To:
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`Subject:
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`Three Spirits Brewery, LLC (jjs@schwartz-iplaw.com)
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`U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 86175819 - HOPPER'S
`DELIGHT - 636/6 - EXAMINER BRIEF
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`Sent:
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`4/20/2015 11:20:28 AM
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`Sent As:
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`ECOM108@USPTO.GOV
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`Attachments: Attachment - 1
`Attachment - 2
`Attachment - 3
`Attachment - 4
`Attachment - 5
`Attachment - 6
`Attachment - 7
`Attachment - 8
`Attachment - 9
`Attachment - 10
`Attachment - 11
`Attachment - 12
`Attachment - 13
`Attachment - 14
`Attachment - 15
`Attachment - 16
`Attachment - 17
`Attachment - 18
`Attachment - 19
`Attachment - 20
`Attachment - 21
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
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`U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 86175819
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`ARK: HOPPER'S DELIGHT(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160) (cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`(cid:160) M
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`*86175819*
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`(cid:160)
`

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`GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION:
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`http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/index.jsp (cid:160)(cid:160)
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`TTAB INFORMATION:
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`http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/process/appeal/index.jsp(cid:160) (cid:160)
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`CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS:
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`(cid:160) 6100 FAIRVIEW RD STE 1135
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`(cid:160) JEFFREY J SCHWARTZ(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`(cid:160) SCHWARTZ LAW FIRM PC(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`(cid:160) CHARLOTTE, NC 28210-4258(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`APPLICANT: Three Spirits Brewery, LLC(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160) (cid:160)(cid:160)
`CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO :(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS:(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`(cid:160) (cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160) (cid:160)
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`(cid:160) (cid:160) 636/6(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`(cid:160) (cid:160) (cid:160) (cid:160) jjs@schwartz-iplaw.com
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`EXAMINING ATTORNEY’S APPEAL BRIEF
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`Applicant, Three Spirits Brewery, LLC has appealed the Trademark examining attorney’s final
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`refusal to register its mark under(cid:160) Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (as amended), 15 U.S.C.
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`Section 2(d).(cid:160) Registration was refused because applicant’s mark, when used on or in connection with the
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`identified goods, so resembles the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 1136375, 2099536(cid:160)and 2143533, as to
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`likely cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive. TMEP §1207.(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`It is respectfully requested that this refusal to register be affirmed.
`
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`FACTS
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`On January 27, 2014, the present application was filed to register the mark HOPPER'S DELIGHT
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`for goods identified as beer, in Class 32.
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`On May 1, 2014, registration was refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (as
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`amended), 15 U.S.C. Section 2(d) based on a likelihood of confusion between applicant’s mark and the
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`marks in U.S. Registration No. 1136375(cid:160)for DELIGHT for goods identified as alcoholic malt
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`

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`beverages, namely, beer, in Class 32; U.S. Registration No. 2099536(cid:160)for HOPPERS and design for
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`goods identified as beer and ale, in Class 32; and U.S. Registration No. 2143533(cid:160)for HOPPERS for
`goods identified as beer and ale, in Class 32.[1]
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`On May 28, 2014, applicant presented argument in favor of registration.(cid:160) After considering the
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`arguments that had been advanced by applicant in support of registration, the examining attorney issued a
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`final refusal on June 17, 2014. In said office action, the 2(d) refusal issued in the initial office action was
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`maintained.
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`On September 12, 2014, applicant filed a request for reconsideration.(cid:160) Inasmuch as no new facts or
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`reasons were presented that were significant and/or compelling with regard to the likelihood of confusion,
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`the examining attorney denied applicant’s request for reconsideration on September 22, 2014. (cid:160) This
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`appeal resulted from this decision.
`
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`ISSUE ON APPEAL
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`The issue on appeal is whether applicant’s mark is likely to cause confusion with U.S.
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`Registration Nos. 1136375,(cid:160)2099536(cid:160)and 2143533.
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`
`(cid:160) (cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
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`(cid:160)(cid:160) ARGUMENT
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`I.(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`General Rules of Analysis for Section 2(d) Cases
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`Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act bars registration of a mark if it “…consists of
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`(cid:160) or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office … as to be
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`likely, when applied to the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion….” 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(d).(cid:160) The
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`duty of a court is to weigh “the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the
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`goods and differences in the marks.” (cid:160) Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098,
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`192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976).(cid:160) The “…ultimate question … is whether the marks as applied to the
`
`respective goods so resemble each other that there is a reasonable likelihood of confusion as to source.” (cid:160)
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`

