Case 4:11-cv-06714-YGR Document 643-11 Filed 04/27/22 Page 1 of 175
`Case 4:11-cv-06714-YGR Document 643-11 Filed 04/27/22 Page 1 of 175
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`ATTACHMENT K
`ATTACHMENT K
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`Case 4:11-cv-06714-YGR Document 643-11 Filed 04/27/22 Page 2 of 175
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`PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL. PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF COUNSEL.
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`OAKLAND DIVISION
`
`
`
`
`IN RE APPLE IPHONE
`ANTITRUST LITIGATION
`
`
`No. 4:11-cv-06714-YGR
`
`
`
`Hon. Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers
`
`
`
`
`EXPERT REPORT OF
`DANIEL L. MCFADDEN
`IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
`
`JUNE 1, 2021
`
`
`
`
`
`Non-Party Highly Confidential—Outside Counsel Eyes Only
`
`

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`Case 4:11-cv-06714-YGR Document 643-11 Filed 04/27/22 Page 3 of 175
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`PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL. PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF COUNSEL.
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`CONTENTS
`
`
`
`Introduction .............................................................................................................................1
`A. Qualifications ....................................................................................................................1
`B. Assignment ........................................................................................................................3
`C. Summary of Opinions ........................................................................................................4
`
` Industry Background .............................................................................................................6
`A.
`iOS-Installed Mobile Devices ...........................................................................................6
`B. Apps and In-App Content ................................................................................................10
`C. Apple App Store ..............................................................................................................15
`1. Apple’s App Store Commission ...............................................................................15
`2. Apple’s Other App Store Revenues: Developer Fee and Search Ads ......................17
`3. Apple’s App Store Business is Highly Profitable ....................................................20
`
` The Relevant Antitrust Market ...........................................................................................20
`A. Common Evidence Supports the Conclusion that the Sales of iOS Apps and In-App
`Content Constitute a Relevant Antitrust Market .............................................................21
`B. Common Evidence Supports the Conclusion that Web Apps Are Not Reasonable
`Substitutes for Native Apps .............................................................................................23
`C. Common Evidence Supports the Conclusion that “Jailbreaking” Is Not a Reasonable
`Substitute for Installing Apps and Purchasing In-App Content Through the App Store 30
`D. Common Evidence Supports the Conclusion that Enterprise Software Installed on iOS
`Devices Is Not a Reasonable Substitute for iOS Apps and In-App Content ...................32
`E. Common Evidence Supports the Conclusion that Apps Compatible with Non-iOS
`Devices Are Not Reasonable Substitutes for iOS Apps ..................................................33
`1. Common Evidence Supports the Conclusion that Consumers Face Significant
`Switching Costs if they Attempt to Switch to an Alternative Mobile OS Device ...34
`2. Common Evidence Supports the Conclusion that Software Applications Developed
`For Personal Computers or Gaming Consoles Are Not Part of The Relevant
`Market ......................................................................................................................40
`3. Dr. Evans’ Analysis of Fortnite Usage Shows that Consumers Do Not Readily
`Switch from iOS Devices to Non-iOS Devices .......................................................42
`F. Common Evidence Supports the Conclusion that Purchasing In-app Content Outside the
`App Store Is Not a Reasonable Substitute for Purchasing it Through the App Store .....45
`
` Apple’s Market Power in the iOS Aftermarket .................................................................49
`A. Source of Apple’s Market Power Common to All Class Members in the iOS
`AfterMarket .....................................................................................................................49
`1. High Switching Costs ...............................................................................................49
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`PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL. PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF COUNSEL.
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`2. Common Evidence Supports the Conclusion that Consumers Lack Sufficient
`Information to Make Life-cycle Cost Calculations ..................................................51
`B. Common Evidence of Apple’s Market Power in the Relevant Market ...........................53
`1. Common Evidence Supports the Conclusion that Apple’s Share in the iOS
`Aftermarket is Almost 100 Percent ..........................................................................53
`2. Common Evidence Supports the Conclusion that Entry Into the iOS App and In-
`App Content Aftermarket Is Not Possible ................................................................53
`3. Common Evidence Supports the Conclusion that Apple’s App Store Profit Margin
`Is Substantial ............................................................................................................56
`
` Common Economic Evidence of Apple’s Anticompetitive Conduct ................................59
`
` Methodologies for Assessing Common Economic Proof of Impact .................................62
`A. Common Economic Impact of the App Store Commission ............................................62
`B. Economic Principles of App Store Commission .............................................................66
`C. But-For Commission Rates .............................................................................................71
`iOS Aftermarket Demand and Supply and App Developers’ Profit Maximization
`D.
