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`Case 4:20-cv-04869-KAW Document 53 Filed 08/28/20 Page 1 of 15
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`
`
`JEFF LANDRY
` ATTORNEY GENERAL OF LOUISIANA
`ELIZABETH B. MURRILL (pro hac vice forthcoming)
` Solicitor General
`JOSEPH S. ST. JOHN (pro hac vice forthcoming)
` Deputy Solicitor General
`LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
`1885 N. Third Street
`Baton Rouge, LA 70804
`Tel: (225) 326-6766
`emurrill@ag.louisiana.gov
`
`Counsel for the State of Louisiana
`
`SEE SIGNATURE PAGE FOR
`ADDITIONAL PARTIES AND COUNSEL
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`
`No. 4:20-cv-4869-KAW
`
`NOTICEOF MOTION AND MOTION TO
`INTERVENE BY THE STATES OF
`LOUISIANA, MONTANA, ARKANSAS,
`MISSISSIPPI, MISSOURI, TEXAS, WEST
`VIRGINIA, AND WYOMING
`
`Hr’g Date: Oct. 15, 2020
`Hr’g Time: 1:30 p.m.
`Judge: Hon. Kandis Westmore
`Action Filed: July 21, 2020
`Dep’t: Oakland Courthouse
`
`
`
`
`
`STATE OF CALIFORNIA, by and through
`ATTORNEY GENERAL XAVIER
`BECERRA and the STATE WATER
`RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD,
`STATE OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF
`NEW YORK, STATE OF COLORADO,
`STATE OF CONNECTICUT, STATE OF
`ILLINOIS, STATE OF MAINE, STATE
`OF MARYLAND, COMMONWEALTH
`OF MASSACHUSETTS, STATE OF
`MICHIGCAN, STATE OF MINNESTOA,
`STATE OF NEVADA, STATE OF NEW
`JERSEY, STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
`STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, STATE
`OF OREGON, STATE OF RHODE
`ISLAND, STATE OF VERMONT,
`COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,
`STATE OF WISCONSIN, and the
`DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`
`ANDREW R. WHEELER, in his official
`capacity as ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
`UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
`PROTECTION AGENCY, and the
`UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
`PROTECTION AGENCY,
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`Defendants.
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`Case 4:20-cv-04869-KAW Document 53 Filed 08/28/20 Page 2 of 15
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`TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
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`PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Pursuant to Local Rule 7-1(b), the States of Louisiana,
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`Montana, Arkansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming (collectively, “State
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`Intervenors”) respectfully move to intervene as Defendants in the above-captioned litigation without
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`oral argument. Alternatively, the State Intervenors notice that on October 15, 2020, at 1:30 p.m.,
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`before the presiding district judge or the Hon. Kandis Westmore, 1301 Clay Street, Oakland,
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`California, or as soon thereafter as the Court may order, the State Intervenors will and do hereby
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`move for the same relief.
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`This motion is brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. As more fully set
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`forth in the accompanying memorandum, the grounds for the motion are: (a) the motion is timely;
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`(b) the State Intervenors have significant protectable interests, both as sovereigns and as advocates
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`for the challenged rule; (c) the disposition of this action could impede the State Intervenors’ ability to
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`protect those interests; (d) the current parties do not adequately represent the interests of the State
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`Intervenors; and (e) the State Intervenors’ position in support of the revised regulations plainly
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`involves common questions of law and fact with this action, and their direct opposition to Plaintiffs’
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`claims satisfies the “common question” requirement for permissive intervention. This motion is
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`based on this motion and the supporting memorandum below; the accompanying Declaration of
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`Joseph S. St. John; and any further papers filed in support of this motion, the argument of counsel,
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`and all pleadings and records on file in this matter.
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`PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that counsel for Louisiana contacted counsel for
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`the parties on August 20, 2020. Both Plaintiffs and the United States take no position on this motion.
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`PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that State Intervenors’ proposed answer is
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`attached.
