Case 2:22-cv-00441 Document 1 Filed 04/05/22 Page 1 of 44
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`v.
`
`
`AMAZON.COM, INC. and AMAZON
`LOGISTICS, INC.,
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 1
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
`SEATTLE DIVISION
`
`
`FLI-LO FALCON, LLC, on behalf of itself
`and all others similarly situated,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`No.
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
`JURY DEMAND
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00441 Document 1 Filed 04/05/22 Page 2 of 44
`
`Plaintiff, Fli-Lo Falcon, LLC (“Plaintiff” or “Fli-Lo”), brings this action individually
`and on behalf of all business entities in the United States that executed a 2.0 Delivery
`Service Partners Agreement with Amazon Logistics, Inc. (“ALI”), acting on behalf of
`Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”) (collectively referred to as “Amazon” or “Defendants”),
`from 2019 to present, for damages.
`Plaintiff’s allegations pertaining to it are made on personal knowledge. All other
`allegations are based on information and belief pursuant to the investigation conducted
`by Plaintiff’s counsel, which includes, but is not limited to, a review of the contracts,
`policies, and marketing materials discussed below, as well as publicly available
`information, including Defendants’ filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
`NATURE OF THE ACTION
`This class action case is brought on behalf of small package delivery
`1.
`companies, known as “Delivery Service Partners” or “DSPs,” with whom Amazon,
`through its wholly-owned subsidiary, ALI, contracts to deliver Amazon’s products to
`consumers (the “DSP Program”). Amazon is among the world’s largest companies and
`dominates e-commerce in the United States. With over 300 million active users,
`Amazon, as of 2021, controlled more than 40% of the U.S. e-commerce market share
`and measures quarterly profits in billions of dollars. The typical DSP has a fleet of
`approximately 20 – 40 Amazon-branded vans. As of December 2021, approximately
`2,500 DSPs were part of Amazon’s DSP Program. The purpose of the DSP Program is
`to shield Amazon from its responsibilities to delivery drivers and the public. Amazon, by
`and through ALI, exercises near complete control over the DSPs but fails to provide the
`required safeguards under Washington’s Franchise Investment Protection Act.
`2.
`Amazon fraudulently induced Plaintiff and other DSP owners to enter into
`DSP contracts (“DSP Agreements”) with ALI with misrepresentations that they will own
`and operate independent businesses earning profits between $75,000 and $300,000
`annually. In reality, DSPs do not earn profits in that range. ALI uses its technology and
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 2
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00441 Document 1 Filed 04/05/22 Page 3 of 44
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`
`
`
`
`
`control to limit DSPs’ capacity to earn the represented profits.
`3.
`Despite promising DSPs a significant level of autonomy, the DSPs are not
`independent businesses and their activities are dictated and run by Amazon through ALI.
`Amazon requires its DSPs to make a substantial investment and to use certain vendors
`under Defendants’ terms. DSPs do not control their own operations and are restricted
`from making material adjustments to increase their profits. ALI uses a subjective and
`opaque formula with impossible benchmarks to determine how much money DSPs will
`receive. DSPs are liable for acts of the drivers, who are pressed to meet the delivery
`schedules mandated by ALI. Finally, DSPs are assessed costs by ALI if they try to exit
`the DSP Program.
`4.
`By entering into the DSP Agreements, the parties consent to the
`application of Washington law. Defendants violated Washington’s Franchise Investment
`Protection Act by, among other things, portraying the DSP Program as an opportunity
`for DSP owners to operate their own business without reasonable interference by
`Defendants when, in reality, the DSP owners are unable to control critical aspects of
`their business. Violations of Washington’s Franchise Investment Protection Act
`constitute unfair or deceptive acts, which in turn are a per se violation of Washington’s
`Consumer Protection Act.
`fraudulent
`fraud,
`for Defendants’
`5.
`This complaint seeks damages
`inducement, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation
`of the state of Washington’s Consumer Protection Act based on violations of
`Washington’s Franchise Investment Protection Act.
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
`This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the state law claims under
`6.