`Conditions ........................................................................................................................76
`1. Profit Maximization Conditions for App Developers ..............................................77
`2. Consumer Demand for Apps and IAPs ....................................................................80
`3. App Developers’ Costs .............................................................................................82
`E. Estimation Procedure .......................................................................................................93
`F. Scaling Up Calculations of Common Impact ..................................................................97
`
` Common Proof of Damages .................................................................................................99
`
` Curriculum Vitae of Daniel McFadden .............................................................108
`
` Materials Relied Upon..........................................................................................125
`
` Apple App Store Transactions Data ...................................................................144
`
` Consumer Utility Maximization..........................................................................151
`D.1 App Download Demand ................................................................................................151
`D.2 In-app Purchase Demand ...............................................................................................152
`
` Quantifying Common Economic Impact: Technical Details ............................153
`E.1 Data Preparation for Estimation ....................................................................................153
`E.2 Model Estimation ..........................................................................................................156
`E.3 Estimation Results .........................................................................................................159
`E.4 But-for World Simulations ............................................................................................161
`
` Profit Maximization Conditions Under the Pricing Tier Policies ....................168
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`
`Figure 1: US Smartphone Shares of iOS and Android ................................................................... 8
`Figure 2: US Tablet Shares of iOS and Android ............................................................................ 9
`Figure 3: Evolution of iOS App Monetization: App Store RevenueS .......................................... 13
`Figure 4 Evolution of iOS App Monetization: Share of App Store Revenues ............................. 14
`Figure 5 U.S. App STORe Commission Revenues ...................................................................... 17
`Figure 6 AppLE’s Revenues attributable to Developer Fees........................................................ 18
`Figure 7 Number of Apps iOS Consumers Spent Money on........................................................ 52
`Figure 8 App Store Profit Margin in FY2019 ............................................................................... 57
`Figure 9: Apple’s App Store Gross and Contribution Margins .................................................... 58
`Figure 10. App Store Gross Margin, 2015 – 2019 ........................................................................ 59
`Figure 11. Effects of Tax on Consumers and Suppliers ............................................................... 67
`Figure 12. Effects of commission on consumers and app developers .......................................... 69
`Figure 13: Pocket Gems, monthly ua vs. gross bookings, ios ...................................................... 89
`Figure 14: Pocket Gems, monthly server costs vs. gross bookings, ios ....................................... 92
`Figure 15 Estimation Results ...................................................................................................... 102
`Figure 16 Summary of estimated price effects: games ............................................................... 103
`Figure 17 Summary of Estimated Price Effects: Entertainment and Music ............................... 105
`Figure 18: Description of variables Analyzed in my analysis .................................................... 144
`Figure 19: Sample and Full Data Comparison: Observations .................................................... 146
`Figure 20: Sample and Full Data Comparison: Spending .......................................................... 146
`Figure 21: Sample and full Data Comparison: Content Type ..................................................... 147
`Figure 22: Sample and full Data Comparison: Genre (App Category) ...................................... 148
`Figure 23: Sample and full Data Comparison: Platform ............................................................ 149
`Figure 24: Sample and full Data Comparison: Posting Reason .................................................. 149
`Figure 25: Sample and full Data Comparison: Content Type ..................................................... 150
`Figure 26: Sample and Full data Comparison: Sap_line_item_type .......................................... 150
`Figure 27: Share of Transactions by Price, Transaction Type, and App Type ........................... 155
`Figure 28: Summary of Estimation Results: Games ................................................................... 160
`Figure 29: Summary of Estimation Results: Music and Entertainment ..................................... 161
`Figure 30: Summary of Estimated Price Effects: Games ........................................................... 164
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`Figure 31: Summary of Estimated Price Effects: Music and Entertainment .............................. 164
`Figure 32: Summary of Estimated Price Effects: Games ........................................................... 165
`Figure 33: Summary of Estimated Price Effects: Music and Entertainment .............................. 166
`Figure 34: Summary of Estimated Price Effects: Games ........................................................... 166
`Figure 35: Summary of Estimated Price Effects: Music and Entertainment .............................. 167
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`Non-Party Highly Confidential—Outside Counsel Eyes Only
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`PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL. PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF COUNSEL.
