Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper6
`Date: May 6, 2021
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`APPLE,INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`V.
`
`SENTIUS INTERNATIONAL,LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2020-01646
`Patent 7,672,985 B2
`
`Before DAVID C. MCKONE, CHRISTOPHER L. OGDEN,and
`STEVEN M. AMUNDSON,Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`OGDEN,Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Granting Institution ofInter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314
`
`
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper6
`Date: May 6, 2021
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`APPLE,INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`V.
`
`SENTIUS INTERNATIONAL,LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2020-01646
`Patent 7,672,985 B2
`
`Before DAVID C. MCKONE, CHRISTOPHER L. OGDEN,and
`STEVEN M. AMUNDSON,Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`OGDEN,Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Granting Institution ofInter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 314
`
`
`
`IPR2020-01646
`Patent 7,672,985 B2
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Petitioner Apple Inc. (“Apple”)! filed a Petition (Paper1, “Pet.”)
`under 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-319 requesting inter partes review of claims 1-23,
`25-29, 31, 32, and 35—46 of U.S. Patent No. 7,672,985 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the
`°985 patent”). Patent Owner Sentius International, LLC (“Sentius”)’ filed a
`Preliminary Response (Paper5, “Prelim. Resp.”).
`
`Underthe authority delegated to us by the Director under 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.4(a), we mayinstitute an inter partes review when“the information
`presented in the petition .
`.
`. and any response .
`.
`. showsthatthere is a
`reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least
`
`1 of the claims challengedin the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018); see
`also 37 C.E.R. § 42.108(c) (2019). Applying that standard, weinstitute an
`inter partes review ofall the challenged claims of the ’985 patent for the
`reasons explained below. Thisis a preliminary decision, and wewill base
`our final written decision onthe full trial record, including any timely
`
`response by Sentius.
`
`II.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`A.
`
`RELATED PROCEEDINGS
`
`Theparties identify the following as related matters: Sentius Int’l,
`LLCv. Apple Inc., No. 4:20-cv-00477-YGR(N.D.Cal. filed Jan. 22, 2020),
`transferredfrom No. 1:19-cv-01444-MN (D.Del. filed July 31, 2019); and
`Zoho Corp. v. Sentius Int'l, LLC, No. 4:19-cv-00001-YGR(N.D.Cal. filed
`
`' According to the Petition, Appleis the real party in interest. Pet. 68.
`2 Sentius identifies itself as the real party in interest. Paper 3, 1.
`
`2
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`IPR2020-01646
`Patent 7,672,985 B2
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`Jan. 1, 2019). Pet. 68; Paper 3, 1. The parties also refer to a claim
`
`construction order in the following case relating to the ’985 patent: Sentius
`
`Int’l, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 5:13-cv-00825-PSG (N.D. Cal. filed Feb.
`
`22, 2013, terminated Feb. 5, 2015) (Ex. 1007).
`
`B.
`
` THE’985 PATENT (EX. 1001)
`
`The ’985 patent relates to a system that automatically builds a term
`database that associates terms ofinterest within a corpus of documents with
`
`content provided by experts related to those terms. Ex. 1001, code (57);
`1:16-17, 2:21—22, 2:31-32. The system also “syndicates content from that
`
`database to remote application installations.” /d. at 1:18-19.
`
`In one embodiment, the term database, called the “RichLink Term
`
`Database,”“is a library that containsall terms and associated content that
`
`can be sorted and queried, using businesscriteria to organize into
`dictionaries or similar information,” and may include content types “such as
`
`text, image, sound, video, mixed media, [or] forms.” Ex. 1001, 4:13-18; see
`also id. at 12:67—13:2 (“The content comes from types such as text, images,
`
`movies, sounds, forms (including eCommercetransactions, surveys, or
`polls), or a mixture of the above.”). In this embodiment, “there is a one-to-
`manyrelationship .
`.
`. between matching terms and content associated with
`
`matching terms.” Jd. at 4:18-20.
