Case 2:22-cv-00965 Document 1 Filed 07/13/22 Page 1 of 55
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
`AT SEATTLE
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`No.
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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`CHRISTOPHER BROWN, SCOTT
`GRAEBER, LAURA LOES, LETICIA
`SHAW, and DAVID ATWOOD, on behalf of
`themselves and all others similarly situated,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`AMAZON.COM, INC., a Delaware
`corporation,
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`Defendant.
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Case 2:22-cv-00965 Document 1 Filed 07/13/22 Page 2 of 55
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 
`JURISDICTION ................................................................................................................10 
`VENUE ..............................................................................................................................11 
`PARTIES ...........................................................................................................................11 
`A. 
`Plaintiffs .................................................................................................................11 
`B. 
`Defendant Amazon ................................................................................................13 
`STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................13 
`A. 
`MMAs reduce online retail competition and raise consumer prices. .....................13 
`B. 
`Amazon’s MMAs reduce competition on Amazon Marketplace. .........................16 
`C. 
`The two-sided Online Retail Marketplace Market is the relevant
`market to assess the anticompetitive impact of Amazon’s MMAs. .......................25 
`The Online Retail Marketplace Market does not include
`1. 
`brick-and-mortar retailers. .........................................................................28 
`The Online Retail Marketplace Market does not include
`single-merchant e-commerce sites. ............................................................31 
`Social media, comparison shopping sites, and promotional
`sites are not interchangeable with online retail
`marketplaces. .............................................................................................33 
`Online marketplaces with limited categories of goods are
`not reasonably interchangeable with broad-based online
`marketplaces. .............................................................................................34 
`Amazon’s MMAs harm both sides of the Online Retail
`Marketplace Market and create barriers to competition from other
`online retail marketplaces. .....................................................................................35 
`Amazon dominates the Online Retail Marketplace Market. ..................................37 
`Online retail marketplaces, like Amazon Marketplace, have
`1. 
`powerful network effects. ..........................................................................38 
`Amazon does not face any serious competitive threat to its
`dominance in the Online Retail Marketplace Market. ...............................41 
`Amazon alternatively dominates the Online Retail Market or
`submarkets for specific product categories sold online. ........................................43 
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`I. 
`II. 
`III. 
`IV. 
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`V. 
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`D. 
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`E. 
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`F. 
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`2. 
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`3. 
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`4. 
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`2. 
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`Case 2:22-cv-00965 Document 1 Filed 07/13/22 Page 3 of 55
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`INTERSTATE TRADE AND COMMERCE ...................................................................44 
`VI. 
`VII.  CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS ..................................................................................44 
`VIII.  ANTITRUST INJURY AND STANDING .......................................................................46 
`IX. 
`CAUSES OF ACTION ......................................................................................................47 
`FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1 ....................................................47 
`SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 2 ...............................................48 
`THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA’S
`CARTWRIGHT ACT, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16700, ET SEQ.
`(PER SE VIOLATION ON BEHALF OF THE CALIFORNIA CLASS) ........................49 
`FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION VIOLATION OF MD. CODE ANN., COM.
`LAW § 11-201, ET SEQ. (PER SE VIOLATION ON BEHALF OF THE
`MARYLAND CLASS) ......................................................................................................50 
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED .........................................................................................................52 
`PRAYER FOR RELIEF ................................................................................................................52 
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - ii
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`Plaintiffs allege the following upon personal knowledge as to themselves and their own
`acts, and as to all other matters upon information and belief, based upon the investigation made
`by and through their attorneys:
`
`I.
`INTRODUCTION
`1.
`In Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc., the Supreme Court warned that
`that “the potential anticompetitive consequences of vertical price restraints must not be ignored or
`underestimated.”1 The Court emphasized that there is a significant “likelihood that the restraint
`facilitates” anticompetitive purposes when a dominant retailer is “the impetus for a vertical price
`restraint[.]” In particular, the Court warned that a dominant retailer could pressure a manufacturer
`into adopting minimum retail prices and “if the manufacturer believes it needs access to the
`retailer’s distribution network,” it “might consider it has little choice but to accommodate the
`retailer’s demands for vertical price restraints.”23 In that situation, “the manufacturer does not
`establish the practice to stimulate services or to promote its brand”—procompetitive purposes—
`but rather to give an “inefficient retailer[] higher profits,” while “[r]etailers with better distribution
`systems and lower cost structures would be prevented from charging lower prices.”4
`2.
