Case 3:22-cv-01050-RS Document 23 Filed 07/11/22 Page 1 of 11
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`GILLIAN DAVIDSON, et al.,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`v.
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`SPROUT FOODS INC.,
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`Defendant.
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`Case No. 22-cv-01050-RS
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`ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
`DENYING IN PART MOTION TO
`DISMISS
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`I. Introduction
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`Plaintiffs Gillian and Samuel Davidson, a married couple, bring this putative class action
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`against Defendant Sprout Foods Inc. (“Sprout”), which sells baby and toddler food products.
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`Defendant brings a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the Complaint. In the Complaint, Plaintiffs
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`aver various violations of California law based on the inclusion of statements on Sprout products
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`touting the nutrients included in its products, such as “3g of Protein” or “4g of Fiber.” For the
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`reasons explained below, plaintiffs aver nutrient content claims potentially violative of federal
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`Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) regulations prohibiting such claims on products made
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`specifically for children under two years of age. Plaintiffs have therefore stated a claim under the
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`“unlawful” prong of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), and have also stated a claim
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`for unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs have not, however, stated a claim for violation of the California
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`Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), the California False Advertising Law (“FAL”),
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`common law fraud, or the “fraudulent” prong of their UCL claim. The motion to dismiss is
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`Case 3:22-cv-01050-RS Document 23 Filed 07/11/22 Page 2 of 11
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`therefore granted in part and denied in part. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), this motion is
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`suitable for disposition without oral argument, and the hearing scheduled for July 14, 2022 is
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`vacated.
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`A. Factual Background1
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`II. Background
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`On February 19, 2022, the Davidsons filed this putative class action. Sprout sells branded
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`baby and toddler food products. Plaintiffs aver that “Defendant misbrands its baby and toddler
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`food products by making nutrient content claims on the product packages that are strictly
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`prohibited by the Food and Drug Administration . . . and by misleading purchasers into believing
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`that its products are healthier than other products for children under two years of age in order to
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`induce parents into purchasing Defendant’s products.” Complaint, ¶ 3. During the putative class
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`period, Plaintiffs stated that they purchased two types of Sprout pouches: Pumpkin, Apple, Red
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`Lentil, and Cinnamon and Sweet Potato, White Beans, and Cinnamon.2 Id. at ¶ 11; Exhibits B and
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`C. The products addressed in this lawsuit contained statements about nutrition content in the front
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`panel of the packaging, such as “3g of Protein, 4g of Fiber and 300mg Omega-3 from Chia ALA.”
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`Id. at ¶ 34. This same information—along with additional nutrition information—was also
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`included in the Nutrition Facts Panel on the back of the packaging.
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`Plaintiffs bring the following claims for relief: (1) violation of the CLRA, California Civil
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`Code § 1750, et seq.; false advertising in violation of California Business and Professions Code §
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`17500, et seq.; (3) common law fraud, deceit, and/or misrepresentation; (4) unlawful, unfair, and
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`fraudulent trade practices in violation of Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq.; and (5)
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`unjust enrichment.
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`1 Unless noted otherwise, all facts recited are from the Complaint, and are taken as true for the
`purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th
`Cir. 2005).
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`2 The Complaint states that Plaintiffs also purchased the Strawberry with Banana & Butternut
`Squash product, but this product is not listed in the Plaintiffs’ declarations.
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`ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS
`CASE NO. 22-cv-01050-RS
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`Case 3:22-cv-01050-RS Document 23 Filed 07/11/22 Page 3 of 11
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`B. Background on Nutrient Content Claims and FDA Regulation
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`Aside from exceptions made by regulation, “no nutrient content claims may be made on
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`food intended specifically for use by infants and children less than 2 years of age[.]” 21 C.F.R. §
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`101.13(b)(3). A nutrient content claim may be express or implied. “An expressed nutrient content
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`claim is any direct statement about the level (or range) of a nutrient in the food, e.g., ‘low sodium’
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`or ‘contains 100 calories.’” Id. at § 101.13(b)(1). An implied nutrient claim is one that either
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`“[d]escribes the food or an ingredient therein in a manner that suggests that a nutrient is absent or
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`present in a certain amount (e.g., ‘high in oat bran’)” or “[s]uggests that the food, because of its
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`nutrient content, may be useful in maintaining healthy dietary practices and is made in association
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`with an explicit claim or statement about a nutrient (e.g., ‘healthy, contains 3 grams (g) of fat’).”
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`Id. at § 101.13(b)(2).
