`
`BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK, LLP
`MITCHELL J. LANGBERG, SBN 171912
`mlangberg@bhfs.com
`2049 Century Park East, Suite 3550
`Los Angeles, California 90067-3007
`Telephone: 310.500.4600
`Facsimile: 310.500.4602
`BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK, LLP
`Matthew J. McKissick (Pro Hac Vice Admitted)
`mmckissick@bhfs.com
`100 North City Parkway, Suite 1600
`Las Vegas, Nevada 89106
`Telephone: 702.464.7054
`Facsimile: 702.382.8135
`Attorneys for Defendants
`ROBINHOOD MARKETS, INC. and
`ROBINHOOD FINANCIAL, LLC
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
`
`O'SHEA JACKSON, SR. (p/k/a "ICE
`CUBE"), an individual,
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`ROBINHOOD MARKETS, INC., a
`Delaware corporation; ROBINHOOD
`FINANCIAL LLC, a Delaware limited
`liability company,
`Defendants.
`
`Case No. 3:21-cv-02304-LB
`NOTICE OF MOTION AND
`MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST
`AMENDED COMPLAINT
`PURSUANT TO FRCP 12(b)
`Date
`August 26, 2021
`Time:
`9:30 am
`Dept:
`Courtroom B, 15th Floor
`Magistrate Judge:
`Honorable Laurel Beeler
`
`PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, on August 26, 2021, at 9:30 a.m. or as soon
`thereafter as counsel may be heard in Courtroom B, 15th Floor of the above-entitled
`court, Defendants Robinhood Markets, Inc. and Robinhood Financial LLC
`(collectively, “Defendants” or “Robinhood”), by and through their attorneys and
`pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6) will and do hereby
`move the Court to dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff O’Shea Jackson’s (“Plaintiff”)
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`BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK,LLP
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`2049 Century Park East, Suite 3550
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`Los Angeles, CA 90067-3007
`
`
`
`Case 3:21-cv-02304-LB Document 31 Filed 07/20/21 Page 2 of 28
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`First Amended Complaint in its entirety.
`Defendants move to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiff lacks standing under
`federal law and that the First Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for which
`relief can be granted. Specifically, Plaintiff fails to plausibly plead facts showing how
`Defendants’ use of a still frame from a movie and a paraphrase of a line from his
`song Check Yo’ Self for illustrative purposes amounts to a false endorsement under
`the Lanham Act. Moreover, Defendants’ noncommercial conduct does not satisfy the
`commercial-use requirement for Plaintiff’s false endorsement claim, Plaintiff’s
`claims are barred by the First Amendment, Plaintiff’s claim conflicts with federal
`copyright law, Defendants’ use of the image and paraphrase satisfied the Rogers
`defense, and Plaintiff otherwise has not plead tenable claims.
`This motion is based upon this Notice, the following memorandum of points
`and authorities, the pleadings and records contained herein, on such other argument
`and evidence as may be presented at the hearing, and all matters of which this Court
`may take judicial notice.
`Dated: July 20, 2021
`
`BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER
`SCHRECK, LLP
`
`By: /s/ Mitchell J. Langberg
`MITCHELL J. LANGBERG
`Attorneys for Defendants
`ROBINHOOD MARKETS, INC.
`AND ROBINHOOD FINANCIAL,
`LLC
`
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`2049 Century Park East, Suite 3550
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`Los Angeles, CA 90067-3007
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`Case 3:21-cv-02304-LB Document 31 Filed 07/20/21 Page 3 of 28
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`B.
`
`INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1
`I.
`STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................................................. 2
`II.
`III. ARGUMENT .................................................................................................. 4
`A.
`Plaintiff's Claim Should Be Dismissed Pursuant to FRCP
`12(b)(1) Because He Lacks Standing ................................................... 4
`Plaintiff's Claim Should Be Dismissed Pursuant To FRCP
`12(b)(6) Because He Fails To Allege Facts Sufficient To State A
`Claim ..................................................................................................... 7
`1.
