Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper 18
`Date: May 4, 2022
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`APPLE INC.,
`Apple,
`
`V.
`
`SENTIUS INTERNATIONAL, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`‘
`
`IPR2020-01646
`Patent 7,672,985 B2
`
`Before DAVID C. MCKONE, CHRISTOPHER L. OGDEN,and
`STEVEN M. AMUNDSON,Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`OGDEN,Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`JUDGMENT
`Final Written Decision
`Determining All Challenged Claims Unpatentable
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a)
`
`
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper 18
`Date: May 4, 2022
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`APPLE INC.,
`Apple,
`
`V.
`
`SENTIUS INTERNATIONAL, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`‘
`
`IPR2020-01646
`Patent 7,672,985 B2
`
`Before DAVID C. MCKONE, CHRISTOPHER L. OGDEN,and
`STEVEN M. AMUNDSON,Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`OGDEN,Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`JUDGMENT
`Final Written Decision
`Determining All Challenged Claims Unpatentable
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a)
`
`
`
`IPR2020-01646
`Patent 7,672,985 B2
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`
`In response to a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) by Petitioner Apple Inc.
`
`(“Apple”),! the Board instituted an inter partes review of claims 1-23, 25-
`
`29, 31, 32, and 35-46 of U.S. Patent No. 7,672,985 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the
`°985 patent”). Paper 6. Patent OwnerSentius International, LLC (“Sentius”)?
`
`filed a Patent Owner Response (Paper8, “PO Resp.”), Apple filed a Reply to
`
`the Patent Owner Response (Paper10, “Pet. Reply”), and Sentius filed a
`Sur-reply (Paper 11, “PO Sur-reply”).
`|
`Weheld an oral hearing on February 3, 2022, and the transcriptis
`
`entered on the record. Paper 17 (“Tr.”).
`
`This is a Final Written Decision under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) as to
`
`whetherthe claims challenged in the inter partes review are unpatentable.
`
`For the reasons below, we conclude that Apple has shownthatall the
`
`challenged claims are unpatentable on the groundsofthe Petition.
`
`Il. BACKGROUND
`
`A.
`
`RELATED PROCEEDINGS
`
`The parties identify the following as related matters: Sentius Int’l,
`
`LLC vy. Apple Inc., No. 4:20-cv-00477-YGR (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 22, 2020),
`
`transferredfrom No. 1:19-cv-01444-MN (D.Del. filed July 31, 2019); and
`
`Zoho Corp. v. Sentius Int'l, LLC, No. 4:19-cv-00001-YGR (N.D. Cal. filed
`
`Jan. 1, 2019); Sentius Int’l, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 5:13-cv-00825-PSG
`
`(N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 22, 2013, terminated Feb. 5, 2015). Pet. 10-13, 68;
`
`' Apple identifies itself as the real party in interest. Pet. 68.
`2 Sentius identifies itself as the real party in interest. Paper3, 1.
`
`2
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`IPR2020-01646
`Patent 7,672,985 B2
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`Paper 3, 1; Ex. 1007 (claim construction order in Sentius v. Microsoft);
`
`Ex. 1008 (claim construction order in Zoho v. Sentius).
`
`B.
`
` THE’985 PATENT (Ex. 1001)
`
`The ’985 patentrelates to a system that automatically builds a term
`
`database that associates potential terms of interest within a set of documents
`
`with expert-provided content related to those terms. Ex. 1001, code (57);
`
`1:16—-17, 2:21-22, 2:31-32. The system also “syndicates content from that
`
`database to remote application installations.” Jd. at 1:18-19.
`
`The main example of such a term database, called the “RichLink Term
`
`Database,” “is a library that contains all terms and associated content that
`
`can be sorted and queried, using businesscriteria to organize into
`
`dictionaries or similar information,’ and may include content types “such as
`
`text, imagc, sound, vidco, mixed media, [or] forms.” Ex. 1001, 4:13-18; see
`
`also id. at 12:67—13:2 (“The content comes from types suchas text, images,
`
`movies, sounds, forms (including eCommercetransactions, surveys, or
`
`polls), or a mixture of the above.”). In this example,“there is a one-to-many
`
`relationship . .. between matching terms and content associated with
`
`matching terms.” Jd. at 4:18—20.