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`Paula Payne Products Co. v. Johnson Publishing Co., Inc., 177 USPQ 76, 77 (CCPA 1973).(cid:160) Any doubt
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`that may arise on the question of likelihood of confusion must be resolved in favor of the prior registrant
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`and against the applicant who has a legal duty to select a mark that is totally dissimilar to marks already
`
`being used.(cid:160) Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 203 USPQ 191 (TTAB 1979).(cid:160) See In re
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`Whittaker Corporation, 200 USPQ 54 (TTAB 1978).
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`II.(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`
`Comparison of Marks
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`A.(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`General Rules for Comparison of Marks(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered
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`mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of
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`the goods of the applicant and registrant.(cid:160) See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).(cid:160) A determination of likelihood of
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`confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du
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`Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination.(cid:160)
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`Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir.
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`2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474
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`(Fed. Cir. 2000)).(cid:160) Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and
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`any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.(cid:160) Citigroup Inc.
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`v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315
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`F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476
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`F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`In any likelihood of confusion determination, two key considerations are similarity of the marks
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`and similarity or relatedness of the goods.(cid:160) Syndicat Des Proprietaires Viticulteurs De Chateauneuf-Du-
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`Pape v. Pasquier DesVignes, 107 USPQ2d 1930, 1938 (TTAB 2013) (citing Federated Foods, Inc. v.
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`Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976)); In re Iolo Techs.,
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`LLC, 95 USPQ2d 1498, 1499 (TTAB 2010); see TMEP §1207.01.(cid:160) That is, the marks are compared in
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`their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.(cid:160) In re
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`Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re E. I. du Pont
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`de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-
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`

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`(b)(v).(cid:160) Additionally, the goods are compared to determine whether they are similar or commercially
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`related or travel in the same trade channels.(cid:160) See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d
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`1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc. ,
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`308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §1207.01, (a)(vi).
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`B.(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`The Marks are Highly Similar
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`For a visual comparison, the wording of the marks at issue are set forth below:
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`HOPPER’S DELIGHT (cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`Applicant’s mark
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`DELIGHT(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`HOPPERS(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`Registrant’s mark
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`Registrant’s marks
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`Marks must be compared in their entireties and should not be dissected; however, a trademark
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`examining attorney may weigh the individual components of a mark to determine its overall commercial
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`impression.(cid:160) Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1322, 110 USPQ2d
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`1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Nat’l Data Corp. , 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751
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`(Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[I]n articulating reasons for reaching a conclusion on the issue of confusion, there is
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`nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular
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`feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their
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`entireties.”)). (cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`When comparing marks, the test is not whether the marks can be distinguished in a side-by-side
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`comparison, but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their overall commercial
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`impression that confusion as to the source of the goods offered under the respective marks is likely to
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`result.(cid:160) Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F.3d 1046, 1053, 103 USPQ2d
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`1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1813 (TTAB 2014); TMEP §1207.01(b).(cid:160)
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`The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific
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`impression of trademarks.(cid:160) United Global Media Grp., Inc. v. Tseng, 112 USPQ2d 1039, 1049, (TTAB
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`2014); L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon , 102 USPQ2d 1434, 1438 (TTAB 2012); TMEP §1207.01(b).
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`Where the goods of an applicant and registrant are identical or virtually identical, the degree of
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`