`28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), as amended by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
`109-2, 119 Stat. 4, because the amount in controversy for the Class exceeds $5,000,000
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 3
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00441 Document 1 Filed 04/05/22 Page 4 of 44
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`
`
`
`
`
`and because there are members of the Class who are citizens of a different state than
`Defendants.
`7.
`The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because their principal
`places of business are in Seattle, Washington.
`8.
`Venue is proper in this judicial district because a substantial part of the
`events, acts, omissions, and injuries giving rise to the claims – e.g., the formation of the
`DSP Agreements and Defendants’ issuance of bad faith edicts dictating the DSPs’
`business operations – occurred in this judicial district, and because Defendants have
`their principal places of business in this judicial district and are subject to personal
`jurisdiction in this judicial district at the time this action has commenced.
`THE PARTIES
`9. Max Whitfield (“Whitfield”) is a resident of California. Whitfield owns and
`operates Fli-Lo, a single-member limited liability company, which was originally
`incorporated in North Carolina and is currently operating in Wyoming as its home state
`with its principal offices in Casper, Wyoming. Fli-Lo is a transportation and logistics
`company, which entered into a contract to deliver packages for ALI in the Sacramento,
`California area from October 2019 to May 15, 2021. Fli-Lo first delivered packages for
`Amazon in January 2020.
`10. Defendant Amazon Logistics, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its
`principal place of business at 410 Terry Avenue North, Seattle, Washington 98109. ALI
`is a transportation and logistics company. ALI is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Amazon.
`ALI provides transportation and logistics services primarily to Defendant Amazon.
`11. Defendant Amazon.com, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal
`place of business at 410 Terry Avenue North, Seattle, Washington 98109. Amazon’s
`deliveries are effectuated through ALI, an Amazon subsidiary founded in 2016. Upon
`information and belief, Amazon has complete control over ALI’s business. In its few
`short years, ALI has gained control over 20% of the total package shipping market in the
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 4
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00441 Document 1 Filed 04/05/22 Page 5 of 44
`
`United States.1 ALI’s tremendous growth has vaulted it ahead of Federal Express, one
`of the industry leaders with decades more experience than ALI. Upon information and
`belief, Amazon is ALI’s primary or only customer.
`12. Upon information and belief, Defendants are and were at all relevant times
`the agents, affiliates, alter egos, partners, assignees, joint venturers, successors-in-
`interest, or principals of each other, or were otherwise responsible for or participated in
`the performance of the wrongful acts alleged herein, and thereby are jointly and severely
`responsible for such acts and incurred liability.
`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
`13. Amazon is the world’s largest online retailer, reporting almost $370 billion
`in estimated sales for 2021.2 As of October 2021, Amazon accounted for 41% of the
`U.S. e-commerce market, making it by far the leading online retailer in the country.3
`14. Amazon describes itself as a company that is customer obsessed. To
`ensure customer satisfaction, Amazon obtained greater control over its deliveries by
`establishing its own delivery and logistics network, ALI. Notably, Amazon’s creation of
`the network, which, as discussed below, relies on individual businesses to make
`deliveries, was also animated by its desire to avoid the unionization of its delivery
`personnel.4
`
`
`1 John Corrigan, Report: Amazon Surpasses FedEx in U.S. Shipping Share, ADVERTISING SPECIALTY
`INSTITUTE (Oct. 21, 2021), https://www.asicentral.com/news/newsletters/promogram/october-2021/report-
`amazon-surpasses-fedex-in-us-shipping-share/.
`2 Chris Walton, 5 Things the Top 10 Online U.S. Retailer List Says About the Future, FORBES (May 18,
`2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherwalton/2021/05/18/5-things-the-top-10-online-us-retailer-
`list-says-about-the-future/?sh=6ee9a2eb6ef4.
`3 Stephanie Chevalier, Market Share of Leading Retail E-Commerce Companies in the United States as
`of October 2021, STATISTA (Oct. 29, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/274255/market-share-of-
`the-leading-retailers-in-us-e-commerce/.
