Trials@uspto. gov
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper 11
`Entered: May 11, 2022
`
`UNITED ST ATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISECO.,
`Petitioner,
`
`Vv.
`
`INTELLECTUAL VENTURESIT LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2022-00096
`Patent RE44,818E
`
`Before DAVID C. MCKONE, JOHN A. HUDALLA, and
`JOHN D. HAMANN,Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`HUDAL.LA, Administrative Patent.Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Granting Institution ofJnter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. $314
`
`Petitioner, Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company(“Petitioner”), filed a
`
`Petition (Paper2, “Pet.”) requesting an interpartes review of claims 1-3, 6,
`
`7, 17-19, 30, 32-34, 37, 38, and 40 (“the challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent
`
`No. RE44,818 E (Ex. 1001, “the ’818 patent”). Petitioner filed a Declaration
`
`
`571-272-7822
`
`Paper 11
`Entered: May 11, 2022
`
`UNITED ST ATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISECO.,
`Petitioner,
`
`Vv.
`
`INTELLECTUAL VENTURESIT LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`
`IPR2022-00096
`Patent RE44,818E
`
`Before DAVID C. MCKONE, JOHN A. HUDALLA, and
`JOHN D. HAMANN,Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`HUDAL.LA, Administrative Patent.Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Granting Institution ofJnter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. $314
`
`Petitioner, Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company(“Petitioner”), filed a
`
`Petition (Paper2, “Pet.”) requesting an interpartes review of claims 1-3, 6,
`
`7, 17-19, 30, 32-34, 37, 38, and 40 (“the challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent
`
`No. RE44,818 E (Ex. 1001, “the ’818 patent”). Petitioner filed a Declaration
`
`
`
`IPR2022-00096
`Patent RE44,818E
`
`of Aaron D.Striegel, Ph.D. (Ex. 1003) with its Petition. Patent Owner,
`Intellectual Ventures II LLC (“Patent Owner’), filed a Preliminary Response
`(Paper10, “Prelim. Resp.”).
`
`We haveauthority to determine whetherto institute an interpartes
`
`review. See 35 U.S.C. § 314; 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a). Under 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 314(a), we may not authorize an interpartes review unless the information
`in the petition and the preliminary response “showsthat there is a reasonable
`
`likelihood thatthe petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the
`
`claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasonsthat follow, weinstitute
`an interpartes review asto claims 1-3, 6, 7, 17-19, 30, 32-34, 37, 38, and
`
`40 of the ’818 patent on all grounds of unpatentability presented.
`
`A.
`
`Real Parties-in-Interest
`
`lL BACKGROUND
`
`Petitioner identifies Hewlett Packard Enterprise Companyasthereal
`
`patty-in-interest. Pet. 1. Patent Owneridentifies Intellectual Ventures IT
`
`LLCasthe real party-in-interest. Paper 5, 1.
`
`B.
`
`RelatedProceedings
`Theparties identify the following proceedingrelated to the
`
`818 patent (Pet. 1; Paper 5, 1):
`
`Intellectual Ventures ILLC v. Hewlett PackardEnterprise Co., Case
`
`No. 6-21-cv-00226 (W.D.Tex. filed Mar. 9, 2021).!
`
`' Patent Ownerindicates that this action is currently being transferred to the
`U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Paper6, 1.
`
`
`
`IPR2022-00096
`Patent RE44,818E
`
`Petitioner also notes that the ’818 patent was the subject of
`
`IPR2020-00859 and IPR2020-01081 filed by a different petitioner, VMware,
`
`Inc. Pet. 13. VMware challenged claims 1, 30, 32, 33, and 37-42 in
`
`IPR2020-00859, and weinstituted an interpartes review on November5,
`
`2020. Exs. 1013, 1015. OnFebruary 2, 2021, we terminated
`
`IPR2020-00859 based ona settlement. Ex. 1016. VMware challenged
`
`claim 17 in IPR2020-01081. Ex. 1017. On January 26, 2021, and prior tq
`rendering an institution decision, we terminated IPR2020-01081 based ona
`
`settlement. Ex. 1019.
`
`C.
`
`The ’&18patent
`The ’818 patentis a broadeningreissue of U.S. Patent No. 7,711,789
`B1 (“the ’789 patent”). Ex. 1001, code (64), 1:12-16. The 818 patentis
`directed to “distributed computing systems and, more particularly, to the
`
`quality of service (QoS) managementofvirtualized input/output(I/O)
`subsystemsin virtual I/O servers.” Jd. at 1:20—23. Figure 1 ofthe
`°818 patent is reproduced below.