`
`The system identifies terms of interest by parsing the documents
`
`accordingto a set of rules. See Ex. 1001, 6:51-7:18, Fig. 7. Each term that
`
`the parser identifies “can be assigned manually or automatically to an expert
`based on the expert’s area of knowledge,” who“submits content for the
`terms assigned to them.” /d. at 11:21-24. These experts may, for example,
`
`be from a marketing team of a “content sponsor” whobuilds a dictionary of
`
`product information associated with the identified terms. See id. at 11:25—34.
`
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`An expert whois “assigned terms in this way will have an editing interface
`
`that enables them to submit content for their list of terms,” and this content
`
`mayinclude “text, links, images, movies, sound files, response forms, or
`
`mixtures of someorall of these.” Jd. at 11:37-39. Third parties may also
`
`sponsor content, and this content “can take almost any form, suchastext,
`
`images, mixed media, banner ads, surveys, links, and email requests.” See
`
`id. at 13:65-67.
`
`The system then annotates source documents by tagging the identified
`
`terms andcreating links to the associated content. See Ex. 1001, 7:35—-44,
`
`8:35-9:17. Ultimately, when a user reads the document that has been
`
`annotated with this system, the user may click on the annotated term and
`
`bring up a window showingthe content associated with that term. See
`
`Ex. 1001, 7:45-51; 12:6-15.
`
`C.
`
`CHALLENGED CLAIMS AND GROUNDS
`
`Independent claim 1, which exemplifies the other challenged claims,
`
`is as follows:
`
`1. A computer implemented method for processing
`database content, the method comprising the stepsof:
`[1(a)]
`syndicating one or more data objects associated with a
`term database to one or more remote computers,
`wheroin the one or morc data objects contain data
`associated with one or more terms;
`
`[1(b)] parsing one or more documentsto identify at least one
`term based on at least onerule;
`
`[1(c)]
`[1(d)]
`
`identifying content for the at least one term; and
`associating the at least one term with the identified
`content;
`
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`Patent 7,672,985 B2
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`[1(e)] wherein the one or more data objects associated with
`the term database provide a representation of at
`least a portion of the term database at the one or
`more remote computers andare used tolink the
`identified content with the at least one term.
`
`Ex. 1001, 14:8-22 (Apple’s reference letters added). Claims 11, 20, 21,
`
`and 36 are also independent, and the remaining challenged claims depend
`
`directly or indirectly from the independent claims. See id., cols. 14-16.
`
`Apple argues two groundsfor inter partes review, as summarized in
`
`the following table:
`
`
`
`
`Claim(s) Challenged
`1-23, 26-29, 31, 32, 35-46
`
`Pet. 4.
`
`35 U.S.C. §
`
`References(s)/Basis
`van Hoff,' Rodkin®
`van Hoff, Rodkin,Ingram‘
`
`
`
`
`
`D.
`
`DECLARATORY TESTIMONY
`
`In its Petition, Apple relies on the declaration of Dr. Loren Terveen,
`
`whois a Professor at the University of Minnesota in the Department of
`
`Computer Science and Engineering. Ex. 1003 4 6, App’x A (curriculum
`
`335 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
`Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 103, sec. (n)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 287, 293 (2011)
`(effective Mar. 16, 2013). The ’985 patent issued on March 2, 2010, whichis
`before the effective date of this amendmentto section 103. See Ex. 1001,
`code (45).
`4 Van Hoff, US 5,822,539, issued Oct. 13, 1998 (Ex. 1004).
`> Rodkinet al., US 6,092,074, issued July 18, 2000 (Ex. 1005).
`° Ingram et al., US 6,925,496 B1, filed June 16, 2000, issued Aug. 2, 2005
`(Ex. 1006). Apple contends that Ingram is prior art becauseits filing date
`preceded the ’985 patent’s earliest priority date. See Pet. 63 (citing 35 U.S.C.
