Case 2:22-cv-00743-TL Document 45 Filed 09/27/22 Page 1 of 13
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
`AT SEATTLE
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`CASE NO. 2:22-cv-00743-TL
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`ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES,
`DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
`OR STAY, AND APPOINTING
`INTERIM CLASS COUNSEL
`
`CASE NO. 2:22-cv-00783-TL
`
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`JOY PECZNICK and GIL KAUFMAN,
`individually and on behalf of all others
`similarly situated,
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`v.
`
`Plaintiffs,
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`AMAZON.COM, INC., a Delaware
`corporation,
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`Defendant.
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` Plaintiff,
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`DENA GRIFFITH, individually and on
`behalf of all others similarly situated,
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`AMAZON.COM, INC., a Delaware
`corporation,
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` Defendant.
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`v.
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`ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES, DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, AND APPOINTING INTERIM CLASS COUNSEL
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`Case 2:22-cv-00743-TL Document 45 Filed 09/27/22 Page 2 of 13
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`This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Dena Griffith’s Motion to Consolidate
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`and for Appointment of Interim Class Counsel (Griffith Dkt. No. 14),1 Defendant Amazon.com,
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`Inc.’s Motion to Consolidate (Dkt. No. 16), and Plaintiffs Joy Pecznick and Gil Kaufman’s
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`Motion to Dismiss or Stay Griffith; or in the Alternative to Appoint Wilshire Law Firm, PLC as
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`Interim Class Counsel (Dkt. No. 31). For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the motions to
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`consolidate, DENIES the motion to dismiss or stay the Griffith case, and APPOINTS the law firms
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`representing Plaintiff Griffith (BORDE LAW PLLC, Schroeter Goldmark & Bender, and the
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`Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron, APLC) as interim class counsel.
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`I. BACKGROUND
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`On May 31, 2022, Plaintiffs Joy Pecznick and Gil Kaufman filed a putative class action
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`(Pecznick) in the Western District of Washington against Defendant Amazon.com, Inc., alleging
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`that the company had changed Amazon Prime members’ contractual benefits without
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`compensation by “unilaterally rescinding” a benefit of their annual subscription. Dkt. No. 1 at
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`8–10, 13. At the time the fee was introduced in 2021, customers had been paying $119 per year
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`for their Amazon Prime subscriptions, which had—in many locations across the United States—
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`included free grocery delivery from Whole Foods Markets for orders over $35.00. Id. at 5–7.
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`With the policy change, Amazon added a $9.95 “service fee” to any delivery from Whole Foods.
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`Id. at 8. The Pecznick Plaintiffs seek to certify a class of “[a]ll Amazon Prime members residing
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`in the United States who ordered Amazon’s Whole Foods free delivery and were annual
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`members when the $9.95 fee was introduced on October 25, 2021.” Id. at 10. The suit brings four
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`causes of action: violations of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (Wash. Rev. Code
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`1 References to “Dkt. No.” are to filings in the Pecznick action (Case No. 22-743) while references to “Griffith Dkt.
`No” are to filings in the Griffith action (Case No. 22-783).
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`ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES, DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, AND APPOINTING INTERIM CLASS COUNSEL
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`Case 2:22-cv-00743-TL Document 45 Filed 09/27/22 Page 3 of 13
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`§ 19.86.020), breach of contract, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust
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`enrichment. Id. at 13–15. The case was assigned to the Honorable Tana Lin.