`These concerns are precisely encapsulated by Amazon’s anticompetitive minimum
`margin agreements (MMAs) with its suppliers, which Amazon uses to prevent other online
`retailers from offering the same product Amazon sells at a lower price. They violate Section 1 of
`the Sherman Act’s prohibition against price-fixing by setting a de facto minimum retail price for
`the products under agreement. By restraining competition from Amazon’s online retail rivals, these
`agreements injure consumers by artificially raising online retail prices for thousands of retail
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`1 551 U.S. 877, 893 (2007).
`2 Id. at 893-94.
`3 Id. at 897-98.
`4 Id. at 893.
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`brands that Amazon sells. This conduct is a naked restraint under the Sherman Act and a per se
`violation of the Cartwright Act (California) and the Maryland Antitrust Act.5
`3.
`Under the MMAs, Amazon suppliers guarantee both that Amazon will be able to
`price the supplier’s product competitively against other online competition at least 95% of the time
`and that Amazon will receive a minimum margin on each sale regardless of the actual price that
`Amazon sells the product at retail.6 Amazon enforces this agreement by requiring its suppliers to
`compensate it monthly for any lost margins necessitated by lowering its retail price to match a
`competitor.7
`4.
`To illustrate how the MMAs work, a supplier may agree, for example, to sell its
`product at a wholesale price of $5 per unit and that it will compensate Amazon if it receives less
`than $4 over its marginal cost. If Amazon sells at least 95% of the supplier’s product for $9 or
`more, the supplier owes Amazon no money. But if, in this example, Amazon lowers its price to $8
`to match a competitor’s price that month, then the supplier will owe Amazon $1 for every product
`sold at $8 beyond the 5% threshold.
`5.
`So instead of Amazon risking its own profit margins to compete with its retail rivals
`on price, Amazon contractually shifts that risk to its suppliers. This shift ensures that Amazon’s
`suppliers adopt a de facto minimum retail price (or floor price) for their products market-wide.
`That floor price is the combined sum of the supplier’s wholesale price and its minimum margin
`guarantee, in the previous example $9 ($5+$4). By requiring suppliers to compensate Amazon
`whenever their products sell below the agreed floor price, the MMA agreements fix prices by
`penalizing suppliers unless they suppress competitive pricing from Amazon’s rivals.
`6.
`MMAs add to the suppliers’ cost of doing business and are implemented to
`accommodate Amazon, not as a means of promoting the suppliers’ products or fostering price
`
`5 Frame-Wilson v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44109, at *35-36 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 2022)
`(holding that price-fixing under California and Maryland’s antitrust statutes is a per se violation whether the scheme
`is horizontal (between competitors) or vertical (between entities at different levels of the distribution chain)).
`6 Boyd Evert, The squeeze continues for retail suppliers, https://talkbusiness.net/2017/10/the-squeeze-
`continues-for-retail-suppliers/; Lesley Hensell, Amazon Sellers Are Losing Control of Pricing Due to “Standards for
`Brands, Webretailer, Nov 08, 2021, https://www.webretailer.com/b/amazon-standards-for-brands/.
`7 Id.
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`competition in the marketplace. In a competitive market, suppliers would benefit by rotating price
`promotions with different retailers to ensure a broad range of distribution options.8 In his chart,
`reprinted below, Martin Heubel, former senior Amazon category manager, illustrates how
`providing margin support to Amazon is ineffective for suppliers and causes higher consumer
`prices:9
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`7.
`Heubel explains that even if a supplier is profitable at the account level, Amazon
`will still hold that supplier to task if any individual product is unprofitable; “the result is invariably
`Amazon asking them to renegotiate costs and provide margin support, and if a supplier refuses it
`almost always takes punitive action.”10 A supplier that refuses Amazon’s demand for “back-
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`8 Martin Heubel, How to Design a Profitable Amazon Vendor Portfolio Strategy (May 20, 2022),
`https://consulterce.com/amazon-portfolio-strategy/.
`9 Ian Quinn, Will GSCOP stop the CRAP Amazon suppliers face?, the Grocer (Feb. 19, 2022),
`https://www.thegrocer.co.uk/online/will-gscop-stop-the-crap-amazon-suppliers-face/664641.article.
`10 Martin Heubel, What is Amazon CRaP? Definition, Causes and Solutions for Brands, (Jan. 1, 2022),
`https://consulterce.com/amazon-crap/.