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`Case 4:20-cv-04869-KAW Document 53 Filed 08/28/20 Page 3 of 15
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`MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
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`BACKGROUND
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`THE CLEAN WATER ACT
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`
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`Since 1970, “[a]ny applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity . . . which
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`may result in any discharge into the navigable waters . . . shall provide the licensing or permitting
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`agency a certification from the State in which the discharge originates or will originate . . . .” Water
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`Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91, 108 (Apr. 3, 1970). In 1972, Congress
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`enacted a “total restructuring” and “complete rewriting” of the nation’s water pollution control laws,
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`including the provision requiring certification. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981)
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`(quoting legislative history); see also Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub.
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`L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, 877 (Oct. 16, 1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1341). Of particular relevance
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`here, Congress narrowed the requirement from a certification “that such activity will be conducted in a
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`manner which will not violate applicable water quality standards,” 84. Stat. at 108 (emphasis added), to a
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`certification only “that any such discharge will comply with the applicable provisions of sections 301, 302,
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`306, and 307 of this Act,” 86 Stat. at 877 (emphasis added).
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`CERTAIN STATES ABUSE THEIR 401 CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY
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`
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`Despite the statutory change, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) failed to revise
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`the regulations governing the required certification, which is known as a 401 Certification. As a
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`result, EPA’s regulations were incongruent with the new statutory language. Cf. NPDES; Revision of
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`Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 32,854, 32,856 (June 7, 1979) (indicating need for updated certification
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`rules). Certain states began using the incongruity and ambiguities in EPA’s regulations to abuse their
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`certification authority for the purpose of delaying or denying certifications on non-water quality
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`grounds. In February 2019, Louisiana and other State Intervenors wrote to EPA Administrator
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`Wheeler about that abuse and requested that EPA “clarify[y] . . . the process by which federal and
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`state regulatory authorities are expected to implement [Section 401].” Exh. 1. That weighty request
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`was bolstered when, on April 10, 2019, the President issued an Executive Order noting that
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`“[o]utdated Federal guidance and regulations regarding section 401 of the Clean Water Act . . . are
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`causing confusion and uncertainty and are hindering the development of energy infrastructure.” EO
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`Case 4:20-cv-04869-KAW Document 53 Filed 08/28/20 Page 4 of 15
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`13868, 84 Fed. Reg. 15,494 (Apr. 15, 2019). The President directed Administrator Wheeler to review
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`EPA’s Section 401 regulations, “determine whether any provisions thereof should be clarified,” and
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`“publish for notice and comment proposed rules revising such regulations, as appropriate and
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`consistent with law.” Id. Louisiana and other Intervenor States then submitted additional comments
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`in response to EPA’s request for Pre-Proposal Stakeholder Engagement. Exhs. 2, 7.
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`Louisiana identified the State of Washington’s denial of certification for a proposed coal
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`facility, the Millennium Bulk Terminal, as a paradigmatic example of abuse. Exh. 1. The Governor of
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`Wyoming later explained:
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`Wyoming has been adversely impacted by the misapplication of other states’ CWA
`Section 401 certifications. Our interest in a streamlined 401 certification process is
`founded by the fact that a large portion of Wyoming’s economy depends on our
`ability to export our energy products to the markets that demand them, particularly
`markets located overseas in Asia. In the case of the Millennium Bulk Terminal,
`Washington State blocked the terminal’s construction by inappropriately denying the
`State’s Section 401 certification on account of non-water quality related impacts -- an
`illegal maneuver based on alleged effects that are outside of the scope of Section 401.
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`Exh. 4. The permit applicant for the proposed Millennium Bulk Terminal elaborated:
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`Millennium sought a Clean Water Act, Section 401 water quality certification from the
`Washington Department of Ecology (“Washington Ecology”) for nearly six years. As
`part of the 401 certification process, Millennium has spent over $15 million to obtain
`an environmental impact statement (“EIS”), which originally began as a dual EIS
`under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and the Washington State
`Environmental Policy Act (“SEPA”), with the US Army Corps of Engineers as the
`lead agency under NEPA and with the Washington Ecology and Cowlitz County as
`co-lead agencies under SEPA. In September 2013, the state and federal agencies
`agreed to separate and prepare both a federal EIS and a state EIS.