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`On June 7, 2022, Plaintiff Dena Griffith filed a putative class action (Griffith) in the same
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`district against Amazon.com, Inc., alleging false and misleading advertising and “bait-and-
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`switch” advertising in connection with “FREE” delivery from Whole Foods Markets. Griffith
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`Dkt. No. 1 at 5–10. Griffith alleges that Defendant engaged in deceptive practices by continuing
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`to advertise that it offered “free delivery” from Whole Foods to Prime members after instituting
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`the new fee and that it used “drip-pricing” tactics to sneakily add that fee to Whole Foods orders
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`placed by Prime members on Amazon.com, while not applying any fee to customers picking up
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`items from a Whole Foods store. Id. at 7–10. Plaintiff Griffith proposes certification of a
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`nationwide class as well as a California sub-class. Id. at 12. The nationwide class would include:
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`“All U.S. citizens who were Amazon Prime members that were charged a service fee in
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`connection with an online delivery from Whole Foods Market from August 1, 2021[,] until the
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`date notice is disseminated to the class, excluding Defendant and Defendant’s officers, directors,
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`employees, agents and affiliates, and the Court and its staff.” Id. The California sub-class would
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`include: “All California residents who were Amazon Prime members that were charged a service
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`fee in connection with an online delivery from Whole Foods Market from August 1, 2021[,] until
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`the date notice is disseminated to the class, excluding Defendant and Defendant’s officers,
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`directors, employees, agents and affiliates, and the Court and its staff.” Id. The complaint brings
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`eight causes of action: (1) the Washington Consumer Protection Act (Wash. Rev. Code §§
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`19.86.010 et seq.); (2) the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750 et seq.);
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`(3) the False Advertising Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500 et seq.); (4) the Unfair
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`Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.); (5) unjust enrichment / quasi
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`ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES, DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, AND APPOINTING INTERIM CLASS COUNSEL
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`Case 2:22-cv-00743-TL Document 45 Filed 09/27/22 Page 4 of 13
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`contract; (6) negligent misrepresentation; (7) concealment / non-disclosure; and (8) fraud. Id. at
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`14–25.
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`On the day she filed her complaint, Plaintiff Griffith also filed a notice of related case,
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`alerting the Court that there were now two “putative class actions for claims arising out of a
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`service fee charged by Amazon.com, Inc. in connection with its grocery delivery service from
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`Whole Foods Market.” Griffith Dkt. No. 2 at 2. For this reason, the Griffith case was also
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`assigned to the Honorable Tana Lin.
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`On June 23, 2022, Plaintiff Griffith and Defendant Amazon.com, Inc. each filed their
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`respective motions to consolidate. Griffith Dkt. No. 14; Dkt. No. 16. In her motion, Plaintiff
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`Griffith also requested that the Court appoint her counsel team as interim class counsel. Griffith
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`Dkt. No. 14. Plaintiffs in the Pecznick action opposed both motions, Dkt. No. 20, and
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`subsequently filed a motion to dismiss or stay the Griffith case under the first-filed rule, or
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`alternatively (in case of consolidation) to have their counsel appointed as interim lead counsel.
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`Dkt. No. 31.
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`II. DISCUSSION
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`A.
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`The First-to-File Rule
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`The first-to-file rule is “a generally recognized doctrine of federal comity which permits a
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`district court to decline jurisdiction over an action when a complaint involving the same parties
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`and issues has already been filed in another district.” Pacesetter Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 678
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`F.2d 93, 94–95 (9th Cir. 1982); accord Kohn Law Grp., Inc. v. Auto Parts Mfg. Miss., Inc., 787
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`F.3d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir. 2015). “The purpose of the rule is to eliminate wasteful duplicative
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`litigation, to avoid rulings that may trench upon a sister court’s authority, and to avoid piecemeal
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`resolution of issues calling for a uniform result.” Ekin v. Amazon Servs., LLC, No.
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`2:14-cv-00244, 2014 WL 12028588, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 28, 2014) (citation and quotation
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`ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES, DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, AND APPOINTING INTERIM CLASS COUNSEL
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`Case 2:22-cv-00743-TL Document 45 Filed 09/27/22 Page 5 of 13
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`omitted). Under the first-to-file rule, a court may dismiss, stay, or transfer a case when a similar
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`case is before a different district court. Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Prods., Inc., 946 F.3d 622, 623
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`(9th Cir. 1991). In order for the first-to-file rule to apply, (1) the relevant action must have been
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`filed prior to the one the Court is being asked to decline jurisdiction over; (2) the same or
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`substantially similar parties must be involved; and (3) the issues raised in the suits must be the
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`same or substantially similar. See Kohn, 787 F.3d at 1239–1240.
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`The Pecznick action was the first-filed case, and the parties are substantially similar given
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`that plaintiffs have proposed overlapping classes. See Edmonds v. Amazon.com, Inc., No.