`
`
`
`IPR2022-00096
`Patent RE44,818E
`
`12a
`
`i
`
`106
`
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`Figure 1 depicts I/O switch fabric 104 interconnecting application
`
`servers 102a—< andvirtual I/O server 106. Jd. at 2:66—3:2. Storage area
`
`network (SAN) I/O subsystems 114 and local area network (LAN) I/O
`
`subsystems116 are attached to virtual I/O server 106. Jd. at 3:24. Virtual
`
`I/O server 106 has host bus adapters (HBAs) 108 as physical storage
`
`networkinterfaces connecting with SAN I/O subsystems 114 and network
`
`interfaces (NICs) 112 as physical LAN interfaces connecting with LAN I/O
`
`subsystems 116. /d. at 3:4-9. Virtual I/O server 106 connects to I/O switch
`
`fabric 104 through I/O fabric interface 110. Jd. at 3:9-11. Virtual I/O
`
`server 106 creates virtual device interfaces for application servers 102 to
`
`
`
`IPR2022-00096
`Patent RE44,818E
`
`accessthe I/O subsystemsasif the I/O subsystems were directly connected
`
`to application servers 102. Jd. at 3:18-21.
`
`Figure 2 of the ’818 patent is reproduced below.
`
`Applteatioen
`
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`
`Fig. 2
`
`Figure 2 is a schematic diagram illustrating a protocol stack and software
`modules of an application server. Jd. at 2:32-34. I/O fabric PHY
`
`interface 202 is a hardwareinterface or interconnection to I/O switch
`
`fabric 104. Jd. at 4:32-33. Encapsulation module 206 handles
`
`encapsulation processes associated with the virtualization of I/O subsystems
`betwecn application server 102 and nctworkinterfaces 112 and host bus
`adapters 108. Jd. at4:51-55. Encapsulation module 206 presents a generic
`interface to higher layer virtual interfaces, such as virtual HBAlayer 208a.
`
`Id. at 4:55-57. Virtual HBAlayer 208a establishes a connection with the
`
`
`
`IPR2022-00096
`Patent RE44,818E
`
`virtual block interface ofvirtual I/O server 106 to forward commandsor
`
`other messages. Jd. at 5:10-13. Virtual network interface 220is used to
`
`access networkinterfacesofvirtual I/O server 106 over I/O switch
`
`fabric 104. Jd. at 5:17—20. Virtual HBA layer 208ais assigned one or more
`
`virtual World Wide Names (WWNs). Jd. at 7:30—-32.
`
`The ’818 patent also discloses a hierarchical token bucket (HTB)
`scheduling mechanism that controls whether packets are forwarded for
`further processing or enqueued. Jd. at 9:66—10:2, 10:21-36. Sucha
`
`mechanism mayincludehierarchical classes.
`
`/d. at 10:15-21.
`
`The ’789 patent issued from an application that wasfiled on
`
`December7, 2007. Ex. 1002, code(22). Accordingly, the earliest possible
`
`effective filing date for the claims of the ’818 patent is December 7, 2007.
`
`Ex. 1001, code (64). Petitioner applies this date for qualitying the asserted
`
`referencesas prior art. See Pet. 12, 22.
`
`D.
`
`Illustrative Claim
`
`Ofthe challenged claims,claims 1, 17, 30, and 32 are independent.
`
`Claims 2, 3, 6, and 7 dependdirectly or indirectly from claim 1; claims 18
`and 19 depend from claim 17; and claims 33, 34, 37, 38, and 40 depend
`directly or indirectly from claim 32. Claim1is illustrative of the challenged
`
`claims andrecites:
`
`1.
`
`A method, comprising
`maintaining a connection, over a networkfabric, to a
`virtual storage networkinterface layer of an application server,
`
`
`
`* TIPR2022-00096
`Patent RE44,818E
`
`wherein thevirtual storage network interface layer is associated
`with a virtual storage nodeidentifier;
`presenting, at a physical storage networkinterface, the
`virtual storage nodeidentifier to a storage area network;
`enforcing a hierarchical token bucket resource allocation
`of bandwidth acrossthe physical storage networkinterface;
`receiving, over the connection, a storage command from
`the virtual storage networkinterface layer of the application
`server, wherein the storage commandis a commandto read data
`from, or write data to, a target connected to the storage area
`network;
`classifying the storage commandrelative to the
`hierarchical token bucket resource allocation to determine a
`current amount of tokensavailable;
`comparing a data transfersize of the storage command to
`the current amountof tokens available;
`forwarding the data associated with the storage command
`to the data’s destination, if the current amount of tokens
`available are sufficient; and
`
`buffering the storage command,if the current amount of
`tokens available are insufficient.