`The system identifies terms of interest by parsing a corpus of
`documents accordingto a set of rules. See Ex. 1001, 6:51-7:18, Fig. 7. Each
`
`identified term “can be assigned manually or automatically to an expert
`
`based on the expert’s area of knowledge,” who “submits contentfor the
`
`terms assigned to them.”/d. at 11:21-24. These experts may, in one
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`embodiment, be from a marketing team of a “content sponsor” who builds a
`
`dictionary of product information associated with the identified terms. See
`
`id. at 11:25-34. An expert whois “assigned terms in this way will have an
`
`editing interface that enables them to submit contentfor their list of terms,”
`
`and this content mayinclude “links.” Jd. at 11:35—38; see also id. at 13:65—
`
`67 (“Sponsored content can take almost any form, such as. .
`
`. links.”).
`
`When a term from the term database appears in a source document
`
`that has been annotated with this system, a user reading the source document
`
`mayclick on the term and bring up a window showingthe content associated
`
`with that term. See Ex. 1001, 7:45—51; 12:6—15.
`
`C.
`
`CHALLENGED CLAIMS AND GROUNDS
`
`Independent claim 1, which exemplifies the other challenged claims,
`
`is as follows:
`
`[1(P)]
`
`1. A computer implemented method for processing
`database content, the method comprising the stepsof:
`
`[1(a)]
`
`[1(b)]
`
`[1(c)]
`[1(d)]
`
`[1(e)]
`
`syndicating one or more data objects associated with a
`term database to one or more remote computers,
`wherein the one or more data objects contain data
`associated with one or more terms;
`
`parsing one or more documents to identify at least one
`term based onat least one rule;
`
`identifying content for the at least one term; and
`associating the at least one term with the identified
`content;
`
`wherein the one or more data objects associated with the
`term database provide a representation ofat least a
`portion of the term database at the one or more remote
`computers and are usedto link the identified content
`with the at least one term.
`
`4
`
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`Patent 7,672,985 B2
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`Ex. 1001, 14:8-22 (Apple’s reference letters added). Claims 11, 20, 21, and
`
`36 are also independent, and the remaining challenged claims depend
`
`directly or indirectly from the independent claims. See id., cols. 14-16.
`
`Apple argues two groundsfor inter partes review, as summarized in
`
`the following table:
`
`
`
`
`
`Claim(s) Challenged
`1-23, 26-29, 31, 32, 35-46
`
`Pet. 4.
`
`
`
`35 U.S.C. §
`
`
`
`van Hoff,’ Rodkin®
`van Hoff, Rodkin, Ingram®
`
`
`
`
`
`
`D.
`
`DECLARATORY TESTIMONY
`
`In its Petition, Apple relies on the declaration of Professor Loren
`
`Terveen, whois a Professor at the University of Minnesota in the
`
`Department of Computer Science and Engineering. Ex. 1003 6, App’x A
`
`(curriculum vitae). Supporting its Preliminary Response, Sentius has
`
`submitted a declaration by Professor Vijay Madisetti, who is a Professorin
`
`335 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006), amended by Leahy—Smith America Invents Act,
`Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 103, sec. (n)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 287, 293 (2011)
`(effective Mar. 16, 2013). The ’985 patent issued on March 2, 2010, whichis
`before the effective date of this amendmentto section 103. See Ex. 1001,
`code (45).
`4 Van Hoff, US 5,822,539, issued Oct. 13, 1998 (Ex. 1004).
`
`5 Rodkinet al., US 6,092,074, issued July 18, 2000 (Ex. 1005).
`° Ingram et al., US 6,925,496 B1, filed June 16, 2000, issued Aug. 2, 2005
`(Ex. 1006). Apple contends that Ingram is prior art becauseits filing date
`preceded the 985 patent’s earliest priority date. See Pet. 63 (citing 35 U.S.C.
`§ 102(e) (2006)). This is uncontested at this stage. Prelim. Resp. 54—55.
`
`5
`
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`Electrical and Computer Engineering at the Georgia Institute of Technology.
`
`Ex. 2001 4 30, Ex. A (curriculum vitae).