`4 Matt McFarland, Amazon Thrived During the Pandemic – These Drivers Say They Paid the Price, WTOP
`NEWS (June 3, 2021), https://wtop.com/business-finance/2021/06/amazon-thrived-during-the-pandemic-
`these-drivers-say-they-paid-the-price/.
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 5
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00441 Document 1 Filed 04/05/22 Page 6 of 44
`
`15. Amazon’s delivery and logistics network is called the DSP Program. Under
`the DSP Program, Amazon contracts with ALI, its subsidiary, for delivery and
`transportation of the products it sells to consumers online. ALI, in turn, contracts with
`transportation and logistics companies around the country, which are called “DSPs,” to
`deliver Amazon packages. The DSPs, in turn, hire drivers to deliver packages for
`Amazon within the DSPs’ service areas.
`16. ALI advertises the DSP Program as an opportunity for small business
`owners to run their own businesses, and to earn substantial income. Indeed, the uniform
`written marketing materials that ALI provides to its prospective DSPs, and which are
`available on Amazon’s website, tout that the annual profit potential for DSPs is $75,000
`to $300,000. A copy of those materials is annexed hereto as Exhibit A.
`17. However, as discussed below: (i) DSPs are required to adhere to ALI’s strict
`method of operations and use all of ALI’s trademarks; (ii) ALI dictates control over every
`material aspect of a DSP’s business operations; and (iii) the potential profit range is a
`pipe dream that is rarely achieved, and, in fact, is undermined by ALI’s implementation
`of the DSP Program.
`18. Under the DSP Program, ALI subjectively assigns “scores” to drivers and
`DSPs based on performance and productivity. ALI relies on these scores when
`determining, among other things, whether a DSP is eligible for bonuses. Given the high
`operating costs, a DSP must receive bonuses to have any realistic opportunity to
`become profitable.
`19. The original DSP Program was launched in June 2018 and was called the
`DSP 1.0 Program. The DSP 2.0 Program was rolled out in 2019.
`20. Upon information and belief, Amazon created the DSP 2.0 Program as a
`way to refine and institute stricter performance criteria. Among other innovations,
`Amazon (i) limited each DSP owner to owning only one DSP business, in order to prevent
`any one owner from gaining bargaining leverage, and (ii) set exceedingly aggressive
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 6
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00441 Document 1 Filed 04/05/22 Page 7 of 44
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`
`
`
`
`
`time limits that could rarely be safely met for DSPs to complete their routes, and that
`made attaining a bonus close to impossible.
`21. Whitfield established Fli-Lo to exclusively deliver packages for the DSP 2.0
`Program and did so from January 2020 to May 15, 2021.
`22. Fli-Lo employed a total of 188 drivers between January 2020 to May 2021.
`On average, Fli-Lo tried to have at least 80 drivers on its payroll at any given time.
`However, Fli-Lo incurred constant training expenses due to high driver turnover because
`of the difficult routes and low pay mandated by Amazon. Amazon did not reimburse Fli-
`Lo for training expenses. Additionally, every driver Fli-Lo hired had to go through a
`training program set up by Amazon. Therefore, Fli-Lo was unable to hire more drivers
`until a spot opened in an Amazon training class.
`23. On average during non-peak operations, Fli-Lo delivered 280-320
`packages daily, per van. On average during peak operations, Fli-Lo delivered 350-400
`packages daily, per van.
`24. Whitfield executed a DSP Agreement on behalf of Fli-Lo with ALI, expecting
`to have a fair opportunity to enjoy the benefit of their bargain and to work collaboratively
`and in good faith with ALI.
`25. The DSP Agreement states each DSP owner “can accept or reject any
`opportunity” offered by ALI and ALI “may give [the] company route plans, forecasts, or
`other projections.”
`26. Marketing materials provided by Amazon state the DSP Program “provides
`an opportunity for strong leaders who are passionate about developing a hardworking
`team to start their own business.” See Exhibit A attached hereto.
`27.
`In reality, however, ALI controlled nearly every aspect of Plaintiff’s business,
`created unsafe working conditions for its drivers, and arbitrarily imposed penalties
`causing Fli-Lo significant damages.
