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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
`
`THE COUNTY COMMISSION OF
` MINGO COUNTY, and THE TOWN
`OF KERMIT, WEST VIRGINIA,
`on behalf of themselves and
`all others similarly situated,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`
`MCKINSEY & COMPANY, INC.,
`
`Defendant.
`
`2:21-cv-00079
`Case No. ____________________
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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`

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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`I.
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`II.
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`III.
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`IV.
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`INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 4
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE ......................................................................................10
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`PARTIES ..........................................................................................................................11
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`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS ..........................................................................................11
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`a. Purdue pleads guilty to misbranding OxyContin and is bound by a Corporate
`Integrity Agreement...................................................................................................12
`
`b. Purdue hires McKinsey to boost opioid sales in light of the guilty plea and
`Corporate Integrity Agreement. ...............................................................................13
`
`i. The Sacklers distance themselves from Purdue. ........................................ 14
`
`ii. Purdue hires McKinsey to devise and implement an OxyContin sales
`strategy consistent with the Sacklers’ goals. ...............................................15
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`c. What McKinsey does: “Consulting is more than giving advice.” .........................18
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`d. Purdue relies on McKinsey. ......................................................................................21
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`i. The Transformational Relationship .............................................................22
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`e. McKinsey delivers. .....................................................................................................23
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`i. Granular Growth ...........................................................................................23
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`ii. “Identifying Granular Growth Opportunities for OxyContin” ................26
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`1.
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`2.
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`3.
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`4.
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`5.
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`Marketing – Countering Emotional Messages ..................................27
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`Targeting – Selling More OxyContin to Existing High
`Prescribers .............................................................................................28
`
`Titration – Selling Higher Doses of OxyContin .................................30
`
`Covered Persons – Sales Quotas and Incentive Compensation ........31
`
`Increasing the Overall Size of the Opioid Market: the Larger the
`Pie, the Larger the Slice ...................................................................... 33
`
`f. Transformation: Purdue adopts McKinsey’s strategies. ......................................34
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`i. Project Turbocharge .....................................................................................36
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`g. McKinsey’s efforts triple OxyContin sales. .............................................................39
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`h. McKinsey knew. .........................................................................................................41
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`i. Coda ............................................................................................................................47
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`i. Guilty again. .................................................................................................. 51
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`ii. A mea culpa. ...................................................................................................52
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`V.
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`
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`CLASS ALLEGATIONS ................................................................................................53
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`VI. CAUSES OF ACTION ....................................................................................................56
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`a. Negligence ...................................................................................................................56
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`b. Negligent Misrepresentation .....................................................................................56
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`c. Public Nuisance ..........................................................................................................57
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`d. Fraud ...........................................................................................................................60
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`e. Civil Conspiracy/Joint and Several Liability ..........................................................62
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`
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`f. Civil Aiding and Abetting ........................................................................................63
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`g. Unjust Enrichment ....................................................................................................63
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`h. Intentional Acts and Omissions ……………………………………………………64
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`VII. JURY DEMAND ..............................................................................................................65
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`VIII. PRAYER ...........................................................................................................................66
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`I. INTRODUCTION
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`1.
`
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`On May 10, 2007, John Brownlee, United States Attorney for the Western
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`District of Virginia, announced the guilty plea of the Purdue Frederick Company, the parent of
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`Purdue Pharma, L.P. (“Purdue”), relating to the misbranding of OxyContin. Brownlee stated,
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`“Even in the face of warnings from health care professionals, the media, and members of its own
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`sales force that OxyContin was being widely abused and causing harm to our citizens, Purdue,
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`under the leadership of its top executives, continued to push a fraudulent marketing campaign that
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`promoted OxyContin as less addictive, less subject to abuse, and less likely to cause withdrawal.
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`In the process, scores died as a result of OxyContin abuse and an even greater number of people
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`became addicted to OxyContin; a drug that Purdue led many to believe was safer, less subject to
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`abuse, and less addictive than other pain medications on the market.”
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`2.
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`Along with the guilty plea, Purdue agreed to a Corporate Integrity Agreement
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`with the Office of Inspector General of the United States Department of Health and Human
`
`Services. For a period of five years, ending in 2012, Purdue was obligated to retain an Independent
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`Monitor and submit annual compliance reports regarding its marketing and sales practices and
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`training of sales representatives vis-à-vis their interactions with health care providers.
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`3.
