To:
`
`Subject:
`
`Sent:
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`Sent As:
`
`Attachments:
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`Chang, David T (david_chang40@hotmail.com)
`
`TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 78126848 - GHETTOPOLY...A STOLEN PROPERTY FENCING G
`ETC. - N/A
`
`1/14/03 4:02:35 PM
`
`ECom102
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`(cid:160) (cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160) SERIAL NO: 78/126848
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160) APPLICANT:(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`
`Chang, David T
`
`(cid:160) (cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160) CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS:
`
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160) DAVID T CHANG
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160) 226 Chestnut St.
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160) St. Mary's PA 15857
`
`RETURN ADDRESS:(cid:160)
`Commissioner for Trademarks
`2900 Crystal Drive
`Arlington, VA 22202-3513
`ecom102@uspto.gov
`
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160) MARK:(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`(cid:160) (cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160) CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO :(cid:160)(cid:160) N/A
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160) CORRESPONDENT EMAIL ADDRESS:(cid:160)(cid:160) david_chang40@hotmail.com
`
`Please provide in all correspondence:
`
`(cid:160)1
`
`.(cid:160) Filing date, serial number, mark and
`applicant's name.
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`2.(cid:160) Date of this Office Action.
`3.(cid:160) Examining Attorney's name and
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160) Law Office number.
`4. Your telephone number and e-mail
`address.
`
`GHETTOPOLY...A STOLEN PROPERTY FENCING G ETC.
`
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`
`O AVOID ABANDONMENT, WE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS
`
`OFFICE ACTION
`
`(cid:160)T
`
`OF OUR MAILING OR E-MAILING DATE.(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`
`Serial Number(cid:160) 78/126848
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`(cid:160)T
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`(cid:160)T
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`his letter responds to the applicant’s communication(s) dated October 24, 2002.
`
`he examining attorney has reviewed the above referenced response and determined the following:
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`(cid:160)R
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`EGISTRATION
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`(cid:160)1
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`.(cid:160) Likelihood of Confusion
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`(cid:160)R
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`egistration was also refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(d), because the mark for which registration is sought so
`resembles the mark shown in U.S. Registration No. 21,536,501, as to be likely, when used on the identified goods, to cause confusion, or to cause
`mistake, or to deceive.
`
`(cid:160)T
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`he examining attorney has considered the applicant's arguments in favor of registration, carefully but has found them unpersuasive.(cid:160) For the
`reasons below, the refusal under Section 2(d) is maintained and made FINAL.
`
`(cid:160)T
`
`he applicant has applied to register the mark, GHETTOPOLY (and Design) for a board game.(cid:160)(cid:160) Registration was refused based
`on a prior registration for “ MONOPOLY (cid:160) also for a board game. The applicant argues that the marks are distinctively different, and the
`examining attorney has considered those arguments.(cid:160) The examining attorney must analyze each case in two steps to determine whether there is
`
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`

`
`a likelihood of confusion.(cid:160) First, the examining attorney must look at the marks themselves for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation and
`commercial impression. (cid:160) In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973).(cid:160) Secondly, the examining attorney
`must compare the goods or services to determine if they are related or if the activities surrounding their marketing are such that confusion as to
`origin is likely.(cid:160) In re August Storck KG, 218 USPQ 823 (TTAB 1983); In re International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., 197 USPQ 910
`(TTAB 1978); Guardian Products Co., v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ 738 (TTAB 1978).
`
`(cid:160)D
`
`(cid:160)A
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`uPont Analysis
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`.(cid:160) The Sound, Commercial Meaning, and Impression of the Marks are Closely Related.