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`similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as in
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`the case of diverse goods.(cid:160) See United Global Media Grp., Inc. v. Tseng, 112 USPQ2d 1039, 1049 (TTAB
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`2014) (quoting Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 877, 23 USPQ2d
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`1698, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); TMEP §1207.01(b).(cid:160) In the instant matter, the goods associated with the
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`marks are beer.(cid:160) Therefore, the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of
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`likelihood of confusion is not as great as in the case of diverse goods.(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`Comparison with Registration No. 1136375
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts
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`of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.(cid:160)
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`See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce , 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986),
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`aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n , 811 F.2d 1490,
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`1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly
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`similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and
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`CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983)
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`(finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). (cid:160) In the instant
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`matter, both marks share the term DELIGHT.(cid:160) It is noted that the term DELIGHT has the same
`commercial impression in each mark, namely, “a cause or source of great pleasure.” [2]
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`Adding a term to a registered mark generally does not obviate the similarity between the
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`compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section
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`2(d).(cid:160) See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105,
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`106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL and BENGAL LANCER and design confusingly similar); In re
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`Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1269 (TTAB 2009) (finding TITAN and VANTAGE TITAN
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`confusingly similar); In re El Torito Rests., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002, 2004 (TTAB 1988) (finding MACHO
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`and MACHO COMBOS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).(cid:160) In the present case, the marks are
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`identical in part.(cid:160) And, in the instant matter, the addition of the term HOPPER’S creates a commercial
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`impression that registrant has created another line of DELIGHT beer. Therefore, there is a likelihood of
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`confusion between these marks.
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`

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`Comparison with U.S. Registration No. 2099536 and 2143533(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts
`
`of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.(cid:160)
`
`See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce , 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986),
`
`aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n , 811 F.2d 1490,
`
`1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly
`
`similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and
`
`CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983)
`
`(finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). (cid:160) In the instant
`
`matter, both marks share the very similar terms HOPPER’S and HOPPERS. (cid:160) It is noted that the term
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`HOPPER’S and HOPPERS are phonetic equivalents that have the same basic commercial impression,
`namely, “a person that hops.” [3]
`
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`It is further noted that applicant’s use of the term “hopper” is in the possessive form, namely,
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`HOPPER’S and registrant’s use of the term “hopper” is in the plural form, namely HOPPERS. The
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`difference between these terms has little, if any, trademark significance and does not otherwise affect the
`
`overall similarity of the marks in terms of commercial impression.(cid:160) See In re Binion, 93 USPQ2d 1531,
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`1534 (TTAB 2009) (noting that “[t]he absence of the possessive form in applicant’s mark . . . has little, if
`
`any, significance for consumers in distinguishing it from the cited mark”); In re Curtice-Burns, Inc., 231
`
`USPQ 990, 992 (TTAB 1986) (finding the marks McKENZIE’S and McKENZIE “virtually identical in
`
`commercial impression”); Winn’s Stores, Inc. v. Hi-Lo, Inc. , 203 USPQ 140, 143 (TTAB 1979) (noting
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`that “little if any trademark significance can be attributed to the apostrophe and the letter ‘s’ in
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`opposer’s mark”). (cid:160) This is because these terms are phonetic equivalents and similarity in sound alone
`
`may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar.(cid:160) In re White Swan Ltd., 8
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`USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls , Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586
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`(TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).
`
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`It has long been held that adding a term to a registered mark generally does not obviate the
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`similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of
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`