`
`Ex. 1001, 17:44—18:5.
`
`E.
`
`Prior Art
`
`Petitionerrelies on the following priorart:
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,782,869 B1, tiled Nov. 29, 2007,
`issued Aug. 24, 2010 (Ex. 1006,“Srinivasa”);
`U.S. Patent Application No. 2003/0172149 Al, filed
`Jan. 23, 2002, published Sept. 11, 2003 (Ex. 1007, “Edsall’”);
`and
`
`Wu,J. et al., “Hierarchical Disk Sharing for Multimedia
`Systems,” Proceedings ofthe 15th International Workshop on
`Network and Operating Systems Supportfor Digital Audio and
`Video, June 13-14, 2005, pp. 189-94 (Ex. 1008, “Wu”).
`
`
`
`IPR2022-00096
`Patent RE44,818E
`
`F.
`
`The Asserted Grounds
`
`Petitioner challenges claims 1-3, 6, 7, 17-19, 30, 32-34, 37, 38, and
`
`40 of the ’818 patent on the following grounds(Pet. 3):
`
`Claims Challenged|35 U.S.C. §
`
`1-3, 6, 7, 17-19, 30,|102(e)? Srinivasa
`32-34, 37, 38, 40
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1-3, 6, 7, 17-19, 30,|103(a) Edsall, Wu
`
`
`32-34, 37, 38, 40
`
`
`
`Il. ANALYSIS
`
`We now consider Petitioner’s asserted grounds and Patent Owner’s
`
`arguments in the Preliminary Response to determine whetherPetitioner has
`
`metthe “reasonablelikelihood” standardfor institution under 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 314(a).
`
`A.
`
`Legal Standards
`A claim is anticipated if a single prior art reference either expressly or
`inherently discloses every limitation of the claim. Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai
`Motor Am., 605 F.3d 967, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Although the elements must
`
`be arranged or combinedin the same wayasin the claim,“the reference
`
`need notsatisfy an ipsissimis verbistest,”i.e., identity of terminology is not
`
`required. Inre Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing In re
`
`Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832-33 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
`
`* The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125
`Stat. 284, 287-88 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112.
`Becausethe ’818 patent wasfiled before March 16, 2013 (the effective date
`of the relevant amendments), the pre-AIA versions of §§ 102, 103, and 112
`apply.
`
`
`
`IPR2022-00096
`Patent RE44,818E
`
`A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences
`between the claimed subject matter andthepriorart are such that the subject
`
`matter, as a whole, would have been obviousat the time the invention was
`
`madeto a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
`pertains. See KSR Int’ Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007).
`‘he question of obviousnessis resolved on the basis ofunderlying factual
`determinations, including (1) the scope and content ofthe prior art; (2) any
`
`differences between the claimed subject matter andthe priorart; (3) the level
`
`of skill in the art; and (4) where in evidence, so-called secondary
`
`considerations.? See Graham v. John Deere Co. , 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
`
`Wealso recognize thatprior art references must be “considered together
`
`with the knowledgeof one of ordinary skill in the pertinentart.” Jn re
`Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing Jn re Samour, 571] F.2d
`
`559, 562 (CCPA 1978)).
`
`B.
`
` LevelofOrdinary Skillin the Art
`Citing testimony from Dr. Striegel, Petitioner contends a person of
`ordinary skill in the art “would have had a bachelor’s degree in electrical
`engineering, computer science, computerengineering, or an equivalentfield
`of study, with at least two years of experience working with distributed
`
`computer systemsinvolving virtualization as well as QoS,including class-
`based scheduling mechanismssuchashierarchical token bucket (‘HTB’).”
`Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1003 § 27-34). Petitioner notes that we previously
`adopted this definition in IPR2020-00859. Jd. (citing Ex. 1015, 9). Patent
`
`3 The present record does notinclude any evidence of secondary
`considerations of nonobviousness.
`
`
`
`IPR2022-00096
`Patent RE44,818E
`
`Ownerdoesnotdispute Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill
`
`at this time.
`
`For purposesofthis Decision, we adopt Petitioner’s definition ofthe
`
`level of ordinary skill in the art. On the present record, wearesatisfied that
`
`this definition comports with the level of skill necessary to understand and
`
`implementthe teachings of the ’818 patent and the assertedpriorart.