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`margin funding,” will find its product delisted, no longer on order, or suppressed from most
`consumer searches.11
`8.
`Former Amazon senior executive, Andrea Leigh,confirms that Amazon threatens
`to terminate the relationship with its suppliers if it does not receive its margin guarantee:
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`Amazon reports vendor profitability numbers back to vendors,
`requesting to be compensated when their item-level profits aren’t
`hitting targets. They receive this funding in the form of margin
`guarantees and other subsidies. If Amazon can’t get subsidies for
`these products, . . . Amazon may stop ordering.[12]
`9.
`Gordon Christiansen, digital marketing consultant, conludes: “Through these
`policies Amazon is making it clear that they hold suppliers responsible for managing pricing
`across the internet.”13 Christiansen explains that “Amazon has done a great job convincing
`consumers that they are the cheapest,” when, “in reality Amazon is a price follower rather than a
`price leader.”14 So “Amazon is constantly monitoring their own site, across all their platforms, and
`scraping the entire web to find competitive pricing and . . . when a ‘rogue’ trader offers highly
`discounted pricing on a product,” Amazon follows the price cut and then “asks the supplier of that
`product to pay Amazon for lost margin or they suppress the item meaning it won’t turn up most
`searches.”15 By forcing its suppliers to pay for its lost margins, Amazon’s MMAs ensure that its
`suppliers put an end to “rogue” discounting.16
`10.
`Another marketing consultant echoes that thought:
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`They [Amazon employees] literally spider the web and other major
`retailers to ensure they are basically the lowest. [If you, the brand,
`d]on’t like the price they are selling at? Tough luck says Amazon.
`Amazon will then direct you to other sites like Target and Walmart
`and tell you to tell them to raise their price before they raise Amazon
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`11 Quinn; see also What is Amazon CRaP? Definition, Causes and Solutions for Brands; Gordon Christiansen,
`Is Amazon A Price Leader?, https://thinkhighlands.com/ecommerce/is-amazon-a-price-leader/.
`12 Andrea K. Leigh, “Free Shipping” Online: The Truth About Who Pays It, February 18, 2020,
`https://andreakleighconsulting.com/free-shipping-online-the-truth-about-who-pays-it/. See also
`https://andreakleighconsulting.com/about/.(stating that Ms. Leigh launched Amazon’s CRaP program, which is one
`means Amazon uses to impose MMAs).
`13 Is Amazon A Price Leader (emphasis added).
`14 Id.
`15 Id.
`16 Id.
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`back up. This is one of the bigger pain points with brands as it
`disrupts their retailer relationships.[17]
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`11.
`In a competitive market, online retailers would compete for consumer loyalty by
`offering the best price. But Amazon’s MMAs restrain that head-to-head competition. Because
`Amazon can match its retail rivals’ prices without risking its own loss of revenue, it reduces
`“[r]etailers’ incentives to undercut Amazon's prices at the retail level in order to improve their
`market position.”18 When Amazon’s stacked the deck, discounting is futile.
`12.
`Equally, in a competitive market, suppliers would choose retailers that provide the
`best and most efficient means of marketing their goods. MMAs are anticompetitive because they
`disrupt suppliers’ relationships with other retailers and force suppliers to incur unnecessary costs
`that they would otherwise avoid by distributing through more efficient retailers. Leigh reports that
`by shifting “the burden of price matching” to its suppliers, Amazon has transformed itself from
`manufacturers’ “least expensive channel to their most expensive – by a long shot.”19 Suppliers
`already shoulder virtually all costs and risks associated with Amazon’s distribution of their
`products. They pay Amazon for shipping and handling of their products and absorb any losses
`associated with the loss or damage to their products.20 What is more, the “payment terms” Amazon
`has with its suppliers “extend beyond the amount of time necessary to collect proceeds from [its]
`consumer customers.”21 It is not uncommon for suppliers to wait 90 days to be paid, although 60
`days is the most common term.22 So, while big box retailers, like Walmart, Target, and Costco are
`
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`17 Danny DeMichele, Selling to Amazon or selling through Amazon? Vendor And Seller Central,
`https://dannydemichele.com/selling-amazon-selling-amazon-vendor-seller-central/.
`18 European Commission, Directorate General for Competition, Case AT.40153 EBook MFNs and related
`matters (Amazon), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40153/40153_4392_3.pdf (“EBook
`MFNs and related matters (Amazon)”), ¶ 148.