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`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`A. QUALIFICATIONS
`
`1. My name is Daniel McFadden. I am the E. Morris Cox Professor Emeritus of Economics at the
`University of California at Berkeley and also the Presidential Professor of Health Economics and
`Policy Emeritus at the University of Southern California. My office is located in Evans Hall at
`the Department of Economics, 508-1 Evans Hall #3880, University of California, Berkeley, CA.
`Previously, I was the James R. Killian Professor of Economics at MIT. I received my Ph.D. in
`Economics from the University of Minnesota in 1962. I am also a Principal of the Brattle Group
`(Brattle), an economics and financial consulting firm.
`
`2. Throughout the course of my career, I have published more than one hundred peer-reviewed
`articles and have written or edited several academic books and monographs on economic
`modeling. In 2000, I was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics for my work on
`discrete choice modeling.1 The discrete choice models that I developed are used extensively by
`economists and statisticians to explain or predict a choice between two or more discrete (i.e.,
`distinct and mutually exclusive) alternatives. For example, such models are used to explain the
`factors that will cause a consumer to purchase one brand of car versus another.2
`
`3. Many of my publications over the last thirty years have focused on econometric methods for
`analysis of consumer market behavior and welfare, including use of transactions databases on
`consumers’ choices, natural experiments in which external events allow identification and
`estimation of consumer behavior without confounding by overall market variations, and designed
`
` 1
`
`
`
`In particular, I received this award for showing “how to statistically handle fundamental aspects of microdata,
`namely data on the most important decisions we make in life: the choice of education, occupation, place of
`residence, marital status, number of children, so called discrete choices.” Nobel Media AB 2014, "Daniel L.
`McFadden – Facts," Nobelprize.org, May 25, 2021, available at,
`https://old.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2000/mcfadden-facts.html, last accessed
`May 29, 2021.
`2 Note that in a seminal paper, Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes estimate market equilibrium prices in the automobile
`industry using demand data derived from a discrete choice model, citing heavily to my work. See Berry, Steven,
`James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes, “Automobiles Prices in Market Equilibrium,” Econometrica 63(4) (July
`1995): 841-890.
`
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`Case 4:11-cv-06714-YGR Document 643-11 Filed 04/27/22 Page 8 of 175
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`PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL. PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF COUNSEL.
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`experiments and choice-based conjoint surveys that provide information on consumer
`perceptions and intentions.
`
`4. I have also served as an expert in several high-profile matters, including class action matters, in
`which I testified on economically sound methods for assessing common impact and calculating
`market prices given discrete choice demand.3 Finally, I have continued to publish on survey-
`related topics throughout my career, including in my 2019 book, Foundations of Stated
`Preference Elicitation: Consumer Behavior and Choice-Based Conjoint Analysis (with Moshe
`Ben-Akiva and Kenneth Train),4 as well as many other studies.
`
`5. In addition to the Nobel Prize, I have received numerous other fellowships and honors over the
`course of my career. In 1975, I was awarded the John Bates Clark Medal by the American
`Economic Association, given to the economist under 40 who has made the most significant
`contribution to economics. I have been awarded the Frisch medal, the Nemmers Prize, and the
`Laffont Prize for my contributions to economics, and have been awarded more than 20 honorary
`degrees, including J.D. D. Sc., and PhD. I have served as the Chair of the National Academy of
`Science section on Economic Sciences and am on the Advisory Committee for the Journal of
`Applied Econometrics. I have previously served as an editor of several other peer-reviewed
`academic journals, and I am past-president of the American Economic Association, the
`Econometric Society, and the Western Economics Association International.
`
`6. My curriculum vitae, which provides a more detailed summary of my qualifications, including a
`list of my publications and a list of my previous expert testimony within the last four years, is
`attached as Appendix A. Appendix B lists the documents that I relied upon in preparing this
`report.