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`The state EIS concluded with respect to the Project that “There would be no
`unavoidable and significant adverse environmental impacts on water quality.”
`
`
`* * * * *
`
`
`Washington Governor Jay Inslee, and others in his administration, including
`Washington Ecology Director Bellon, have expressed their belief that no fossil fuel
`infrastructure projects should ever be built in the State of Washington. Denying
`Millennium’s 401 water quality certification was the way that they could impose their
`own personal policy preferences to ensure that no permits would be issued for the
`Project and they could stop sister states from exporting their products into foreign
`commerce.
`
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`Exh. 8.
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`Other comments and judicial opinions make clear the Millennium Bulk Terminal denial was
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`not an isolated abuse. See, e.g., Exh. 9. Indeed, the State of Maryland went so far as to seek a multi-
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`Case 4:20-cv-04869-KAW Document 53 Filed 08/28/20 Page 5 of 15
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`billion dollar “payment-in lieu” of imposing unachievable conditions unrelated to the discharge for
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`which certification was sought – a demand that would ordinarily be considered extortion and which
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`raises constitutional concerns. Ex. 10; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). The Federal
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`Energy Regulatory Commission bluntly summarized the status quo: “[I]t is now commonplace for
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`states to use Section 401 to hold federal licensing hostage.” Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC, 913 F.3d
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`1099, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
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`EPA ADOPTS A RULE TO ELIMINATE AMBIGUITY AND ABUSE
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` Citing the April 2019 Executive Order and Pre-Proposal Stakeholder Engagement, EPA
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`published a proposed rule, Updating Regulations on Water Quality Certification, 84 Fed. Reg. 44,080
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`(Aug. 22, 2019), to, inter alia, limit the scope of 401 certification to water quality impacts from the
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`discharge associated with the licensed or permitted project; interpret “receipt” and “certification
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`request” as used in the CWA; reaffirm that certifying authorities are required by the CWA to act on a
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`request for certification within a reasonable period of time, which shall not exceed one year; and
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`specify the contents and effect of a certification or denial. Despite the short text of the proposed rule
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`itself—less than four Federal Register pages—EPA provided a lengthy statutory and legal analysis.
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`Louisiana, joined by other states, provided extensive comments in support of the proposed
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`rule. Exhs. 1-3. The Governor of Wyoming even testified before the Senate Committee on the
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`Environment and Public Works in support of EPA’s rule and parallel Congressional action.
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`Thereafter, EPA published the final rule, Clean Water Act Section 401 Certification Rule, 85 Fed.
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`Reg. 42210 (July 13, 2020). Plaintiffs filed their 32-page complaint a mere eight days later. Louisiana,
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`Arkansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming (collectively, “State
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`Intervenors”) now timely move to intervene in defense of the final rule.
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`LEGAL STANDARDS
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`With respect to intervention as of right, “[o]n timely motion, the court must permit anyone to
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`intervene who: (1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or (2) claims an
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`interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that
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`disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its
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`interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). “An applicant
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`Case 4:20-cv-04869-KAW Document 53 Filed 08/28/20 Page 6 of 15
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`seeking to intervene as of right under Rule 24 must demonstrate that four requirements are met: (1)
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`the intervention application is timely; (2) the applicant has a significant protectable interest relating to
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`the property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (3) the disposition of the action may, as a
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`practical matter, impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect its interest; and (4) the existing
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`parties may not adequately represent the applicant’s interest.” Citizens for Balanced Use v. Montana
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`Wilderness Ass’n, 647 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2011). “[T]he requirements are broadly interpreted in
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`favor of intervention.” Id.