`§ 102(e) (2006)). Sentius does not contest this. See PO Resp. 35-37, 61-62.
`
`5
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`vitae). Supporting its Patent Owner Response, Sentius submits a declaration
`
`by Dr. Vijay Madisetti, who is a Professor in Electrical and Computer
`
`Engineering at the GeorgiaInstitute of Technology. Ex. 2002 J 8, Ex. A
`
`(curriculum vitae).
`
`Apple contends that we should give Dr. Madisetti’s testimony
`
`minimal weight because“the vast majority of his declaration is simply a
`
`verbatim copy of the attorney arguments in the [Patent Owner Response],”
`
`and because his “long and lucrative careertestifying against Apple calls into
`
`question the independentnature of his opinions.” Pet. Reply 22—23 (citing
`
`Ex. 1014, 40:22-42:7, 43:5-50:24, 64:3-—20; Ex. 2002 Ex. A; Ex. 1015).
`
`Wedisagree that these are persuasive reasonsfor us to diminish the
`
`weight we give Dr. Madisetti’s testimony. In this decision, we considerhis
`
`testimony and give it appropriate weight based solely on its merits.
`
`III. GROUNDSOF THE PETITION
`
`For the reasons below, we determine that Apple has shown,by a
`
`preponderanceofthe evidence, that claims 1-23, 26-29, 31, 32, and 35-46
`
`of the ’985 patent are unpatentable under the ground based on the
`
`combination of van Hoff and Rodkin, and that claim 25 is unpatentable
`
`underthe ground based on the combination of van Hoff, Rodkin, and
`
`Ingram. Before analyzing these groundsin detail, we address two matters
`
`that will underlie our analysis: the level of ordinary skill in the art and the
`
`construction we will apply to the claim terms.
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`A.
`
`LEVEL OF ORDINARYSKILL IN THE ART
`
`The level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the
`
`invention is a factor in how weconstrue the patent claims. See Phillips v.
`
`AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). It is also
`
`one of the factors we consider when determining whethera patent claim is
`
`obviousoverthe prior art. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18
`
`(1966).
`
`To assess the level of ordinary skill, we construct a hypothetical
`
`“person of ordinary skill in the art,” from whose vantage point we assess
`
`obviousness and claim interpretation. See In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357
`
`(Fed. Cir. 1998). This legal construct “presumesthat all prior art references
`
`in the field of the invention are available to this hypothetical skilled artisan.”
`
`Id. (citing In re Carlson, 983 F.2d 1032, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
`
`Relying on Dr. Terveen’s testimony, Apple argues that a person of
`
`ordinary skill in the art would have had “at least a Bachelor’s degree in
`
`computer science and/or software engineering, or an equivalent degree with
`
`one year of experience in database managementand creation. Additional
`
`education may substitute for lesser work experience and vice versa.” Pet. 3
`
`(citing Ex. 1003 Ff 23-25).
`
`Sentius does not contest this, “but would add that a [person of
`
`ordinary skill in the art] would also have experience with web-based systems
`
`and design.” See PO Resp. 18-19 (citing Ex. 2002).
`
`Apple’s and Sentius’s proposedarticulations of the level of ordinary
`
`skill are slightly different than those proposed bytheir experts. On Apple’s
`
`behalf, Dr. Terveen, opines that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have had
`
`“multiple years of experience in the fields of software engineering or
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`IPR2020-01646
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`computer engineering,” as well as “experience with data structures, user
`
`interface design, and database management and creation systems, or their
`
`equivalent.” Ex. 1003 J 24. On behalf of Sentius, Dr. Madisetti states that he
`
`has “no substantial disagreement” with Dr. Terveen’s opinion on the level of
`
`ordinary skill, except that he would add “that such a person would have
`
`between 2-4 years of experience rather than leave it unspecified.” Ex. 2002
`44.
`.
