Case 4:22-cv-04437-KAW Document 1 Filed 08/01/22 Page 1 of 251
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`Steve W. Berman (pro hac vice forthcoming)
`Robert F. Lopez (pro hac vice forthcoming)
`Abigail D. Pershing (pro hac vice forthcoming)
`HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
`1301 Second Avenue, Suite 2000
`Seattle, WA 98101
`Telephone: (206) 623-7292
`Facsimile: (206) 623-0594
`steve@hbsslaw.com
`robl@hbsslaw.com
`abigailp@hbsslaw.com
`
`Ben M. Harrington (SBN 313877)
`HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPIRO LLP
`715 Hearst Avenue, Suite 202
`Berkeley, CA 94710
`Telephone: (510) 725-3000
`Facsimile: (510) 725-3001
`benh@hbsslaw.com
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiffs Société du Figaro, SAS,
`L’Équipe 24/24 SAS, le GESTE, and the
`Proposed Classes
`
`[Additional counsel on signature page]
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`SAN JOSE DIVISION
`
`SOCIÉTÉ DU FIGARO, SAS, a French simplified
` No.
`joint-stock company; L’ÉQUIPE 24/24 SAS, a
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`French simplified joint-stock company, on behalf of
`PLAINTIFFS’ CLASS ACTION
`themselves and all others similarly situated; and LE
`COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE
`GESTE, a French association, on behalf of itself, its
`SHERMAN ACT, CALIFORNIA UNFAIR
`members, and all others similarly situated,
`COMPETITION LAW, AND CALIFORNIA
`
`CARTWRIGHT ACT
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`APPLE INC., a California corporation,
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`v.
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`011083-11/1969605 V1
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`Plaintiffs,
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`Defendant.
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`Case 4:22-cv-04437-KAW Document 1 Filed 08/01/22 Page 2 of 251
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`I. 
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`II. 
`III. 
`IV. 
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`V. 
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
`INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1 
`A. 
`Apple’s willful, anticompetitive, and unjustifiable monopoly .................................... 2 
`B. 
`Alternatively, Apple’s willful, anticompetitive, and unjustifiable
`monopsony ................................................................................................................ 10 
`Requested redress ...................................................................................................... 10 
`C. 
`JURISDICTION .................................................................................................................... 11 
`VENUE .................................................................................................................................. 11 
`PARTIES ............................................................................................................................... 12 
`A. 
`The Plaintiffs ............................................................................................................. 12 
`1. 
`Individual Developers ................................................................................... 12 
`a. 
`Figaro ................................................................................................. 12 
`b. 
`L’Équipe ............................................................................................ 14 
`Association—Le GESTE ............................................................................... 16 
`2. 
`The Defendant ........................................................................................................... 18 
`B. 
`RELEVANT FACTS ............................................................................................................. 18 
`As They Must, iOS Developers Distribute Their Native Apps and
`A. 
`Digital In-App Products in or via Apple’s App Store, Or in Apps
`Acquired Therefrom, On Apple’s Terms .................................................................. 20 
`1. 
`Inception of the App Store ............................................................................ 20 
`2. 
`The scale of the App Store ............................................................................ 20 
`3. 
`Plaintiffs’ and the classes’ iOS device-specific digital
`products ......................................................................................................... 22 
`How iOS app and in-app product distribution works .................................... 23 
`4. 
`Apple has willfully monopolized the market for iOS app-
`distribution and IAP services. .................................................................................... 25 
`1. 
`The market ..................................................................................................... 26 
`a. 
`The geographic market ...................................................................... 26 
`b. 
`The product market ............................................................................ 26 
`
`B. 
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - i
`Case No.:
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`Case 4:22-cv-04437-KAW Document 1 Filed 08/01/22 Page 3 of 251
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`C. 
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`D. 
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`E. 
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`F. 
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`G. 
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`H. 
`
`I. 
`J. 
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`Apple’s willful acquisition of monopoly market power ................................ 29 
`2. 
`Alternatively, Apple has willfully attempted to acquire monopoly
`market power. ............................................................................................................ 30 
`Alternatively, Apple has willfully acquired monopsony market
`power, or has willfully attempted to acquire it .......................................................... 31 
`By Apple’s purposeful, exclusionary design, no entity applies
`market constraints. ..................................................................................................... 31 
`Apple’s willful practices with respect to the iOS App Store are
`especially grievous and effective as to the market for iOS app-
`distribution and IAP services, where already there are high barriers
`to entry. ...................................................................................................................... 33 
`Apple offers an overblown excuse for its brazenly anticompetitive
`behavior. .................................................................................................................... 34 
`In an illustration and exercise of its monopoly power, Apple
`unfairly taxes iOS app and in-app product distribution. ............................................ 36 
`1. 