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`(cid:160)T
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`In particular, the sound, commercial
`he proposed mark and the prior registered mark are highly similar under the analysis set forth above.(cid:160)(cid:160)
`meaning and impression of the marks are closely related.(cid:160) The issue in this case is whether the users of the applicant’s and the defendant’s
`services which be confused as to the source of origin of the services.(cid:160) And in determining the likelihood of confusion, the similarity between the
`marks must be considered.(cid:160) When the applicant's mark is compared to a registered mark, "the points of similarity are of greater importance than
`the points of difference."(cid:160) Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 229 F.2d 37, 108 USPQ 161 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 973, 109 USPQ
`517 (1956).(cid:160)
`In considering the degree of similarity of marks the Tenth Circuit in the case(cid:160) opined in(cid:160) Universal Money Ctrs. V. American
`Telephone & Telegraph Co., 22 F.3d 1527 (10th Cir. 1994), cir denied, 115 S.Ct. 644 (1994):
`
`The degree of similarity between marks is tested on three levels as encountered in the marketplace:(cid:160) sight, sound, and
`meaning.(cid:160) In evaluating similarity, we must not engage in a “side-by-side” comparison.(cid:160) Rather the court must determine
`whether the alleged infringing mark will be confusing to the public when singly presented.(cid:160) Further, similarities between
`marks should be given more weight than differences. Warner Bros. V. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.
`1983); 42 USPQ 2d 1455, 949 F.Supp 1539 (1996).
`
`Well Known Mark
`
`(cid:160)T
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`he issue under Section 2(d) is whether the marks create the same overall impression. Visual Information Institute, Inc. v. Vicon Industries Inc.,
`209 USPQ 179 (TTAB 1980).(cid:160) The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific
`impression of trademarks.(cid:160) Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper
`Co., 190 USPQ 106 (TTAB 1975); TMEP section 1207.01(b).(cid:160) In considering the commercial impression of the marks, an additional fact to be
`considered in this instance is the well known nature of the registrant’s mark; the(cid:160) so called “fame” of the mark:(cid:160) With regard to famous marks,
`Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure states:
`
`The fame of a registered mark is a factor to be considered in determining likelihood of confusion.(cid:160) In re E. I. du Pont de
`Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177(cid:160)USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).(cid:160) Famous marks enjoy a wide latitude of legal
`protection because they are more likely to be remembered and associated in the public mind than a weaker mark.(cid:160) Recot, Inc.
`v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1327, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1897 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Trademark Trial and Appeal Board erred in
`limiting the weight accorded to the fame of opposer’s FRITO-LAY mark); Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Industries, Inc.,
`963 F.2d 350, 352, 22 USPQ2d 1453, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 862 (1992) (Board erred in discounting
`the fame of opposer’s mark PLAY-DOH).(cid:160) The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has stated:
`
`[A] mark with extensive public recognition and renown deserves and receives more legal protection than an
`obscure or weak mark.(cid:160)
`
`Achieving fame for a mark in a marketplace where countless symbols clamor for public attention often requires
`a very distinct mark, enormous advertising investments, and a product of lasting value.(cid:160) After earning fame, a
`mark benefits not only its owner, but the consumers who rely on the symbols to identify the source of a desired
`product.(cid:160) Both the mark’s fame and the consumer’s trust in that symbol, however, are subject to exploitation
`by free riders.
`
`Kenner Parker Toys, 963 F.2d at 353, 22 USPQ2d at 1456.
`
`When present, the fame of the mark is “a dominant factor in the likelihood of confusion analysis for a famous mark,
`independent of the consideration of the relatedness of the goods.”(cid:160) Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1328, 54
`USPQ2d 1894, 1898.(cid:160) However, like the other du Pont factors, the fame of a mark may be considered only if there is relevant
`evidence of record.(cid:160) See TMEP §1207.01 and cases cited therein.(cid:160) In Tiffany & Broadway v. Commissioner, 167 F. Supp.2d
`949 (S.D. Tex. 2001), the fame of four registered marks cited against the applicant was a significant factor in finding a
`likelihood of confusion between applicant’s TIFFANY for ladies’ dress shoes and registrant’s TIFFANY and TIFFANY & CO.