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`In the wake of Purdue’s accession to the Corporate Integrity Agreement, Purdue
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`faced newly imposed constraints on its sales and marketing practices. The Corporate Integrity
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`Agreement was a problem to solve. Despite the agreement’s constraints (i.e. do not lie about
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`OxyContin), Purdue and its controlling owners, the Sackler family, still intended to maximize
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`OxyContin sales.
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`4.
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`The problem was complex. As a result of the 2007 guilty plea, the Sacklers made
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`the strategic decision to distance the family from Purdue, which was regarded as an increasingly
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`dangerous “concentration of risk” for Purdue’s owners. Ten days after the guilty plea was
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`announced, David Sackler wrote to his dad, Richard Sackler, and uncle, Jonathan Sackler,
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`describing precisely what that “risk” was: legal liability for selling OxyContin. In response to
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`Jonathan stating that “there is no basis to sue ‘the family,’” David replied:
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`
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`5.
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` Given concern over this “concentration of risk,” the two sides of the Sackler
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`family spent considerable time and energy debating the best way to achieve distance from Purdue,
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`and collectively considered a variety of options for doing so. One option was to sell the company
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`to or merge the company with another pharmaceutical manufacturer. Shire was discussed as a
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`possible target, as was Cephalon, UCB, and Sepracor, Inc. The proceeds of such a transaction
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`could then be re-invested in diversified assets, thereby achieving the Sacklers’ desired distance.
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`6.
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`Another option was to have Purdue borrow money in order to assure Purdue had
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`adequate funds to continue operating while the Sacklers, as owners, began to make substantial
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`distributions of money from the company to themselves. Once again, the proceeds of the
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`distributions could then be re-invested in diversified assets, thereby achieving the Sacklers’ desired
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`distance.
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`7.
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`In order to pursue either of these options, the Sacklers needed to maximize
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`opioid sales in the short term so as to make Purdue – by then the subject of substantial public
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`scrutiny – appear either as an attractive acquisition target or merger partner to another
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`pharmaceutical manufacturer or as a creditworthy borrower to a lender.
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`8.
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`In short, the Sacklers planned to engage in a final flurry of opioid pushing in
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`order to rid themselves of their pharmaceutical company dependency for good.
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`9.
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`Given the complexity of the problem, the Sacklers and Purdue realized that they
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`would need assistance in achieving these internally contradictory objectives. Purdue did not have
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`the capabilities in-house to design and implement a sales strategy for OxyContin that would
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`achieve the Sacklers’ objectives. They turned to the global management consulting firm
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`McKinsey, which had already been advising the Sacklers and Purdue for at least three years, for
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`help with their new problem.
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`10.
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`McKinsey accepted their request,1 and by June 2009 McKinsey and Purdue were
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`working together to increase sales of Purdue’s opioids. McKinsey suggested a specific sales and
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`marketing strategy based on McKinsey’s own independent research and unique methodologies,
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`and Purdue adopted that strategy. McKinsey and Purdue then implemented McKinsey’s plan.
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`Despite the strictures imposed upon Purdue by the Corporate Integrity Agreement, OxyContin
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`sales began to multiply.
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`11.
`
`In 2012, Purdue’s Corporate Integrity Agreement ended. With its demise,
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`McKinsey’s ongoing relationship2 with Purdue flourished. In 2013, McKinsey proposed, and
`
`
`1 This Petition assumes that Purdue asked McKinsey to design and implement the strategy for
`boosting opioid sales, and McKinsey accepted Purdue’s offer. What is known is that McKinsey performed
`the work for Purdue. For the purposes of this Petition, Plaintiffs and Other Class Members assume Purdue
`initiated the relationship with McKinsey. Should it arise that instead McKinsey pitched a proposal to
`increase OxyContin sales to Purdue, and Purdue accepted that proposal, then Plaintiffs will amend this
`Class Petition accordingly.
`2 McKinsey espouses the idea of the “transformational relationship.” It is not a one-off seller of
`advice for any given CEO’s problem of the day. Rather, McKinsey argues that real value for the client
`derives from an ongoing “transformational” relationship with the firm. Duff McDonald, The Firm, Pg. 136
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`Purdue implemented with McKinsey’s ongoing assistance, Project Turbocharge, a marketing
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`strategy to increase opioids sales by hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Purdue then picked
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`a new name – Evolve 2 Excellence – and adopted it as the theme to its 2014 national sales
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`campaign. With McKinsey’s assistance, Purdue trained its sales representatives to operate pursuant
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`to McKinsey’s strategy for selling OxyContin.
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`12.