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`2:19-cv-01613, 2020 WL 5815745, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sep. 20, 2020) (finding similarity of
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`plaintiffs in the context of a first-to-file motion where the putative classes encompassed “at least
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`some of the same individuals”) (citations omitted). However, the Court finds the third factor is
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`not met. As to the similarity of the issues between the various actions, the Pecznick Plaintiffs
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`argue in their opposition to the motion to consolidate that both the factual and legal claims are
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`“vastly different,” Dkt. No. 20 at 10–12, and they “still maintain that the issues are not similar”
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`in their motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 31 at 4, undermining their arguments for a first-to-file
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`dismissal. The Pecznik Plaintiffs assert that if the Court is persuaded by Plaintiff Griffith and
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`Defendant’s arguments for consolidation, then the Court must also find that this third first-to-file
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`factor is met. Dkt. No. 31 at 4. The Court disagrees.
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`First-to-file dismissals are appropriate where “two identical actions are filed in courts of
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`concurrent jurisdiction,” Pacesetter Sys., Inc., 678 F.2d at 95, or where there is significant
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`overlap in issues such that it would be wasteful and duplicative to pursue the claims in separate
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`actions. Ekin, 2014 WL 12028588, at *3. Further, a danger of applying the doctrine where claims
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`vary between actions, as they do in this case, is that other potentially independent viable claims
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`may be extinguished on grounds other than their merits. Consolidation, on the other hand, only
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`ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES, DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, AND APPOINTING INTERIM CLASS COUNSEL
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`Case 2:22-cv-00743-TL Document 45 Filed 09/27/22 Page 6 of 13
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`requires that actions “involve a common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a)
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`(emphasis added). For the reasons stated in Section II.B. below, the Court believes a more
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`equitable outcome than dismissing or staying the Griffith action would be to consolidate the two
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`cases. Indeed, consolidation of these cases would obviate the need to apply the first-to-file rule.
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`See, e.g., Ekin, 2014 WL 12028588, at *3 (“consolidation is the preferred route [over a first-to-
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`file rule stay] to avoiding the inherent inefficiencies involved with duplicative litigation”).
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`Further, the “most basic aspect of the first-to-file rule is that it is discretionary.” Alltrade,
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`946 F.2d at 625. “[D]istrict court judges can, in the exercise of their discretion, dispense with the
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`first-filed principle for reasons of equity.” Id. at 628. When actions are pending before the same
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`judge, courts in this circuit have declined to apply the first-to-file rule. See Cole | Wathen | Leid |
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`Hall, P.C. v. Assoc. Indus. Ins. Co. Inc., No. 2:19-cv-02097, 2020 WL 3542516, at *2 (W.D.
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`Wash. June 30, 2020) (“the federal comity concerns underlying the first-to-file rule are not
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`present [when cases are pending before a single judge], so courts in this circuit have declined to
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`extend the rule accordingly”) (citations omitted); Ekin, 2014 WL 12028588, at *3 (“Courts
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`regularly decline . . . to apply the first-to-file rule . . . where the two actions are actively pending
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`before the same judge.”) (citation omitted); but see Dolores Press, Inc. v. Robinson, 766 F.
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`App’x 449, 453 (9th Cir. 2019) (declining to definitively resolve the issue of whether “the first-
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`to-file rule is inapplicable when the two actions are filed in the same district”). In asserting that
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`the first-to-file rule is not limited to cases brought in different districts, the Pecznick Plaintiffs
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`cite to mostly non-Washington cases, along with a single, “see also”2 reference to a Washington
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`case, GM Northrup Corp. v. Mass. Bay Ins. Co. No. 3:22-cv-05243, 2022 WL 1689631 (W.D.
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`Wash. May 26, 2022). Dkt. No. 31 at 2–3. However, GM Northrup Corp. involved actions filed
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`2 According to Bluebook Rule 1.2(a), “see also” is an introductory signal to be used where “[c]ited authority
`constitutes additional source material that supports the proposition.”
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`ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES, DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, AND APPOINTING INTERIM CLASS COUNSEL
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`Case 2:22-cv-00743-TL Document 45 Filed 09/27/22 Page 7 of 13
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`in two different states, i.e., Washington and Minnesota. The Court finds the Pecznick Plaintiffs’
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`misleading use of this case to be troubling.
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`Given these two cases are in the same district before the same judge and consolidation is
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`an option, the Court denies the Pecznik Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss.
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`B. Motions to Consolidate
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`District courts may consolidate actions that “involve a common question of law or fact.”