`
`C.
`
`Claim Interpretation
`In an interpartes review, we construe each claim “in accordance with
`
`the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of
`
`ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.”
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Accordingly, our claim construction standard is the
`
`sameasthat of a district court. See id. Under the standard applied by
`
`district courts, claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary
`
`meaning as would have been understoodby a personofordinary skill in the
`
`art at the time of the invention and in the context ofthe entire patent
`
`disclosure. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
`
`(en banc). “Thereare only two exceptionsto this general rule: 1) whena
`
`patenteesets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when
`
`the patentee disavowsthe full scope of a claim term either in the
`
`specification or during prosecution.” Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am.
`
`LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
`
`Wedeterminethat no aspects of the challenged claims require explicit
`
`construction. See, e.g.,Realtime Data, LLC v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 1368, 1375
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The Board is required to construe ‘only those terms.. .
`
`that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the
`
`10
`
`
`
`IPR2022-00096
`Patent RE44,818E
`
`controversy.’” (quoting Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200
`
`F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
`
`D.
`
`Patent Owner’s Arguments Regarding DiscretionaryDenial
`Patent Owner contends we should exercise our discretion to deny
`
`institution “because the Petition presents substantially the same art and
`arguments consideredby the Office during prosecution.” Prelim. Resp. 44—
`
`49. Petitioner disagrees. Pet. 10-11.
`
`Institution of interpartes review is discretionary. SASInst. Inc. v.
`
`Tancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (2018) (“[Section] 314(a) invests the Director
`
`with discretion on the question whetherto institute review... .” (emphasis
`
`omitted); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 1368. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016)
`
`(“|T|he agency’s decision to denya petition 1s a matter committed to the
`
`Patent Office’s discretion.”); Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc. , 815 F.3d
`
`1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T ]he [Office] is permitted, but never
`
`compelled,to institute an [interpartes review] proceeding.”). When
`determining whetherto institute an interpartes review,“the Director may
`
`take into account whether, and reject the petition or request because,the
`
`sameor substantially the sameprior art or arguments previously were
`
`presented to the Office.” 35 U.S.C. §325(d). The Board uses a two-part
`framework in determining whetherto exercise its discretion under § 325(d),
`
`specifically:
`(1) whether the sameor substantially the sameart previously
`waspresented to the Office or whether the same or substantially
`the same arguments previously were presentedto the Office;
`and (2) if either condition ofthe first part of the frameworkis
`satisfied, whetherthe petitioner has demonstratedthat the
`
`11
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`
`
`IPR2022-00096
`Patent RE44,818E
`
`Office erred in a mannermaterial to the patentability of
`challenged claims.
`
`AdvancedBionics, LLC v. Med-El Elektromedizinische Gerdte GmbH,
`
`IPR2019-01469, Paper6 at 8 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2020) (precedential). In
`
`applying the two-part framework, we consider several non-exclusive factors,
`
`including:
`
`(a) the similarities and material differences betweenthe asserted
`art and the prior art involved during examination; (b) the
`cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated
`during examination; (c) the extent to which the asserted art was
`evaluated during examination, including whetherthepriorart
`wasthe basis for rejection; (d) the extent of the overlap between
`the arguments made during examination and the manner in
`whichPetitionerrelies on the prior art or Patent Owner
`distinguishes the prior art; (e) whether Petitioner has pointed
`out sufficiently howthe Examinererred in its evalnation of the
`asserted prior art; and (f) the extent to which additional
`evidence and facts presentedin the Petition warrant
`reconsideration ofthe prior art or arguments.
`
`Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. B. Braun Melsungen AG, IPR2017-01586,
`
`Paper 8 at 17-18 (PTAB Dec.15, 2017) (precedential as to Section III.C.5,
`
`first paragraph). If, after review offactors (a), (b), and (d), we determine
`
`that the sameor substantially the sameart or arguments previously were
`
`presentedto the Office, then factors (c), (e), and (f) relate to whether the
`
`petitioner demonstratesthat the Office erred in a manner materialto the
`
`patentability of the challenged claims. AdvancedBionics, Paper6 at 10.
`
`Patent Ownercontends that Wu wasdisclosed by the patent applicants
`
`and cited during prosecution of the ’789 patent and ’818 patent. Prelim.