`for a variety of goods, including jewelry, china, silverware, glassware, leather goods, belt buckles, ties, scarves, clocks,
`watches, brushes and lamps, and for retail store services specializing in the sale of jewelry, watches, clocks, and gift items.(cid:160)
`The ex parte record included excerpts from 18 news articles where the registrant Tiffany & Company was identified as a
`
`(cid:160)(cid:160)
`(cid:160)
`(cid:160)
`

`
`famous business; citations to three published decisions in which the fame of the TIFFANY mark had been judicially
`recognized; and evidence that the registrant’s goods were sold at over 60 Tiffany locations worldwide--including 34 in the
`
`United States--and through independently-owned retail stores and mail order outlets.(cid:160)(cid:160)
`
`The examining attorney submitted Lexis Nexis evidence of the fame of the registered mark, Monopoly,(cid:160) in the initial refusal. One excerpt for
`example states that over 150 million copies of the game Monopoly have been sold world wide.(cid:160) McClathy Newspapers Inc.(cid:160) September 1,
`2002. Furthermore, in its response the applicant submits evidence of a Supreme Court suit involving the game “Monopoly,” which also
`evidences the fame of the mark. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc, 525 U.S. 813; 119 S. Ct. 48; 142 L. Ed. 2d 37 (1998).(cid:160)(cid:160) The evidence
`indicates that the game monopoly has existed for many years, may have been known by the name “Monopoly” as early as 1911. (cid:160) As opined by
`the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, therefore, the fame of the mark is a dominant consideration in the likelihood of confusion in this case.
`
`(cid:160)P
`
`arody
`
`(cid:160)T
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`he applicant argues, however, that it’s mark, Ghettopoly, is a parody of the famous “Monopoly” mark. [1](cid:160) The applicant’s argument is
`unconvincing. With regard to parodies, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has opined:
`
`Parody is not a defense to a likelihood of confusion refusal.(cid:160) There are confusing parodies and non-confusing parodies.(cid:160) See
`3 J. McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, §31.153 (4th ed. 2000).(cid:160) A true parody actually decreases
`the likelihood of confusion because the effect of the parody is to create a distinction in the viewer’s mind between the actual
`product and the joke.(cid:160) While a parody must call to mind the actual product to be successful, the same success also
`necessarily distinguishes the parody from the actual product.(cid:160) Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905,
`231 USPQ 963 (D. Neb. 1986).
`
`Another example of parody can be found in Columbia Pictures Industries Inc., v. Miller, 211 USPQ 816 (TTAB 1981)
`(CLOTHES ENCOUNTERS held likely to be confused with CLOSE ENCOUNTERS OF THE THIRD KIND, for men’s and
`women’s clothing); Cf., Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Inc., 828 F.2d 1482, 4 USPQ2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1987)
`(LARDASHE for pants was not an infringement of the JORDACHE mark).
`
`A parody is intended to create a distinct commercial impression, which is intended to be a “joke.” A parody is distinct from a mark which
`disparages or brings into ridicule a group of persons.(cid:160) The examining attorney provided evidence in the initial office action that the proposed
`mark is disparaging, makes fun of various social groups and races.(cid:160) The proposed mark, then may not be considered a “Parody.” [2] See also
`Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3rd 806 (2nd Cir. 1999) ( “[A] parodist whose expressive work aims its parodic commentary at a
`trademark is given considerable leeway, but a claimed parodic use that makes no comment on the mark is not permitted trademark parody
`use”).
`
`(cid:160)T
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`he applicant has also made reference to the following claims:
`
`(cid:160)F
`
`irst Amendment
`
`(cid:160)I
`
`t is well settled that free speech is not a viable defense to the claim of trademark violations.(cid:160) Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1944);
`Urantia Found v. Maaherra; 895 F.Supp 1329 (Arizona Dist. 1995).(cid:160) The courts have opined that the free speech issue with regard to
`trademarks is relevant only when the trademark is not being used as a source identifier.(cid:160) See. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Group, 611
`F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979).(cid:160) Moreover, the courts have concluded that the use of a trademark as a source identifier is a “noncommercial use
`exemption” to the First Amendment.(cid:160) Matel Inc. et al.(cid:160) V. MCA Records , Inc., et al, 296 F.3rd 894(cid:160) (9th Cir 2002). The applicant’s free speech
`claim then is not relevant to the issue of the registrability of the proposed mark.
`
`(cid:160)D
`
`efamation
`
`(cid:160)A
`
`lthough the applicant has not made it clear the relevance of the issue of defamation to the trademark application.(cid:160) The applicant should note
`that the courts have normally addressed the issue of defamation arising from trademark usage; rather than initial applications for trademarks.[3](cid:160)
`See, Matel Inc. et al.(cid:160) V. MCA Records , Inc., et al, 296 F.3rd 894(cid:160) (9th Cir 2002).