`Apple’s supracompetitive default commission ............................................. 36 
`2. 
`Commission rates charged at other stores ..................................................... 39 
`a. 
`Epic Games Store .............................................................................. 39 
`b. 
`Bandcamp .......................................................................................... 41 
`c. 
`Google Play ....................................................................................... 41 
`d. 
`Chrome Web Store ............................................................................ 42 
`e. 
`Microsoft Store .................................................................................. 42 
`f. 
`Amazon Appstore .............................................................................. 44 
`Apple’s maximization of its super-high commission by
`pricing mandates ............................................................................................ 45 
`Apple’s added annual fee .............................................................................. 46 
`4. 
`Apple’s supracompetitive profits .................................................................. 46 
`5. 
`Alternatively, as a retailer, Apple has underpaid developers. ................................... 48 
`The lack of competition has diminished the quality of Apple’s
`services. ..................................................................................................................... 48 
`1. 
`Slow payments ............................................................................................... 48 
`2. 
`Inferior refunds .............................................................................................. 49 
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`3. 
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - ii
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`K. 
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`L. 
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`3. 
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`2. 
`3. 
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`M. 
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`VI. 
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`Other interference in the relationship between developers
`and end-users ................................................................................................. 50 
`Nor does the potential for web apps alleviate the harm to plaintiffs
`or competition. ........................................................................................................... 50 
`Apple’s deliberate and unlawful practices harm competition, iOS
`developers, and end-user consumers of iOS apps and in-app
`products, too. ............................................................................................................. 52 
`Apple’s harm to competition and iOS developers, as well as
`1. 
`end-user consumers, including by depression of output ............................... 53 
`Apple’s stifling of innovation ........................................................................ 55 
`Apple’s harm to iOS developers by denying them the
`opportunity to choose other means to get paid for their
`work ............................................................................................................... 59 
`a. 
`Apple’s refusal to allow others to innovate in the market ................. 59 
`b. 
`Apple’s ATT program ....................................................................... 59 
`Apple’s admission that iOS developers have antitrust standing to
`bring this suit ............................................................................................................. 62 
`TRADE OR COMMERCE AMONG THE SEVERAL STATES, OR
`WITH FOREIGN NATIONS ................................................................................................ 64 
`VII.  RELEVANT MARKET ........................................................................................................ 64 
`VIII.  CLASS ALLEGATIONS ...................................................................................................... 67 
`A. 
`U.S. federal-law classes ............................................................................................. 67 
`B. 
`State-law, i.e., California-law, Classes ...................................................................... 68 
`C. 
`Elements .................................................................................................................... 69 
`APPLICABILITY OF U.S. FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW ............................................... 72 
`IX. 
`APPLICABILITY OF CALIFORNIA LAW ........................................................................ 76 
`X. 
`CLAIMS FOR RELIEF ......................................................................................................... 77 
`XI. 
`FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT –
`MONOPOLIZATION OF THE IOS APP-DISTRIBUTION AND IAP
`SERVICES MARKET (15 U.S.C. § 2) ................................................................................. 77 
`SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT –
`ATTEMPTED MONOPOLIZATION OF THE IOS APP-
`DISTRIBUTION AND IAP SERVICES MARKET (15 U.S.C. § 2) ................................... 79 
`THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA UNFAIR
`COMPETITION ACT (CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200 ET SEQ.) .......................... 80 
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - iii
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`Apple has behaved unlawfully .................................................................................. 81 
`A. 
`Apple has behaved unfairly ....................................................................................... 81 
`B. 
`FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION: VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA
`CARTWRIGHT ACT (CA. BUS & PROF. CODE §§ 16700 ET SEQ.) ............................. 82 
`PRAYER FOR RELIEF .................................................................................................................... 84 
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED ............................................................................................................ 85 
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - iv
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`For their complaint against defendant Apple Inc. (Apple), plaintiffs Société du Figaro, SAS;
`L’Équipe 24/24 SAS (collectively, Individual Developers); and le GESTE, a French association
`comprised of and representing certain France-based publishers of online content and services,
`including certain France-based iOS developers, allege and pray as follows:
`I.