`19 Supra “Free Shipping” Online: The Truth About Who Pays It.
`20 Amazon sellers: first-party relationship versus third-party relationship (Dec. 3, 2019),
`https://www.gs1uk.org/insights/news/amazon-sellers-first-party-relationship-versus-third-party-relationship.
`21 Suppliers Are Funding Amazon’s Future, Marketplace Pulse (Oct. 30, 2020),
`https://w.marketplacepulse.com/articles/suppliers-are-funding-amazons-future.
`22 Amazon sellers: first-party relationship versus third-party relationship (Dec. 3, 2019),
`https://www.gs1uk.org/insights/news/amazon-sellers-first-party-relationship-versus-third-party-relationship; Carina
`McLeod, Amazon Vendor Contract Negotiations: What You Need to Know,
`https://www.ecomengine.com/blog/vendor-contract-negotiations.
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`lucky if they can sell products to their customers within a couple weeks after paying their suppliers,
`Amazon pays its suppliers months after it sold their products, which “allows Amazon to borrow
`from its suppliers to finance its operations, interest-free.”23 It costs suppliers less to distribute the
`bulk of their products through other retailers, but the MMAs penalize suppliers who do so. Just as
`the Supreme Court had forewarned, Amazon’s MMAs give an inefficient, dominant retailer higher
`profits, while preventing other online retailers with lower cost distribution systems to charge lower
`prices.
`13.
`Amazon’s enforcement of MMAs also constitutes an abuse of monopoly power
`under the Sherman Act, Section 2. Monopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude
`competition.24 Through anticompetitive MMAs implemented since at least October 2017, Amazon
`has acquired or maintained the power to control online prices for the millions of products it resells
`online.25 This lock on online retail prices not only harms competition from other online retailers,
`but it also harms competition from other online retail marketplaces, like eBay, for whom—much
`like the retailers—discounting of goods sold on its platform is a largely futile act because any price
`eBay offers, Amazon will be able to match or undercut—without losing any revenue. For the same
`reason, MMAs deter potential new online retail marketplace competitors from entering the market
`because they likewise cannot rely on price competition to gain a foothold in the market.26 This loss
`of competition ultimately harms consumers, who pay uncompetitive prices.
`14.
`Amazon’s MMAs have also reduced competition among online marketplaces.
`Whereas eBay was once the largest online retail marketplace, MMAs are likely a substantial factor
`contributing to eBay’s market share losses over the last several years. Sales on Amazon’s online
`
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`23 Supra Suppliers Are Funding Amazon’s Future.
`24 United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 378 (1956).
`25 Supra The squeeze continues for retail suppliers.
`26 See Amazon Removes Price Parity Obligation for Retailers on Its Marketplace Platform,
`BUNDESKARTELLAMT (Federal Cartel Office of Germany), at 2 (Dec. 9, 2013) (“BKartA Decision”) at 3,
`http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidung/EN/Fallberichte/Kartellverbot/2013/B6-46-
`12.pdf%3F__blob%3DpublicationFile%26v%3D2 (discussed below) (German competition authorities found that
`Amazon’s analogous provision prohibiting third-party sellers from selling at lower prices on competing
`marketplaces was a price-fixing violation and created unfair barriers to competing online marketplace operators).
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`retail marketplace (“Amazon Marketplace”) now make up as much as 90% of all online
`marketplace sales in the United States and account for over 50% of all online retail sales revenue
`in the United States.27 By comparison, Amazon’s two closest competitors in online marketplaces,
`Walmart and eBay, are only peripheral players in the Online Retail Marketplace Market and
`account for only 7.1% and 4.3%, respectively, of online retail sales revenue.28
`15.
`Amazon operates Amazon Marketplace as a two-sided platform, where it is also the
`largest retailer. Beginning in 1999, Amazon opened its online retail platform to other businesses
`(“third-party sellers”), where they can register and list their goods for sale. Amazon Marketplace
`presents itself “as a single integrated platform that makes no” significant “distinction between
`Amazon’s own retail business and the Marketplace business.”29 The “products offered by third-
`party sellers are presented on the same pages as those sold by Amazon itself, in competition with
`each other.”30
`16.