`
`7. Brattle charges $1100 per hour for my services. Several Brattle colleagues have helped me in
`preparing the analyses I used to establish my conclusions in this matter. Brattle charges between
`
` 3
`
` See e.g., In Re: General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litigation, United States District Court for the Southern
`District of New York, Case No. 14-MD-2543; and Laumann et al. v National Hockey League et al., 12-cv-1817
`and Garber et al. v. Office of the Commissioner of Baseball et al., 12-cv-3704, S.D.N.Y.
`4 Ben-Akiva, M., D. McFadden, and K. Train, “Foundations of Stated Preference Elicitation: Consumer Behavior
`and Choice-based Conjoint Analysis,” in Foundations and Trends® in Econometrics 10 (1-2) (2019).
`
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`$195 and $800 per hour for these staff members. Our compensation is not contingent on my
`findings or on the result of this proceeding.
`
`B. ASSIGNMENT
`
`8. According to Counsel for Consumer Plaintiffs, the Consumer Class is defined as all persons in
`the United States who purchased one or more iOS applications or application licenses from
`Apple, or who paid Apple for one or more in-app purchases (defined below), including, but not
`limited to, any subscription purchase, for use on an iOS device at any time since July 10, 2008
`(the “Class Period”).5 Consumer Plaintiffs allege that Apple has engaged in an anticompetitive
`scheme to monopolize the aftermarket for iOS applications and in-app purchases throughout the
`Class Period.
`
`9. Consumer Plaintiffs allege that Apple monopolized the aftermarket by equipping iOS mobile
`devices with an operating system that forecloses iOS device users from buying iOS applications
`from any source other than Apple and from paying for certain in-app purchases except to Apple,
`and thus forces iOS device users to pay Apple a 30 percent fee for buying iOS applications and
`making those in-app purchases.6 Consumer Plaintiffs also allege that Apple controls what prices
`developers can charge and “exercises that control by insisting that every paid app be priced in
`dollar increments at $0.99, $1.99, $2.99, and so forth.”7
`
`10. I have been asked by counsel for Consumer Plaintiffs to assess economic evidence relevant to
`the theory of the case, summarized above, and determine whether the economic evidence is
`common to the Consumer Class and can be used to support their claims. I have been also asked
`by counsel to address (1) the availability of methods and evidence, common to the Consumer
`Class, to demonstrate whether Apple’s misconduct related to the Apple App Store caused harm
`to all or virtually all members of the Consumer Class, and (2) whether common methods and
`
` 5
`
` The Consumer Class excludes Apple and its employees, agents and affiliates, and the Court and its employees.
`6
`In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litigation, Stipulation and [Proposed] Order for Leave to File Third Amended
`Consolidated Class Action Complaint, No. C 11-06714-YGR, September 11, 2020, (“Third Amended
`Complaint”), ¶¶ 8-12.
`7 Third Amended Complaint, ¶ 11.
`
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`PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL. PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF COUNSEL.
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`evidence can be used to quantify the damages to the members of the Consumer Class caused by
`Apple’s alleged misconduct.
`
`11. Throughout this report, I will use the terms “As-Is” or “As-Is world” to refer to the economic
`conditions consumers actually faced during the alleged damage period; the terms “But-For” or
`“But-For world” to refer to the economic conditions that consumers would have faced but for the
`conduct by Apple that the complaint in this case alleges to be anti-competitive; the term “in-app
`content” to refer to digital content such as content subscriptions or game artifacts provided by
`iOS applications, the term “in-app purchases” to refer to the purchases of in-app content made by
`iOS device users with iOS applications; the term “In-App Purchase” to refer to Apple’s In-App
`Purchase method which uses Apple’s payment solution for in-app purchases; the term “the App
`Store revenues” to refer to the dollar amount spent on the App Store for purchases of apps and
`in-app content; the term “the App Store commission revenues” to refer to Apple’s revenues from
`the App Store commission; the term “retail price” to refer to the price seen and paid by iOS
`device users for an app or in-app content; the term “commission” to refer to the share of the retail
`price of an app or in-app purchase retained by the Apple App Store; the term “wholesale price”
`to refer to the revenue per transaction received by the app developer from a transaction, equal to
`non-commission share of the retail price; the term “excess commission” to refer to the difference
`between the Apple App Store commission in the As-Is world and the But-For world; and the
`term “overcharge” to refer to the difference between the As-Is and the But-for retail price for a
`transaction.