`INTRODUCTION
`iOS developers create the applications and in-app add-ons that bring Apple iPhones,
`1.
`iPads, and iPod touch music players1 to life. Their apps allow users to socialize with others, to edit
`documents, to make exercise more fun, to meditate, and so much more. And their in-app products,
`including enhanced or extra features, game add-ons, services, and content subscriptions,2 make their
`applications more useful and fun. Because there are probably more than one billion iOS devices in
`operation worldwide, the market for apps and digital in-app products is colossal as well. So, then, is
`the market for iOS app-distribution and in-app purchase (IAP) services.
`2.
`By Apple’s design, there is one regular channel for the distribution of iOS native
`apps: its own App Store. Also, with minor exceptions, Apple mandates the use of its IAP services for
`digital add-ons to those apps, whether sold directly in the App Store, or in apps acquired from the
`App Store. Thus, Apple has willfully monopolized the market for iOS app-distribution and IAP
`services.
`Apple is a U.S. company, and the App Store is thoroughly U.S.-based. As
`3.
`demonstrated in Sec. IX below and throughout this complaint, Apple runs the App Store, contracts
`
`
`1 Apple recently announced that it is discontinuing production of the iPod touch.
`2 Apple states that “[t]here are four types of in-app purchases, and you can offer multiple types
`within your app.” (E.g., “In-app purchase,” available at: https://developer.apple.com/in-app-
`purchase/ (last accessed July 27, 2022).). These include consumables, non-consumables, auto-
`renewable subscriptions, and non-renewing subscriptions. (Id.) Throughout this complaint the term
`“in-app product” refers to such digital or virtual items, among others. Apple charges developers a
`commission on the sale of non-zero-priced digital in-app products when the sale is made in or via an
`app acquired from the App Store or in or via the App Store directly. (See, e.g., Ex. A (Developer
`Program License Agreement (DPLA)), ¶ 7.2 and Schedule 2 thereto, ¶ 3.4; Ex. B (App Store Review
`Guidelines (Developer Guidelines)), Sec. 3.1.1 (“If you want to unlock features or functionality
`within your app, (by way of example: subscriptions, in-game currencies, game levels, access to
`premium content, or unlocking a full version), you must use in-app purchase. . . .”).)
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 1
`Case No.:
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`with developers, takes in their products, sets and enforces policies and practices for developers, and
`conducts other App Store-related business with developers, from and in the U.S.
`4.
`Apple solicits developers worldwide to fill the App Store with their compatible digital
`products. To do so, and to sell their in-app products, these developers, wherever they reside, buy
`Apple’s iOS app-distribution and IAP services in America.3 This suit aims to remedy the harm that
`Apple has caused to France-resident iOS developers—purchaser-participants in the U.S. domestic
`market for these services—by way of its violations of U.S. antitrust and California fair-competition
`law.
`
`Plaintiffs bring their suit in this Court pursuant to the choice-of-law, forum, and venue
`5.
`terms contractually specified by Apple. As remedies, plaintiffs seek monetary and injunctive relief
`under U.S. federal and California state law, on their own behalf and on behalf of the classes of
`French-resident iOS developers they seek to represent.
`A.
`Apple’s willful, anticompetitive, and unjustifiable monopoly
`6.
`Except in very limited circumstances, app developers, in order to convey their device-
`compatible native apps to users of Apple-branded mobile devices, must utilize Apple’s iOS app-
`distribution services. And except in very limited circumstances, app developers, in order to sell non-
`zero-priced native apps to these users, must pay Apple what it determines to charge for these
`
`
`3 For the sake of brevity, plaintiffs refer to iOS, iOS developers, the iOS App Store, Apple’s iOS
`app-distribution and IAP services throughout this complaint. But plaintiffs’ and putative class
`members’ claims cover services related to the distribution of all apps and in-app products (whether
`purchased in-app or directly from the App Store) for which Apple mandates the use and purchase of
`its App Store-related distribution and IAP services. Thus, plaintiffs’ complaint also covers services
`related to apps and in-app products for: (a) the iPad (including those powered by iPad OS) and (b)
`Apple Watch (powered by watchOS) are included by reference, as are (c) iMessage apps and in-app
`products and (d) Phone and iPad apps and in-app products sold for use on Apple Silicon Macs. (See,
`e.g., “App Store Support,” and links therein, available at: https://support.apple.com/apps (last
`accessed July 27, 2022); “iMessage Apps and Stickers,” available at:
`https://developer.apple.com/imessage/ (last accessed July 27, 2022); “In-app purchase,” available at:
`https://developer.apple.com/in-app-purchase/ (“Offer extra content and features — including digital
`goods, subscriptions, and premium content — directly within your app through in-app purchases on
`all Apple platforms. You can even promote and offer in-app purchases directly on the App Store.”)