`
`In 2013, despite significant headwinds, OxyContin sales finally peaked. The
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`restrictions on Purdue’s sales and marketing methods contained in the Corporate Integrity
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`Agreement should have resulted in fewer overall OxyContin sales: the guilty plea identified a
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`specific segment of existing OxyContin sales that were illegitimate and should thus cease. All else
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`being equal, OxyContin sales should have decreased to account for the successful snuffing out of
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`improper sales. In fact, OxyContin sales did decrease in the immediate aftermath of the 2007 guilty
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`plea.
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`13.
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`Within five years, however, OxyContin sales would triple. McKinsey is
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`responsible for the strategy that accomplished this. It presented specific plans to Purdue, which
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`Purdue adopted and spent hundreds of millions of dollars implementing. The result: a final spasm
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`of OxyContin sales before the inevitable decline of the drug.3
`
`
`-37 (Simon & Schuster 2013) (“McKinsey no longer pitched itself as a project-to-project firm; from this
`point forth [the late 1970’s], it sold itself to clients as an ongoing prodder of change, the kind a smart CEO
`would keep around indefinitely.”).
`This Petition tells the story of McKinsey’s transformational relationship with Purdue.
`3 On February 10. 2018, Purdue announced that it is no longer marketing opioids, and disbanded
`its OxyContin sales force.
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`14.
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`McKinsey has recently been the subject of scrutiny for its various business
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`practices, including its work facilitating the opioid crisis for Purdue.4 On March 7, 2019, Kevin
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`Sneader, McKinsey’s global managing partner, addressed all McKinsey employees regarding this
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`scrutiny. Drawing inspiration from Theodore Roosevelt, Sneader stated, “[W]e cannot return to a
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`time when we were in the background and unobserved. Those days have gone. Indeed, I have little
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`doubt that scrutiny – fair and unfair – will continue. It is the price we pay for being ‘in the arena’
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`and working on what matters.”5
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`15.
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`Weeks later, McKinsey announced that it is no longer working for any opioid
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`manufacturer. “Opioid abuse and addiction are having a tragic and devastating impact on our
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`communities. We are no longer advising clients on any opioid-specific business and are continuing
`
`
`4 See Michael Forsythe and Walt Bogdanich, McKinsey Advised Purdue Pharma How to
`‘Turbocharge’ Opioid Sales, Lawsuit Says, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 2019, available at:
`https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/01/business/purdue-pharma-mckinsey-oxycontin-opiods.html.
`5 See “The Price We Pay for Being ‘In the Arena’”: McKinsey’s Chief Writes to Staff About Media
`Scandal,
`Fortune Magazine, March
`8,
`2019,
`at
`Scrutiny
`and
`available
`https://fortune.com/2019/03/08/mckinsey-staff-letter-kevin-sneader/.
`The “arena” reference is to Citizenship in a Republic, a speech delivered by Theodore Roosevelt
`on April 23, 1910: “It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles,
`or where the doers of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in
`the arena [here, McKinsey; and the arena, opioid sales], whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood;
`who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, because there is no effort without error
`and shortcoming; but who does actually strive to do the deeds; who knows great enthusiasms, the great
`devotions; who spends himself in a worthy cause; who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high
`achievement, and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never
`be with those cold and timid souls who neither know victory nor defeat.”
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`to support key stakeholders working to combat the crisis,” McKinsey stated.6 In addition to its
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`work for Purdue, McKinsey has performed work for “several other companies on opioids.”7
`
`16.
`
`Plaintiffs now argues that the price for being in the arena is more than scrutiny,
`
`however fair. This lawsuit argues that, like any other participant in the arena, McKinsey is liable
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`for its deeds. McKinsey is liable for its successful efforts to increase OxyContin sales after
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`Purdue’s 2007 guilty plea for misbranding the drug. Indeed, McKinsey’s mandate was to increase
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`the sales of the drug in light of the fact that Purdue had plead guilty to misbranding, and the owners
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`of Purdue now wished to exit the opioid market due to the perceived reputational risks of remaining
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`there.
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`17.
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`McKinsey’s task was to thread the needle: to increase OxyContin sales given the
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`strictures imposed by the 5-year Corporate Integrity Agreement. This McKinsey did,
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`turbocharging8 the sales of a drug it knew fully well was addictive and deadly, while paying at
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`least tacit respect to the Corporate Integrity Agreement.
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`18.