`
`confusion under Section 2(d).(cid:160) See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556,
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`557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL and BENGAL LANCER and design
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`confusingly similar); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1269 (TTAB 2009) (finding
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`TITAN and VANTAGE TITAN confusingly similar); In re El Torito Rests., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002, 2004
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`(TTAB 1988) (finding MACHO and MACHO COMBOS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).(cid:160)
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`With regard to U.S. Registration No. 2143533, the marks are identical in part.(cid:160) And, in the instant matter,
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`the addition of the term DELIGHT creates a commercial impression that registrant has created another
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`specific line of HOPPERS beer.
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`Finally, with regard to U.S. Registration No. 2099536, for a composite mark containing both
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`words and a design, the word portion may be more likely to be impressed upon a purchaser’s memory
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`and to be used when requesting the goods.(cid:160) Joel Gott Wines, LLC v. Rehoboth Von Gott, Inc., 107
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`USPQ2d 1424, 1431 (TTAB 2013) (citing In re Dakin’s Miniatures, Inc. , 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1596 (TTAB
`
`1999)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii); see In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908,
`
`1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F. 2d 1579, 1581-82, 218 USPQ 198, 200 (Fed.
`
`Cir 1983)).(cid:160) Thus, although such marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often
`
`considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are
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`confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.(cid:160) In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at
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`1366, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc. , 710
`
`F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).(cid:160) Accordingly, the design element in
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`registrant’s mark is less significant than the term HOPPERS in creating the overall commercial
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`impression of registrant’s mark. Therefore, there is a likelihood of confusion between these marks.
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`C.(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`Applicant’s Argument
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`In its brief, applicant argues that when the marks are considered in their entireties, applicant’s
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`mark is not likely to cause confusion with the cited registrations because of the differences in connotation
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`and overall commercial impression. (cid:160) Specifically, applicant advances the argument that its mark
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`“HOPPER’S DELIGHT is a word play on the fit song “Rapper’s Delight” which was recorded in 1979
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`by the Sugar Hill Gang.” (cid:160) Applicant contends that the song is widely recognized, particularly to
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`consumers in the beer industry.” (cid:160) Applicant further presents argument that its mark is unitary.(cid:160) In so
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`

`
`doing, applicant advances the argument that the examining attorney violated the anti-dissection rule and
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`did not view its mark independent of the meaning of its constituent elements “HOPPER’S” and
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`“DELIGHT”.
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`In addressing the unitary argument first, the examining attorney notes that he did not violate the
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`anti-dissection rule because he did not ignore any portions of the marks at hand.(cid:160) In reviewing each mark,
`
`the examining attorney merely applied the applicable Trademark Law, namely, the two part analysis of the
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`du Pont factors, in reaching the conclusion that the marks have similar commercial impressions and are
`
`likely to cause confusion.
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`Marks must be compared in their entireties and should not be dissected; however, a trademark
`
`examining attorney may weigh the individual components of a mark to determine its overall commercial
`
`impression.(cid:160) Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1322, 110 USPQ2d
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`1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Nat’l Data Corp. , 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751
`
`(Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[I]n articulating reasons for reaching a conclusion on the issue of confusion, there is
`
`nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight has been given to a particular
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`feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their
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`entireties.”)). (cid:160) Therefore, to properly conduct a 2(d) analysis of the marks at hand, the examining attorney
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`had to consider the commercial impression of the terms HOPPER’S and DELIGHT in applicant’s mark
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`in relationship to the commercial impression of the terms DELIGHT and HOPPERS in registrants’
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`marks. (cid:160) In so doing, and for the reasons articulated above, the examining found that the commercial
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`impression established by applicant’s mark was likely to cause confusion with the commercial impression
`
`established by registrants’ marks.
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`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`In particular, when the terms “HOPPER’S” and “DELIGHT” are combined to form the mark
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`HOPPER’S DELIGHT, the individual components “HOPPER’S” and “DELIGHT” retain their
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`commonly understood meanings.(cid:160) As such, the commercial impression of the mark HOPPER’S
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`DELIGHT is not more memorable and independent of the commercial impression of the constituent
`
`elements of the mark. When these individual components of the mark are weighed to determine the overall
`
`commercial impression, there is a likelihood of confusion between applicant’s mark and the cited
`
`registrations.
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`

