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`Roland Tellis (SBN 186269)
`rtellis@baronbudd.com
`Sterling Cluff (SBN 267142)
`scluff@baronbudd.com
`David Fernandes (SBN 280944)
`dfernandes@baronbudd.com
`Shannon Royster (SBN 314126)
`sroyster@baronbudd.com
`BARON & BUDD, P.C.
`15910 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 1600
`Encino, CA 91436
`Telephone: 818.839.2333
`
`Don Bivens (pro hac vice forthcoming)
`don@donbivens.com
`DON BIVENS PLLC
`15169 N. Scottsdale Road, Suite 205
`Scottsdale, AZ 85254
`Telephone: 602.708.1450
`
`Counsel for Plaintiff
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`
`
`Austin Recht, individually and on
`Case No. 2:22-cv-8613
`behalf of all others similarly situated,
`
`
`CLASS ACTION
` Plaintiff,
`
`
` v.
`COMPLAINT
`
`
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`TikTok Inc. (f/k/a Musical.ly, Inc.);
`ByteDance Inc.; Beijing Douyin
`
`Information Service Co. Ltd. a/k/a
`
`ByteDance Technology Co. Ltd.; and
`
`Douyin Ltd. a/k/a ByteDance Ltd.,
`
`Defendants.
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`Case 2:22-cv-08613-MEMF-AGR Document 1 Filed 11/25/22 Page 2 of 76 Page ID #:2
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`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`
`
`I.
`II.
`
`III.
`
`V.
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`NATURE OF THE ACTION ........................................................................... 1
`THE PARTIES ................................................................................................. 2
`A.
`Plaintiff ............................................................................................. 2
`B.
`Defendants ....................................................................................... 3
`C.
`Alter Ego And Single Enterprise Allegations .................................. 4
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE ....................................................................... 4
`A. Allegations Supporting Personal Jurisdiction over the Foreign
`Defendants ....................................................................................... 5
`IV. GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS ..................................................... 16
`A.
`TikTok’s Business Model: Profits from Advertising by Monetizing
`User Data ........................................................................................ 18
`Global Privacy Concerns Regarding TikTok’s Data Use Practices
` ........................................................................................................ 20
`1.
`Concerns in the U.S. ............................................................ 20
`2.
`Concerns Abroad ................................................................. 26
`3.
`Biometric Data Privacy Litigation ....................................... 28
`TikTok’s Interception and Theft of Users’ Sensitive, Personally
`Identifying Information Input into Third Party Websites .............. 29
`The Data Collected in Defendants’ In-App Browser Has Inherent
`Value to Plaintiff and Class Members ........................................... 46
`Plaintiff and Class Members Have a Reasonable Expectation of
`Privacy in the Data Collected in Defendants’ In-App Browser .... 49
`Plaintiff and Class Members Did Not Consent to the Collection of
`Data via the In-App Browser ......................................................... 51
`TOLLING ....................................................................................................... 52
`
`B.
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`C.
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`D.
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`E.
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`F.
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`Case 2:22-cv-08613-MEMF-AGR Document 1 Filed 11/25/22 Page 3 of 76 Page ID #:3
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`VI. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS .............................................................. 53
`VII. CALIFORNIA LAW APPLIES TO ALL CLASS MEMBERS ................... 55
`VIII. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF ................................................................................. 56
`FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF .................................................................................. 56
`SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF ............................................................................. 59
`THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF ................................................................................. 61
`FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF ............................................................................. 63
`FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF .................................................................................. 65
`SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF ................................................................................. 68
`SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF ........................................................................... 70
`IX. PRAYER FOR RELIEF ................................................................................. 71
`X. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL ...................................................................... 73
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`Case 2:22-cv-08613-MEMF-AGR Document 1 Filed 11/25/22 Page 4 of 76 Page ID #:4
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`For his complaint against Defendants, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of
`all others similarly situated, alleges as follows:
`I. NATURE OF THE ACTION
`Plaintiff brings this proposed class action on behalf of all persons who
`1.