`Wefind Apple’s articulation reasonable in light of the subject matter
`
`involved in the ?985 patent except for a couple of caveats. Both experts
`
`appearto agree that an ordinarily skilled artisan would haveat least two
`
`years of experience, and wefind their testimony persuasive. See Ex. 1003
`
`q 24; Ex. 2002 7 44. We also agree with Sentius that an ordinarily skilled
`
`artisan would have had experience in web-based systems and design. While
`
`the °985 patent “relates generally to database building and delivery of
`
`database content” (Ex. 1001, 1:14—15), it also discusses linking the database
`
`content to words and phrases in a web document(see id. at 2:7-59, 4:33-39,
`
`5:54-58, 6:51-7:18, 8:22—29).
`
`Thus, for our decision, we adopta level of ordinary skill consistent
`
`with both parties’ proposals and the expert testimony: wefind that a person
`
`of ordinary skill in the art would have had at least a Bachelor’s degree in
`
`computerscience, soitware engineering, or an equivalent degree with 24
`years of experience in database managementand creation as well as web-
`based systems and design. See Pet. 3; PO Resp. 18-19.
`
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`B.
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`
`In an inter partes review, we construe a patent claim “using the same
`
`claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a
`
`civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2021). This
`
`generally includes “construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and
`
`customary meaning of such claim as understood by one ofordinary skill in
`
`the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Jd. The ordinary
`and customary meaning of a claim term “is its meaning to the ordinary
`artisan after reading the entire patent,” and “as of the effective filing date of
`
`the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313, 1321. There are only two
`circumstances in which a construction departs from the ordinary and
`
`customary meaning: “1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as
`
`[their] own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavowsthe full scope of
`
`a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.” Thornerv.
`
`Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Any
`
`such special meaning of a term “must be sufficiently clear in the
`
`specification that any departure from commonusage would be so understood
`
`by a person of experiencein the field of the invention.” Multiform
`
`Desiccants Inc. v. Medzam Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
`
`To construe the claim terms, “we look principally to the intrinsic
`
`evidence of record, examining the claim languageitself, the written
`
`description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc.v.
`
`Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006). We
`
`also consider“[a]ny prior claim construction determination concerning a
`
`. that is timely made of record”in this
`.
`term of the claim in a civil action .
`proceeding. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2020).
`
`9
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`Weaddressthe parties’ claim construction arguments below.
`
`1,
`
`Uncontested Proposed Constructions
`
`Apple proposes constructions below for the following terms, as
`
`construed in tworelatedlitigations (see supra Section II.A; Exs. 1007,
`
`1008):
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Apple’s Proposed Construction
`syndicated |
`“making content available for automatic
`
`syndicating
`download over a network to one or more
`
`remote subscribed computers”
`
` database
`“a collection of data with a given structure for
`accepting, storing and providing, on demand,
`
`data for at least one user”
`
`
`
`“(create/creating] a pointer to data or
`linking the identified
`
`
`information or the location of data or
`content with the at least
`
`
`information that is external to the source
`ane term | linking ta the
`material”
`supplemental content
`
`
`
`
`A means-plus-function-limitation:
`term modulefor parsing /
`function: “parsing one or more documents to
`means for parsing
`
`
`
`
`identify at least one term based onat least
`
`one rule”
`corresponding structure: “a computer
`processorin conjunction with executable
`
`code for instructing the computer
`
`processor to parse one or more documents
`
`to identify at least one term based onat
`
`least one rule, and equivalents thereof”
`
`
`A means-plus-function-limitation:
`processing modulefar
`
`
`
`function: “identifying content for the at least
`
`
`identifying / meansfor
`one term”
`identifying
`
`
`
`corresponding structure: “a computer
`processorin conjunction with executable
`
`code for instructing the computer
`processorto identify content for the at
`
`least one term, and equivalents thereof”
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`10
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`
`
`
`“computer readable data structures that
`data objects associated
`
`include data from [a/the] [term] database”
`with a term database/
`
`data objects associated
`with the term database /
`
`
`data objects associated
`with a database
`
`
`
` “breaking one or more documents into
`parsing one or more
`segments to identify at least one term based
`documents to identify at
`
`
`on [atleast one rule] / [one or more
`least one term based on at
`
`
`predetermined rules]”
`least one rule /
`
`
`
`
`parsing one or more
`source documents to
`
`identify at least one term
`based on one or more
`
`predetermined rules
`
`
`
`lexicon object
`
`
`“computer-readable data structure that
`providesa local representation of the content
`of the term database”
`
`
`
`Pet. 10-13 (alterations in original) (citing Ex. 1007; Ex. 1008, 31-33).