`
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`With respect to applicant’s argument that its mark creates a unitary, and consequently different
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`commercial impression than the marks HOPPERS and DELIGHT, the examining attorney notes that the
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`record is devoid of any evidence which supports applicant’s contention that the Sugar Hill Gang’s 1979
`
`song “RAPPER’S DELIGHT” is widely recognized by consumers of beer.
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`(cid:160) Further, the record is
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`devoid of evidence that consumers of beer are likely to recognize applicant’s mark as referencing the
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`song “Rapper’s Delight.” To the contrary, consumers of beer would likely perceive the term “hoppers”
`
`and “hopper’s” as referencing the beer ingredients “hops.” Thus consumers would likely perceive the
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`mark as suggesting the delight of one who adds hops to beer, and not referencing rappers, or a rap song.(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`With respect to applicant argument that its mark is a parody of the song “Rapper’s delight,” the
`
`examining attorney notes that the issue at hand is not whether applicant’s mark may be a “play” on a hit
`
`song, but, whether applicant’s mark is likely to cause confusion with the cited registrations. The fact that
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`a mark is intended to be a parody of another trademark is not, by itself, sufficient to overcome a likelihood
`
`of confusion refusal, because “[t]here are confusing parodies and non-confusing parodies.” J. Thomas
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`McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, §31.153 (4th ed. 2010); see also Nike, Inc.
`
`v. Maher, 100 USPQ2d 1018, 1023 (TTAB 2011) (“[P]arody is not a defense if the marks would
`
`otherwise be considered confusingly similar.”). “A true parody actually decreases the likelihood of
`
`confusion because the effect of the parody is to create a distinction in the viewer’s mind between the
`
`actual product and the joke.” Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905, 910, 231 USPQ 963,
`
`965 (D. Neb. 1986), aff’d, 836 F.2d 397, 5 USPQ2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1987). Thus, ”[w]hile a parody must
`
`call to mind the actual product to be successful, the same success also necessarily distinguishes the
`
`parody from the actual product.(cid:160) See TMEP Section 1207.01(b)(x).
`
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
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`In this case, as previously discussed, the marks at issue create a confusingly similar commercial
`
`impression.(cid:160) As conceded by applicant, “the parody” does not call to mind products of the cited mark
`
`HOPPERS, nor does it call to mind products of the cited mark DELIGHT.(cid:160) See Page. 7 of Applicant’s
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`Brief.(cid:160) In order for a parody to decrease a likelihood of confusion, it must create a distinction in the
`
`viewer’s mind between the actual products and a joke. Id. Thus, a true parody must call to mind the
`
`registrant’s products in order to distinguish the products from the joke. (cid:160) In this case, because the
`
`comparison does not call to mind the registrant’s actual products, it necessarily fails to create a
`
`distinction between the actual products and a joke.(cid:160) Therefore, if considered a parody, applicant’s mark
`
`

`
`would be considered a confusingly similar parody because it fails to make a distinction between the actual
`
`products and a joke.(cid:160) Further, the issue as to whether applicant’s mark is intended to be a parody of Sugar
`
`Hill Gang’s song “Rapper’s Delight” is of no consequence in addressing the issue of likelihood of
`(cid:160) Put another way, the concept that a
`
`confusion between applicant’s mark and the cited registrations.
`
`parody decreases the likelihood of confusion between marks has no bearing on the 2(d) refusal herein
`
`because applicant’s mark fails to create a distinction in the viewer’s mind between registrant’s actual
`
`products and the joke.
`
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`
`III(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`
`Relatedness of Goods
`
`A.(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160) General Rules for Relatedness of Goods
`
`The second step in a likelihood of confusion analysis is to compare the goods to determine
`
`whether they are similar or commercially related or travel in the same trade channels.(cid:160) See Coach Servs.,
`
`Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
`
`Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc. , 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
`
`TMEP §1207.01, (a)(v).
`
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`
`The goods of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of
`
`confusion.(cid:160) See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
`
`(“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same
`
`goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”); TMEP
`
`§1207.01(a)(i).(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`
`The respective goods need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances
`
`surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods
`
`emanate from the same source.” (cid:160) Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101
`
`USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB
`
`2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
`
`B.(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160) Applicant’s Goods are Related to Registrants’ Goods
`
`

`
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`
`In the instant matter, applicant’s identified goods are beer, in Class 32; registrant’s identified
`
`goods for U.S. Registration No. 1136375(cid:160)are alcoholic malt beverages, namely, beer, in Class 32;
`
`Registrant’s identified goods in U.S. Registration No. 2099536(cid:160)and 2143533 are beer and ale, in Class 32.
`
`(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)(cid:160)
`
`When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods for similarity and relatedness, that
`
`determination is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue,
`
`not on extrinsic evidence of actu