`
`(cid:160)B
`
`.(cid:160) The Goods of the Parties Are Identical
`
`(cid:160)S
`
`econdly, the goods of the parties are identical.(cid:160) As noted in the initial refusal, the goods or services of the parties need not be identical or
`directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.(cid:160) They need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing
`be such, that they could be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that could give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods
`come from a common source.(cid:160) In re Martin's Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Corning Glass
`Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985); In re Rexel Inc., 223 USPQ 830 (TTAB 1984); Guardian Products Co., Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 200 USPQ
`738 (TTAB 1978); In re International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 197 USPQ 910 (TTAB 1978).(cid:160)(cid:160) Both the applicant and the registrant offer
`board games.
`
`(cid:160)
`

`
`(cid:160)(cid:160) The presumption under Trademark Act Section 7(b), 15 U.S.C. Section 1057(b), that the registrant is the owner of the mark, extends to all
`
`services identified in the registration.(cid:160) The presumption also implies that the registrant operates in all normal channels of trade and reaches all
`classes of purchasers.(cid:160) RE/MAX of America, Inc. v. Realty Mart, Inc., 207 USPQ 960 (TTAB 1980). As such, it is presumed that the applicant
`may offer computer consulting, programming and other services offered by the registrant, in addition to its educational services. Furthermore, in
`cases of doubt, the examining attorney must resolve any doubt as to the issue of likelihood of confusion in favor of the registrant and against the
`applicant who has a legal duty to select a mark which is totally dissimilar to trademarks already being used.(cid:160) Burroughs Wellcome Co. v.
`Warner‑Lambert Co., 203 USPQ 191 (TTAB 1979).
`
`(cid:160)2
`
`.(cid:160) Falsely Suggest a Connection
`
`(cid:160)T
`
`he refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(a), 15 U.S. C. Section 1052(a); TMEP Sections 1203.3(e) and 1203.03(f) is continued and made
`Final.
`
`(cid:160)T
`
`he examining attorney herein incorporates the arguments above by reference, including the evidence previously submitted.
`
`(cid:160)3
`
`.(cid:160) Disparages and Brings Into Contempt
`
`(cid:160)T
`
`(cid:160)T
`
`he refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(a), 15 U.S. C. Section 1052(a) is continued and made Final.
`
`he examining attorney herein incorporates the arguments above by reference, including the evidence previous submitted.
`
`(cid:160)I
`
`nformalities
`
`(cid:160)D
`
`rawing of the Mark
`
`(cid:160)T
`
`he drawing remains unacceptable because it will not reproduce satisfactorily.(cid:160) The applicant must submit a new drawing showing the mark
`clearly and conforming to 37 C.F.R. §2.52.(cid:160) TMEP §807.07(a).
`
`(cid:160)T
`
`he requirements for a special‑form drawing are as follows:
`
`(1) The drawing must appear in black and white; no color is permitted.
`
`(cid:160)(
`
`(cid:160)(
`
`(cid:160)(
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`2)(cid:160) Every line and letter must be black and clear.
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`3)(cid:160) The use of gray to indicate shading is unacceptable.
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`4)(cid:160) The lining must not be too fine or too close together.
`
`(cid:160)(
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`5)(cid:160) The preferred size of the area in which the mark is displayed is 2½ inches (6.1 cm.) high and 2½ inches (6.1 cm.) wide.(cid:160) It should not
`be larger than 4(cid:160)inches (10.3 cm.) high or 4 inches (10.3 cm.) wide.
`
`(cid:160)(
`
`6)(cid:160) If the reduction of the mark to the required size renders any details illegible, the applicant may insert a statement in the application to
`describe the mark and these details.
`
`37 C.F.R. §2.52; TMEP §§807.01(b) and 807.07(a).(cid:160) The Office will enforce these drawing requirements strictly.(cid:160)(cid:160)
`
`The Office prefers that the drawing be depicted on a separate sheet of smooth, nonshiny, white paper 8 to 8½ inches (20.3 to 21.6 cm.) wide and
`11 inches (27.9 cm.) long, and that the sheet contain a heading listing, on separate lines, the applicant’s complete name; the applicant’s address;
`the goods or services recited in the application; and, if the application is filed under Section 1(a) of the Act, the dates of first use of the mark and
`of first use of the mark in commerce; or, if the application is filed under Section 44(d), the priority filing date of the foreign application.(cid:160) 37
`C.F.R. §2.52(b); TMEP §§807.01(a), 807.01(b), 807.01(c) and 807.07(a).