`(last accessed July 27, 2022); “Manage availability of iPhone and iPad Apps on Apple Silicon
`Macs,” available at: https://help.apple.com/app-store-connect/#/dev2de8e790b (last accessed July 27,
`2022).)
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 2
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`services. Further, if these developers wish to sell in-app digital products to these users, either through
`the App Store directly, or from within apps acquired from the App Store, they must, except in limited
`circumstances, use Apple’s IAP services and pay Apple what it determines to charge.
`7.
`Apple-branded mobile device buyers never agree with Apple to purchase their apps
`solely from Apple’s iOS App Store. Nonetheless, Apple restricts such buyers in almost all cases to
`do so. Similarly, in almost all cases, their in-app purchase transactions must be made through the
`App Store or in apps acquired therefrom.
`8.
`Apple, therefore, has cornered the market on iOS app distribution and IAP services—
`but not because it built an app store that beat all comers fair and square. Rather, Apple has
`deliberately built its monopoly by blocking any competition, blocking all would-be competitors
`through technical means and contracts with developers. Thus, it has acquired and maintained
`monopoly power in the market for iOS app distribution and IAP services4 willfully, by barring the
`door to any rivals. In the case of IAP services, the issue is even more acute because developers are
`not only constrained by the use of Apple service itself but also by the high level of commission
`perceived by Apple for each transaction, where they should normally be able to take advantage of
`competition for promotional purposes for example.
`9.
`Among the justifications that Apple proffers for its behavior is security. Supposedly,
`it competes as to the sale of iOS devices in part by offering some sort of unique security regime for
`apps and in-app products. That is, no potential rival could possibly offer sufficient security in the
`distribution of iOS apps and in-app products, or in the services related thereto. Yet Apple never touts
`studies which would indicate that iOS device owners bought their products because Apple mandates
`one app store, its own—and the sole use of its own distribution and IAP services.
`And in fact, Apple already allows open distribution for its MacOS devices.5 That is,
`10.
`as to the former, Apple already has established an alternative (albeit limited) distribution model for
`
`
`4 Alternatively, as alleged herein, Apple is a de facto monopsonist given its status as the sole
`retailer, in its iOS App Store (or in apps acquired therefrom), of the app developers’ digital products.
`5 See, e.g., Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 559 F. Supp. 3d 898, 1008-09 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (Epic
`Games).
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 3
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`companies to develop and distribute apps. And as to the latter, Apple allows real competition—its
`Mac App Store is but one place where Mac apps are made available for sale. Yet neither impacts
`Apple’s safety narrative; in fact, Apple itself speaks to the safety of Macs, including in light of the
`protection systems it has set up for MacOS apps—systems it could replicate for iOS app and in-app
`product distribution.6
`Safely open apps on your Mac
`
`macOS includes a technology called Gatekeeper, that’s designed to ensure that
`only trusted software runs on your Mac.
`
`The safest place to get apps for your Mac is the App Store. Apple reviews
`each app in the App Store before it’s accepted and signs it to ensure that it hasn’t been
`tampered with or altered. If there’s ever a problem with an app, Apple can quickly
`remove it from the store.
`
`If you download and install apps from the internet or directly from a
`developer, macOS continues to protect your Mac. When you install Mac apps, plug-
`ins, and installer packages from outside the App Store, macOS checks the Developer
`ID signature to verify that the software is from an identified developer and that it has
`not been altered. By default, macOS Catalina and later also requires software to be
`notarized, so you can be confident that the software you run on your Mac doesn't
`contain known malware. Before opening downloaded software for the first time,
`macOS requests your approval to make sure you aren’t misled into running software
`you didn’t expect.
`
`***
`Privacy protections
`
`macOS has been designed to keep users and their data safe while respecting
`their privacy.