`
`Sentius does not contest these proposed constructions. See PO Resp. 20; id.
`
`at 25-26 (citing Ex. 2002 Ff 95-97) (accepting the District Court’s
`
`constructions of database andthe variations of data objects associated with
`
`a term database). We adopt these constructions for purposesofthis decision.
`
`Apple also proposes that we construe the term template object to
`
`mean “computer-readable data structure that identifies the rules that should
`
`be used in processing.” Pet. 13. And Apple proposes that we construe means
`
`for associating as a means-plus-function limitation with the function of
`
`“associating the at least one term with the identified content,” and the
`
`corresponding structure of “a computer processor in conjunction with
`
`executable code for instructing the computer processorto associate the at
`
`least one term with the identified content.” Pet. 14. Sentius does not include
`
`these terms among those it contends need to be construed. See PO Resp. 20.
`
`1]
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`Because the meaningsofall the above terms are not in controversy,
`
`and do not affect the contested issues raised in this proceeding, we do not
`
`need to construe these terms. See Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad
`
`Ocean Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“{W]e need only
`
`construe terms ‘that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to
`
`resolve the controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g,
`
`Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
`
`2.
`
`“content,” “identified/linked content,” and “identifying
`contentfor the at least one term”
`Sentius proposes that we construe the term content to mean “data,
`including data to be displayed.” PO Resp.31 (citing Ex. 2002 ff 107-109).
`
`According to Sentius, the ’985 patent uniformly describes procuring content
`
`“for display” and then displaying content in a content window.Jd. at 30-31
`
`(citing Ex. 1001, 12:6-15, 12:57-65). Similarly, Sentius contends that we
`
`should construe the terms identified content (found in independentclaims1,
`
`11, and 20) and linked content (found in independent claims 21 and 36) as
`
`“database contentfor display.” PO Resp. 29-30 (citing Ex. 2002 {J 105—
`
`106). And Sentius argues that we should construe the term identifying
`
`contentfor the at least one term (foundin all independent claims) as
`
`requiring that the identified content be “for display.” Jd. at 23 (citing
`
`Ex. 2002 | 90); PO Sur-reply 1-2.
`
`Sentius distinguishes between such content, which Sentius arguesis
`
`“for display,” and metadata, whichis not. Sentius argues that “[i]n the
`
`parlance of the °985 patent, the display content curated in the system was
`
`also referred to as ‘supplemental information,’” which the patent treats and
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`discusses separately from metadata. See PO Resp. at 23—24 (citing Ex. 1001,
`
`2:7-19, 11:55-67).
`
`Apple replies that Sentius’s proposed construction is inconsistent with
`
`principles of claim differentiation because dependent claims 37, 41, and 45
`
`explicitly require that the identified content “is displayed,” which is missing
`
`in their respective independentclaims 1, 11, and 20. Pet. Reply 4-5. Apple
`
`also contendsthat the ’985 patent describes embodiments, including “links,”
`
`in whichthe identified content is not displayed. Jd. at 5 (citing Ex. 1001,
`
`11:35-38, 13:65-67).