`Amazon’s third-party sellers vastly expand the product offering on its marketplace
`by adding around 340 million products to Amazon’s own considerable catalogue of retail goods.31
`No other retailer or retail marketplace can match Amazon Marketplace’s ability to provide
`products for virtually every imaginable search.32 In Amazon’s own words, “allowing third parties
`to offer products side-by-side” with Amazon’s own catalog of about 12 million products, makes
`Amazon “more attractive to customers,” which draws “even more sellers” to Amazon Marketplace
`and adds to Amazon’s “economies of scale[.]”33
`
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`27 BKartA Decision at 255; Amazon Marketplace is 25% of US E-commerce, Marketplace Pulse (Feb. 1, 2022),
`https://www.marketplacepulse.com/articles/amazon-marketplace-is-25-of-us-e-commerce (observing that third-party
`sellers on Amazon Marketplace alone account for 25% of ecommerce).
`28 Blake Droesch, Amazon dominates US ecommerce, though its market share varies by category, eMarketer
`(Apr. 27, 2021), https://www.emarketer.com/content/amazon-dominates-us-ecommerce-though-its-market-share-
`varies-by-category.
`29 BKartA Decision at 2.
`30 Autorità Garante Della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Dec. 9, 2021 Final report (“AGCM Report”), ¶ 133.
`31 15 Amazon Statistics You Need to Know in 2022, https://www.repricerexpress.com/amazon-statistics/.
`32 Minimum Viable Amazon, Marketplace Pulse (Jan 21, 2021),
`https://www.marketplacepulse.com/articles/minimum-viable-amazon.
`33 Amazon 2014 Annual Report, EX-99.1 (sec.gov),
`https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1018724/000119312515144741/d895323dex991.htm.
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`17.
`As recognized by the House subcommittee on antitrust, Amazon has evolved,
`through its marketplace business, into the unofficial “gatekeeper for ecommerce” in the United
`States.34 Amazon also has more than 2.4 million active third-party sellers which is about 24 times
`the 100,000 third-party sellers that Walmart hosts and 8,000 times the 300 third-party sellers on
`Target’s marketplace.35 Amazon Marketplace grants third-party sellers access to Amazon’s Prime
`members who are 96% more likely to buy goods from Amazon Marketplace36 and spend on
`average $1,968 per year on Amazon Marketplace.37
`18. Manufacturers and suppliers of consumer goods can no longer afford to ignore
`Amazon Marketplace, and it is not uncommon for a brand manufacturer to sell more than half of
`its products through Amazon.38 James Thomson, Ph.D., a partner at Amazon management and
`consulting firm BuyBox Experts explains: “When it comes to Amazon, you’re dealing with a large,
`open marketplace and a massive customer audience. Having a presence there not only means
`you’re better able to manage an important piece of a smart omni-channel sales strategy, but also
`that you can have more control over how your brand is represented there ... because if you don’t
`list your products on Amazon, someone else probably will.”39
`
`
`34 SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST, COMMERCIAL, AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE
`JUDICIARY, 116th CONG., INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS, MAJORITY STAFF REPORT AND
`RECOMMENDATIONS (“House Report”) 256 (2020), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-
`content/uploads/2020/10/investigation_of_competition_in_digital_markets_majority_staff_report_and_recommenda
`tions.pdf.
`35 Walmart Surpasses 100,000 Marketplace Sellers, Marketplace Pulse (Jul. 13, 2021), https://www.marketplace
`pulse.com/articles/walmart-surpasses-100000-marketplace-sellers; Target’s Marketplace Still Tiny Two Years Later,
`Marketplace Pulse (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.marketplacepulse.com/articles/targets-marketplace-still-tiny-two-
`years-later.
`36 Kiri Masters, What’s Driving Amazon’s $10 Billion Advertising Business, Forbes (July 26, 2019),
`https://www.forbes.com/sites/kirimasters/2019/03/20/study-89-of-consumers-are-more-likely-to-buy-products-from-
`amazon-than-other-e-commerce-sites/?sh=2dd0b61a4af1 (last visited Feb. 23, 2022).
`37 Marc Bain, Prime has never been more important to Amazon, Quartz (May 3, 2021), https://qz.com/2004369/
`the-pandemic-made-prime-even-more-valuable-to-amazon/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2022).
`38 Supra The Truth About Who Pays for “Free Shipping” Online; see also As Amazon’s dominance grows,
`suppliers are forced to play by its rules, cnbc.com (Dec. 21, 2017) (“At least 21 public companies have disclosed
`they are generating 10 percent or more of their revenue through Amazon.”), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/21/as-
`amazons-dominance-grows-suppliers-are-forced-to-play-by-its-rules.html.