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 7
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00441 Document 1 Filed 04/05/22 Page 8 of 44
`
`28. Additionally, Amazon constantly and unilaterally changes the DSP Program
`requirements, which ensures that the individual DSPs are not able to reach the
`advertised annual profit potential.
`29. Fli-Lo entered into the DSP Agreement based on marketing materials
`provided by ALI, which stated that the annual profit potential for DSPs would be $75,000
`- $300,000. See Exhibit A attached hereto.
`30. As of February 20, 2022, the average annual pay for an Amazon DSP in the
`United States was $63,874 a year.5
`31. Additionally, the top Amazon DSP annual salary was $185,500 and the
`lowest annual salary was $20,500. The majority of Amazon DSPs range between
`$31,500 (25th percentile) and $64,500 (75th percentile), meaning that the vast majority
`of DSPs earn significantly less than the low-end of the profit range ALI touted in its
`marketing materials.
`32.
`In order to get their delivery business up and running, Defendants also
`required DSPs to spend a minimum of $10,000 in start-up costs, which consisted largely
`of purchases from Amazon’s vendors. Accordingly, Fli-Lo and members of the Class
`incurred significant costs to set up their businesses, including overhead, hiring, and
`training costs, among other expenses.
`33. Section 10 of the standard form DSP Agreement, which Fli-Lo entered into,
`provides that DSPs are entitled to exercise a significant level of autonomy over the
`operations:
`
`
`Your company is an independent contractor of Amazon. Your
`company has exclusive responsibility for its Personnel,
`including exclusive control over compensation, hours, and
`working conditions. Your company’s Personnel are not
`eligible for any employee benefits available to employees of
`Amazon or any of its Affiliates. Neither your company nor any
`
`
`5 Amazon Delivery Partner Salary, ZIPRECRUITER, https://www.ziprecruiter.com/Salaries/Amazon-
`Delivery-Partner-Salary (last visited March 7, 2022).
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 8
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00441 Document 1 Filed 04/05/22 Page 9 of 44
`
`of its Personnel has any authority to bind Amazon to any
`agreement or obligation.
`
`In fact, however, while Plaintiff was a DSP, Defendants dictated, directly
`34.
`managed, and controlled nearly every aspect of the DSP’s operations, including, but not
`limited to:
`
`a. Requiring Plaintiff to operate exclusively under the ALI trademark;
`b. Requiring Plaintiff to follow and operate pursuant to ALI’s method of
`operations;
`c. Requiring Plaintiff to make purchases through authorized vendors only;
`d. Controlling all hiring of Plaintiff’s drivers;
`e. Retaining the ability to terminate and discipline Plaintiff’s drivers;
`f. Providing inadequate training to Plaintiff’s drivers;
`g. Requiring Plaintiff’s drivers to wear ALI-branded clothing;
`h. Dictating the personal grooming requirements of drivers, their manner,
`and type of clothing drivers wear;
`i. Determining the make, model, and style of delivery van to be used while
`Plaintiff’s drivers deliver packages;
`j. Requiring Plaintiff to sign a contract with Element Fleet for delivery
`vehicles;
`k. Requiring Plaintiff to contract with Aon for insurance;
`l. Requiring Plaintiff to contract with Paycom or ADP for payroll;
`m. Requiring that delivery vans contain ALI insignia and logos and
`prohibiting Plaintiff from displaying its own name or branding on the
`vans;
`n. Requiring Plaintiff’s drivers to arrive at and load and unload packages
`from ALI’s warehouse centers for delivery;
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 9
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00441 Document 1 Filed 04/05/22 Page 10 of 44
`
`o. Monitoring Plaintiff’s drivers’ performance of pre-trip and post-trip
`delivery van inspections and Plaintiff’s performance and compliance
`with ALI’s requirements;
`p. Requiring that Plaintiff’s drivers deliver packages to Amazon customers
`according to a precise schedule created by ALI that dictates the order of
`delivery and provides the exact route that Plaintiff’s drivers must follow
`and does not allow Plaintiff to modify any routes;
`q. Dictating how many packages Plaintiff’s drivers must deliver each day
`on each route and not allowing Plaintiff to modify package counts;