`
`Atthis preliminary stage, the parties do not challenge the declarants’
`
`qualifications to offer testimony as expert witnesses. However, Sentius
`
`contends that Professor Terveen’s declarationis entitled to little or no weight
`
`becauseit “(1) fails to define key claim terms; (2) is riddled with
`
`inconsistencies and erroneousassertions; and [(3)] merely reiterates Apple’s
`
`conclusory arguments.” Prelim. Resp. 23; see id. at 23-36.
`
`Asto Sentius’s first point (see Prelim. Resp. 23-25), we discuss the
`
`parties’ claim construction contentions below, including Sentius’s argument
`
`that Apple has failed to define key claim terms, and we determinethat the
`
`Petition—andby extension Professor Terveen’s supporting testimony—is
`
`not fatally deficient for failing to propose explicit constructions for “term
`
`database,” “content,” and “content window.” See infra part II.B.6.
`
`Sentius’s second andthird points are directed to the credibility,
`
`evidentiary foundation, and persuasiveness of Professor Terveen’s testimony
`
`in support ofApple’s asserted grounds of unpatentability. See Prelim. Resp.
`
`25~36. The issue of what weight we should give Professor Terveen’s
`
`testimonyis best resolved attrial. This is especially true because Sentius’s
`
`declarant, Professor Madisetti, has not yet opined in detail about Apple’s
`
`asserted grounds, except to the extent they relate to Sentius’s proposed claim
`
`constructions. See Ex. 2001 Ff 3-29. As we discuss below, the evidence
`
`currently of record, including Professor Terveen’s testimony, showsthat
`
`there is a reasonable likelihood of prevailing at trial. At trial, we will also
`
`consider any rebuttal evidence or testimony that Sentius introduces, and will
`
`reconsider Professor Terveen’s testimony in light of the full record.
`
`6
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`Ill.
`
`GROUNDSOF THE PETITION
`
`For the reasons below, we determine there is a reasonable likelihood
`
`that Apple would prevail in showingthat at least one of claims 1-23, 25-29,
`
`31, 32, and 35-46is unpatentable under the groundsraised in the Petition.
`
`Before addressing those groundsin detail, we first address the level of
`
`ordinary skill in the art, and whether we needto construe any claim terms
`
`explicitly for our analysis.
`
`A,
`
`LEVEL OF ORDINARYSKILL IN THE ART
`
`Thelevel of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time of the
`
`invention is one of the factual considerations relevant to obviousness. See
`
`Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). It is also relevant to
`
`how weinterpret the patent claims. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
`
`1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). To assess the level of ordinary
`
`skill, we construct a hypothetical “person of ordinary skill in the art,” from
`
`whosevantage point we assess obviousness and claim interpretation. See
`
`In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). This legal construct
`
`“presumesthat all prior art references in the field of the invention are
`
`available to this hypothetical skilled artisan.” Jd. (citing Jn re Carlson, 983
`
`F.2d 1032, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
`
`Relying on Professor Terveen’s testimony, Apple argues that a person
`
`of ordinary skill in the art would have had “at least a Bachelor’s degree in
`
`computer science and/or software engineering, or an equivalent degree with
`
`one year of experience in database managementand creation. Additional
`
`education may substitute for lesser work experience and vice versa.” Pet. 3
`
`(citing Ex. 1003 4] 23-25).
`
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`At this stage, Sentius does not contest Apple’s articulation ofthe level
`
`of ordinary skill. See Prelim. Resp. 7-8.
`
`Wefind Apple’s articulation sufficiently reasonable in light of the
`
`subject matter involved in the ’985 patent, and adoptit for our decision.If
`
`Sentius contests this articulation at trial, we will consider any evidence that
`
`Sentius submits, in light of the full trial record.
`
`B.
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`
`In an inter partes review, we construe a patent claim “using the same
`
`claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a
`
`civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2019). This
`
`generally includes “construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and
`
`customary meaning of such claim as understood by oneofordinary skill in
`
`the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Jd. We also
`
`consider “[a]ny prior claim construction determination concerning a term of
`
`the claim in a civil action .