`downloaded TikTok, a social media application (the “TikTok app”) 1, and used
`TikTok’s in-app website browser (“in-app browser”).
`This case exemplifies that the “world’s most valuable resource is no
`2.
`longer oil, but data.”2 Unbeknownst to Plaintiff and Class Members, Defendants
`TikTok Inc., ByteDance Inc., Beijing Douyin Information Service Co. Ltd. a/k/a
`ByteDance Technology Co. Ltd.., and ByteDance Ltd. (collectively, the
`“Defendants”) invaded the privacy of Plaintiff and Class Members by secretly
`intercepting details and contents about Plaintiff and Class Members without their
`consent.
`At no time did Defendants disclose to Plaintiff and Class Members that
`3.
`TikTok users who access external websites via the TikTok app3 use an in-app
`browser which is a sophisticated data collection mechanism.
`As described more fully below, the in-app browser inserts JavaScript
`4.
`code into the websites visited by TikTok users. The clear purpose of the JavaScript
`code inserted into these websites is to track every detail about TikTok users’
`website activity.
`Through the use of its in-app browser, TikTok has secretly amassed
`5.
`massive amounts of highly invasive information and data about its users by tracking
`their activities on third-party websites. Defendants have unlawfully intercepted
`private and personally identifiable data and content from TikTok users so that
`
`1 Also, at times hereinafter, “the app”
`2 The World's Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, But Data, THE
`ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-
`worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longeroil-but-data (emphasis added).
`3 At times hereinafter, “third-party website”
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`Case 2:22-cv-08613-MEMF-AGR Document 1 Filed 11/25/22 Page 5 of 76 Page ID #:5
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`Defendants may generate revenue from use of this data. Through their clandestine
`tracking activities, Defendants have violated wiretap laws, unlawfully intruded
`upon users’ privacy, violated their rights of privacy, and unjustly profited from their
`unlawful activities.
`Plaintiff’s class action complaint seeks to recover all available
`6.
`remedies, including statutory penalties, and redress the wrongs imposed by
`Defendants on Plaintiff and Class Members.
`II. THE PARTIES
`
`A.
`
`Plaintiff
`Plaintiff Austin Recht is a citizen and resident of the State of California,
`currently residing in Culver City. Plaintiff downloaded the TikTok app and created
`his TikTok account in 2019 on his mobile device, an Apple iPhone. While using
`the TikTok app, Plaintiff Recht clicked on links to external, third-party websites.
`Plaintiff Recht purchased merchandise from a website provided in an
`advertisement. The link took him to a third-party website via the in-app browser
`where he completed his purchase and entered his private data, including his credit
`card information. Defendants surreptitiously collected data associated with
`Plaintiff’s use of third-party websites without his knowledge or consent, including
`his contact and credit card information provided during Plaintiff’s purchase of
`merchandise.
`In August of 2022, Plaintiff discovered that TikTok collects data and
`7.
`monitors what users do on third-party websites via the in-app browser after
`reviewing an article on the internet. Prior to reviewing this article, Plaintiff did not
`know that his activity on third-party websites was accessed via TikTok’s in-app
`browser and was being monitored by Defendants, nor did he know that his data
`regarding that activity was being captured and recorded by Defendants.
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`Case 2:22-cv-08613-MEMF-AGR Document 1 Filed 11/25/22 Page 6 of 76 Page ID #:6
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`B. Defendants
`TikTok Inc. f/k/a Musical.ly, Inc. (“TikTok Inc.”) is, and at all
`8.
`relevant times was, a California corporation doing business throughout the United
`States, with its principal place of business in Culver City, California. Defendant
`TikTok Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of TikTok, LLC.
`ByteDance Inc. (“ByteDance Inc.”) is, and all relevant times was, a
`9.
`Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Mountain View,
`California. Upon information and belief, ByteDance Inc. operates in concert with
`TikTok Inc. to carry out instructions from the foreign Defendants relating to the
`TikTok app. For example, based on LinkedIn profiles of ByteDance Inc.,
`employees, these employees recruit applicants to work with them on research and
`development of software for the TikTok app. Additionally, the “ByteDance”
`website displays job postings that specifically relate to the TikTok app.
`10. TikTok Inc. and ByteDance Inc. are collectively referred to as “the
`domestic Defendants.”
`11. Beijing Douyin Information Service Co. Ltd. a/k/a ByteDance
`Technology Co. Ltd. (“Beijing ByteDance”) is, and at all relevant times was, a
`privately held company headquartered in Beijing, China. Beijing ByteDance is a
`wholly owned subsidiary of ByteDance Co., Ltd.
`12. Douyin Ltd. a/k/a ByteDance Ltd. (“ByteDance Ltd.”) is and at all
`relevant times was, a privately held company incorporated in the Cayman Islands.
`ByteDance Ltd. is owned by Yiming Zhang and a number of institutional investors.
`ByteDance Ltd. owns 100% of Douyin Group (HK) Ltd. a/k/a ByteDance (HK)
`Co., Ltd., which is headquartered in Hong Kong, TikTok Pte. Ltd., TikTok Ltd.,
`and ByteDance Inc.
`13. Beijing ByteDance and ByteDance Ltd are collectively referred to as
`“the foreign Defendants.”
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`C. Alter Ego And Single Enterprise Allegations
`
`14. At all relevant times, and in connection with the matters alleged
`herein, each Defendant acted as an agent, servant, partner, joint venturer and/or
`alter ego of each of the other Defendants, and acted in the course and scope of such
`agency, partnership, and relationship and/or in furtherance of such joint venture.
`Each Defendant acted with the knowledge and consent of each of the other
`Defendants and/or directed, authorized, affirmed, consented to, ratified,
`encouraged, approved, adopted, and/or participated in the acts or transactions of the
`other Defendants, as described below in Section III(A).
`15. At all relevant times, and in connection with the matters alleged
`herein, Defendants were controlled and largely owned by the same person, founder
`Yiming Zhang, and constitute a single enterprise with a unity of interest.
`Recognition of the privilege of separate existence under such circumstances would
`promote injustice, as described below in Section III(A).
`III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
`16. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28
`U.S.C. § 1331 because this suit is brought under the laws of the United States, i.e.,
`the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq.
`17. This Court also has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant
`to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), because members of the
`proposed Classes are citizens of states in the United States and the foreign
`Defendants are subjects or citizens of foreign states, and the aggregate amount in
`controversy exceeds $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
`18. This Court has general jurisdiction over Defendants ByteDance Inc.
`and TikTok Inc. because they have their principal place of business in California.
`19. This Court has specific jurisdiction over Defendants because they (i)
`transact business in California; (ii) they have substantial aggregate contacts with
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`California; (iii) they engaged and are engaging in conduct that has and had a direct,
`substantial, reasonably foreseeable, and intended effect of causing injury to persons
`in California; and (iv) purposely availed themselves of the laws California. This
`Court also has specific jurisdiction over the foreign Defendants for the additional
`reason that they exert substantial control over the domestic Defendants, as
`described below in Section III(A).
`20. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law
`claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
`21. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because a
`substantial part of the events and/or omissions giving rise to the claims herein
`occurred in this district and because TikTok Inc. has its headquarters located in this
`district.
`A. Allegations Supporting Personal Jurisdiction over the Foreign
`Defendants
`
`1.