`r. Tracking delivery performance, including, but not limited to, the number
`of packages Plaintiff’s drivers deliver each day, the location of Plaintiff’s
`drivers at any given time, whether drivers touched their cell phones while
`driving, whether drivers were wearing seatbelts, whether drivers moved
`over the speed limit, whether drivers accelerated or stopped too quickly,
`and the efficiency of the deliveries as reported through ALI’s handheld
`devices, the Flex App, and/or the Mentor App;
`s. Supervising the work of Plaintiff’s drivers on a daily basis;
`t. Evaluating the performance of Plaintiff’s drivers on a periodic basis in
`accordance with ALI’s specific policies and procedures;
`u. Setting minimum wages, insurance coverage, and benefits that Plaintiff
`must provide to its own drivers;
`v. Requiring Plaintiff to submit to periodic audits so that Amazon can verify
`that Plaintiff has complied with Amazon’s requirements with respect to
`wages, insurance, and benefits for Plaintiff’s drivers;
`w. Ordering Plaintiff’s drivers to reattempt delivery when Plaintiff’s drivers
`do not complete a delivery; and
`x. Maintaining control over and access to Plaintiff’s payroll accounts.
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 10
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00441 Document 1 Filed 04/05/22 Page 11 of 44
`
`35. Plaintiff offered, sold, and/or distributed services to Defendants’ customers,
`while using ALI’s trademarks and marketing plan.
`A.
`Routes, Packages, and Safety
`36. ALI’s DSP marketing materials advertise that each DSP owner can have up
`to 40 vans in its fleet. According to the materials, if a DSP “deliver[ed] a great customer
`experience” it would have the opportunity to grow its business and deliver more
`packages and earn more profits. See Exhibit A attached hereto.
`37. Throughout its time operating as a DSP for Amazon, Fli-Lo was given, on
`average, 25 routes per day by ALI for its drivers to cover in the Sacramento, California
`area. The number of routes a DSP has is coterminous with the number of vans/trucks it
`was required to maintain in its fleet. In other words, ALI requires one van/truck per route.
`38. Upon information and belief, even to reach the lowest end of the profit range
`promised by ALI, a DSP owner has to operate at least 40 routes per day. However, the
`restrictions ALI places on the DSPs’ ability to hire and train drivers renders it virtually
`impossible for a DSP to timely hire additional drivers in order to ramp up its operations
`and vie for additional routes in order to reach the 40-route threshold. The alternative,
`which is to incur the cost of hiring, training, and paying significantly more drivers than is
`necessary to satisfy a DSP’s current routes in the hopes that ALI would approve such
`hires and offer additional routes, is not economically feasible or sensible.
`39. ALI only provided Plaintiff with one-week’s notice of the routes for the week
`and would frequently make changes or reduce scheduled routes the same day when ALI
`experienced low inventory or labor shortages at its warehouse, leaving many of Plaintiff’s
`scheduled drivers suddenly without work. Under state and federal law, Plaintiff was still
`required to pay drivers for four hours if they were scheduled but did not drive. ALI refused
`to reimburse Plaintiff for those wages.
`40. Conversely, if circumstances arise where a DSP cannot cover an assigned
`route – such as, for example, driver illness, maintenance issues, etc. – ALI fines them.
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 11
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00441 Document 1 Filed 04/05/22 Page 12 of 44
`
`41. DSPs have no control over ALI’s routes. ALI refuses to allow DSPs any
`ability to modify or optimize routes to account for terrain, density, traffic congestion,
`construction, or any other important considerations.
`42. ALI automatically accepts routes on behalf of DSPs, depriving DSPs the
`ability to deny the route without incurring route cancellation fines, suffering a reduction
`in its scorecards, and/or receiving threats of being in breach of contract.
`43. For example, ALI required Plaintiff to accept routes in downtown
`Sacramento, California where parking is extremely limited and expensive, and where Fli-
`Lo’s drivers had to navigate under the unique challenges associated with delivering
`packages in a dense, congested, downtown urban core.