`
`.
`
`. that is timely made of record”in this
`
`proceeding.Id.
`
`The ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term “is its meaning
`
`to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent,” and “as of the
`
`effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313,
`
`1321. To make this determination,“we look principally to the intrinsic
`
`evidence of record, examining the claim languageitself, the written
`
`description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence.” DePuy Spine, Inc. v.
`
`Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
`
`We addressthe parties’ arguments concerning claim construction
`
`below.
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`1.
`
`Apple’s Uncontested Proposed Constructions
`
`Apple proposes the constructions below for the following terms,as
`
`the District Court construed them in twoofthe related litigations in the
`
`Northern District of California (see supra part II.A; Exs. 1007, 1008):
`
`“syndicated/syndicating”
`
`“database”
`
`
`
`
`
`Apple’s Proposed Construction
`“making content available for
`automatic download over a network
`
`to one or more remote subscribed
`
`computers” Pet. 10 (citing
`
`
`
`‘a collection of data with a given
`structure for accepting, storing and
`
`providing, on demand,data for at
`least one user” Pet. 10 (citing
`
`
`
`
`“(create/creating] a pointer to data
`“linking the identified content with
`or information or the location of
`the at least one term” /
`
`
`
`
`data or information that is external
`“linking to the supplemental
`to the source material” Pet. 11
`content”
`
`
`
`
`(brackets in original) (citing
`
`
`
`A means-plus-function-limitation:
`“term module for parsing” /
`
`function: “parsing one or more
`“means for parsing”
`
`
`
`documents to identify at least
`
`one term based onat least one
`
`rule”
`
`corresponding structure:
`“a computer processor in
`
`conjunction with executable
`
`code for instructing the computer
`
`processorto parse one or more
`
`documents to identify at least
`
`one term based onat least one
`
`
`rule, and equivalents thereof”
`Pet. 11
`(citing
`
`
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`
`
`
`
`
`A means-plus-function-limitation:
`“processing module for
`
`function: “identifying content for
`identifying”/
`
`the at least one term”
`“means for identifying”
`
`
`
`corresponding structure:
`“a computer processor in
`
`conjunction with executable
`code for instructing the computer
`
`processorto identify content for
`
`the at least one term, and
`
`
`
`“data objects associated with a term
`
`
`
`that include data from [a/the] [term]
`database”/
`
`database”Pet. 12 (brackets in
`
`“data objects associated with the
`
`
`original) (citing Ex. 1008, 30-31)
`term database” /
`
`
`“data objects associated with a
`
`database”
`
`
`
`“breaking one or more documents
`“parsing one or more documents to
`into segments to identify at least
`
`identify at least one term based on
`
`
`one term basedon[at least one
`at least one rule” /
`
`
`rule] / [one or more predetermined
`“parsing one or more source
`
`
`rules]” Pet. 12 (brackets in original)
`documentsto identify at least one
`
`
`
`(citing Ex. 1008, 31-32)
`term based on one or more
`
`
`predetermined rules”
`
`
`
`
`‘“computer-readable data structure
`“lexicon object”
`that provides a local representation
`
`of the content of the term database”
`
`
`Pet. 13 (citing Ex. 1008, 3233).
`Sentius does not contest these proposed constructions. See Prelim.
`
`Resp. 10-11, 13, 15-17.
`
`Apple also proposes that we construe the term “meansfor associating”
`
`as a means-plus-function limitation with the function of “associating the at
`
`least one term with the identified content,” and the corresponding structure
`
`of “a computer processor in conjunction with executable code forinstructing
`
`the computer processorto associate the at least one term with the identified
`
`10
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`content.” Pet. 14. Sentius “does not object to this interpretation.” Prelim.
`
`Resp. 18.
`
`Because the meanings of the above terms are not presently in
`
`controversy, and are not dispositive of our decision to institute trial, we do
`
`not need to construe these terms explicitly at this stage. See Nidec Motor
`
`Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean MotorCo., 868 F.3d 1013, 1017 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2017) (“[W]e need only construe terms‘that are in controversy, and only to
`
`the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.