`Plaintiff cannot state a claim because the Article does not
`satisfy the commercial use requirement for his claim ................ 8
`Plaintiff's claim fails because it is barred, as a matter of
`law, by the First Amendment ................................................... 10
`Plaintiff's Lanham Act claim fails under the Rogers
`Defense based on Defendants’ expressive use of the
`image and phrase ...................................................................... 13
`As a copyrighted work, only the copyright owner has all
`exclusive rights in the movie still frame, and Plaintiff
`cannot bypass that exclusivity with unfair competition
`law ............................................................................................. 16
`Plaintiff cannot base any of his claims on the phrase
`“Check Yo Self, Before You Wreck Yo Self” ......................... 18
`a.
`The phrase “Check Yo Self, Before You Wreck Yo
`Self” does not identify Plaintiff ...................................... 18
`Plaintiff’s use of the Phrase in the Article amounts
`to a nonactionable parody .............................................. 20
`IV. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 22
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`5.
`
`b.
`
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`BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK,LLP
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`Los Angeles, CA 90067-3007
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`Attorneys at Law
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`
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`Case 3:21-cv-02304-LB Document 31 Filed 07/20/21 Page 4 of 28
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Federal Cases
`Allen v. National Video, Inc.
`610 F.Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ........................................................................ 8
`ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pac. R. Co.,
`765 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2014) ................................................................................ 7
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) ............................................................................................. 7
`Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co.,
`272 F. 505 (D.N.Y. 1921) ................................................................................... 20
`Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Co.,
`463 U.S. 60 (1983) ........................................................................................... 8, 9
`Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc.,
`724 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2013) ............................................................................ 13
`Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co.,
`292 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2002) .............................................................................. 8
`Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
`598 F3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2010) ............................................................................... 4
`Chaquico v. Friedberg,
`274 F.Supp.2d 942 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2017) ................................................. 5, 7
`Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
`539 U.S. 23 (2003) ....................................................................................... 17, 18
`Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch,
`265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001) .................................................................. 10, 11, 12
`Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.,
`109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) ............................................................................ 21
`E.S.S. Ennm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc.,
`547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008) ............................................................................ 13
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`Attorneys at Law
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`2049 Century Park East, Suite 3550
`
`Los Angeles, CA 90067-3007
`
`
`
`Case 3:21-cv-02304-LB Document 31 Filed 07/20/21 Page 5 of 28
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`Fifty-Six Hope Road Music, Ltd. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc.,
`778 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2015) ............................................................................ 19
`Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc.,
`897 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018) superseded on other grounds by 909
`F.3d 257 (Nov. 20, 2018) ....................................................................... 13, 14, 15
`Hebrew University of Jerusalem v. General Motors LLC,
`878 F.Supp. 2d 1021 (C.D. Cal 2012), vacated, 2015 WL 9653154
`(C.D. Cal. 2015) ................................................................................................... 8
`Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,
`255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) ...................................................................... 11, 12
`Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America,
`511 US 375 (1994) ............................................................................................... 4
`Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC¸507
`F.3d 252, 267 (4th Cir. 2007) ............................................................................. 21
`Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. My Other Bag, Inc.,
`156 F. Supp. 3d 425, 117 U.S.P.Q.2d 1537 (S.D.N.Y. 2016),
`judgment aff'd, 2017 Copr. L. Dec. P. 31026, 2016 W 7436489
`(2nd Cir. 2016) ................................................................................................... 21
`Mattel v. MCA Records,
`296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) .............................................................................. 13
`
`Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods.
`353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) .............................................................................. 21
`O’Toole v. Northrop Grumman Corp.,
`499 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) ............................................................................ 4
`Rebelution, LLC v. Perez,
`732 F. Supp. 2d 883 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010) .................................................. 14
`Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. United States Dept. of Homeland Security,
`908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018) reversed in part, vacated in part on
`other grounds by 140 S.Ct. 1891 (Jun. 18, 2020) ................................................ 4
`Rogers v. Grimaldi,
`875 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1989) ....................................................................... passim
`
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`- iii -
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`BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK,LLP
`
`Attorneys at Law
`
`2049 Century Park East, Suite 3550
`
`Los Angeles, CA 90067-3007
`
`
`
`Case 3:21-cv-02304-LB Document 31 Filed 07/20/21 Page 6 of 28
`
`Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,
`136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) ..................................................................................... 4, 5
`Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,
`266 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001) ................................................................................ 7
`Tin Pan Appel v. Miller Brewing Co.,
`737 F.Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ........................................................................ 8
`Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc.,
`328 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2003) .............................................................................. 4
`Wendt v. Host Intl'l, Inc.,
`125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997) ................................................................................ 8
`White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,
`971 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1992) .............................................................................. 8
`Yeager v. Cingular Wireless LLC,
`673 F.Supp.2d 1089 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2009) ....................................... 10, 11, 12
`In re Zynga Privacy Litig.,
`750 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2014) .............................................................................. 4
`Federal Statutes
`15 U.S.C.