`
`The Foreign Defendants have Pervasive Contacts with
`the U.S. and California
`
`22. Plaintiff is informed and believes, based on information available in
`the public domain, including in news articles and reports described below, that
`China-based employees of the foreign Defendants and U.S. employees of the
`domestic Defendants perform work on and concerning the TikTok app that is at the
`center of this lawsuit, including the functionality and operation of the TikTok app
`that targets consumers in California and across the United States and the Chinese
`version of the app (“Douyin”) that, on information and belief, the foreign
`Defendants operate in China. Defendants and their engineers have done significant
`coding for the TikTok app and its many versions and updates. The foreign and
`domestic Defendants collectively work together to sell, develop, and operate a
`version of the TikTok app for both Apple and Android mobile devices, available in
`the Apple and Google stores, respectively.
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`Case 2:22-cv-08613-MEMF-AGR Document 1 Filed 11/25/22 Page 9 of 76 Page ID #:9
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`23. ByteDance’s website touts “we now have over 110,000 employees
`based out of more than 200 cities globally…our apps operate in 150 markets.” It
`then goes on to display the number of available jobs in each of its global offices.
`13 of those offices are in the U.S., with 5 in California. Upon information and
`belief, the “ByteDance” website is owned, controlled, and operated by Beijing
`ByteDance and ByteDance Ltd. Upon information and belief, the foreign
`Defendants actively recruit and employ California personnel to perform work
`relevant to the TikTok app, including via job postings on U.S.-based job-search
`websites and via the “ByteDance” website, which is displayed in English.
`In October 2021, GeekWire reported on “ByteDance’s” U.S. presence,
`24.
`noting that that the “TikTok parent” also has offices in several California cities:
`Mountain View, San Francisco, Los Angeles and—referencing the TikTok parent’s
`“U.S. headquarters”—Culver City.4 Upon information and belief, this report
`describes the activities of Beijing ByteDance and ByteDance Ltd.
`25. TikTok has defended and filed a counter claim in trademark suits
`regarding the TikTok app in the Central District of California, Case No. 2:21-cv-
`06636, and in the Southern District of California, Case No. 3:21-cv-00626. It also
`defended a contract lawsuit regarding the TikTok app in Delaware District Court,
`Case No. 1:20-cv-01272.
`26. TikTok specifically targets consumers in California and the United
`States with advertising that appeared on television in California and across the
`United States.5
`
`
`4 Todd Bishop, Tiktok Parent Bytedance Sets Up Bellevue WA Office as First
`Official Presence in Seattle Area, GEEKWIRE (October 12, 2021),
`https://www.geekwire.com/2021/tiktok-parent-bytedance-sets-bellevue-wa-office-
`first-official-presence-seattle-area/.
`5 See Sam Bradley, TikTok on TV: What Does the Social Media Platform’s Ad
`Spend Tell Us?, THEDRUM.COM (April 27, 2021),
`https://www.thedrum.com/news/2021/04/27/tiktok-tv-what-does-the-social-video-
`Footnote continued on next page
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`27. ByteDance Ltd. holds several U.S. trademarks relating to the TikTok
`app, including its logo. It has also initiated and defended litigation in U.S. courts
`regarding the app, including in the Central District of California.
`28. Also, upon information and belief, at certain relevant times the foreign
`Defendants employed a vast number of content reviewers to review TikTok videos
`uploaded by U.S. and California users, and these reviewers had authority to take
`down any such videos if the content was deemed to be noncompliant with policies
`that were disseminated by Beijing ByteDance and ByteDance Ltd. These
`substantial and recurring activities were directed toward U.S. and California users.
`29. Upon information and belief, the foreign Defendants regularly evaluate
`potential acquisitions in the U.S., and occasionally do transact to purchase certain
`U.S. companies and assets, like Musical.ly, the predecessor to the TikTok app.
`The Foreign Defendants Exert Substantial Control
`2.
`Over the Operations of the Domestic Defendants
`
`30. Upon information and belief, Defendant Beijing ByteDance and
`ByteDance Ltd., direct the operations of the domestic Defendants with respect to
`the TikTok app, and the domestic Defendants have reported to Defendant Beijing
`ByteDance and ByteDance Ltd. The foreign Defendants have collected and
`analyzed data from the U.S. and California regarding the performance of various
`features of the TikTok app, and have worked with the domestic Defendants to
`address performance issues.