`
`(quoting Vivid Techs., Inc.
`
`v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
`
`2.
`
`“term database”
`
`Asdiscussed above, the parties do not dispute the district court’s
`
`construction of “database,” in one ofthe related litigations, as “a collection
`
`of data with a given structure for accepting, storing and providing, on
`
`demand,data for at least one user.” Ex. 1007, 2; Pet. 11; Prelim. Resp. 11.
`
`Building on that construction, Sentius contends that we should
`
`construe “term database” to mean “a collection of data with a given structure
`
`for allowing the data to be accepted, stored, and provided, on demand,
`
`including data to display to a user.” Prelim. Resp. 11 (emphasis added)
`
`(citing Ex. 2001 9§ 18-22). In other words, Sentius contendsthat a “term”
`
`database, as used in the challenged claims, means a database that includes
`
`data to display to a user.
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`As evidence for this construction, Sentius relies on the ’985 patent
`
`specification.’ In particular, Sentius points to the ’985 patent’s description of
`a RichLink® Term Database module, which the patent describesas “a library
`
`that contains all terms and associated content that can be sorted and queried,
`
`using businesscriteria to organize into dictionaries ofsimilar information.”
`
`Prelim. Resp. 11 (quoting Ex. 1001, 4:14-17). According to Sentius, the
`
`’985 patent makesclear“that the ‘associated content’ includes the actual
`
`content to be displayed in the RichLink Content Window.” Jd. at 11-12
`
`(citing Ex. 1001, 12:6-15 (“This module retrieves and displays content by
`
`constructing and serving the RichLink Content Window 170... . This
`
`module interacts with the Term Database and the Template Managerto select
`
`and display the appropriate content, navigation elements, and display
`
`elements in the RichLink Content Window.”)).
`
`Sentius also points to other passages in the ’985 patent that describe
`
`the RichLink Content Windowas displaying content associated with the
`
`term of interest that the user clicks on, and that this content is retrieved from
`
`the term database, or from a data object syndicated from the term database.
`
`Prelim. Resp. 12—13 (citing Ex. 1001, 9:23-29, 10:14—12:5, 12:57-67).
`
`Based on the preliminary record, we do not find Sentius’s preliminary
`
`arguments persuasive as to the meaning of“term database.” First, at this
`
`stage, the record does not give us reason to depart from our generalrule that
`
`we apply the ordinary and customary meaning of claim terms. 37 C.F.R.
`
`7 Professor Madisetti testifies that “the term ‘term database’ is not a term of
`art that would have a commonly understood meaning to a [person of
`ordinary skill in the art] outside of the patent specification.” Ex. 2001 4 18.
`8 “RichLink” appears to be a trademark.
`
`12
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`§ 42.100(b) (2019). There are only two exceptionsto this rule: “1) when a
`
`patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when
`
`the patentee disavowsthe full scope of a claim term either in the
`
`specification or during prosecution.” Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am.
`
`LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Sentius does not point to any
`
`evidence in the specification or the prosecution history indicating that the
`
`applicant intended to provide a special definition for “term database”or
`
`disavowthe term’s full ordinary and customary scope.
`
`Althoughthe “RichLink Term Database” described in the ’985 patent
`
`appears to include displayable content in the database, the present record
`
`suggests that a person ofordinary skill in the art would understandthis
`
`description as describing the preferred embodiment, rather than
`
`lexicographically defining or limiting the meaning of “term database.” See
`
`Williamson vy. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
`
`(“This court has repeatedly ‘cautioned against limiting the claimed invention
`
`to preferred embodiments or specific examples in the specification.’”
`
`(quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1328 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2002))). Thus, based on the evidence on the preliminary record, we view
`
`the term “term database” as having its ordinary and customary meaningin
`
`light of the °985 patent specification.
`
`Considering the ’985 patent specification as a whole, we do notat this
`
`time conclude that this ordinary and customary meaning requiresthat a
`
`“term database” include data to display to a user. In particular, we note that
`
`challenged claim 38 depends from claim 1 andrecites “wherein the
`
`identified content is stored in the term database”—suggesting that in
`
`claim 1, the identified content need not be stored in the term database.