`§ 1064(3) ............................................................................................................. 20
`§ 1125(a)(1) ........................................................................................................ 17
`§ 1125(a)(1)(B) ................................................................................................... 17
`Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
`§ 12(b)(1) .......................................................................................................... 4, 7
`§ 12(b)(6) .............................................................................................................. 7
`Lanham Act
`§ 43(a) ............................................................................................... 13, 17, 18, 19
`Other Authorities
`J. McCarthy, Trademark and Unfair Competition § 28:15 (5th ed.
`2021) ................................................................................................................... 19
`J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 31:153 (5th ed.
`2021) ................................................................................................................... 21
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`Attorneys at Law
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`2049 Century Park East, Suite 3550
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`Los Angeles, CA 90067-3007
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`
`
`Case 3:21-cv-02304-LB Document 31 Filed 07/20/21 Page 7 of 28
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`I.
`
`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
`INTRODUCTION
`After this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of standing, in his
`First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) Plaintiff abandons all of his untenable California
`state law claims leaving only a single cause of action under the Lanham Act. Still,
`Plaintiff fails to plausibly plead additional facts showing how Robinhood’s March 8,
`2021 newsletter entitled Why are tech stocks falling? (the “Article”) violates the
`Lanham Act. Instead, the FAC appears to be a thinly disguised motion for
`reconsideration. For the same reasons this Court determined the initial complaint
`was legally insufficient, Plaintiff’s FAC falls short again.
`Plaintiff lacks standing to bring his claim because he again fails to allege how
`Robinhood’s use of his image and paraphrase of a line from his song creates the
`misapprehension that Plaintiff sponsored, endorsed, or is otherwise affiliated with
`Robinhood. As amended, Plaintiff’s allegations are still nonactionable. Further,
`Robinhood’s noncommercial conduct cannot be the basis of Plaintiff’s commercial
`claim, the claim is barred by the First Amendment, the claim conflicts with federal
`copyright law, Defendants’ expressive use of the image and paraphrase satisfies the
`Rogers defense, and the Article amounts to a nonactionable parody.
`Plaintiff’s additional facts related to congressional testimony and SEC filings
`are red herrings and do not change the central, controlling fact of this case—that
`Robinhood used Plaintiff’s image for purposes of illustration, not endorsement. The
`FAC fails to address this Court’s previous ruling that, on its face, the Article
`fundamentally does not suggest an endorsement between Plaintiff and Robinhood,
`but rather used Plaintiff’s image to illustrate a point about stock market corrections.1
`
`1 Order Granting Motion to Dismiss and Denying Motion to Strike As Moot (the “Order”)
`– ECF 29 at 7:19–21 (“Robinhood used Ice Cube’s picture and paraphrase of a line from
`his song to illustrate an article about market corrections. That illustration does not
`suggest that the plaintiff endorsed Robinhood. . .”) (emphasis added). Citations refer to
`material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”), where appropriate, pinpoint citations are to
`the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents.
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`2049 Century Park East, Suite 3550
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`Los Angeles, CA 90067-3007
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`
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`Case 3:21-cv-02304-LB Document 31 Filed 07/20/21 Page 8 of 28
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`Instead of alleging new facts that shed light on this central issue, Plaintiff continues
`to reiterate the unsupported conclusion that the Article implies some form of
`endorsement.
`Moreover, even after this Court properly concluded that the Article is
`“demonstrably not an advertisement,”2 Plaintiff doubles down by alleging without
`any basis that Robinhood’s newsletters (“Snacks”) are not only advertisements, they
`are also standalone financial brokerage products in and of themselves.3 Plaintiff
`contends that Snacks are a “gateway point” designed to lure new investors onto
`Robinhood’s platform.4 The truth is Snacks are educational articles that inform the
`public about the stock market, empowering readers with the knowledge they need to
`pursue their own investing goals. Plaintiff’s strained efforts to convert Defendants’
`publication of free financial news articles into commercial activity begs the question:
`How can publishing a free educational article amount to commercial activity when
`the article is “demonstrably not an advertisement” and does not require, solicit, or
`encourage any transaction at all?
