations
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`omitted). In the absence of an allegation that Sidewalk somehow deprived Plaintiffs of the use of
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`their property, they fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted. See Brodsky v. Apple Inc.,
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`445 F. Supp. 3d 110, 124 (N.D. Cal. 2020). (“Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to allege the
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`requisite showing of harm. . . . Plaintiffs do not allege that 2FA prevents Plaintiffs from logging
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`in after that delay, or that Plaintiffs’ devices are “damaged” by the delay.”); Opperman v. Path,
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`Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1055–56 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (finding that “[b]ecause Plaintiffs have not
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`quantified or otherwise articulated the alleged resource usage, they fail to allege an injury that
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`can serve as the basis of standing” even where plaintiffs claimed “the unauthorized transmissions
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`ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND
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`Case 2:21-cv-00912-BJR Document 49 Filed 08/25/22 Page 11 of 13
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`and operations used iDevice resources, battery life, energy and cellular time at a cost to Plaintiffs
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`and caused loss of use and enjoyment of some portion of each iDevice’s useful life”).
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`Plaintiffs have also attempted to cast the “significant time” they spent learning about and
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`disabling Sidewalk as an injury. PSAC, ¶ 50. However, while “[p]ecuniary losses occasioned by
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`inconvenience may be recoverable as actual damages, . . . damages for . . . inconvenience are not
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`recoverable under the CPA.” Panag, 166 Wn.2d at 57–58 (citing Keyes v. Bollinger, 31 Wn. App.
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`286, 295 (1982) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs have not alleged any “pecuniary” losses occasioned
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`by the “significant time” they spent on their Echo. The cases Plaintiffs cite for the proposition that
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`the CPA recognizes injury for the expense of “time and money,” therefore, are inapposite. See,
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`e.g., McDonald v. OneWest Bank, FSB, 929 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1098 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (denying
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`summary judgment on CPA claim where plaintiff provided evidence the defendant’s “deceptive
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`acts forced him to expend time and money” to investigate) (emphasis added). There is no
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`authority supporting Plaintiffs’ position that time alone, in the absence of pecuniary consequence,
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`is a cognizable injury under the CPA. And even if it were as a general matter, here Plaintiffs’
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`claim that they spent “significant” time and had to take “several steps” to disable the feature is too
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`vague and de minimus to constitute the kind of injury for which the law provides redress.
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`b. Unjust Enrichment Claim
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`Plaintiffs’ claim for unjust enrichment fails for the same reasons. A claim for unjust
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`enrichment provides “the method of recovery for the value of the benefit retained absent any
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`contractual relationship because notions of fairness and justice require it.” Young, 164 Wn. 2d at
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`484. To prevail on such claim, however, a plaintiff must demonstrate, among other elements, that
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`the defendant was enriched at the “plaintiff’s expense.” Id. at 484–85. In the absence of an
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`ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND
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`Case 2:21-cv-00912-BJR Document 49 Filed 08/25/22 Page 12 of 13
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`allegation that a benefit was conferred at the plaintiff’s expense, dismissal of an unjust enrichment
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`claim is appropriate. See Lavington v. Hillier, 510 P.3d 373, 377 (Wash. Ct. App. 2022)
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`(affirming dismissal of unjust enrichment claim based on defendant’s use of plaintiff’s driveway
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`without permission, where defendant received a benefit, but plaintiff “acknowledged that she did
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`not give anything to [defendant] that benefited him”). Here, as noted above, the PSAC fails to
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`allege facts supporting an inference of such expense. Even if Plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that
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`third parties accessed the Sidewalk network through their Echo (which they did not), Plaintiffs
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`were not charged an overage fee therefor, or suffer any alleged pecuniary consequences that could
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`be characterized as an “expense” to them as a result. Because the unjust enrichment claim would
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`therefore be subject to dismissal, the proposed amendment is futile.
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`c. Theft of Telecommunications Services Claim
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`Finally, because Plaintiffs have failed to allege any injury, the Court denies their request
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`to amend the Theft of Telecommunications Services claim. A person is authorized to bring a
`private right of action under the TSS statute only if he or she suffered an “injury to his or her
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`person, business, or property.” RCW 9A.56.268(2). It is clear that Plaintiffs cannot plead
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`sufficient allegations, as discussed above, to support an inference any such injury occurred. Their
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`request to amend the TSS claim is therefore also denied.
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`///
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`///
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`ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND
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`Case 2:21-cv-00912-BJR Document 49 Filed 08/25/22 Page 13 of 13
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`IV. CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend is DENIED, and this matter is
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`hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
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`DATED this 25th day of August, 2022.
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`A
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`Barbara Jacobs Rothstein
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`U.S. District Court Judge
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`ORDER DENYING MOTION TO AMEND
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