`
`13
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`Ex. 1001, 16:43-44; see also id. at 16:53—54 (claim 42, depending from
`
`claim 11 and adding the samelimitation), 16:63—64 (claim 46, depending
`
`from claim 20 and adding the same limitation); Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315
`
`(“[T]he presence of a dependentclaim that adds a particular limitation gives
`
`rise to a presumptionthat the limitation in question is not present in the
`
`independentclaim.” (citing Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d
`
`898, 910 (Fed. Cir. 2004))).
`
`Wealso note that the °985 patent appears to describe embodiments in
`
`which the “content” of the term database is not necessarily the displayable
`
`content itself, but Jinks to the displayable content. See Ex. 1001, 11:35-38
`
`(“The types of content that may be submitted includetext, links, images,
`
`movies, sound files, response forms, or mixtures of someorall of these.”
`
`(emphasis added)); id. at 13:65-67 (“Sponsored content can take almost any
`
`form, such as text, images, mixed media, bannerads, surveys,links, and
`
`email requests.” (emphasis added)).
`
`For the above reasons, we determinefor this decision that “term
`
`database” has its ordinary and customary meaningin light of the ’985 patent
`
`specification, and that this meaning does not require that the database
`
`necessarily include data to display to a user. As permitted underthe rules of
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`the Board, the parties may present additional arguments or evidence onthis
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`issueattrial.
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`3.
`
`“content”
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`Next, Sentius proposes that we construe the term “content” to mean
`
`“data, including data to display to a user in a content window.”Prelim. Resp.
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`13 (citing Ex. 2001 Ff 23-25).
`
`14
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`
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`IPR2020-01646
`Patent 7,672,985 B2
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`Aswith the term “term database,” Sentius relies on the ’985 patent
`specification as evidenceforits proposed construction.’ See Prelim. Resp.
`
`14. In particular, Sentius points to passages in the ’985 patent describing the
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`“RichLink Content Window.” Jd. According to Sentius, a module in the
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`system “retrieves and displays content by constructing and serving the
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`RichLink Content Window,” which “interacts with the Term Database and
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`the Template Managerto select and display the appropriate content,
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`navigation elements, and display elements in the RichLink Content
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`Window.”Jd. (quoting Ex. 1001, 12:6-15). Sentius notes that when a user
`
`clicks a term in the document, “content associated with the term and menu
`
`item chosen appears in a Content Pane” of the RichLink Content Window.
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`Id. (quoting Ex. 1001, 12:57-65). Thus, according to Sentius, “the ’985
`
`patent explicitly teaches that the contentthat is identified for, associated with
`
`and linked to a given parsed term in a documentincludesthe data to be
`
`displayed to a user in a content window.” Jd.
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`We do notfind Sentius’s arguments persuasiveat this stage. First, the
`
`evidence of record does not suggest a departure from the general rule that we
`
`apply this term’s ordinary and customary meaning, becauseit appears that a
`
`person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the above passages of
`
`the ?985 patent as describing the preferred embodiment of a content window,
`
`rather than lexicographically defining or limiting the term “content.” Thus,
`
`for this decision, we view the term “content” as having its ordinary and
`
`customary meaningin light of the ?985 patent specification.
`
`” According to Professor Madisetti, “the term ‘content’ is not a term ofart
`that would have a consistent meaning to a [person ofordinary skill in theart]
`outside of the patent specification.” Ex. 2001 § 24.
`
`15
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`Patent 7,672,985 B2
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`Considering the ’985 patent specification as a whole, we do notat this
`
`time concludethat the ordinary and customary meaning of “content” must
`
`include data to display to a user in a content window.As we note above,the
`
`°985 patent appears to describe embodiments in which the “content”
`
`associated with the terms in the term databaseis not necessarily the
`
`displayable content itself, but Jinks to the content that may eventually be
`
`displayed in a content window. See supra part III.B.2; Ex. 1001, 11:35-38.