`44. Similarly, ALI frequently required Fli-Lo to accept routes in areas with many
`multifamily dwellings and high-rise offices.
`45. Despite the challenges arising from delivering thousands of packages each
`day in these areas, ALI refuses to adjust the number of packages per route to
`accommodate for the additional time it took to deliver packages to multifamily dwellings
`and high-rise offices as well as the additional time it would take to find safe and legal
`parking.
`46. Upon information and belief, DSP owners have requested that ALI allow
`them to use smaller vans and revise their routes in areas where streets are extremely
`narrow, sloped, and have tight switchbacks. ALI has refused to permit DSPs to use
`alternative vehicles suitable for the delivery location. ALI’s vans do not fit these streets
`and drivers are unable to safely make turns. Despite incurring expected and forewarned
`damages, ALI penalizes the drivers and DSPs for the damage and refuses to reimburse
`the DSPs or help pay for repairs.
`47. ALI does not accommodate for these numerous obstacles mentioned in the
`preceding paragraphs when allocating time for each route. As a result, ALI consistently
`penalizes DSPs and their drivers for, among other things, not completing deliveries
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 12
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00441 Document 1 Filed 04/05/22 Page 13 of 44
`
`within ALI’s mandated schedule or returning to the ALI warehouse with undelivered
`packages.
`48. Not only does ALI retain exclusive control over DSPs’ routes, but it also
`retains complete control over package count distribution for each route and for each
`driver. As a result, there is significant disparity in package distribution among routes and
`among drivers for no justifiable reason. The difference in package counts among drivers
`does not correspond to the difficulty or challenges associated with a particular route or
`the experience of a particular driver.
`49. Consequently, to fully complete ALI’s required routes in a single day,
`Plaintiff’s drivers would work over their defined route assignments of eight-to-ten-hour
`shifts. As required under state and federal law, Plaintiff had to pay the difference,
`including overtime wages. ALI refused to reimburse Plaintiff for these additional wages
`and costs, even though ALI prohibited Plaintiff from modifying routes and package
`counts to reduce and/or eliminate these additional costs.
`50. ALI’s refusal to assign reasonable routes with reasonable package counts
`caused significant damage to Plaintiff. When Plaintiff’s drivers were unable to fully
`complete routes ALI assigned on a given day, it was counted against Plaintiff and its
`drivers. Plaintiff’s scorecards were negatively affected, which negatively affected its
`eligibility for bonuses, limited potential business growth, and jeopardized future route
`assignments.
`51. To mitigate the harsh consequences to its drivers and to its business,
`Plaintiff had to pay additional drivers to go “rescue” overburdened drivers on the road in
`order to complete ALI’s assigned routes. ALI refused to reimburse Plaintiff for these
`additional rescue drivers.
`52. Due to rapid turnover of drivers and to avoid penalties and a reduction in its
`scorecards because ALI’s unreasonable route assignments became so common, Fli-Lo
`had to schedule additional drivers to ensure all routes assigned by ALI were covered.
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 13
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00441 Document 1 Filed 04/05/22 Page 14 of 44
`
`As a result, any standby drivers who were not given a route were paid for a four-hour
`minimum shift. ALI refused to reimburse Plaintiff for these additional costs.
`53. Upon information and belief, ALI is aware that its route assignments and
`package counts cannot reasonably be completed in a standard work shift. ALI tracks
`DSP drivers’ every move and calls DSPs if ALI determines that one or more of their
`drivers are not completing deliveries quickly enough. ALI would then demand that DSPs
`dispatch rescue drivers but, as asserted above, ALI refuses to reimburse DSPs for these
`rescue drivers.
`54. DSPs are required to bear the costs of the additional rescue drivers, without
`reimbursement from ALI, even though ALI schedules the routes and package counts and
`refuses to allow DSPs to modify the routes or package counts in ways that would ensure
`that every driver could timely complete all deliveries during a standard work shift.