`
`C.
`
`SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
`
`12. The economic evidence as to the core aspects of liability—market definition, market power,
`entry barriers, and misconduct—is common to all Consumer Class members. Common economic
`evidence supports the conclusion that the sale and purchase of native iOS applications (“apps”)
`and in-app content to users of iPhones, iPads, and other mobile devices sold by Apple that use its
`proprietary iOS operating system constitute a distinct economic antitrust market, commonly
`referred to as an aftermarket—i.e., a market derived from the fact that purchasers of iOS mobile
`devices are economically locked into purchasing apps and in-app content specifically for those
`devices. Common economic evidence supports the conclusion that there are no reasonable
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`PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL. PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF COUNSEL.
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`substitutes for those device-specific content purchases and that barriers to entry by other sellers
`are extremely high. Common economic evidence also supports the conclusion that Apple’s
`conduct—in particular, its exclusive control of sales through the Apple App Store—ensures that
`Apple has a (near) 100 percent share of the sale of the iOS apps and in-app content in the
`relevant iOS aftermarket, which also is reflected in the Apple App Store’s relatively high
`margins.
`
`13. Common economic evidence supports the conclusion that, absent the alleged misconduct, all or
`nearly all consumers of iOS apps or in-app content would have paid lower prices for their
`purchases. Common economic evidence first supports the conclusion that, absent the
`misconduct, the marketplace for the sale of iOS apps and in-app content would have been
`competitively structured, which would have driven down the commissions that Apple extracts
`from consumer purchases of apps and in-app content. I currently calculate that the “As-Is”
`commission has been near 30 percent, and the “But-For” commission would have ranged
`between 10 and 12 percent.
`
`14. Common economic evidence, in turn, supports the conclusion that the elevated commissions in
`the As-Is world compared to the But-For world functioned as a tax levied on app developers. As
`a matter of long-standing and fundamental economic principles and evidence, this tax on app
`developers harmed both developers and consumers. App developers set “wholesale” prices that
`maximize their profits, accounting for the Apple commission they have to pay and the effect of
`“retail” prices on consumer demand for their products. As a result, retail prices are elevated, and
`consumers effectively pay part of the Apple commission. In other words, the Apple commission
`creates a wedge between wholesale price and retail price, and both developers and consumers
`share the “burden” of the Apple tax. Consumers cannot individually bargain over prices for iOS
`apps or in-app content. While the extent of the harm to each class member will depend on their
`individual purchases, common economic evidence demonstrates a quantifiable pattern of impact
`on all class members.
`
`15. Common economic evidence can also be used to show the extent of damages to all or nearly all
`class members. The same methodologies used for demonstrating impact through common
`
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`economic proof can be used to quantify the amount that each class member would likely have
`paid in the But-For world.
`
`
`
`INDUSTRY BACKGROUND8
`
`A.
`
`IOS-INSTALLED MOBILE DEVICES
`
`16. Apple mobile devices relevant for this matter are the iPhone, iPad, and iPod Touch (“iOS mobile
`devices” hereafter).9 All of these iOS mobile devices run on Apple’s proprietary iOS operating
`system. These devices cannot use a different operating system (“OS”), and iOS is only available
`on Apple’s mobile devices. Also, apps developed for non-iOS devices cannot be used on Apple’s
`iOS mobile devices.
`
`17. The iPhone has been the central device of the iOS mobile devices since its introduction in 2007
`
`with
`
` of the U.S. Apple IDs registered with the iPhone, according to the App Store
`
`transactions data Apple produced in this matter.10
`
` of the App Store revenues are
`
`attributable to the iPhone from July 2008 to September 2019, the whole period covered by the
`
`produced App Store transactions data.11 The iPad is
`
`,
`
`accounting for
`
` of the App Store revenues during the same period. The iPod Touch
`
`makes up only a relatively minor part of the iOS mobile devices historically. Its relative share of
`
` 8
`
`
`
`I note that all of this background information will be offered through common evidence from various sources,
`but have not repeated that verbiage throughout this section.