`
`Thus, we determinefor this decision that the term “content”has its
`
`ordinary and customary meaningin light of the ’985 patent specification,
`
`and that this meaning does not necessarily require that the content include
`
`data for display to a user in a content window.As permitted underthe rules
`
`of the Board, the parties may present additional arguments or evidence on
`
`this issueattrial.
`
`4.
`
`“content window ”’
`
`Sentius proposes that we construe the term “content window” to mean
`
`“a window particularized to display content to a user.” Prelim. Resp. 14-15
`
`(citing Ex. 2001 {J 26-27). As support for this construction, Sentius points
`
`to a description in the ’985 patent that whena userclicks a term in the
`
`document, “content associated with the term and menu item chosen appears
`
`in a Content Pane” of the RichLink Content Window.Jd. at 15 (quoting Ex.
`
`1001, 12:57-65).
`
`The term “content window”appears in dependentclaims4, 14, 23,
`
`and 25 (see Ex. 1001, 14:30, 15:6, 15:55, 15:58), and Apple relies on Rodkin
`
`or Ingram as teaching the “content window”limitation. See Pet. 35, 45, 52—
`
`54, 64-66. As we discuss below, we find Apple’s arguments for these claims
`
`sufficiently persuasive at this stage, even under Sentius’s proposed
`
`16
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`
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`IPR2020-01646
`Patent 7,672,985 B2
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`construction for this term. See infra parts III.C.8, 0. Thus, we do not need to
`
`construe the term explicitly at this stage. See Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017.
`
`J.
`
`“template object”
`
`Apple proposesthat we construe the term “template object” to mean
`
`“computer-readable data structure that identifies the rules that should be
`
`used in processing.” Pet. 13. Sentius disagrees, and instead proposes that we
`
`construe the term as meaning “computer-readable data structure that
`
`providesa local representation of processing and linking rules... of a
`
`template database.” Prelim. Resp. 17 (citing Ex. 2001 {] 28-29).
`
`The term “template object” appears in dependent claims 7 and 17
`
`(Ex. 1001, 14:40, 15:15), and Petitioner relies on van Hoff as teachingthis
`
`limitation. See Pet. 37-39, 46. In its arguments regarding claims 7 and 17,
`
`Sentius does notspecifically allege that the difference between its proposed
`
`construction and Apple’s is material to the sufficiency ofApple’s arguments
`
`on these claims. See Prelim. Resp. 51, 52-53.
`
`Because wefind Apple’s arguments for claims 7 and 17 to be
`
`sufficient at this stage, under either construction, we do not need to
`
`explicitly construe this term. See Nidec, 868 F.3d at 1017.
`
`6.
`
`Whether the Petition Is Fatally Deficientfor
`Failing to Propose Certain Constructions
`
`Because Apple did not propose explicit constructions for “term
`
`database,” “content,” or “content window,” Sentius contendsthat this
`
`omission rendersthe Petition fatally deficient. Prelim. Resp. 8-9 (citing
`
`37 C.E.R. § 42.104(b)(3); Orthopediatrics Corp. v. K2M, Inc., IPR2018-
`
`01548, Paper 9 (PTAB Mar.1, 2019); ASMIP Holding B.V. v. Kokusai
`
`17
`
`
`
`IPR2020-01646
`Patent 7,672,985 B2
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`Semiconductor Equipment Corp., IPR2018-01582, Paper 11 (PTAB Feb.25,
`
`2019); Zoyota Motor Corp. v. GE Hybrid Techs., LLC, 1PR2019-00009,
`
`Paper 7 (PTAB May3, 2019)).
`
`Apple has a burden ofspecificity in setting forth its groundsin the
`
`Petition. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 322(a)(3) (2018) (requiring a petition to
`
`identify “with particularity, each claim challenged, the grounds on which the
`
`challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds
`
`for the challenge to each claim’); 37 C.F.R. § 42.22(a)(2) (2019) (requiring a
`
`petition to include a “full statement of the reasonsfor the relief requested,
`
`including a detailed explanation of the significance of the evidence”), 37
`C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (2019) (setting forth the required contents of a petition
`including identifying “[h]ow the challenged claim is to be construed”).