`39 ModernRetail, The Retailer’s Guide to Amazon (2019), pdf, https://www.modernretail.co/wp-
`content/uploads/2019/07/modernretail_report_2019_updated-1.pdf.
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 8
`010888-16/1814118 V1
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`1301 Second Avenue, Suite 2000, Seattle, WA 98101
`(206) 623-7292 OFFICE (206) 623-0594 FAX
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`19.
`The House subcommittee on antitrust found that Amazon “uses its dominant
`position in e-commerce as leverage” to impose anticompetitive agreements “to ensure that none
`of its suppliers or third-party sellers can collaborate with an existing or potential competitor to
`make lower-priced or innovative product offerings available to consumers.”40
`20.
`Amazon’s MMA is one example of the types of anticompetitive agreements that
`Amazon uses to prevent other online retailers from offering the same product Amazon sells at a
`lower price. David Barnett, Founder and CEO of Amazon supplier PopSockets, testified before
`the House subcommittee that Amazon imposed minimum margin guarantees on his company’s
`products, and that in his experience Amazon suppliers generally concede to its practice of
`“demanding funding whenever [Amazon] elects to lower prices to the consumer.”41 This is
`consistent with an industry report on October 1, 2017, stating: “Amazon.com asks suppliers to sign
`a ‘Guaranteed Minimum Margin Agreement.’ The agreement requires a monthly true-up between
`actual margin and what was guaranteed, so long as it is in Amazon’s favor.”42
`21.
`Courts and regulators have found that similar contractual provisions that raise
`consumer prices by immunizing the retailer from competition from other retailers are
`anticompetitive. In United States v. Apple, the court found that a series of contracts between a
`retailer and its suppliers “destroyed” competition because it “removed the ability of retailers to set
`the prices of their e-books and compete with each other on price, relieved Apple of the need to
`compete on price,” and increased consumer prices.43 The European Commission investigated
`Amazon in 2015-2017 and found that Amazon replicated the same anticompetitive agreements
`used in the Apple conspiracy and that such action constituted an abuse of its monopoly power.44
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`40 House Report at 295.
`41 Questions for the Record from the Honorable David N. Cicilline, Chairman, Subcommittee on Antitrust,
`Commercial and Administrative Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, Questions for David Barnett, Founder and
`CEO, PopSockets, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU05/20200117/110386/HHRG-116-JU05-20200117-
`QFR007.pdf.
`42 Boyd Evert, The squeeze continues for retail suppliers, TB&P (Oct. 1, 2017),
`https://talkbusiness.net/2017/10/the-squeeze-continues-for-retail-suppliers/.
`43 United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 694. (S.D.N.Y. 2013), affirmed 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015).
`44 E-book MFNs and related matters (Amazon).
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 9
`010888-16/1814118 V1
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`1301 Second Avenue, Suite 2000, Seattle, WA 98101
`(206) 623-7292 OFFICE (206) 623-0594 FAX
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`Case 2:22-cv-00965 Document 1 Filed 07/13/22 Page 13 of 55
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`The German competition agency, Bundestkartellamt (“BKartA”), found that Amazon harmed
`competition in the online retail marketplaces market when it sought to enforce similar provisions
`that penalized Amazon’s third-party sellers who sold their goods on another online platform at a
`price lower than on Amazon Marketplace.45
`22.
`The loss of competition in the Online Retail Marketplace Market represents higher
`prices and the loss of quality and innovation that a competitive market fosters. Existing
`marketplaces cannot expand by competing on price and new marketplaces cannot enter the market
`to compete on price.
`23.
`Plaintiffs assert price-fixing and monopolizing claims against Amazon on behalf of
`themselves and other consumers who bought goods from Amazon that are subject to Amazon’s
`MMAs. See below Sec. VII (defining classes).
`
`II.
`JURISDICTION
`24.
`This Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
`1337(a) and 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(a) and 26 because this Action arises under federal antitrust laws,
`including 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2, as invoked herein.
`25.
`Additionally, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action
`Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) because at least one Class member is of diverse
`citizenship from Amazon, there are more than 100 Class members nationwide, and the aggregated
`amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
`26.
`Plaintiffs are residents of California and Maryland who purchased goods from
`Amazon. Amazon’s conduct as discussed further herein harmed and injured Plaintiffs financially.
`27.
`This Court has personal
`jurisdiction over Amazon because Amazon
`is
`headquartered in Wash