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (emphasis added). A court has “broad discretion” under this rule to
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`consolidate actions pending within one judicial district. Investor’s Rsch. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for
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`Cent. Dist. of Cal., 877 F.2d, 777 (9th Cir. 1989). Factors relevant to the analysis include
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`“judicial economy, whether consolidation would expedite resolution of the case, whether
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`separate cases may yield inconsistent results, and the potential prejudice to a party opposing
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`consolidation.” Chorak v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2:20-cv-00627, 2020 WL 8611291, at *1
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`(W.D. Wash. Nov. 10, 2020) (citation omitted).
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`Though the Pecznick Plaintiffs insist that their complaint differs significantly from the
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`complaint in the Griffith case, see Dkt. No. 20 at 9–12, both cases are against the same
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`defendant, have similar plaintiffs, center around the same core fact (Defendant charging Amazon
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`Prime customers a fee for deliveries from Whole Foods Market), and assert causes of action
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`under the Washington Consumer Protection Act on behalf of overlapping classes. Compare
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`Pecznick Dkt. No. 1 with Griffith Dkt. No. 1. While the other theories (breach of contract versus
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`false advertising) may be different, the Court respects that plaintiffs are the masters of their own
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`complaints. Newtok Vill. v. Patrick, 21 F.4th 608, 616 (9th Cir. 2021). And as the drafters of
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`their complaint, Pecznick Plaintiffs cannot now assert that both cases do not involve a common
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`factual question regarding the propriety of Amazon’s fee for deliveries from Whole Foods
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`Market for Amazon Prime customers and some similar legal theories related to the fee.
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`ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES, DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, AND APPOINTING INTERIM CLASS COUNSEL
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`Case 2:22-cv-00743-TL Document 45 Filed 09/27/22 Page 8 of 13
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`Given the similarities between the cases, the Court finds it would further judicial
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`economy to consolidate the cases and expedite their resolution by avoiding duplicative
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`discovery. As the cases are before the same judge, the risk of inconsistent results is low.3 With
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`regard to prejudice, the Pecznick Plaintiffs fear that their breach of contract claim will be de-
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`prioritized and “fundamental[ly] misunderst[ood]” by Plaintiff Griffith’s counsel, Dkt. No. 42 at
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`13, but they have not established that consolidation is likely to prejudice their claims. In fact, the
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`Pecznick Plaintiffs do not address the issue of prejudice at all in their opposition to the motion to
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`consolidate. See Dkt. No. 20. Rather, the Pecznick Plaintiffs argue, for the first time in their reply
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`brief for their motion to dismiss, that “were Griffith to include Peznick’s [sic] breach of contract
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`claims in a consolidated complaint, it would necessarily require her negligent misrepresentation
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`claim to be dismissed under the independent duty doctrine.” Dkt. No. 42 at 14. “It is not
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`acceptable legal practice to present new evidence or new argument in a reply brief.” United
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`Specialty Ins. Co. v. Shot Shakers, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00596, 2019 WL 199645, at *6 (W.D.
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`Wash. Jan. 15, 2019), aff'd, 831 F. App'x 346 (9th Cir. 2020). Neither opposing counsel nor
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`counsel for Plaintiff Griffith had the opportunity to respond to this argument, and the Court does
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`not consider it in its ruling.
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`For the reasons stated in this section, the Court believes the factors weigh in favor of
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`consolidation. Therefore, the Court will consolidate the Pecznick and Griffith cases. All future
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`filings shall bear the following case caption and be filed in Case No. 2:22-cv-00743-TL:
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`3 Coordination is typically utilized when cases are pending in different jurisdictions. See 3 Newberg and Rubenstein
`on Class Actions § 10:41 (6th ed.). This Court’s discussion of coordination in Tokarski v. Med-Data Inc., No.
`2:21-cv-00631, 2022 WL 815882, at *4, was in the context of two actions in different jurisdictions.
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`ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES, DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, AND APPOINTING INTERIM CLASS COUNSEL
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`Case 2:22-cv-00743-TL Document 45 Filed 09/27/22 Page 9 of 13
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
` WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
` AT SEATTLE
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`IN RE: AMAZON SERVICE FEE
`LITIGATION
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`CASE NO. 2:22-cv-00743-TL
`(CONSOLIDATED CASE)
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`C.