`
`These managerial acrobatics were necessary for Purdue to seem financially
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`attractive enough that a potential buyer would be willing to discount (or even overlook) the
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`otherwise obvious risks associated with purchasing the maker of OxyContin. Purdue was the
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`proverbial hot potato. The Sackler family hired McKinsey to help them hand it to someone else.
`
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`6 See Paul La Monica, Consulting firm McKinsey no longer working with opioid maker Purdue
`Pharma, CNN, May 24, 2019, available at: https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/24/business/mckinsey-purdue-
`pharma-oxycontin/index.html. The statement was attributed to McKinsey as an entity. No individual’s
`name was attributed.
`7 See Drew Armstrong, McKinsey No Longer Consulting for Purdue, Ends Opioid Work,
`Bloomberg, May 23, 2019, available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-24/mckinsey-
`no-longer-working-with-purdue-halts-opioid-consulting. While Plaintiff is aware of work McKinsey has
`performed for other opioid manufacturers, this Petition concerns McKinsey’s work with Purdue.
`8 If the description is overbearing, note that it is McKinsey’s own, as described below.
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`McKinsey obliged, and devised a successful strategy to purposefully increase the amount of
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`OxyContin sold in the United States. Their efforts tripled OxyContin sales.
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`19.
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`In the end, of course, the Sacklers never sold Purdue, and no one loaned it
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`money. In time, the full scope of the opioid crisis would be clear not only to experts, insiders, and
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`industry participants. Along with the rest of nation, Plaintiffs are now squarely focused on the
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`crisis.
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`II.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`20.
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`This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
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`§ 1332(d)(2), because (i) at least one member of the putative Class is a citizen of a state different
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`from Defendant McKinsey (ii) the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, exclusive of interest
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`and costs, and (iii) none of the exceptions under the subsection apply to this action.
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`21.
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`This Court has personal jurisdiction over each Defendant because Plaintiff’s
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`claims arise out of, or relate to, each Defendants’ contacts with West Virginia.
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`22.
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`At all times relevant hereto, Defendant engaged in the business of researching,
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`designing, and implementing marketing and promoting strategies for various opioid manufacturers
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`including Purdue Pharma in the State of West Virginia and within Mingo County.
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`23.
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`This Court has jurisdiction over Defendant due to Defendant’s conduct in Mingo
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`County and throughout West Virginia. McKinsey has deliberately engaged in significant acts and
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`omissions within Mingo County, the Town of Kermit, and Other Class Members that has injured
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`its residents. Defendants purposefully directed their activities at Mingo County, the Town of
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`Kermit, and Other Class Members and their residents, and the claims arise out of those activities.
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`24.
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`Venue is proper in this District because a substantial part of the events giving
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`rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in, were directed to, and/or emanated from this District. 28
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`U.S.C. § 1391(b).
`
`III.
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`PARTIES
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`25.
`
`Plaintiff, the County Commission of Mingo County, is the duly elected
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`governing body that oversees Mingo County, a political subdivision of the State of West Virginia.
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`The County Commission of Mingo County brings this action on behalf and for the benefit of Mingo
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`County at large pursuant to W.Va. Code §§7-1-3kk1 and 8-12-1(3).
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`26.
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`Plaintiff, the Town of Kermit, West Virginia, is a municipal corporation of the
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`State of West Virginia.
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`27.
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`Defendant McKinsey & Company, Inc. is a foreign corporation with its principal
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`office at 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017. It may be served with process through its
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`registered agent, Corporation Service Company, 80 State Street, Albany, New York 12207.
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`Additionally, McKinsey, though its affiliate McKinsey & Company, Inc. Washington DC, is
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`registered to do business in West Virginia and may be served with process through its registered
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`agent, Corporation Service Company, 209 West Washington Street, Charleston, WV, 23502.
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`IV.
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`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
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`28.
`
`This lawsuit concerns McKinsey’s work for Purdue Pharma and its owner, the
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`Sackler family, beginning at least as early as 2004, and in particular McKinsey’s work in the years
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`after the 2007 guilty plea relating to Purdue’s sales and marketing strategy for its opioids.
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`29.
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`McKinsey had an ongoing relationship with Purdue beginning at least as early
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`as 2004 and lasting decades. By June 2009 McKinsey was advising Purdue on precisely the same
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`sales and marketing strategy and practices for OxyContin that were the subject of the Corporate
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`Integrity Agreement. McKinsey continued this work after the expiration of the Corporate Integrity
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`Agreement and at least through November of 2017.
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`a. Purdue pleads guilty to misbranding OxyContin and is bound by a
`Corporate Integrity Agreement.