`
`Resp. 48 (citing Ex. 1002, 136, 365; Ex. 1005, 523). According to Patent
`
`Owner, the first part of the AdvancedBionics frameworkis satisfied if there
`
`is “either overlapping art or argument,”so the patent applicants’ citation of
`
`12
`
`
`
`IPR2022-00096
`Patent RE44,818 E
`
`Wuis sufficient to satisfy the first prong. Jd. (citing AdvancedBionics,
`
`Paper 6 at 8). Patent Ownerfurther contendsthat, under the secondpart of
`
`the Advanced Bionics framework,“the burdenshifts to Petitioner to
`
`demonstrate a material errorin the Office’s consideration of Wu,” but
`
`“Petitioner has failed to meet this burden.” Jd.
`
`Petitioner argues that“[t]he prior art and argumentspresentedin this
`petition were not previously considered and overcomebefore the Office.”
`
`Pet. 10. In particular, Petitioner argues that ““Wu wasidentified in an
`
`[Information Disclosure Statement] but never discussed or analyzed” during
`
`prosecution. /d. (citing Ex. 1002, 822). Petitionerlikewise argues that“it
`
`cannot attempt to show how the Office erred in applying Wuother than by
`
`noting that there is no evidence to suggest that the Office reviewed or
`
`attempted to apply Wuatall.” Jd. at 11. Petitioner additionally argues that
`
`the combination of Edsall and Wuasserted here has never been considered
`
`by the Office.4 Id.
`
`Petitioner’s anticipation ground based on Srinivasa applies a reference
`
`that was not previously considered before the Office. In addition, Patent
`
`Owner’s arguments regarding § 325(d) relate solely to the obviousness
`
`ground based on Edsall and Wu, whereasSrinivasais asserted in an
`
`anticipation ground. Becausethe Srinivasa ground applies differentart in a
`
`* Petitioner also argues that our disposition of Patent Owner’s § 325(d)
`arguments in IPR2020-00859 weighsin Petitioner’s favor here. Pet. 10.
`Patent Ownerarguesthat this argumentis “a newlegal doctrine from whole
`cloth”that is “completely untethered from § 325(d) and the factorslaid out
`in AdvancedBionics.” Prelim. Resp. 47. We need not and do not consider
`the disposition of the prior case in assessing Patent Owner’s arguments
`under § 325(d) here.
`
`
`
`IPR2022-00096
`Patent RE44,818E
`
`different way, we find that the sameor substantially the same art or
`
`arguments wasnot previously presented. Accordingly, we need not proceed
`
`past thefirst stage of the AdvancedBionics framework with respectto
`
`’ Srinivasa. Thus, §325(d) is not implicated by Petitioner’s reliance on
`
`Srinivasa.
`
`Regarding the obviousness ground based on Edsall and Wu, we note
`
`that Wu wascited in an Information Disclosure Statement during
`
`prosecution of the ’789 patent. Ex. 1005, 523. Nevertheless, Edsall was not
`
`before the Office. Petitioner relies on Edsall to teach mostofthe limitations
`
`of the challenged claims. Petitioner relies on Wuonly for teaching the use
`
`of hierarchical token buckets for disk sharing when combined with Edsall.
`
`See Pet. 49-51. The combination ofEdsall and Wu wasneverpreviously
`
`evaluated. Because the Edsall-Wu obviousness ground applies ditterentart
`
`in a different way, wefind that the sameor substantially the sameart or
`
`arguments wasnot previously presented. Again, we need not proceed past
`
`the first stage of the AdvancedBionics frameworkwith respectto this
`
`combination, and we determinethat § 325(d) is not implicated by
`
`Petitioner’s reliance on this combination.
`
`Accordingly, we do not exercise our discretion to deny the Petition
`
`under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d).
`
`k.
`
`Anticipation GroundBased on Srinivasa
`
`Petitioner contends claims 1-3, 6, 7, 17-19, 30, 32—34, 37, 38, and 40
`
`are anticipated by Srinivasa. Pet. 22-47. Patent Ownerdisputes Petitioner’s
`
`contentions. Prelim. Resp. 28-39.
`
`
`
`14
`
`
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`IPR2022-00096
`Patent RE44,818E
`
`l.
`
`Srinivasa
`
`Srinivasa is a U.S. patent directed to “quality of service (QoS)and the
`
`shaping oftraffic over a switch fabric networkin a distributed system that
`includesvirtualization of input/output(I/O) subsystems.” Ex. 1006, 1:6—9.
`
`Figure 1 of Srinivasa is reproduced below.