`31. Publicly available reports and articles reveal that executives and
`leaders in Beijing substantially control the operations of the entities whose names
`include “TikTok”, which upon information and belief also includes ByteDance Inc.,
`often referred to colloquially as simply “TikTok.” Upon information and belief, the
`
`platform-s-ad-spend-tell-us; Todd Spangler, TikTok Launches Biggest-Ever Ad
`Campaign as Its Fate Remains Cloudy, VARIETY (August 18, 2020)
`https://variety.com/2020/digital/news/tiktok-advertising-brand-campaign-sale-
`bytedance-1234738607/.
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`executives and leaders in Beijing are employees of Beijing ByteDance and
`ByteDance Ltd., which are referred to colloquially in reports simply as
`“ByteDance” or described as the “parent” of “TikTok.”
`32. Upon information and belief, with respect to Defendants’ monitoring
`and censorship of content on the TikTok app, the foreign Defendants’ management
`at Beijing ByteDance and ByteDance Ltd. have determined content review policies
`enforced in the domestic Defendants’ offices; a content review manager in the same
`U.S. office was reporting to someone in China; and another content reviewer was
`required to seek authorization from someone in China in order to access non-
`published information about user accounts when content concerns arose.
`33. At various relevant times, the TikTok app has been advertised on
`television in California and throughout the United States.6 Based on the publicly
`available information detailed in this section, the foreign Defendants directed the
`domestic Defendants to create and implement these advertisements, which had to
`be approved by leadership in China at Beijing ByteDance and ByteDance Ltd.
`34. Upon information and belief, at certain relevant times, employees have
`held concurrent leadership positions at the domestic Defendants and Beijing
`ByteDance or ByteDance Ltd., and personnel freely transition roles between the
`domestic and foreign Defendants.
`35. The foreign and domestic Defendants share common executives. For
`example, in April 2021, “TikTok” announced that Shouzi Chew, the CFO at
`ByteDance, would also take on the role of CEO of TikTok, thus holding leadership
`positions at both companies.7 The head of HR for “TikTok,” Americas & Global
`Functions, Global Business Solutions also holds herself out in her LinkedIn profile
`in a concurrent role as Head of HR for “ByteDance,” U.S & Europe,
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`6 See Id.
`7 Molly Schuetz, et al., ByteDance’s Shouzi Chew Named New TikTok CEO,
`FORTUNE (April 30, 2021), https://fortune.com/2021/04/30/new-tiktok-ceo-
`bytedance-shouzi-chew/.
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`Monetization.”8 LinkedIn profiles of several other non-executive level employees
`in roles such as global payment, global business development, software engineer,
`and legal also hold themselves out as working for both “TikTok” and “ByteDance”
`concurrently.9
`In a LinkedIn interview of Issac Bess and Gregory Justice, employees
`36.
`of Defendants, Bess identifies himself as responsible for leading “ByteDance”
`business development from Los Angeles and notes both are part of the “corporate
`development organization at ByteDance.” Justice notes he works on the content
`team for “TikTok” in the U.S. Greg goes on to describe the “free flow of
`colleagues from China coming to the LA office or vice versa.”10 Employees often
`have both a TikTok and a ByteDance email address.11
`37. U.S. employees of the domestic Defendants working in California are
`expected to “restart” their day and work during Chinese business hours to be
`available to the China-based foreign Defendants’ employees. One former project
`manager, employed at the domestic Defendants, revealed she was expected to
`regularly attend late night “Beijing meetings.”12 This employee was also required
`to submit a last-minute product proposal regarding the app for approval to the
`“Beijing team”—after it had already been approved by U.S. leadership. The
`“Beijing team” had the final say over whether the proposal would be implemented,
`
`
`8 https://www.linkedin.com/in/katemcfarlinbarney/ (last visited November 18,
`2022).