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`A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
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`III. Legal Background
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`Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) governs motions to dismiss for failure to state a
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`claim. A complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is
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`entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). While “detailed factual allegations” are not required, a
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`complaint must have sufficient factual allegations to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
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`face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
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`544, 570 (2007)). However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
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`by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based
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`on either the “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or on “the absence of sufficient facts alleged”
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`under a cognizable legal theory. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d
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`1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When evaluating such
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`a motion, courts “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings
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`in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th
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`Cir. 2005).
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`When a claim is “grounded in fraud[,]” the pleading as a whole “must satisfy the
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`ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS
`CASE NO. 22-cv-01050-RS
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`Case 3:22-cv-01050-RS Document 23 Filed 07/11/22 Page 4 of 11
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`particularity requirement of Rule 9(b).” Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir.
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`2009). “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances
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`constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). “Averments of fraud must be accompanied by
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`‘the who, what, when, where, and how’ of the misconduct charged.” Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1124
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`(quoting Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2003)). Plaintiffs do not respond
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`to Defendant’s assertion that Rule 9(b) applies to their pleading, and thus the particularity
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`requirement is applied when analyzing this motion to dismiss.3
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`B. California Statutes
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`Plaintiff avers violations of the UCL, FAL, and CLRA. The UCL “bars ‘unfair
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`competition’ and defines the term as a ‘business act or practice’ that is (1) ‘fraudulent,’ (2)
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`‘unlawful,’ or (3) ‘unfair.’” Shaeffer v. Califia Farms, LLC, 44 Cal. App. 5th 1125, 1135 (2020).
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`“Each is its own independent ground for liability under the unfair competition law, but their
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`unifying and underlying purpose is to protect both consumers and competitors by promoting fair
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`competition in commercial markets for goods and services.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
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`citations omitted).
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`“California’s false advertising law bars ‘any advertising device . . . which is untrue or
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`misleading.’” Id. (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500). “[T]his law and the fraudulent prong
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`of the unfair competition law substantively overlap[,]” and thus “plaintiff’s burden under these
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`provisions is the same[.]” “[T]o state a claim under either the UCL or the false advertising law,
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`based on false advertising or promotional practices, it is necessary only to show that members of
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`the public are likely to be deceived.” Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939, 951 (2002) (internal
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`quotation marks and citation omitted).
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`The CLRA defines various “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
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`practices.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1770. Some of the unfair methods or acts included are “[r]epresenting
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`3 Even if Rule 9(b) was inapplicable, the result would be the same under the Rule 12(b)(6)
`standard.
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`ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS
`CASE NO. 22-cv-01050-RS
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`Case 3:22-cv-01050-RS Document 23 Filed 07/11/22 Page 5 of 11
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`that goods . . . have . . . characteristics [or] . . . benefits . . . that they do not have[,]” and
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`“[r]epresenting that goods . . . are of a particular standard, quality, or grade . . . if they are of
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`another[.]” Id. The UCL, FAL, and CLRA all utilize the reasonable consumer standard, Califia, 44
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`Cal. App. 5th at 1136, “which requires a plaintiff to show potential deception of consumers acting
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`reasonably in the circumstances-not just any consumers.” Hill v. Roll Internat. Corp., 195 Cal.
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`App. 4th 1295, 1304 (2011).
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`A. Standing
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`IV. Discussion
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`As a threshold matter, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs lack Article III and statutory
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`standing to challenge label statements on products they did not see or buy. Plaintiffs purchased
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`two products from Sprout, but challenge the labelling on 26 Sprout products. For Article III
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`standing, a plaintiff must allege an injury-in-fact, and for statutory standing under the UCL and
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`FAL, Plaintiffs must show they “suffered injury in fact and [] lost money or property as a result of
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`the unfair competition.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17204, 17535. Similarly, for the CLRA, the
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`plaintiff must show “economic injury[.]” Victor v. R.C. Bigelow, Inc., 13–cv–02976–WHO, 2014
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`WL 1028881, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2014); see also Carrea v. Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc.,
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`No. C 10-01044 JSW, 2011 WL 159380, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011) (analyzing statutory
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`standing jointly for FAL, UCL, and CLRA claims).
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`Other courts in this district have held that “a plaintiff may have standing to assert claims
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`for unnamed class members based on products he or she did not purchase so long as the products
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`and alleged misrepresentations are substantially similar.” Miller v. Ghirardelli Chocolate Co., 912
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`F.Supp.2d 861, 869 (N.D. Cal. 2012). In many of these cases, “the critical inquiry seems to be
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`whether there is sufficient similarity between the products purchased and not purchased.” Astiana
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`v. Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc., No. C-11-2910 EMC, 2012 WL 2990766, at *11 (N.D. Cal.