`
`Generally stated, a petitioner must “articulate specific reasoning, based on
`
`evidence of record, to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Jn re
`
`Magnum Oil Tools Int'l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing
`
`KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)). However, after
`
`considering the Petition as a whole, we disagree with Sentius’s contention
`
`that Apple has failed to meet that burden.
`
`Asto the three non-precedential decisions that Sentius cites in support
`
`of its argument, these decisions appear to be inapposite to the facts of this
`
`case. In Orthopediatrics, the panel held that the petition was insufficient
`
`becausethe petitioner advocated for a different construction from that of the
`
`district court in a related litigation, and in orderto resolve the dispute, the
`
`claims had to be construed expressly to determine whether they contained
`
`means-plus-function limitations. See IPR2018-01548, Paper 9 at 9-11. In
`
`ASM IP Holding, the panel determined that the petitioner’s proposed
`
`18
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`
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`IPR2020-01646
`Patent 7,672,985 B2
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`construction wasincorrect, and as a result, the petitioner failed to articulate
`
`sufficiently specific reasoning to support its grounds for unpatentability. See
`
`IPR2019-01582, Paper 7 at 18-19. In Toyota Motor, the panel found the
`
`patent owner’s proposed constructions persuasive, and on that basis, found
`
`that the petitioner had not showna reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the
`
`asserted grounds. See IPR2019-00009, Paper 7 at 7-13, 18-24.
`
`In contrast to these cases, we do not find Sentius’s proposed claim
`
`constructions persuasive. And even though Apple did not propose explicit
`29:66
`
`constructionsfor “term database,”
`
`“content,” or “content window,” Apple’s
`
`view as to the ordinary and customary meaning ofthese termsis sufficiently
`
`apparent from the way that Apple mapsthese termsto the prior art, and
`
`Apple sufficiently expresses its position on the meaning of these terms. See,
`
`e.g., Pet. 1 (arguing that according to the 985 patent, a “term database”
`
`“containsall the terms and their associated content (e.g., supplemental
`
`information like the term’s category or context)”), 22 (contending that the
`
`“contents” of the database are the “data objects” of the directory), 35
`
`(identifying the “content window” in Rodkin as a browser configured to
`
`display a web page, showing hyperlinks, relating to a term).
`
`Thus, we decline to deny the Petition on the ground that Apple has
`99 66
`
`failed to propose explicit constructions for “term database,”
`
`“content,” and
`
`“content window.”
`
`C.|OBVIOUSNESS GROUND BASED ON VAN HOFF AND RODKIN
`(CLAIMS 1-23, 26-29, 31, 32, 35-46)
`
`Next, we consider Apple’s groundsofthe Petition. First, Apple
`
`contends that claims 1—23, 26-29, 31, 32, and 35—46 are unpatentable under
`
`§ 103(a) as obvious over van Hoff in view of Rodkin. Pet. 4, 14-62.
`
`19
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`
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`IPR2020-01646
`Patent 7,672,985 B2
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`A claim is unpatentable under § 103(a) for obviousnessif the
`
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the priorart are “such
`
`that the subject matter as a whole would have been obviousat the time the
`
`invention was madeto a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
`
`subject matter pertains.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 406. And when a ground in a
`
`petition is based on a combination of references, we consider “whether there
`
`was an apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion
`
`claimed by the patentat issue.” Jd. at 418 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977,
`
`988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Our obviousness inquiry focuses on factual
`
`considerations including (1) the scope and contentofthe priorart, (2) any
`
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the priorart, (3) the level
`
`of skill in the art, and (4) any objective indicia of obviousness or non-
`
`obviousness that may be in evidence. See Graham, 383 U:S. at 17-18.
`Considering these factors,'° we find Apple’s arguments sufficiently
`
`persuasive, at this stage, to show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing attrial
`
`on at least one of the challenged claims. We begin our analysis wit
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