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`On May 10, 2007, the Purdue Frederick Company, Purdue’s parent, as well as
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`30.
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`three of Purdue’s officers, pleaded guilty to the misbranding of OxyContin pursuant to various
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`provisions of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, et seq.
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`31.
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`Purdue admitted that “supervisors and employees, with the intent to defraud or
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`mislead, marketed and promoted OxyContin as less addictive, less subject to abuse and diversion,
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`and less likely to cause tolerance and withdrawal than other pain medications.”
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`32.
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`Concurrent with the guilty plea by the Purdue Frederick Company, Purdue
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`entered into a Corporate Integrity Agreement with the Office of Inspector General of the United
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`States Department of Health and Human Services on May 7, 2007.
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`33.
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`Purdue’s compliance obligations under the Corporate Integrity Agreement ran
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`for a period of five years, expiring on May 10, 2012.
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`34.
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`Pursuant to the Corporate Integrity Agreement, Purdue was obligated to
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`implement written policies regarding its compliance program and compliance with federal health
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`care program and Food and Drug Administration requirements, including:
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`a. “selling, marketing, promoting, advertising, and disseminating Materials or
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`information about Purdue’s products in compliance with all applicable FDA
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`requirements, including requirements relating to the dissemination of
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`information that is fair and accurate … including, but not limited to information
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`concerning the withdrawal, drug tolerance, drug addiction or drug abuse of
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`Purdue’s products;
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`b. compensation (including salaries and bonuses) for Relevant Covered Persons
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`engaged in promoting and selling Purdue’s products that are designed to ensure
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`that financial incentives do not inappropriately motivate such individuals to
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`engage in the improper promotion or sales of Purdue’s products;
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`c. the process by which and standards according to which Purdue sales
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`representatives provide Materials or respond to requests from HCP’s [health
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`care providers] for information about Purdue’s products, including information
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`concerning withdrawal, drug tolerance, drug addiction, or drug abuse of
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`Purdue’s products,” including “the form and content of Materials disseminated
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`by sales representatives,” and “the internal review process for the Materials and
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`information disseminated by sales representatives.”
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`35.
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`Purdue was obligated to engage an Independent Review Organization to ensure
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`its compliance with the strictures of the Corporate Integrity Agreement, and to file compliance
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`reports on an annual basis with the inspector general.
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`b. Purdue hires McKinsey to boost opioid sales in light of the company’s guilty
`plea and Corporate Integrity Agreement.
`
`36.
`
`The Sackler family has owned and controlled Purdue and its predecessors since
`
`
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`1952. At all times relevant to this Petition, individual Sackler family members occupied either six
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`or seven of the seats on Purdue’s board of directors, and at all times held a majority of Board seats.
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`To advise the board of directors of Purdue Pharma was to advise the Sackler family. The interests
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`of the Sackler family and the Purdue board of directors, and Purdue itself, as a privately held
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`company, are all aligned. Practically, they are indistinguishable.9
`
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`9 Craig Landau, soon to become CEO of Purdue, acknowledged in May 2017 that Purdue operated
`with “the Board of Directors serving as the ‘de facto’ CEO.” The future CEO of the company, in other
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`i. The Sacklers distance themselves from Purdue.
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`37.
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`After the 2007 guilty plea, the Sackler family began to reassess its involvement
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`in the opioid business. On April 18, 2008, Richard Sackler, then the co-chairman of the board
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`along with his uncle, communicated to other family members that Purdue’s business of selling
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`OxyContin and other opioids was “a dangerous concentration of risk.” Richard Sackler
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`recommended a strategy of installing a loyal CEO of Purdue who would safeguard the interests of
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`the Sackler family, while at the same time positioning Purdue for an eventual sale by maximizing
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`OxyContin sales.
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`38.
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`In the event that a purchaser for Purdue could not be found, Richard stated
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`Purdue should “distribute more free cash flow” to the Sacklers. This would have the effect of
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`maximizing the amount of money an owner could take out of a business, and is a tacit
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`acknowledgement that reinvestment of profits in the business was not a sound financial strategy.
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`It is, in other words, an acknowledgement that Purdue’s reputation and franchise was irrevocably
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`damaged, and that Purdue’s opioid business was not sustainable in the long term.
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`39.
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`By 2017, with the hope for any acquisition now gone, the Sacklers’ decision to
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`milk opioid profits by “distributing more free cash flow” on the way down had its natural effect
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`on Purdue. Craig Landau, then the CEO, stated, “the planned and purposeful de-emphasis and
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`deconstruction of R&D has left the organization unable to innovate.”