`
`182a
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`Vialual
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`~(__HaADriver_
`interface
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`
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`| Driver
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`(Interface
`
`Fig. 1
`
`Figure | is a functional block diagram illustrating I/O switch fabric 50
`
`interconnecting application servers 102 and virtual I/O servers 60. Jd. at
`3:8-10, 3:59-62, 16:30-32. Packets or framesofdata are transmitted across
`
`1/O switch fabric 50, Jd. at 16:30-32.
`
`15:
`
`
`
`IPR2022-00096
`Patent RE44,818E
`
`Figure 3 of Srinivasa is reproduced below.
`399
`
`
`Agent/Dacmon.
`
`
`Manageraent
`Consol
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Virraal Network Inverfice
`is
`
`~
`
`interface
`
`3
`
`
`
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`
`
`
`ci
`Link
`Link Layer Driver
`Neework PLY Interface , of
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`I Vicual Hluck Interface
`
`326
`
`2
`
`;
`
`Hor Bas PHY Interface
`320
`
`Fig.3
`
`Figure 3 is a schematic diagram illustrating a protocolstack and software
`
`modulesofvirtual I/O server 60. Jd. at 3:14-16, 4:29-31. Multiplexer 308
`
`is a kernel modulethat transfers incoming requests from application
`
`servers 102 to the appropriate native HBAor NICdriverattachedto virtual
`
`I/O servers 60. Jd. at 3:67-4:3. Encapsulation modules 306 tunnel I/O
`
`traffic over I/O switch fabric 50 betweenvirtual device interfaces on
`
`application server 102 and multiplexer 308 ofvirtual I/O server 60. Jd. at
`
`4:36. Multiplexer 308 can be configured to provide Quality of Service
`
`(QoS)to the client application and servers. Jd. at 4:14-15. Host bus PHY
`
`interface 320 is the physical hardware interface or adapterthat interconnects
`
`virtual I/O server 60 to a mass storage system or storage network system.
`
`16
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`
`
`IPR2022-00096
`Patent RE44,818E
`
`Id. at 4:47-49. Network PHY interface 340is the physical hardwarethat
`
`provides a connection to a network, suchas a LAN.
`
`/d. at 4:66—5:1.
`
`Figure 5 of Srinivasa is reproduced below.
`
`"VES Layer
`
`
`ApelicanienJtos|
`
`
`
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`
`Mirrval Block Device
`Incerfsoe
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`uOane=WORAbieierseck|Driverane=WORAbieierseck|
`WO Fabric pH Ingerface
`
`
`TOSwitch Eabric
`
`Fig._5
`
`Figure 5 is schematic diagram illustrating a protocol stack and software
`
`modules of an application server 102. Jd. at3:20—22. Virtual block device
`
`driver 208 receives block requests fora given device. Jd. at 8:20—23.
`
`Encapsulation module 206 consumes messages from higher layers ofthe
`
`protocol stack, encapsulates messages with a header, and transmit messages
`
`across I/O switch fabric 50 to virtual I/O Server60.
`
`17
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`
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`IPR2022-00096
`Patent RE44,818E
`
`Figure 5A of Srinivasa is reproduced below.
`
`Tra
`
`c Layer
`
`
`
` 222
`iP|time
`
`
`——aDriveragStorageDriverStack|NecworkLinkLevelDevicetnterface,
`[sites
`Encapsulation Module Kr
`VO Fabric Driver Stack
`
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`Generis Block Interface
`
`1/O Fabric PHY interface
`
`1/0 Switch Fabric
`
`Monitor
`230
`
`
`
`
`Fig.5A
`
`Figure 5A is a schematic diagram illustrating another implementation of
`
`protocol stack and software modules of application server 102. Jd. at 3:23—
`
`25. In this implementation, virtual HBA module 208a emulates a physical
`
`host bus adapterrelative to the native operating system executed on
`
`application server 102. Jd. at 14:58-61. Virtual HBA module 208a, which
`
`is assigned one or more virtual WWNs,passes Small Computer System
`
`Interface (SCSI) commands,includingread, write, inquiry and modesense,
`
`from storage driver stack 209 to virtual I/O server 60 for execution. Jd.at
`
`14:49-51, 15:9-12.
`
`The sole namedinventorfor Srinivasa is Venkatesh Babu Chitlur
`
`Srinivasa. Jd. at code (75). Petitioner contends Srinivasa qualifies as prior
`
`18
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`
`
`.
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`IPR2022-00096
`Patent RE44,818E
`
`art under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) based on its U.S. filing date. Pet. 22—
`
`23. Petitioner notes that Mr. Srinivasa is the sole inventor for Srinivasa and
`
`contendsthat the inventive entities of Srinivasa and the ’818 patent are not
`
`the same because “Mr. Srinivasa and Rohit Jnagal are the namedjoint
`
`inventors on the °818 patent.” Jd. at 22.