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`With respect to permissive intervention, “[o]n timely motion, the court may permit anyone to
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`intervene who. . . has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law
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`or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1). Additionally, “the court may permit a federal or state governmental
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`officer or agency to intervene if a party’s claim or defense is based on . . . a statute or executive order
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`administered by the officer or agency.” Id. at 24(b)(2). Thus, “permissive intervention requires (1) an
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`independent ground for jurisdiction; (2) a timely motion; and (3) a common question of law and fact
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`between the movant's claim or defense and the main action.” Freedom from Religion Found. v. Geithner,
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`644 F.3d 836, 843 (9th Cir. 2011).
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`INTERESTS AND GROUNDS FOR INTERVENTION
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`I.
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`The Court should grant intervention as of right.
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`A.
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`The motion is timely.
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`Plaintiffs filed their complaint last month, and this litigation is in its earliest stages. See Citizens
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`for Balanced Use v. Montana Wilderness Ass’n, 647 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding a motion was
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`timely when filed three months after plaintiff’s complaint). Defendants have not yet answered the
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`complaint or submitted any other filings, and the proposed intervention poses no prejudice to the
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`parties. Finally, the State Intervenors have not delayed the proceedings. Upon learning of the lawsuit,
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`they quickly acted to meet and confer with all parties and move for party status to protect their
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`substantial interests. This motion is therefore timely. See United States v. Oregon, 745 F.2d 550, 552 (9th
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`Cir. 1984) (listing considerations for timeliness).
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`B.
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`The State Intervenors have significant protectable interests, both as sovereigns
`and as advocates for the challenged rule.
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`The State Intervenors have clear and substantial protectable interests at stake in this action.
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`The “property” that is the subject of this action — particularly given Plaintiffs’ request for
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`nationwide relief — includes the sovereign lands and waters within the State Intervenors’ borders,
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`the scope of the State Intervenors’ power and duty to regulate use of that property, and the State
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`Intervenors’ sovereign right to develop their natural resources without interference from other states.
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`See Oregon, 745 F.2d at 551, 553 (reversing denial of intervention where intervening state’s natural
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`resources “may be affected” by the litigation). Those interests are reinforced by the expansive
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`interpretation of “waters of the United States” many of the same Plaintiffs seek in the co-pending
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`California v. Wheeler, No. 3:20-cv-3005-RS (N.D. Cal.), and the unbounded construction they now seek
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`for the “appropriate requirement of State law” portion of the certification requirement. Put directly,
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`Plaintiffs seek to regulate interstate commerce and waters of the United States in excess of the
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`authority delegated by Congress. In doing so, Plaintiffs seek to foist their policy choices on the State
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`Intervenors by indirectly regulating the State Intervenors’ development and export of natural
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`resources. Cf. Forest Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1496 n.8 (9th Cir. 1995)
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`(abrogated on other grounds) (“By allowing parties with a practical interest in the outcome of a
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`particular case to intervene, we often prevent or simplify future litigation involving related issues; at
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`the same time, we allow an additional interested party to express its views before the court.”)
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`In seeking to protect their sovereign interests through regulatory channels, State Intervenors
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`advocated extensively for the challenged rule. E.g., Exhs. 1-4. Under Ninth Circuit law, such
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`advocates for regulatory action are “entitled as a matter of right to intervene in an action challenging
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`the legality of a measure [they have] supported.” Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1397
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`(9th Cir. 1995) (collecting cases); see also Wilderness Soc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1179-80 (9th
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`Cir. 2011) (en banc). Thus, in addition to their sovereign interests, the States Intervenor’s regulatory
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`advocacy entitles them to intervene as of right to defend the rule for which they advocated.
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`C.
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`The disposition of this action could impede the State Intervenors’ ability to
`protect their interests.
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`The risk this action poses to the State Intervenors’ interests is readily apparent. Many of the
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`intervenors asked EPA to revise its regulations because certain States — including States that are
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`Plaintiffs in this case — were abusing their Section 401 Certification authority to delay and obstruct
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`projects affecting other states for policy reasons unrelated to the Clean Water Act. Indeed, certain
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`Plaintiffs are effectively blockading landlocked states from exporting their natural resources. Not
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`surprisingly, the State Intervenors supported and continue to support EPA’s promulgation of the
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`clarified regulations to stop that abuse.