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`Appointment of Interim Class Counsel
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`Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court “may” designate interim
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`counsel prior to class certification. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(3). The commentary to this rule further
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`notes that a court is authorized to designate interim counsel “if necessary to protect the interests
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`of the putative class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note to 2003 amendment
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`(emphasis added). Appointment of interim class counsel is particularly suited to situations where
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`“a number of lawyers may compete for class counsel appointment” due to “a number of
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`overlapping, duplicative, or competing suits pending in other courts, and some or all of those
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`suits may be consolidated.” Manual for Complex Litig. (Fourth) § 21.11 (2021). “The court has
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`the discretion, but not the obligation, to appoint interim class counsel in advance of class
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`certification.” Zaldivar v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 2:07-cv-01695, 2008 WL 11344661, at *3
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`(W.D. Wash. June 19, 2008) (finding it necessary to appoint interim counsel when where two
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`counsel groups were “unable to agree upon a shared role in representing class members” and
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`“disagree[d] sharply over who belong[ed] in the proposed class”).
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`ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES, DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, AND APPOINTING INTERIM CLASS COUNSEL
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`Case 2:22-cv-00743-TL Document 45 Filed 09/27/22 Page 10 of 13
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`In this instance, the rivalry between the counsel groups representing Plaintiffs and their
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`disagreement over the scope of the proposed class(es) counsel in favor of appointing one counsel
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`group as interim class counsel. Appointing interim class counsel would likely achieve “greater
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`efficiency and clarity” in the pre-certification stages of this suit. See In re Seagate Tech. LLC
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`Litig., No. 3:16-cv-00523, 2016 WL 3401989, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2016) (declining to
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`appoint interim class counsel while noting that “rivalry or uncertainty” may make formal
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`designation of such counsel appropriate in some cases) (citation omitted).
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`Courts typically look to the factors set forth in Rule 23(g) for appointment of class
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`counsel when assessing the adequacy of the counsel vying to serve as interim class counsel:
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`(1) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in
`the action;
`(2) counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and
`the types of claims asserted in the action;
`(3) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law; and
`(4) the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class.
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`Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A)). Additionally, the Court will consider “any other matter
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`pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.” Id.
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`(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(B)). When multiple “adequate” counsel groups seek
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`appointment as class counsel, the Court “must appoint the applicant best able to represent the
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`interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(2). Indeed, the duty of class counsel is to “fairly and
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`adequately represent the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(4).
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`Having reviewed the competing counsel groups’ respective submissions and all of the
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`briefing related to this matter, the Court appoints the counsel team for the Griffith action
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`(BORDE LAW PLLC, Schroeter Goldmark & Bender, and the Law Offices of Ronald A.
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`Marron, APLC) as interim class counsel. Both counsel groups have demonstrated work done in
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`investigating the potential claims, relevant experience and knowledge, and adequate resources to
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`ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES, DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, AND APPOINTING INTERIM CLASS COUNSEL
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`Case 2:22-cv-00743-TL Document 45 Filed 09/27/22 Page 11 of 13
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`represent the class. See Dkt. Nos. 31–36; Griffith Dkt. Nos. 14–17. However, the Griffith team
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`has shown more care and attention in this early stage of litigation than their competitor.
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`Compare, e.g., Griffith Dkt. No. 14 (Plaintiff Griffith’s motion containing detailed argument
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`regarding the caselaw on appointment of class counsel and her firms’ qualifications) with Dkt.
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`No. 31 (Pecznick Plaintiffs’ motion largely repeating arguments already made regarding
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`appointment of class counsel). The Court additionally finds the Griffith complaint to be more
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`thorough, and its class definition more comprehensive.