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`40.
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`In fact, in the years after the 2007 guilty plea, Purdue would retain only the
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`absolute minimum amount of money within Purdue as possible: $300 million. That amount was
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`words, understood that he would have little practical power despite his new title. The owners ran the
`business.
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`required to be retained by Purdue pursuant to a partnership agreement with separate company.
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`Otherwise, all the money was distributed to the owners.10
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`41.
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`Concurrently, the Sacklers backed away from day-to-day jobs at Purdue. During
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`the ongoing investigation that resulted in the 2007 guilty pleas, “several family members who
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`worked at Purdue stepped back from their operational roles.”11 In 2003, Richard Sackler himself
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`resigned as the president to assume his role of co-chairman. Dr. Kathe Sackler and Jonathan
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`Sackler chose to exit their roles as senior vice presidents. Mortimer D.A. Sackler quit being a vice
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`president.
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`42.
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`43.
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`They remained on the board, however.
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`At the time Richard Sackler communicated these plans to distance the family
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`from Purdue, the Sacklers had already established a second company, Rhodes Pharmaceuticals.
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`The Sacklers established Rhodes four months after the 2007 guilty plea.12 Rhodes’ purpose was
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`to sell generic versions of opioids. It was, in other words, a way for the Sacklers to continue to
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`make money off of opioids while separating themselves from Purdue. By 2016, Rhodes held a
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`larger share of the opioid market than Purdue. Through Purdue, the Sacklers controlled 1.7% of
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`the overall opioid market. When combined with Rhodes, however, the Sacklers’ share of the
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`overall opioid market was approximately 6% of all opioids sold in the United States.13
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`Purdue hires McKinsey to devise and implement an OxyContin
`sales strategy consistent with the Sacklers’ goals.
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`ii.
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`
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`10 See Jared S. Hopkins, At Purdue Pharma, Business Slumps as Opioid Lawsuits Mount, Wall
`Street Journal, June 30, 2019, available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/purdue-pharma-grapples-with-
`internal-challenges-as-opioid-lawsuits-mount-11561887120?mod=hp_lead_pos6
`11 Barry Meier, Pain Killer, Pg. 167 (Random House 2018).
`12 Billionaire Sackler family owns second opioid maker, Financial Times, September 9, 2018,
`available at: https://www.ft.com/content/2d21cf1a-b2bc-11e8-99ca-68cf89602132
`13 Id.
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`44.
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`The Sacklers faced a problem: the need to grow OxyContin sales as dramatically
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`as possible so as to make Purdue an attractive acquisition target or borrower, while at the same
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`time appearing14 to comply with the Corporate Integrity Agreement.
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`45.
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`Purdue and the Sacklers were well aware of the constraints posed by the
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`Agreement. Indeed, during a May 20, 2009 Executive Committee Meeting, the discussion led to
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`whether Purdue should have a single sales force marketing all Purdue products, including
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`OxyContin, or instead to “create a separate Sales Force for Intermezzo (a sleeping pill) that would
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`be comprised of approximately 300 representatives.” John Stewart, the Sacklers’ chosen Chief
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`Executive Officer for Purdue at the time, saw an opportunity, and asked if the Corporate Integrity
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`Agreement would apply if Purdue were to launch Intermezzo and another Purdue product, Ryzolt
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`(a branded version of Tramadol, another narcotic painkiller), using the separate sales force. Might
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`the new drug launch fall outside of the Corporate Integrity Agreement, he asked?15
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`46.
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`It would not, he was told by Bert Weinstein, Purdue’s Vice President of
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`Compliance.16
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`47.
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`Given the tension between compliance with the Corporate Integrity Agreement
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`and the desire to sell more OxyContin, Purdue needed help.
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`14 As one Purdue executive stated of Purdue’s attitude toward the Corporate Integrity Agreement:
`“They did not listen to their critics and insisted they had just a few isolated problems. After the settlement,
`they didn’t change – the way the sales force was managed and incentivized, everything stayed the same.”
`David Crow, How Purdue’s ‘one-two’ punch fuelled the market for opioids, Financial Times, September 9,
`2018, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/8e64ec9c-b133-11e8-8d14-6f049d06439c
`15 Purdue Pharma Executive Committee Meeting Notes and Actions, May 20, 2009, Pg. 2.
`16 Id.
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`48.
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`Ethan Rasiel, a former McKinsey consultant, has described the typical way
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`McKinsey begins wo