`Accordingly, the Court should dismiss the FAC with prejudice, as there are no
`additional facts that can cure the legal deficiencies inherent in Plaintiff’s false-
`endorsement claim.
`II.
`STATEMENT OF FACTS
`The Court is already aware of the relevant facts of this case—namely, the
`publication of the Article.5 Although Plaintiff’s efforts to impugn Robinhood’s
`business practices are irrelevant to the viability of his claim, Defendants believe some
`background on its mission and educational content will provide useful context.
`Robinhood is the stock trading platform for the everyday investor, establishing
`
`2 Id. – ECF 29 at 8:1.
`3 First Amended Compl., ¶ 33 – ECF 30 at 8:12–14 (explaining that because Robinhood
`described how Snacks could be misconstrued as financial advice in its SEC Form S-1
`filing, Robinhood provided a “clear admission” that Snacks are “among [Robinhood]’s
`brokerage products and services.”).
`4 Id., ¶ 36 – ECF 30 at 10:7.
`5 Order – ECF No. 29 at 2–4 (“Statement”).
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`Los Angeles, CA 90067-3007
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`Case 3:21-cv-02304-LB Document 31 Filed 07/20/21 Page 9 of 28
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`itself as the first major broker-dealer to offer commission-free stock trading. By
`breaking down the barriers to entry that have been built around traditional stock
`trading platforms—including high commission fees, account minimums, and
`industry jargon—Robinhood aims to democratize finance by providing everyone,
`regardless of race or socioeconomic background, with the opportunity to invest.
`Consistent with this goal, Robinhood provides “simple, easy-to-understand
`and easy-to-use tools and educational resources. . . [to help] support customers from
`all backgrounds. . .”6 Robinhood doesn’t only provide these educational resources to
`its customers; it provides them to the general public as well.7 As of March 31, 2021,
`Robinhood Learn—the section of Robinhood’s website dedicated to educating the
`public about investing—had over seven million views with monthly visits up six-fold
`from January 2020 to March 2021.8 Because over half of Robinhood’s customers are
`first-time investors, speaking to them in a language they understand is critical to
`provide a reference point as they begin building their investment portfolios.9
`In preparation to become a publicly-traded company, Robinhood disclosed
`potential risks that are linked to its business in its Form S-1 SEC filing, explaining
`that its “investment education tools could subject [Robinhood] to additional risks if
`such tools are construed to be investment advice or recommendations.”10 While
`Robinhood explicitly states that Snacks do not constitute financial advice and are
`intended for educational purposes only,11 Robinhood included the foregoing
`
`6 First Amended Compl., ¶ 27 – ECF No. 30 at 6:12–14.
`7 Id., ¶ 28 – ECF No. 30 at 6:25–27 (“[W]e provide educational resources to our
`customers, including our redesigned Robinhood Learn Portal, which is not just available
`to Robinhood customers, but to the general public and had over 3.2 million people visiting
`in 2020.”).
`8 Id., ¶ 31 – ECF No. 30 at 7:26–28.
`9 Id., ¶ 32 – ECF No. 30 at 8:2–4.
`10 Id., ¶ 33 – ECF No. 30 at 8:14–16.
`11 Defendants respectfully request that the Court take judicial notice of Robinhood’s
`financial-advice disclaimer, which can be found at the bottom of the Snacks webpage
`here: https://snacks.robinhood.com/ (last accessed July 20, 2021) (“[Snacks] are meant
`for informational purposes only, are not intended to serve as a recommendation to
`buy or sell any security in a self-directed Robinhood account or any other account,
`and are not an offer or sale of a security. They are also not research reports and are
`not intended to serve as the basis for any investment decision.”) (emphasis added).
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`2049 Century Park East, Suite 3550
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`Los Angeles, CA 90067-3007
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`Case 3:21-cv-02304-LB Document 31 Filed 07/20/21 Page 10 of 28
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`disclosure in its SEC filings out of an abundance of caution.12
`Although Plaintiff dedicates a considerable amount of the FAC delving into
`Robinhood’s Congressional testimony and SEC filings, the FAC fails to offer any
`new facts related to the actual focus of this lawsuit—the Article.13
`III. ARGUMENT
`A.