`
`Sentius acknowledgesthat the °985 patent includes links among the
`
`possible “identified content,” but contends that these links are still
`
`“identified for display (and displayed),” so there is no inconsistency between
`
`the *985 patent specification and its proposed construction. PO Resp. 25
`
`(citing Ex. 2002 { 94); see also PO Sur-reply 3 (citing Ex. 2002 f{] 103—
`
`109). In its Sur-reply, Sentius also clarifies that it is distinguishing between
`
`identified content that is “for display” in independentclaims 1, 11, and 20,
`
`and identified content that “is displayed” in dependentclaims 37, 41, and 45.
`
`PO Sur-reply 2. Sentius also argues that Dr. Madisetti’s opinion on the
`
`claim-differentiation issue is unrebutted. See PO Sur-reply 11-12.
`
`Wedisagree with Sentius that a person of ordinary skill in the art
`
`would have understood the terms identified content, linked content, or
`
`identifying contentfor the at least one term to require that the contentis “for
`
`display.” First, Sentius does not specifically argue that the meaning of the
`
`term departs from its ordinary and customary meaning, and wefind noclear
`
`evidence of such a departure in the °985 patent or its prosecution history. See
`
`generally Exs. 1001, 1002; see also Pet. Reply 7—8 (arguing that neither
`
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`Sentius nor Dr. Madisetti had suggested that the °985 patent applicant
`
`disavowedclaim scope or defined any terms) (citing Ex. 1014, 18:22-19:6,
`22:16—23:15, 24:3-18 (Dr. Madisetti’s cross-examination testimony)).’ For
`
`example, there is nothing in the plain language of independentclaims1, 11,
`
`or 20 that explicitly mentions that the content is intended “for display.” Nor
`
`do wefind in the ’985 patentor its prosecution history any commentary on
`
`the meaning of any of the above terms,let alone any definitional statements
`
`or disavowals of claim scope. Indeed, the ’985 patent takes an expansive
`
`view of what the identified or linked content can be, suggesting that it “can
`
`take almost anyform, suchas text, images, mixed media, bannerads,
`
`surveys, links, and email requests.” Ex. 1001, 13:65-—67 (emphasis added).
`
`Next, although we understand the term supplemental information in
`the °985 patent to be an example ofidentified or linked content, we find no
`persuasive evidencethat an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood
`
`the °985 patent’s descriptions of supplemental information to be definitional.
`In particular, Dr. Madisetti points to passages in the °985 patent referring to
`supplemental information, but fails to provide a basis for his opinion that
`
`these passages are definitional of the terms identified content or linked
`
`’ Forthe first time in its Sur-reply, Sentius raises an alternative argument
`that the °985 patent applicants acted as their own lexicographers by
`including dependentclaims 37, 41, and 45 to clarify that claims 1, 11, and 20
`refer to “display content.” PO Sur-reply 13. This is an improperlate
`argumentnotentitled to consideration. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(b).
`Nevertheless, we disagree with this argument becauseit turns the idea of
`claim differentiation on its head, and there is nothing in claims 37, 41, or 45
`that would have clearly indicated to an ordinarily skilled artisan that the
`applicants were acting as their own lexicographers.
`
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`content, rather than (as weinterpret the passages) merely descriptive of an
`
`embodiment. See Ex. 2002 { 92 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:7-19, 11:55-67).
`
`Finally, we consider Sentius’s argumentthat identified content or
`
`linked content only includes content “for display” to be inconsistent with the
`
`explicit requirement in claims 37, 41, and 45 that content“is displayed.”
`
`Ex. 1001, 16:42, 51, 61. This limitation in the dependentclaims suggests
`
`that there are examplesof identified content that are never displayed, and
`thusare not “for display.”® See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (“[T]he presence
`
`of a dependent claim that adds a particular limitation givesrise to a
`
`presumption that the limitation in question is not present in the independent
`
`claim.” (citing Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 910
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2004)).
`
`Thus, considering the evidence of record, we determine that the terms
`
`content, identified content, linked content, and identifying contentfor the at
`
`least one term havetheir ordinary and customary meanings, which do not
`
`require that the content necessarily be “for display” or include data “to be
`
`displayed.”