`9 See e.g., https://ie.linkedin.com/in/kingsleylam;
`https://www.linkedin.com/in/jordanlowy; https://www.linkedin.com/in/velicue;
`https://www.linkedin.com/in/carlawebb (last visited November 18, 2022).
`10 ByteDance, LinkedIn Interviews ByteDance: How ByteDance Builds its Global
`Employer Brand, YOUTUBE, (October 29, 2021),
`https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Epp_TN52fSU.
`11 Id.
`12 Chloe Shih, Why I Just Quit My Product Manager Job at TikTok, YOUTUBE
`(October 11, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pkDXV2g_i7Y.
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`Case 2:22-cv-08613-MEMF-AGR Document 1 Filed 11/25/22 Page 13 of 76 Page ID #:13
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`and without their approval, the project did not move forward. Upon information
`and belief, the “Beijing team” and “Beijing meetings” refer to employees at
`Defendant Beijing ByteDance and ByteDance Ltd. and during these meetings,
`Beijing ByteDance and ByteDance Ltd. employees direct, control, manage, and
`approve the operations of the domestic Defendants.
`38. Employee testimonials demonstrate that the domestic Defendants do
`not operate as independent corporate entities. Instead, they function as mere
`satellite offices with little independence and are constantly monitored by Chinese
`management at, upon information and belief, Beijing ByteDance and ByteDance
`Ltd. In the words of one former employee, “TikTok product teams sit entirely
`within Bytedance’s scope of influence,” “product teams [are] inextricably tied to
`Beijing HQ,” and noting the “heavy China dependency dynamic.”13 She reports
`that half of her team was located in China and meetings with them would start at
`6pm, ending at midnight. She recounts that leadership reviews, which upon
`information and belief are meetings intended to review an employee’s performance,
`would take place on Sunday or past 10 p.m. – Monday morning in Beijing or during
`regular Beijing business hours. Teams in the U.S. “directly roll up into China-
`based managers.” Domestic Defendants’ employees have also expressed difficulty
`with the Chinese-English language barrier due to the constant interaction and
`meetings between U.S. and Chinese employees. These same experiences have been
`shared and recounted by other former employees of the domestic Defendants.14
`Upon information and belief, these “China-based managers” are employees of
`Beijing ByteDance and ByteDance Ltd.
`
`13 Melody Chu, What it’s Really Like Working at TikTok: The Challenges,
`MEDIUM.COM (April 4, 2022), https://medium.com/@melodychu/what-its-really-
`like-working-at-tiktok-the-challenges-part-3-9c6f6f04fae2.
`14 See e.g., Georgia Wells, et al., TikTok’s Work Culture: Anxiety, Secrecy and
`Relentless Pressure, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (May 6, 2022),
`https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktoks-work-culture-anxiety-secrecy-and-relentless-
`pressure-11651848638?mod=pls_whats_news_us_business_f.
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`Case 2:22-cv-08613-MEMF-AGR Document 1 Filed 11/25/22 Page 14 of 76 Page ID #:14
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`39. Upon information and belief, Beijing ByteDance and ByteDance Ltd.
`made decisions for the domestic Defendants, and the domestic Defendants and
`these other offices were tasked with executing such decisions. Beijing ByteDance
`and ByteDance Ltd. executives are also heavily involved in day-to-day decisions
`made for the domestic Defendants, including the TikTok app’s development, and
`have access to U.S. users’ data. Beijing leadership also has the ability to control
`even minor daily decisions and human resource matters, such as the ability of the
`domestic Defendants’ employees to work from home. Product development is led
`by Beijing ByteDance and ByteDance Ltd. employees. Several publicly available
`reports and articles describe that employees of the domestic Defendants in
`California are tethered to the foreign Defendants’ Chinese leadership teams on
`nearly a daily basis, as described above.