`
`(cid:160)T
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`(cid:160)A
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`he requirement as to the drawing is continued and made Final.
`
`dvisory Note:
`
`(cid:160)T
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`he applicant filed a subsequent request which was not a part of the response requesting that the mark be amended to : Ghettopoly…Astolen
`Property Fencing Game.(cid:160) The applicant should note:
`
`(cid:160)D
`
`rawing May not be Materially Altered
`
`(cid:160)
`(cid:160)
`

`
`(cid:160)A
`
`n applicant cannot amend the drawing of the mark if the change materially alters the mark.(cid:160) TMEP §807.14(a).(cid:160) The Office determines
`whether a proposed amendment materially alters a mark by comparing the proposed amendment with the description or drawing of the mark
`
`filed with the original application.(cid:160) 37 C.F.R. §2.72. (cid:160) TMEP §807.14(a)(i).(cid:160)(cid:160)
`
`Effective October 30, 1999, 37 C.F.R. §2.72 was amended.(cid:160) The revised rule applies to applications pending on or after October 30, 1999.(cid:160)
`Under the new rule, an applicant cannot amend the drawing of the mark if the change materially alters the mark.(cid:160) The new rule also requires the
`Office to determine whether a proposed amendment materially alters a mark by comparing the proposed amendment with the description or
`
`drawing of the mark filed with the original application.(cid:160) TMEP §807.14(a)(i).(cid:160)(cid:160)
`Applicant’s Response
`
`(cid:160)P
`
`lease note that the only appropriate responses to a final action are (1) compliance with the outstanding requirements, if feasible, (2) filing of an
`appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, or (3) filing of a petition to the Commissioner if permitted by 37 C.F.R. Section 2.63(b). 37
`C.F.R. Section 2.64(a).(cid:160) Regarding petitions to the Commissioner, see 37 C.F.R. Section 2.146; TMEP sections 1702 and 1704.(cid:160) If the applicant
`fails to respond within six months of the mailing date of this refusal, this Office will declare the application abandoned.(cid:160) 37 C.F.R. Section
`
`If the applicant has any questions or needs assistance in responding to this Office action, please telephone the assigned examining attorney.
`
`2.65(a).(cid:160)(cid:160)
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`
`/pbm/
`Paula B. Mays
`Trademark Examining Attorney
`Law Office 102
`(703) 308-9102 ext. 159
`E-Mail: ecom102@uspto.gov
`Facsimile (703) 746-8102
`
`How to respond to this Office Action:
`
`(cid:160)T
`
`o respond formally using the Office’s Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), visit http://www.uspto.gov/teas/index.html and
`follow the instructions.
`
`(cid:160)T
`
`o respond formally via E-mail, visit http://www.uspto.gov/web/trademarks/tmelecresp.htm and follow the instructions.
`
`(cid:160)T
`
`o respond formally via regular mail, your response should be sent to the mailing Return Address listed above and include the serial number, law
`office and examining attorney’s name on the upper right corner of each page of your response.
`
`(cid:160)T
`
`o check the status of your application at any time, visit the Office’s Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) system at
`http://tarr.uspto.gov/
`
`about
`
`trademarks,
`
`you
`
`are
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`encouraged
`
`to
`
`visit
`
`the Office’s web
`
`site
`
`at
`
`(cid:160)F
`
`information
`useful
`other
`and
`general
`or
`http://www.uspto.gov/main/trademarks.htm
`
`a
`
`(cid:160) [
`
`1](cid:160) The applicant argues that similar to the “Hasbro” case where the appellee was successful, its mark is a parody of the famous trademark.
`[2] The mark in the mark in the Supreme Court decision was “AntiMonopoly” (cid:160) a play off the word game monopoly, which automatically conjures the image of
`joke.
`[3] It is assumed that the applicant tries to argue that its mark is not defamatory, however, no such assertion has been made by the examining attorney.
`
`(cid:160)(cid:160)