`55. ALI’s conduct also jeopardized the safety of DSP drivers as well as
`members of the public. DSP drivers are unable to complete ALI’s unreasonable routes
`and package counts in a 10-hour shift without sacrificing care and safety precautions,
`and ALI refuses to pay the drivers more if the routes take longer to complete. ALI’s
`unreasonable requirements result in numerous injuries to DSP drivers, including back
`injuries resulting from ALI’s fast paced load-out requirements at the warehouse and falls
`and strains from rushed deliveries. The rushed deliveries also put the community at risk.
`56. Fearing the consequences from ALI for not completing deliveries on time,
`including discipline or termination, DSP drivers frequently sustain injuries while trying to
`satisfy ALI’s unreasonable productivity requirements. Because ALI exclusively controls
`routes and package distributions, DSPs are unable to make the conditions any safer for
`its drivers. When DSP drivers inevitably suffered injuries, DSPs are responsible for
`paying the workers’ compensation claims without reimbursement from ALI.
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 14
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00441 Document 1 Filed 04/05/22 Page 15 of 44
`
`ALI Maintains Complete Control Over DSPs’ Operations
`B.
`57. Amazon portrays the DSP Program as an opportunity for small business
`owners to build their businesses and work with ALI for each party’s benefit. In reality,
`the DSP Program only benefits Defendants. The DSP Program was carefully designed
`to allow ALI to shift costs and liabilities onto DSPs, while maintaining complete control
`over the DSPs’ operations, drivers, and ability to succeed.
`58. Consistent with ALI’s complete control over route assignments and package
`distribution, ALI maintains exclusive control over nearly every aspect of DSPs’
`operations, as described above. DSPs are required to strictly adhere to ALI’s rules and
`policies, which ALI could unilaterally change at any time, without notice to DSPs and
`without DSPs’ consent.
`59. The marketing materials provided by ALI advertised each DSP owner is
`able to interview, vet, and hire its drivers. See Exhibit A attached hereto.
`60.
`In reality, a DSP owner cannot hire a driver unless ALI approves them. ALI
`audits, monitors, and controls the content of DSPs’ employment applications, any offers
`of employment, and DSPs’ employee handbooks.
`61. DSPs are allowed to hire an applicant only if ALI approves. ALI dictates the
`training and sets the minimum wage that DSPs are required to pay its drivers.
`62. ALI’s driver training is inadequate. DSP drivers who had never driven
`anything larger than a standard sedan are given two days to learn how to operate and
`maneuver large delivery vehicles in narrow urban areas. Furthermore, one of the two
`training days are spent learning Amazon-specific procedures for how to load and unload
`the trucks and how to use Amazon’s required Flex and Mentor applications. As a result
`of the inadequate training, damage to DSP vehicles is common and is an expense borne
`exclusively by the DSP owners.
`63. ALI controls the clothing and personal grooming requirements of DSP
`drivers. ALI requires that DSP drivers wear ALI-branded clothing, or in the alternative,
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 15
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-00441 Document 1 Filed 04/05/22 Page 16 of 44
`
`other types of clothing approved by ALI. ALI also determines what constitutes
`“acceptable” grooming. ALI further mandates that drivers adhere to ALI’s rules
`pertaining to body odor, perfume or cologne, clean teeth, face, ears, fingernails, and hair.
`64. ALI requires that DSP drivers submit to ALI’s geo-tracking and monitoring
`systems, including camera recording, so that ALI can always monitor DSP drivers while
`they make deliveries.
`65. ALI requires DSP drivers use ALI’s Flex application and Mentor application
`for smart phones. With these applications, ALI tracks, among other things, delivery
`status, driver location, seat belt use, vehicle acceleration, braking, cornering, fuel
`efficiency, driver distractions, and any damage to DSPs’ delivery vehicles. ALI even
`requires DSP drivers to inspect for damages on their vehicles and report any damage
`directly to ALI.
`66. ALI also retains the power to discipline and terminate DSP drivers for any
`reason and without notice. To complete a scheduled route, DSP drivers need access to
`ALI’s Flex application. ALI will terminate or suspend DSP drivers access to the
`application, effectively terminating DSP drivers. ALI