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`July 20, 2012). Like in Astiana, which concerned labels for different varieties of ice cream
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`products, “Plaintiffs are challenging the same basic mislabeling practice across different product
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`flavors[,]” and thus there is sufficient similarity. Id. at *13. Exhibit A to Plaintiffs’ complaint is a
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`ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS
`CASE NO. 22-cv-01050-RS
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`Case 3:22-cv-01050-RS Document 23 Filed 07/11/22 Page 6 of 11
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`chart listing each challenged product and the nutrient content claim. Each of these claims is similar
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`in nature and includes the amount in grams of at least one of the following nutrients: protein, fiber,
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`or Omega-3. As in Astiana and other similar cases, “concerns . . . about material differences are
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`better addressed at the class certification stage rather than at the 12(b)(6) stage.” Id. In short,
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`Plaintiffs have Article III and statutory standing to pursue their claims despite not having seen or
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`purchased all of the challenged products.
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`B. UCL Unlawfulness Claim
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`The UCL provides for a cause of action to challenge “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent
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`business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising[.]” Cal. Bus. &
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`Prof. Code § 17200. Plaintiffs are pursuing both “unlawful” and “fraudulent” theories of violation
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`of the UCL.4 For the “unlawful” theory, Plaintiffs argue that the labels contained nutrient content
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`claims in violation of state laws and FDA regulation, and thus Sprout engaged in an unlawful
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`business act or practice. “To prevail on a claim under the unlawful prong of the unfair competition
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`law, the plaintiff must show that a challenged advertisement or practice violates any federal or
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`California statute or regulation.” Califia, 44 Cal. App. 5th at 1136 (internal quotation marks and
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`citation omitted).
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`Defendant argues that its labels did not violate FDA regulations, and thus there was no
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`unlawful practice. Whether the labels are in violation of FDA regulations depends on whether the
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`statements on labels such as “2g of Plant Protein Power from White Beans,” “3g of Fiber,” and
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`“300mg Omega-3 from Chia ALA” are nutrient content claims as defined by FDA regulations.
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`While permitted for products for older children and adults, nutrient content claims are not
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`permitted for products intended for specific use by children below two years of age. 21 C.F.R. §
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`101.13(b)(3). Defendant does not contest that the challenged products are made specifically for
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`4 In their opposition, Plaintiffs do not defend their Complaint under an “unfair” theory of
`violation. Defendant argues that the failure to defend the “unfair” prong means the UCL claim
`should be dismissed, but as explained below Plaintiffs have adequately pled a violation of the
`“unlawful” prong, and thus the claim survives this motion to dismiss under that theory.
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`ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS
`CASE NO. 22-cv-01050-RS
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`Northern District of California
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`Case 3:22-cv-01050-RS Document 23 Filed 07/11/22 Page 7 of 11
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`children under the age of two, and the Complaint contains images of two of the challenged
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`products with statements “12 Months & Up” and “6 Months & Up” on the labels. Complaint, ¶¶
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`17-18. Thus, FDA regulation prohibits nutrient content claims on the challenged products.
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`What counts as a nutrient content claim is not clear at first glance. As the regulation itself
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`states, information that is included on the back of the packaging in a Nutrition Facts Panel may be
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`a nutrient content claim. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.13(b)(1) (providing as an example of an express
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`nutrient content claim a package that states the food “contains 100 calories”). Defendant points to
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`language on the FDA website, however, that appears to contradict the regulation:
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`Nutrient content claims describe the level of a nutrient in the product, using terms such as
`free, high, and low, or they compare the level of a nutrient in a food to that of another food,
`using terms such as more, reduced, and lite. An accurate quantitative statement (e.g., 200
`mg of sodium) that does not otherwise “characterize” the nutrient level may be used to
`describe the amount of a nutrient present. However, a statement such as “only 200 mg of
`sodium” characterizes the level of sodium by implying that it is low.
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`See FDA, Label Claims for Conventional Foods and Dietary Supplements, available at
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`https://www.fda.gov/food/food-labeling-nutrition/label-claims-conventional-foods-and-dietary-
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`supplements.
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`The Ninth Circuit, however, has weighed in on whether the repetition of information on a
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`Nutrition Facts Panel can constitute a nutrient content claim when placed elsewhere on the label.
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`In Hawkins v. Kroger Company, 906 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2018), the court noted that “the
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`manufacturer was required to state that the product had ‘0g trans fat per serving’ within the
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`Nutrition Facts Panel” but that “this requirement did not give the manufacturer license to make the
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`same claim elsewhere on the product, and the rest of the product labeling was subject to the rules
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`governing nutrition content claims[.]” Id. at 771. Notably, Defendant fails to discuss Hawkins in
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`its motion or reply, even after Plaintiffs’ discussion of the case in their opposition. Like in
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`Hawkins, the inclusion of statements on the challenged products about levels of a nutrient is a
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`nutrient content claim, even if the information was also included in the Nutrient Facts Panel.