`40. Although publicly available information reveals Beijing ByteDance
`and ByteDance Ltd.’s control over the operations of the U.S. subsidiaries, leaked
`information shows that the foreign Defendants have attempted to hide this
`information. “Multiple TikTok sources, who spoke with The Intercept on the
`condition of anonymity …, emphasized the primacy of ByteDance’s Beijing HQ
`over the global TikTok operation, explaining that their ever-shifting decisions about
`what’s censored and what’s boosted are dictated by Chinese staff, whose policy
`declarations are then filtered around TikTok’s 12 global offices, translated into
`rough English.”15 Censorship guidelines emanate from China and have mandated
`the censorship of U.S. videos ranging from those regarding Tiananmen Square to
`those in violation of the so-called “ugly-content policy,” where domestic
`Defendants’ employees are required to censor because they are “not worthing [sic]
`to be recommended to new users.”16
`
`15 Sam Biddle, et al., Invisible Censorship, THE INTERCEPT (March 15, 2020),
`https://theintercept.com/2020/03/16/tiktok-app-moderators-users-discrimination/.
`16 Id.; see also Drew Harwell & Tony Romm, Inside Tiktok: a Culture Clash
`Footnote continued on next page
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`Case 2:22-cv-08613-MEMF-AGR Document 1 Filed 11/25/22 Page 15 of 76 Page ID #:15
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`In another example, “an American employee working on TikTok
`41.
`needed to get a list of global users, including Americans, who searched for or
`interacted with a specific type of content — that means users who searched for a
`specific term or hashtag or liked a particular category of videos. This employee had
`to reach out to a data team in China in order to access that information. The data
`the employee received included users’ specific IDs, and they could pull up
`whatever information TikTok had about those users. This type of situation was
`confirmed as a common occurrence by a second employee.”17 According to
`reports, a Beijing-based engineer, known internally as a “master admin,” has access
`to U.S. data, regardless of where it is stored: “everything is seen in China.”18
`“Despite the repeated assurances that TikTok’s parent company, the China-based
`ByteDance, isn’t checking out data collected about users in the U.S. and Europe, it
`looks like the company absolutely does and can.”19 This illustrates the lack of
`control, authority, and decision making power employees of the domestic
`Defendants have over daily operations regarding the TikTok app in the U.S. and
`California, including the data of U.S. and Californian users that provides a major
`revenue stream.
`
`
`Where U.S. Views about Censorship Often Were Overridden by the Chinese Bosses,
`THE WASHINGTON POST (November 5, 2019),
`https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/11/05/inside-tiktok-culture-
`clash-where-us-views-about-censorship-often-were-overridden-by-chinese-bosses/.
`17 Salvador Rodriguez, TikTok Insiders Say Social Media Company is Tightly
`Controlled by Chinese Parent ByteDance, CNBC (June 25, 2021),
`https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/25/tiktok-insiders-say-chinese-parent-bytedance-in-
`control.html.
`18 Emily Baker-White, Leaked Audio From 80 Internal TikTok Meetings Shows
`That US User Data Has Been Repeatedly Accessed From China, BUZZFEED NEWS
`(June 17, 2022), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/emilybakerwhite/tiktok-
`tapes-us-user-data-china-bytedance-access.
`19 Christianna Silva & Elizabeth de Luna, It Looks Like China Does Have Access to
`U.S. TikTok User Data, MASHABLE (November 3, 2022),
`https://mashable.com/article/tiktok-china-access-data-in-us.
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`Case 2:22-cv-08613-MEMF-AGR Document 1 Filed 11/25/22 Page 16 of 76 Page ID #:16
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`In the summer of 2022, TikTok announced plans to move its silo of
`42.
`U.S. data to the cloud-based Oracle server, intended to quell fears about Chinese
`government acquisition of U.S. data. According to a leaked audio conversation, an
`employee of TikTok’s U.S. Trust & Safety Team was pressured by TikTok’s Chief
`Internal Auditor—who reports directly to “Be