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`Also significant to the Court’s decision is that counsel for the Pecznick Plaintiffs have
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`misrepresented their credentials to serve as experienced class counsel, as pointed out by Plaintiff
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`Griffith in her reply brief to her motion to consolidate. See Griffith Dkt. No. 34 at 7–9. The
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`Pecznick Plaintiffs’ attempt to rehabilitate the misrepresentation by Wilshire Law Firm, PLC,
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`falls short of being persuasive. See Dkt. No. 20 at 22 (stating that “Wilshire’s class action
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`department has been class counsel numerous times” and listing matters where the firm was not in
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`the class counsel group); Dkt. No. 30 at 1 (offering a praecipe to correct the false statement by
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`changing it to say the firm “has been class counsel, or otherwise involved” in those matters)
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`(emphasis added). This is not just a typo. While recognizing the important work of attorneys who
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`play a supporting role in class action cases, there is still a significant difference between being
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`appointed class counsel versus being “otherwise involved” in a class action case. Stating one
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`“has been class counsel” suggests that one was either representing the class as lead counsel by
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`default where there was no competition for that role or by appointment as lead counsel where
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`leadership of a case was contested (or, at a minimum, by appointment as part of an executive
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`committee or leadership committee, even though it would be best practice to also specify this if it
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`was the case). The misrepresentation of a case discussed in Section II.A. gives the Court further
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`pause. While the Court is also concerned with the issues raised as to the qualification and actions
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`ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES, DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, AND APPOINTING INTERIM CLASS COUNSEL
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`Case 2:22-cv-00743-TL Document 45 Filed 09/27/22 Page 12 of 13
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`of the Marron firm in the proposed Griffith counsel group, see Dkt. No. 42 at 10–12, no
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`questions have been raised regarding the qualifications of Schroeter Goldmark & Bender or
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`BORDE LAW PLLC.
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`Moreover, the Pecznick Plaintiffs failed to comply with this Court’s Standing Order,
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`which requires parties to confer before filing most motions. See Dkt. No. 39 at 2; Griffith Dkt.
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`No. 41 at 2. The Pecznick Plaintiffs even misstate the plain requirements of this Court’s Standing
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`Order in defending their failure to discuss their plan to file a motion seeking a stay or dismissal
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`with opposing parties. See Griffith Dkt. No. 46 at 7 (claiming their motion is a partially
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`dispositive motion not subject to the Court’s conferral requirement); see generally Judge Tana
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`Lin, Standing Order for All Civil Cases, Section II(D) (explaining that while parties generally do
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`not need to confer before filing dispositive motions, there are separate conferral requirements for
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`motions to dismiss); Judge Tana Lin, Standing Order for All Civil Cases, Section II(I) (motions
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`to dismiss “must contain a certification of conferral as set forth above in Section II (D)”).
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`III. CONCLUSION
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`For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby:
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`(1) GRANTS the motions to consolidate (Griffith Dkt. No. 14; Dkt. No. 16) and
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`consolidates Plaintiffs Joy Pecznick and Gil Kaufman v. Amazon.com, Inc., Case No.
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`2:22-cv-00743-TL, and Dena Griffith v. Amazon.com, Inc., Case No. 2:22-cv-00783-
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`TL, under 2:22-cv-00743-TL for all purposes, including trial;
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`(2) DENIES the motion to stay or dismiss the Griffith case (Dkt. No. 31);
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`(3) DESIGNATES Pecznick, et al. v. Amazon.com, Inc., Case No. 2:22-cv-00743-TL the
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`lead case in this consolidated action. The case shall hereinafter be captioned as In Re
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`Amazon Service Fee Litigation;
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`ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES, DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, AND APPOINTING INTERIM CLASS COUNSEL
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`Case 2:22-cv-00743-TL Document 45 Filed 09/27/22 Page 13 of 13
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`(4) DIRECTS all counsel to file all further documents only under the lead case, Case No.
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`2:22-cv-00743-TL;
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`(5) DIRECTS the Clerk to file this order in Case No. 2:22-cv-00743-TL and Case No.
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`2:22-cv-00783-TL;
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`(6) INSTRUCTS the Clerk to leave open the member case, Case No. 2:22-cv-00783-TL;
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`(7) APPOINTS BORDE LAW PLLC, Schroeter Goldmark & Bender, and the Law Offices
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`of Ronald A. Marron, APLC, as interim class counsel; and
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`(8) ORDERS interim class counsel to file a consolidated amended complaint that faithfully
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`represents every claim from both actions within thirty (30) days of this Order.
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`Dated this 27th day of September 2022.
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`Tana Lin
`A
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`United States District Judge
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`ORDER CONSOLIDATING CASES, DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS OR STAY, AND APPOINTING INTERIM CLASS COUNSEL
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