`
`a 8
`
`We note that the °985 patent explicitly includes “soundfiles” as potential
`identified content. See Ex. 1001, 11:38; see also Tr. 20:14—24. At the
`hearing, Sentius’s counsel argued that a sound file wouldstill be “displayed”
`in the sense that a window would appear in whicha usercould start and stop
`the soundfile. See Tr. 43:6-46:14. Although a soundfile might be associated
`with a displayable control window, we disagree that the underlying sound
`file, itself, would be “for display.” See id. Thus, a sound file would be an
`example of identified or linked content not “for display.”
`
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`3.
`
`“term database”’
`
`Similarly to the above terms, Sentius contends that we should
`
`construe term database to mean a databasethat “collects the content that
`
`will be displayed to a user.” PO Resp. 26. As evidence for this construction,
`
`Sentius cites passages in the ’985 patent disclosing that “supplemental
`
`information” for a given term is inserted into, or mergedinto, a central “term
`
`database.” Jd. (citing Ex. 1001, 2:8-14, 3:39-40; Ex. 2002 4 99). Sentius
`
`also points to passages in the ’985 patent describing a “RichLink Term
`
`Database module,” whichis “a library that contains all terms and associated
`contentthat can be sorted and queried, using business criteria to organize
`into dictionaries ofsimilar information.” PO Resp. 26—27 (quoting
`Ex. 1001, 4:14-17). According to Sentius, the ’985 patent “uniformly
`
`describes that the content stored in the term databaseis for display,” and
`
`includes mechanismsfor controlling its display format or composition. Jd. at
`
`27-28 (citing Ex. 1001, 10:53-62, 12:7-15, 12:58-61; Ex. 2002 {J 101-
`
`102).
`
`Apple disagrees that either “all the identified content must be stored in
`
`the database”or “all the identified content must be for display.” Pet. Reply
`
`3. Apple first argues that dependentclaims 38, 42, and 46 add to the
`
`independent claims a requirement that “the identified contentis stored in the
`
`term database,” suggesting that the independent claims include no such
`
`requirement. Jd. at 3 (citing Ex. 1001, claims 38, 42, 46). Apple makes a
`
`similar claim-differentiation argument as to dependentclaims 37, 41, and 45,
`
`which requirethat “the identified content is displayed on a userinterface.”
`
`See id.; see supra SectionIII.B.2.
`
`16
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`Sentius contendsthat its argument about the phrase term database
`
`“do[es] not violate any claim differentiation principles because claims1, 11,
`and 20 do not require that the identified content be specifically stored in a
`term database,” as opposedto, for example, “a data object associated with a
`
`term database (and thereforestill database content).” PO Resp. 26 (citing
`
`Ex. 2002 § 98); see also PO Sur-reply (arguing that the “identif[ied] content
`
`in claims 1, 11, and 20 is a specific subset of the total content of the term
`
`database”(alteration in original) (citing Ex. 2002 FJ 105—106)); see also PO
`
`Sur-reply 11 (arguing that Dr. Madisetti’s opinion on the claim-
`
`differentiation issue is unrebutted).
`
`Wefind Apple’s claim-differentiation arguments persuasive. We
`
`address claim differentiation as to claims 37, 41, and 45 above. See supra
`
`Section JII.B.2. Apple has persuasively shown that the phrase term database
`does not convey a database that must necessarily include content “for
`display.” The ’985 patent disclosure supports this determination becauseit
`
`broadly discloses the types of permissible content that may bestored in the
`
`RichLink Term Database, without any indication that the content is
`
`necessarily “for display.”? See Ex. 1001, 11:37—-39, 13:65-67.
`
`® Sentius contends that “the presence in a term databaseof other content
`beyonddisplay content does not mean that display contentis not included,”
`and “even when the entered contentis a link to be linked to a parsed term,
`there is nothing in the ’985 patent to suggest that it is not also displayed.”
`PO Resp. 28-29 (citing Ex. 2002 Ff 103-104); see also id. at 58-59 (citing
`Ex. 1001, 12:61—13:7). We agree, and it does not appearto be disputed (see
`Tr. 16:16-24, 23:7-10), that a link to other content can itself be displayed.