`
`Patent Ownerarguesthat “Srinivasa does not qualify as prior art
`
`under § 102(e) becauseSrinivasais not ‘by another.’” Prelim. Resp.34.
`
`According to Patent Owner,Petitionerrelies “exclusively on the extra
`
`inventorlisted on the ’818 patent as comparedto Srinivasa”for establishing
`
`that Srinivasa is “by another.” Jd. at 35—36 (citing Pet. 22). Patent Owner
`
`contendsthatthis is not the relevant inquiry and,rather, that we should
`
`consider “whetherthe portions of the reference relied on as prior art, and the
`
`subject matter of the claims in question, represent the work of a common
`
`inventive enlily.” Jd. at 36 (quoting EmeraChem Holdings, LLC v.
`
`Volkswagen Grp. ofAm., Inc., 859 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
`
`Patent Ownerfurtherargues that Petitioner’s cited portions of Srinivasa and
`
`the subject matter of the challenged claims of the 818 patent must have a
`
`commoninventive entity because Petitioner’s anticipation ground posits that
`
`the claims were described in a patent with Mr. Srinivasa as the sole named
`
`inventor. Id. at 36-37.
`
`Therelevant portion of the pre-AIA version of § 102(e) states that “[a]
`
`personshall be entitled to a patent unless .
`
`.
`
`. the invention was described in
`
`...a patent granted on an application for patent by anotherfiled in the
`
`United States before the invention by the applicant for patent.” 35 U.S.C.
`
`§ 102(e) (emphasis added). To determine whetherSrinivasa qualifies under
`
`§ 102(e) as a patent granted on an application for patent by another, we must
`
`19
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`IPR2022-00096
`Patent RE44,818E
`
`determine whetherthe portions of Srinivasarelied on asprior art, and the
`subject matter ofthe challenged claims, represent the work of a common
`
`inventive entity. See EmeraChem,859 F.3d at 1345.
`
`Onthe present record, we do not have sufficient evidence about the
`inventive entity for any ofthe asserted claims. Although Patent Owner
`would have us assumethat Mr. Srinivasa alone mustbe the inventive entity
`
`for the asserted claims based on Petitioner’s anticipation challenge (Prelim.
`
`Resp. 36-37), we decline to do so. Inthe absenceof sufficient evidence
`
`about the inventive entity for particular asserted claims, weare preliminarily
`
`persuadedby Petitioner’s showing that the ’818 patent and Srinivasa (each
`
`as a whole) have different named inventors. Compare Ex. 1001, code (75),
`
`with Ex. 1006, code(75). Thus, for purposesofthis Decision, wefind that
`
`Srinivasa qualifies as prior art “by another” under § 102(e).
`
`Wealso do not have evidence of an invention date on the present
`
`record other than the earliest possible effective filing date of the challenged
`
`claims. For purposesof this Decision, we determinethat Srinivasa qualifies
`
`as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) because Srinivasa’s U.S. filing date of
`
`November29, 2007, is before the earliest possible effective filing date of the
`
`challenged claims, which is December7, 2007. Ex. 1001, code (64);
`
`Ex. 1006, code (22).
`
`Attrial, the parties may further develop the record regarding the
`
`inventive entity for particular asserted claims. Given that Petitioner has
`
`satisfied its initial burden ofproduction regarding whether Srinivasa
`
`qualifies as prior art under § 102(e), the burden of production shifts to Patent
`
`Ownerto argue or produce evidencethat Srinivasa does not qualify as prior
`
`art. Cf Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’! Graphics, Inc. , 800 F.3d 1375,
`
`20
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`
`
`IPR2022-00096
`Patent RE44,818E
`
`1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2015). As such, we do not agree with Patent Owner’s
`argument(Prelim. Resp. 35) that we are improperlyshifting the burden of
`
`persuasion to Patent Ownerin makingthis preliminary determination about
`the prior art status of Srinivasa. See Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1378
`(“In an interpartes review,the burden ofpersuasionis on the petitionerto
`prove ‘unpatentability by a preponderanceofthe evidence,’ 35 U.S.C.
`§ 316(e), and that burden nevershifts to the patentee.”).
`
`2.
`
`Claim 1
`
`The preamble of claim 1 recites “[a] method.” Ex. 1001, 17:44.