`Plaintiff's Claim Should Be Dismissed Pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(1)
`Because He Lacks Standing
`Plaintiff lacks standing under Article III. Article III’s standing requirements
`limit this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, standing is properly
`challenged by a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
`Ins. Co., 598 F3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff bears the burden of
`establishing such jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511
`US 375, 376-378 (1994).
`Where, as here, the challenge to standing is a “facial” attack, the court accepts
`the well-pleaded facts as true (but not the improper conclusions) and dismisses only
`if those facts are insufficient to invoke jurisdiction. Warren v. Fox Family
`Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003).
`Here, Plaintiff has failed adequately to allege a cognizable injury, nor could he
`plausibly do so. As a result, he does not have standing to assert his claims. To invoke
`the powers of the Court, Plaintiff must show that he: (1) suffered an injury (2) that is
`fairly traceable to Defendants’ conduct, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a
`favorable judicial decision. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)
`
`The Court may take judicial notice of publicly-available facts on the Internet that are not
`subject to reasonable dispute. Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. United States Dept. of
`Homeland Security, 908 F.3d 476, 519 n. 30 (9th Cir. 2018) (taking judicial notice of the
`former U.S. President’s “tweets”) reversed in part, vacated in part on other grounds by
`140 S.Ct. 1891 (Jun. 18, 2020); In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1101–02 & n.
`2 (9th Cir. 2014) (judicial notice taken of current version of publicly-available HTTP
`specification); see also O’Toole v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 499 F.3d 1218, 1223–25
`(10th Cir. 2007) (where the court abused its discretion in not taking judicial notice of
`defendants’ earnings history as published on its website).
`12 First Amended Compl., ¶ 34 – ECF No. 30 at 8:20–21.
`13 Id., ¶ 1 – ECF No. 30 at 1:24.
`
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`Attorneys at Law
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`2049 Century Park East, Suite 3550
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`Los Angeles, CA 90067-3007
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`
`
`Case 3:21-cv-02304-LB Document 31 Filed 07/20/21 Page 11 of 28
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`(citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). At the pleading
`stage, Plaintiff is required to “clearly allege facts” demonstrating each element. Id.
`(citation omitted). Satisfaction of this three-part Article III standing test ensures that
`federal courts do not exceed their constitutional authority. Id.
`Injury-in-fact is the “ ‘first and foremost’ of standing’s three elements.” Id.
`(quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998). As a
`constitutional requirement, the failure to show injury-in-fact cannot be cured by
`relying on a statute that grants the right to sue to a plaintiff “who would not otherwise
`have standing.” Id. at 1548 (citation omitted). To satisfy this requirement, Plaintiff
`must show an “ ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and
`particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’ ” Id.
`(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). To be concrete, the injury “must be ‘de facto’; that
`is, it must actually exist.... [and be] ‘real,’ and not ‘abstract.’ ” Id. (citing
`dictionaries). To be particularized, the injury must “ ‘affect the plaintiff in a personal
`and individual way.’ ” Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1). Both requirements—
`concreteness and particularization—must be established; one alone is not enough.
`See id.
`Importantly, the allegations supporting a false endorsement claim under the
`Lanham Act cannot be conclusory. Chaquico v. Friedberg, 274 F.Supp.2d 942, 952
`(N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2017) (motion to dismiss granted because the plaintiff “fail[ed]
`to set forth facts that [d]efendants’ advertisements create an explicitly misleading
`description of the [defendants’ goods or services].). When a complaint is completely
`“devoid of allegations explaining how the [defendant’s use] create[s] the
`misimpression that Plaintiff sponsors, endorses, or is affiliated with the [defendant],”
`the complaint must be dismissed. Id.
`Here, Plaintiff (again) fails, as required, to allege how the Article explicitly
`misleads consumers. Plaintiff’s recitation of the Ninth Circuit’s Sleekcraft eight-
`factor consumer confusion test as applied to celebrity false endorsement claims offers
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`CASE NO. 3:21-cv-02304-LB
`NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FRCP 12(b)
`
`BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK,LLP
`
`Attorneys at Law
`
`2049 Century Park East, Suite 3550
`
`Los Angeles, CA 90067-3007
`
`
`
`Case 3:21-cv-02304-LB Document 31 Filed 07/20/21 Page 12 of 28
`
`conclusory legal conclusions in lieu of offering actual facts which support the
`allegations made within the analysis. For example, instead of offering facts showing
`actual consumer confusion, Plaintiff alleges that there is “evidence of actual
`consumer confusion” because the “public is easily led to believe that Plaintiff
`endorses. . . Defendants’ products. . . based on. . . the Advertisement.” 14 In essence,
`Plaintiff’s claim states that his conclusory legal allegations support his claim, so his
`claim has merit, and does so without identifying (as required) the very facts relating
`to consumer confusion that he claims require resolution.