`But wedisagree that anything in the ’985 patcnt suggests that links or other
`content types associated with a term database must necessarily be “for
`display.”
`
`17
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`We also agree with Apple that the explicit requirement in claims 38,
`
`42, and 46 that “the identified content is stored in the term database”
`
`suggests to a person of ordinary skill in the art that respective independent
`claims 1, 11, and 20 do not include that requirement.!° See Phillips, 415 F.3d
`
`at 1315. We also find persuasive Apple’s argumentthat the °985 patent
`
`specification only suggests storing the identified content in the term database
`
`as an option, not a requirement. See Pet. Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:17-18
`(“Content types .
`.
`. may be stored in [the RichLink Term] database.”
`(emphasis added))). Thus, we agree that a person ofordinary skill in the art
`
`would not have understood, from the 985 patent’s description of the
`
`Richlink Term Database, that storing the identified contentis part of the
`
`meaning of the phrase term database.
`
`For the above reasons, we determine that the phrase term database has
`
`its ordinary and customary meaningin light of the °985 patent specification,
`
`and that this meaning does not require that the database necessarily include
`the identified content, or that its identified content necessarily be for display.
`
`4.
`
`“database content”
`
`Sentius argues that the preambles of the challenged claimsare limiting
`
`because the preambles “define[] that content recited in [the] claimed method
`
`or system is ‘database content.’” PO Resp. 23. According to Sentius, each
`
`10 Unlike the other independentclaims, claim 11 recites “a term database for
`storing the identified content.” Ex. 1001, 14:57. Thus, although claim 11
`does not require identified content to actually be stored, it explicitly requires
`that the term databaseis “for storing” such content. That the applicants
`found it necessary to add “for storing the identified content” is further
`evidence that an ordinarily skilled artisan would not have understood the
`phrase term database, alone, to require storing the identified content.
`
`18
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`claim refers to “identifying content” for various terms, and this “identified
`
`content is database content.” Jd. at 21. Sentius argues that in the °985 patent
`specification and its preferred embodiment, content associated with termsis
`stored in databases, which are necessary for the claimed invention to
`
`function. Jd. (citing Ex. 2002 JJ 85-86). Thus, according to Sentius, we
`should treat the preambles including the term database contentas limiting.
`
`Id. at 22-23.
`
`Asto the meaning of database content, Sentius arguesthat it
`
`“probably needs no construction,” but Sentius offers that its plain and
`
`ordinary meaningis “content that is accepted into, stored by, and provided
`
`from the database.” Jd. at 21.
`
`Apple does not specifically contest Sentius’s proposed construction of
`
`database content, but argues that the preamblesare notlimiting. See Pet.
`Reply 1-2. Apple contendsthat, “contrary to [Sentius’s] assertions, the
`bodies of the claims do notrely on the recited ‘database content’ for
`
`antecedent basis—that phrase does not appear oncein the body ofthe
`
`independentclaims.” Jd. at 2. According to Apple, “[t]he bodies of each of
`
`the claimed methods and systems define a complete invention that can be
`
`performed or made without reference to the preamble. Andin each instance,
`
`the preamble simply states a purpose: ‘processing database content.’” Jd.
`
`(citing Ex. 1UU1, cols. 14-16).
`
`Weagree with Apple that none of the challenged claimsrely on the
`
`term database content for antecedent basis. Although the claimsrefer to
`
`“content” and “identified content,” these terms are introduced in the bodies
`
`of the independent claims without any apparent reterence to an antecedent.
`
`See Ex. 1001, 14:16-17, 14:55, 15:26, 15:41, 16:28. Because the bodies of
`
`19
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`the independent claims define a complete methodorstructure without
`
`reference to their respective preambles, we determine that a person of
`
`ordinary skill in the art would have understood that the preambles merely
`
`express the purpose of the claimed invention, and are notlimiting.
`
`Nevertheless, as we discuss below, we find that van H
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