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`Plaintiffs seek to erase the State Intervenors’ regulatory victory by way of this action.
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`Plaintiffs allege the revised regulations are “arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with law” and
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`“exceed[] EPA’s rulemaking authority.” Compl. ¶¶ 7.5, 7.12, 7.19, 7.25. Plaintiffs then ask this Court
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`to declare the regulations unlawful, set them aside, and vacate them. Compl. at p.27. Of course, if
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`Plaintiffs obtain that relief, the consequences will extend to the State Intervenors, too, even though
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`the State Intervenors support the revised regulations. Aside from intervening in this case to defend
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`against the challenge, there is no ready recourse for the State Intervenors to combat the relief
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`Plaintiffs seek.
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`D.
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`The parties do not adequately represent the interests of the State Intervenors.
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`1.
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`Neither Plaintiffs nor EPA represent the interests of the State
`Intervenors.
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`Unlike Plaintiffs, the State Intervenors believe the revised regulations are necessary to comply
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`with the Clean Water Act. Regardless, the revisions are warranted to remedy abusive delays and
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`obstructions imposed by certain States. To that end, the State Intervenors believe the revised
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`regulations strike a reasonable and legally-correct balance between the States’ sovereign powers and
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`their obligation not to infringe the Commerce Clause, the sovereign rights of other states, and the
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`Takings Clause rights of applicants for federal permits and licenses. Plaintiffs attacking the revised
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`regulations clearly do not represent the State Intervenors’ interests.
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`EPA does not represent the State Intervenors’ interests, either. Although EPA will
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`presumably urge the Court to reject the Complaint, its rationale may differ substantively from the
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`bases the State Intervenors intend to advance. The State Intervenors’ interests unquestionably differ
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`from those of EPA when it comes to proper interpretation of the Clean Water Act’s cooperative
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`federalism framework. For example, Intervenor States contemplate arguing that an essentially
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`unbounded definition of “appropriate requirement of State law” in the Clean Water Act would
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`render the act unconstitutional, an argument EPA is unlikely to put forward. EPA also cannot
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`respond to the Plaintiffs’ arguments in the same manner the State Intervenors can: as same-level
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`sovereigns in our federal form of government. See Sagebrush Rebellion, 713 F.2d at 528 (stating that
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`courts assessing the adequacy of representation consider whether the intervenor offers a necessary
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`element to the proceedings that would be neglected). And if the Court holds the revised regulations
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`unlawful, Plaintiffs will necessarily obtain a remedy that will increase the power of the federal
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`government and some States at the expense of other States, thereby imposing irreparable harms on
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`the State Intervenors.
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`“In assessing the adequacy of representation, the focus should be on the ‘subject of the
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`action,’ not just the particular issues before the court at the time of the motion.” Sw. Ctr. for Biological
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`Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 823 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525,
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`528 (9th Cir. 1983)). “[T]he burden of showing inadequacy is ‘minimal,’ and the applicant[s] need
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`only show that representation of its interests by existing parties ‘may be’ inadequate.” Id. (quoting
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`Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972)). The Intervenor States and their
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`distinct sovereign interests easily satisfy that standard.
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`2.
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`The conduct of EPA compellingly reinforces that it is inadequate to
`represent the interests of the State Intervenors.
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`In addition to the EPA’s legal inadequacy, certain past conduct leaves doubt that it could
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`adequately represent the State Intervenors interests as a factual matter. EPA has repeatedly sought
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`expansive interpretations of environmental statutes vis-à-vis the States. See e.g., Rapanos v. United States,
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`547 U.S. 715, 722 (2006). And EPA has in the past achieved its own policy aims through “sue and
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`settle” tactics, often at the expense of States, which its officials have openly acknowledged. In 2017,
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`then-EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt frankly explained:
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`LOUISIANA ET AL’S MOTION TO INTERVENE
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`Case 4:20-cv-04869-KAW Document 53 Filed 08/28/20 Page 10 of 15
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`In the past, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has sought to resolve
`litigation through consent decrees and settlement agreements that appear to be the
`result of collusion with outside groups. Behind closed doors, EPA and the outside
`groups agreed that EPA would take an action with a certain end in mind,
`relinquishing some of its discretion over the Agency’s priorities and duties and
`handing them over to special interests and the courts. When negotiating these
`agreements, EPA excluded intervenors, interested stakeholders, and affected states
`from those discussions.