`Moreover, the FAC fails to allege facts showing how an editorial news article’s
`illustrative reference to a celebrity amounts to an endorsement. Plaintiff’s allegations
`do not show that when a celebrity’s likeness is used as a figure of speech (i.e., to
`convey an idea that is separate and apart from the celebrity’s fame), the use may be
`mistakenly construed by consumers as an affiliation. The reason for this is clear—
`such illustrative uses are categorically not endorsements. The type of celebrity
`reference used in the Article is widespread on the Internet and is understood by
`reasonable people as an illustration of the idea being conveyed—not as an
`endorsement. This form of communication (i.e., illustrative uses and memes) is now
`ubiquitous in society, especially on the Internet. If each use of a celebrity’s image
`automatically amounted to a false endorsement under the Lanham Act, every meme,
`GIF, and picture on the Internet depicting a celebrity would be in violation of federal
`law. Such a result is, of course, illogical, and if courts were to interpret the Lanham
`Act in this manner, the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech would be in
`jeopardy.
`The FAC is devoid of any facts demonstrating that the Article explicitly creates
`the misimpression that Plaintiff sponsors, endorses, or is affiliated with Defendants.
`Plaintiff’s allegations have no factual basis and are merely conclusory statements that
`the Article implies an endorsement. Ultimately, Plaintiff's FAC and the new
`
`14 First Amended Compl., ¶ 42, Subpara. 4 – ECF No. 30 at 13:1–3.
`- 6 -
`CASE NO. 3:21-cv-02304-LB
`NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FRCP 12(b)
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`BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK,LLP
`
`Attorneys at Law
`
`2049 Century Park East, Suite 3550
`
`Los Angeles, CA 90067-3007
`
`
`
`Case 3:21-cv-02304-LB Document 31 Filed 07/20/21 Page 13 of 28
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`allegations amount to nothing more than a bare recitation of the elements of his cause
`of action, which is insufficient to adequately plead a federal false endorsement claim.
`Chaquico, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 952.
`Because Plaintiff has not adequately plead that the Article explicitly creates
`the misimpression that he endorses Robinhood’s product or services, his claim should
`be dismissed pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(1).
`B.
`Plaintiff's Claim Should Be Dismissed Pursuant To FRCP 12(b)(6)
`Because He Fails To Allege Facts Sufficient To State A Claim
`
`On a motion to dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6), all allegations of material
`fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. “The
`court need not, however, accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly
`subject to judicial notice or by exhibit. Nor is the court required to accept as true
`allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or
`unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th
`Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted).
`In considering the allegations and judicially noticed facts properly before it, a
`court considers whether the complaint states “a claim to relief that is plausible on its
`face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
`Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely
`consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility
`and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id.
`Critically, where a complaint and other allowable sources (i.e., exhibits and
`judicially noticed matter) reveal an absolute defense or bar to recovery, the claims
`are subject to dismissal under FRCP 12(b)(6). ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pac. R. Co.,
`765 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2014).
`Here, Plaintiff's claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
`
`- 7 -
`CASE NO. 3:21-cv-02304-LB
`NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FRCP 12(b)
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`BROWNSTEIN HYATT FARBER SCHRECK,LLP
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`Attorneys at Law
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`2049 Century Park East, Suite 3550
`
`Los Angeles, CA 90067-3007
`
`
`
`Case 3:21-cv-02304-LB Document 31 Filed 07/20/21 Page 14 of 28
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`1.
`
`Plaintiff cannot state a claim because the Article does not satisfy
`the commercial use requirement for his claim
`
`As previously noted, the Article on its face is a noncommercial news article,
`including educational commentary. But, by its nature, Plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim
`protects only commercial interests. Federal unfair competition law, like trademark
`law, seeks to prevent co