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` As to Defendant’s argument about guidance from the FDA on its website, even though the
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`ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS
`CASE NO. 22-cv-01050-RS
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`Case 3:22-cv-01050-RS Document 23 Filed 07/11/22 Page 8 of 11
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`FDA website appears to suggest that Sprout’s statements about the levels of nutrients are not
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`nutrient content claims, the clear text of the regulation and Ninth Circuit decisions state otherwise.
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`Those authorities cannot be ignored. Since the labels contain nutrient content claims in violation
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`of FDA regulation, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Defendant engaged in an unlawful
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`practice.
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`C. CLRA, FAL, Common Law Fraud, and UCL Fraudulent Practice Claims
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`The CLRA, FAL, UCL “fraudulent” prong, and common law fraud claims all require
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`establishing that Defendant’s practices would mislead a reasonable consumer. See Hill, 195 Cal.
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`App. 4th at 1301 (concluding “no reasonable consumer would be misled” by the defendant’s
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`representations in a case alleging CLRA, FAL, common law fraud, and UCL claims). “[W]hether
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`a business practice is deceptive will usually be a question of fact not appropriate for decision” on a
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`motion to dismiss. Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008). That general
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`principle, however, does not mean granting a motion to dismiss as to whether the reasonable
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`consumer requirement is met may never happen. Here, no reasonable consumer would be misled
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`by the inclusion of truthful statements about nutrient contents on the front of the challenged labels,
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`and thus Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for the violation of any of these laws.
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`Plaintiff has two theories of how a consumer would be misled by the inclusion of nutrient
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`content claims. First, Plaintiffs argue that “the claims lead consumers to believe that an increased
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`intake of the advertised nutrients is important for their child when, in fact, such claims are
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`prohibited because of the lack of evidence to support such a claim.” Opposition to Motion to
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`Dismiss, p.11. Second, Plaintiffs argue that “the claims mislead consumers to believe that the
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`Products were superior to competitor products that did not contain unlawful nutrient content
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`claims.” Id. at p.12. Neither of these theories is compelling.
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`As for the first theory, there is no support in the Complaint for the proposition that there is
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`a lack of evidence as to whether the nutrients touted on the label provide a benefit to children.
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`Plaintiffs rely on a quote from the 1991 Federal Register which states “the agency lacks evidence
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`that a more restrictive dietary pattern for other nutrients such as sodium or an increased intake for
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`ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS
`CASE NO. 22-cv-01050-RS
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`nutrients such as fiber are appropriate and recommended for infants and toddlers.” (Opp. at 11,
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`quoting 56 Fed. Reg. 60421). This statement, from over thirty years ago, does not establish that
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`there is no current evidence that the touted nutrients provide a benefit. There may indeed be
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`current evidence that the nutrients in question do not benefit children, but this theory of how a
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`reasonable consumer could be misled is not adequately pled.
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`The second theory is no more compelling. The statements about the nutrient contents are
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`facially true, and do not invoke comparisons to other products. The California Court of Appeal in
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`Shaeffer v. Califia Farms recognized that “statements a business affirmatively and truthfully
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`makes about its product and which do not on their face mention or otherwise reference its
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`competing products at all” exist at the far end of the spectrum of possibly misleading statements.
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`44 Cal. App. 5th at 1139. In Califia, the plaintiff challenged under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA the
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`inclusion of the phrase “No Sugar Added” on the label of tangerine juice, and argued that
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`statement was misleading because it implied competing products did contain added sugar, and that
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`the juice in question contained less sugar than competing brands that did not have “No Sugar
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`Added” on their labels. Id. at 1132-33. The court held that truthful statements that do not reference
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`competing products “are not actionable as a matter of law.” Id. at 1139. The Califia court
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`emphasized that a reasonable consumer is unlikely to make the series of inferential leaps needed to
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`reach the plaintiff’s conclusion that the challenged statement implied other products contained
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`added sugar or more sugar. Id. The court also reasoned that adopting the plaintiff’s theory would
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`place almost any advertisement truthfully touting a product’s attributes at issue for litigation. Id.