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`Exh. 7.
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`As the Third Circuit has recognized, environmental cases “frequently pit private, state, and
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`federal interests against each other.” Kleissler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 964, 971 (3d Cir. 1998). The
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`Third Circuit thus recognized a real risk of collusive litigation actions that undermine adequacy of
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`representation in such cases. Id. at 974. More broadly, where, as here, an agency undertakes an action
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`only reluctantly and after delaying for years, it cannot be trusted to adequately represent the interests
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`of those who advocated for the action. Citizens for Balanced Use v. Montana Wilderness Ass’n, 647 F.3d
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`893, 899-900 (9th Cir. 2011) (reviewing cases). That EPA reportedly has internal resistance to the
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`policies of elected leaders – like the revised regulations at issue – makes clear that EPA cannot
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`adequately represent the Intervenor States’ interests in defending those policies. Cf. Kleissler, 157 F.3d
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`at 974 (finding inadequacy: “[I]t is not realistic to assume that the agency’s programs will remain
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`static or unaffected by unanticipated policy shifts.”).
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`II.
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`Alternatively, the Court should permit permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b).
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`Even if this Court does not grant intervention as of right, the Court should permit the State
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`Intervenors to intervene permissively pursuant Rule 24(b). Because the Court’s jurisdiction is based
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`on federal questions raised by Plaintiffs and the applicants for intervention do not assert additional
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`claims, the requirement for an independent ground for jurisdiction does not apply. Freedom from
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`Religion Found., 644 F.3d at 844. This application is timely for the reasons argued above. And the State
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`Intervenors’ position in support of the revised regulations plainly involves common questions of law
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`and fact with this action, and their direct opposition to Plaintiffs’ claims satisfies the “common
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`question” requirement for permissive intervention. Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094,
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`1110 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by Wilderness Soc., 630 F.3d at 1178, 1180; see also, e.g.,
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`Missouri v. Harris, 2014 WL 2506606, at *7 (E.D. Cal. June 3, 2014). Moreover, the State Intervenors
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`Case 4:20-cv-04869-KAW Document 53 Filed 08/28/20 Page 11 of 15
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`experience with having development blocked by abusive 401 Certification practices will provide a
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`“helpful, alternative viewpoint” to those offered by Plaintiffs that have engaged in those very
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`practices, and EPA, which long-tolerated them, thereby “contribut[ing] to full development of the
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`underlying factual issues and to the just and equitable adjudication of the legal questions presented.”
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`Pickup v. Brown, 2012 WL 6024387, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012).
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`CONCLUSION
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`For the foregoing reasons, the State Intervenors request the Court grant their motion to
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`intervene as a matter of right under Rule 24(a) or, alternatively for permissive intervention under
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`Rule 24(b).
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`Dated: August 28, 2020
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`BENBROOK LAW GROUP, P.C.
`
`/s/ Bradley A. Benbrook
`_______________________________
`BRADLEY A. BENBROOK (CA 177786)
`STEPHEN M. DUVERNAY (CA 250957)
`BENBROOK LAW GROUP, P.C.