`9 Third Amended Complaint, ¶ 1.
`10 Apple Transactions data produced via hard drive January 15, 2021, APL-APPSTORE_10334265 ("App Store
`transactions data"). The App Store transactions data contains data for all Apple IDs that downloaded apps or in-
`app content through the App Store, including those users who didn’t spend any money. Appendix C provides a
`summary of the App Store transactions data and explains how the data were processed.
`11 Calculated based on the App Store transactions data. The App Store transactions data Apple produced for this
`matter thus far covers up to the end of September 2019. Appendix C provides a summary of the produced App
`Store transactions data.
`
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`the App Store transactions among the iOS mobile devices
`
`, accounting for
`
`
`
` of the App Store revenues at the time,
`
`
`
`18. Nearly all smartphone users in the U.S. use iOS- or Android-installed mobile devices.12 As of
`January 2021, 99.5 percent of smartphone subscribers used one of the two operating systems,
`with respective shares of 52.4 percent for iOS and 47.1 percent for Android.13 As Figure 1
`shows, the combined share of iOS and Android has been at least 90 percent since 2013, and over
`95 percent since 2015.
`
`
`12 The Android operating system is an open-source mobile operating system supported by Google, though an
`Android smartphone need not technically be integrated with the Google mobile ecosystem, which includes the
`Google Play Store. However, in practice, effectively all Android smartphones in the US are part of the Google
`ecosystem. Michael Muchmore, “Android vs. iOS: Which Mobile OS Is Best?,” PCMag, October 2, 2020,
`available at, https://www.pcmag.com/comparisons/android-vs-ios-which-mobile-os-is-best, last accessed May
`19, 2021.
`13 comScore, “Subscriber share held by smartphone operating systems in the United States from 2012 to 2021,”
`Chart, April 9, 2021, Statista, available at, https://www.statista.com/statistics/266572/market-share-held-by-
`smartphone-platforms-in-the-united-states/, last accessed April 27, 2021.
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`FIGURE 1: US SMARTPHONE SHARES OF IOS AND ANDROID
`
`Source: comScore, "Subscriber share held by smartphone operating systems in the United
`States from 2012 to 2021," Chart, April 9, 2021, Statista, available at,
`https://www.statista.com/statistics/266572/market-share-held-by-smartphone-platforms-
`in-the-united-states/, last accessed April 27, 2021.
`
`
`
`19. Similarly, nearly all tablets have either iOS or Android installed as the OS. As of February 2021,
`99.9 percent of tablet subscribers used one of the two operating systems, with respective shares
`of 61.3 percent for iOS and 38.6 percent for Android.14 As Figure 2 shows, the combined share
`of iOS and Android has remained above 99 percent since 2017.
`
`
`14 comScore, "Tablet operating systems market share in the United States from 2016 to 2021," Chart, March 22,
`2021, Statista, available at, https://www.statista.com/statistics/271293/market-share-held-by-tablet-os-us/, last
`accessed April 27, 2021.
`
`No. 4:11-cv-06714-YGR | Page 8 of 169
`Written Evidence of Daniel L. McFadden
`Non-Party Highly Confidential—Outside Counsel Eyes Only
`
`

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`Case 4:11-cv-06714-YGR Document 643-11 Filed 04/27/22 Page 15 of 175
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`PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL. PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF COUNSEL.
`
`FIGURE 2: US TABLET SHARES OF IOS AND ANDROID
`
`Apple iOS
`Google Android
`
`Dec '16
`
`Dec '17
`
`Dec '18
`
`Dec '19
`
`Dec '20
`
`
`
`100%
`95%
`90%
`85%
`80%
`75%
`70%
`65%
`60%
`55%
`50%
`45%
`40%
`35%
`30%
`25%
`20%
`15%
`10%
`5%
`0%
`Month
`
`Share of Tablets
`
`Source: comScore, "Tablet operating systems market share in the United States from
`2016 to 2021," Chart, March 22, 2021, Statista, available at,
`https://www.statista.com/statistics/271293/market-share-held-by-tablet-os-us/, last
`access