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`The reasoning in Califia is persuasive and applicable here. The statements on the
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`challenged Sprout labels, while in violation of FDA regulation, are fully truthful and contain the
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`same information found elsewhere on the label. It requires many inferential leaps for a reasonable
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`consumer to reach the conclusion that the absence of such language on other products would mean
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`those products did not contain those same nutrients. Moreover, a consumer concerned about these
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`issues could simply compare the Nutrition Facts Panel on each product he or she was interested in
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`purchasing. “[N]o reasonable consumer would be misled” by the truthful statements on the label to
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`ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS
`CASE NO. 22-cv-01050-RS
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`Case 3:22-cv-01050-RS Document 23 Filed 07/11/22 Page 10 of 11
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`believe that other products did not contain these same nutrients and were therefore superior. Hill,
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`195 Cal. App. 4th at 1301.
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`In short, Plaintiffs have failed to show at the pleading stage that a reasonable consumer
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`would be misled by the challenged statements on the Sprout product labels. The motion to dismiss
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`is granted as to the FAL, CLRA, and common law fraud claims, as well as the “fraudulent” prong
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`of the UCL claim.
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`D. Unjust Enrichment
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`“[I]n California, there is not a standalone cause of action for ‘unjust enrichment,’ which is
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`synonymous with ‘restitution.’” Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 762 (9th Cir.
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`2015). “When a plaintiff alleges unjust enrichment, a court may ‘construe the cause of action as a
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`quasi-contract claim seeking restitution.’” Id. (quoting Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del
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`Rey, 223 Cal. App. 4th 221, 231 (2014). Further, at the pleading stage, an unjust enrichment claim
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`may be duplicative of other claims. See In re Safeway Tuna Cases, No. 15-CV-05078-EMC, 2016
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`WL 3743364, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2016). Defendant argues that the unjust enrichment claim
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`is based on the same factual basis as the other claims, and thus “[b]ecause Plaintiffs ‘failed to state
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`claims under the California consumer protection statutes [due to implausibility], the unjust
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`enrichment claim fails as well.’” Motion to Dismiss, p.19 (quoting Chuang v. Dr. Pepper Snapple
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`Group, Inc., 2017 WL 4286577, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2017)). Plaintiffs, however, have
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`adequately stated a claim for their UCL “unlawful” claim. Further, Defendant does not make any
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`argument about the substance of the unjust enrichment claim itself.5 Thus, at this stage, the unjust
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`enrichment claim may proceed.
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`5 Plaintiffs may have difficulty proceeding on this claim as litigation continues. Plaintiffs aver that
`the products sold by Defendant were “legally worthless” and that “Plaintiffs paid a premium price
`for the Products.” Complaint ¶ 110. As explained earlier, a reasonable consumer would not have
`been led to believe that the inclusion of statements about nutrient contents—that were truthful and
`legally appeared elsewhere on the packaging—made its products superior to competitor products.
`See Califia, 44 Cal. App. 5th at 1139. As such, establishing that the products were worthless or
`that Plaintiffs paid a premium for them may be difficult.
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`ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS
`CASE NO. 22-cv-01050-RS
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`Case 3:22-cv-01050-RS Document 23 Filed 07/11/22 Page 11 of 11
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`E. Equitable Relief
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`The Ninth Circuit has held that a plaintiff “must establish that she lacks an adequate
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`remedy at law before securing equitable restitution for past harm[.]” Sonner v. Premier Nutrition
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`Corp., 971 F.3d 834, 844 (9th Cir. 2020). Defendant argues that “Plaintiffs’ FAL and UCL claims
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`must be dismissed because they only allow for equitable relief, and the Complaint makes clear that
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`legal remedies pleaded under the CLRA and common law fraud in the form of money damages are
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`adequate.” Motion to Dismiss, p.16. As explained above, however, the FAL, CLRA and common
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`law fraud claims have not been adequately pled. Thus, as the Complaint currently stands, the UCL
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`claim and the unjust enrichment claims are the only viable claims, and Defendant’s arguments
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`concerning the availability of legal remedies under the CLRA and common law fraud claims are
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`moot.6
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`V. Conclusion
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`For all the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is denied as to the “unlawful” theory of
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`the UCL claim and the unjust enrichment claim. The motion to dismiss is granted in all other
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`respects. Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend. Should Plaintiffs choose to amend their complaint,
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`the amended complaint is due within 30 days of the filing of this Order.
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`Dated: July 11, 2022
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`______________________________________
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`RICHARD SEEBORG
`Chief United States District Judge
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`6 Similarly, the argument that Plaintiffs cannot pursue injunctive relief because they have not
`alleged inadequate remedies at law is moot, because at this juncture Plaintiffs have not adequately
`pled their claims seeking legal remedies.
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`ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS
`CASE NO. 22-cv-01050-RS
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