`400 Capitol Mall, Suite 2530
`Sacramento, CA 95814
`Tel: (916) 447-4900
`brad@benbrooklawgroup.com
`steve@benbrooklawgroup.com
`
`Counsel for State Intervenors
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`Case 4:20-cv-04869-KAW Document 53 Filed 08/28/20 Page 12 of 15
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`JEFF LANDRY
` ATTORNEY GENERAL OF LOUISIANA
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`/s/ Joseph S. St. John
`________________________________
`ELIZABETH B. MURRILL (pro hac vice forthcoming)
` Solicitor General
`JOSEPH S. ST. JOHN (pro hac vice forthcoming)
` Deputy Solicitor General
`RYAN M. SEIDEMANN (pro hac vice forthcoming)
` Assistant Attorney General
`LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
`1885 N. Third Street
`Baton Rouge, LA 70804
`Tel: (225) 326-6766
`emurrill@ag.louisiana.gov
`stjohnj@ag.louisiana.gov
`seidemannr@ag.louisiana.gov
`
`Attorneys for the State of Louisiana
`
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`TIM FOX
` ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MONTANA
`
`/s/ Jon Bennion
`________________________________
`JON BENNION (pro hac vice forthcoming)
` Chief Deputy Attorney General
`215 N. Sanders, Third Floor
`P.O. Box 201401
`Helena, MT 59620
`Tel: (406) 444-2026
`jonbennion@mt.gov
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`Attorney for the State of Montana
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`Case 4:20-cv-04869-KAW Document 53 Filed 08/28/20 Page 13 of 15
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`LESLIE RUTLEDGE
` ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ARKANSAS
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`/s/ Nicholas J. Bronni
`________________________________
`NICHOLAS J. BRONNI (pro hac vice forthcoming)
` Solicitor General
`VINCENT WAGNER (pro hac vice forthcoming)
` Deputy Solicitor General
`OFFICE OF ARKANSAS ATTORNEY GENERAL
` LESLIE RUTLEDGE
`323 Center Street, Suite 200
`Little Rock, AK 72201
`Tel: (501) 682-8090
`nicholas.bronni@arkansasag.gov
`vincent.wagner@arkansasag.gov
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`Attorneys for the State of Arkansas
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`LYNN FITCH
` ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSISSIPPI
`
`/s/ Kristi H. Johnson
`________________________________
`KRISTI H. JOHNSON (pro hac vice forthcoming)
` Solicitor General
`OFFICE OF MISSISSIPPI ATTORNEY
` GENERAL LYNN FITCH
`P.O. Box 220
`Jackson, MS 39205
`Tel: (601) 359-5563
`kristi.johnson@ago.ms.gov
`
`Attorney for the State of Mississippi
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`ERIC SCHMITT
` ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI
`
`/s/ D. John Sauer
`________________________________
`D. John Sauer (pro hac vice forthcoming)
` Solicitor General
`OFFICE OF THE MISSOURI
` ATTORNEY GENERAL
`P.O. Box 899
`Jefferson City, MO 65102-0899
`Tel: (573) 751-1800
`john.sauer@ago.mo.gov
`
`Attorney for the State of Missouri
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`Case 4:20-cv-04869-KAW Document 53 Filed 08/28/20 Page 14 of 15
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`KEN PAXTON
` ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
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`JEFFREY C. MATEER
` First Assistant Attorney General
`RYAN L. BANGERT
` Deputy First Assistant Attorney General
`DARREN L. MCCARTY
` Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation
`
`/s/ David J. Hacker
`________________________________
`DAVID J. HACKER (CA 249272)
` Associate Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation
`OFFICE OF THE TEXAS
` ATTORNEY GENERAL
`P.O. Box 12548 (MC 001)
`Austin, Texas 78711-2548
`Tel: (512) 936-1700
`david.hacker@oag.texas.gov
`
`Attorney for the State of Texas
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`PATRICK MORRISEY
` ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WEST VIRGINIA
`
`/s/ Lindsay S. See
`________________________________
`LINDSAY S. SEE (pro hac vice forthcoming)
` Solicitor General
`State Capitol Building 1, Rm. 26-E
`Charleston, WV 25305
`Tel: (304) 558-2021
`lindsay.s.see@wvago.gov
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`Attorney for the State of West Virginia
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`Case 4:20-cv-04869-KAW Document 53 Filed 08/28/20 Page 15 of 15
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`FOR THE STATE OF WYOMING
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`/s/ James C. Kaste
`________________________________
`JAMES C