`
`Petitioner contendsthat Srinivasa discloses the recited “method”basedonits
`
`anticipation analysis of the methodsteps in the body of claim 1. Pet. 23. As
`
`discussed below, wetind Petitioner’s analysis these methodsteps to be
`
`sufficient for institution.
`
`Claim 1 further recites “maintaining a connection, over a network
`
`fabric, to a virtual storage network interface layer of an application server,
`
`wherein thevirtual storage networkinterface layer is associated with a
`
`virtual storage nodeidentifier.” Ex. 1001, 17:45—48. Petitionercites
`
`Srinivasa’s description of a connection over a network fabric between a
`
`virtual I/O server and an application server’s virtual host bus adapter (HBA)
`
`layer, which sends and receives commands. Pet. 23-25(citing Ex. 1006,
`
`6:64—7:2, 9:65-10:3, 14:65-15:18, 18:59-19:62, Figs. 3, SA). Petitioner
`
`explains that, in Srinivasa, the virtual I/O server’s physical HBA
`“‘process[es] the commandsand pass[es] them on to the SAN,as appropriate,
`as well as pass[es] responses back to virtual HBA 208a.” Jd. at 26 (citing
`
`Ex. 1003 9§ 63-68). Petitioner further contends Srinivasa’s virtual HBA
`
`21
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`
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`IPR2022-00096
`Patent RE44,818E
`
`(i.e., the recited “virtual storage networkinterface layer”) is associated with
`
`a virtual World Wide Name (VWWN)(i.e., the recited “virtual storage node
`
`identifier”) because “the virtual HBA wasassigned one or more VWWNs,
`
`which were used by the virtual I/O server’s HBA with respect to a SAN so
`
`that the virtual HBA 208a could emulate a physical HBArelative to the
`
`application server’s native operating system.” Jd. at 26 (citing Ex. 1003
`
`68-71; Ex. 1006, 6:1-26, 14:51-64).
`
`At this stage, Patent Ownerdoesnotcontest Petitioner’s analysis of
`the “maintaining” step of claim 1.° Based on the present record, we are
`
`persuadedpreliminarily that Srinivasa discloses “maintaining a connection”
`
`based onits teachings of a connection betweenan application server anda
`
`virtual I/O server through a switch fabric. See, e.g., Ex. 1006, 9:65—10:3,
`Figs. 3, 5A. Srinivasa also discloses the use ofa virtual World Wide Name ~
`
`(i.e., a “virtual storage node identifier”) to identify a virtual HBA (i.e., a
`
`“virtual storage network interface layer’) within the application server. See,
`
`e.g., id. at 6:9-16.
`
`Claim 1 further recites “presenting, at a physical storage network
`
`interface, the virtual storage nodeidentifier to a storage area network.”
`
`Ex. 1001, 17:49-50. Petitioner mapsthe recited “physical storage network
`
`interface” to the HBAorhost bus PHYinterface 320 in Srinivasa’s virtual
`
`I/O server. Pet. 27 (citing Ex. 1006, 4:47—5S0, 6:1-2, 6:67—7:2). Petitioner
`
`contendsthat “the physical storage network interface for the SAN [i]s the
`virtual I/O server’s HBA.” Jd. Petitioner further contendsthatthe virtual
`
`> Although Patent Ownerdoesnotdispute Petitioner’s analysis for any
`particular limitation in claim 1, Patent Ownerdoesput forth arguments
`against Petitioner’s anticipation contentions as a whole, as discussed below.
`
`22
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`
`
`IPR2022-00096
`Patent RE44,818E
`
`World Wide Name(i.e., the recited “virtual storage nodeidentifier”) for a
`
`SAN is presentedto the virtual I/O server’s HBA. Jd. at 27-28 (citing
`
`Ex. 1006, 6:9-26, 12:41-60, 14:45—15:18).
`
`Patent Ownerdoesnot contest Petitioner’s analysis of the
`
`“presenting”step of claim 1 at this time. Based on the presentrecord,
`
`Petitioner has shownsufficiently that Srinivasa discloses the use of a World
`
`Wide Nameat the HBAin its virtual I/O server, which is connected toa
`
`storage areanetwork. See, e.g., Ex. 1006, 4:47—5S0, 6:67—7:2, 14:52—54.
`
`Claim 1 further recites “enforcing a hierarchical token bucket resource
`
`allocation of bandwidth across the physical storage networkinterface.”
`
`Ex. 1001, 17:51-53. Petitioner notes that Srinivasa’s virtual I/O server
`
`receives packets from the application server over the I/O switch fa
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