`
`Gatekeeper performs online checks to verify if an app contains known
`malware and whether the developer’s signing certificate is revoked. We have never
`combined data from these checks with information about Apple users or their devices.
`We do not use data from these checks to learn what individual users are launching or
`running on their devices.
`
`Notarization checks if the app contains known malware using an encrypted
`connection that is resilient to server failures.7
`
`And Apple certainly is not worried that the Mac ecosystem will come crumbling down due to the
`availability of choice to developers and end-users. To the contrary, it promises that “over the next
`
`
`
`
`
`6 See, e.g., id.
`7 “Safely open apps on your Mac,” available at: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202491 (last
`accessed July 27, 2022).
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 4
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`year [it] will introduce several changes to its security checks,” including adding “[a] new preference
`for users to opt out of these security protections.”8
`11.
`As the court observed in Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., following trial:
`under a “notarization” model, Apple could continue to review apps without
`limiting distribution. The notarization model is currently used on macOS. There,
`Apple scans apps using automatic tools and “notarizes” them as safe before they can
`be distributed without a warning. Apps can still be distributed through the Mac store
`(with complete app review) or with a warning if not notarized, but notarization
`provides a “third path” between full app review and unrestricted distribution. In
`theory, notarization review could be expanded to include some of the checks Apple
`currently performs in the App Store, such as human review.9
`
`12.
`Apple also allows limited enterprise distribution for iOS devices, and its enterprise
`program certainly has not crashed safety for iPhones. Certainly it could be expanded, or a similar
`model adopted, for alternative app stores. As the court noted in Epic Games:
`under an “enterprise program” model, Apple could focus on certifying app
`stores instead of apps. The Enterprise Program is an existing model for distributing
`apps on iOS where companies apply to distribute apps within its organization. Apple
`reviews the company and, if conditions are met, gives it a certificate that allows it to
`sign apps for distribution. Although the program has occasionally been abused, it
`shows that Apple could shift its review from apps to app stores, while continuing to
`impose standards for privacy and security.10
`Further, per the Epic Games court: “it is difficult to imagine that Microsoft would be a source of
`malware for iOS users.”11
`13.
`In reality, Apple is content to keep a world-wide end-user base of over a billion
`devices to itself,12 if allowed, by incanting the shibboleth of “safety,” whatever the exaggerations.
`14.
`Plaintiffs are not alone in their view of Apple’s anticompetitive behavior. In October
`2020 the U.S. House Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust released a report13 in which the authors
`
`
`
`8 Id.
`9 Epic Games, 559 F. Supp. 3d at 1008.
`10 Id. (citation omitted).
`11 Id. at n.544.
`12 “Together we turn apps into opportunities,” available at: https://www.apple.com/app-
`store/developing-for-the-app-store/ (last accessed July 27, 2022) (stating, as to its five platforms,
`“We make it easy to reach over 1.5 billion Apple devices.”).
`13 “Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets – Majority Staff Report and
`Recommendations,” U.S. House Subcomm. on Antitrust, etc., Oct. 6, 2020, available at:
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 5
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`concluded, among other things, that Apple is a willful monopolist in its operation of the App Store14
`and by way of its IAP product. The Committee also concluded that Apple abuses its market power by
`“charg[ing] supra-competitive prices within the App Store.”15 And the authors found, after a long,
`extensive, and detail-oriented investigation that “[i]n the absence of competition, Apple’s monopoly
`power over software distribution to iOS devices has resulted in harm to competitors and competition,
`reducing quality and innovation among app developers, and increasing prices and reducing choices
`for consumers.”16
`15. More specifically, Apple’s market, or monopoly, power has allowed it to charge
`developers a default supracompetitive 30% commission17 on the sale of paid apps18 for 14 years now,
`despite the inevitable accrual of experience and economies of scale. Similarly, Apple has imposed
`the same default supracompetitive 30% commission on digital in-app purchases for nearly as many
`years, notwithstanding these accruals.19
`16.
`Additionally, Apple collects a USD $99 (or equivalent) annual fee from all iOS
`developers who wish (and must) sell their products through the App Store.
`
`
`https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/competition_in_digital_markets.pdf (last accessed July 27,
`2022).
`14 See, e.g., id. at 16 (“Apple has significant and durable market power in the mobile operating
`system market. Apple’s dominance in this market, where it controls the iOS mobile operating system
`that runs on Apple mobile devices, has enabled it to control all software distribution to iOS devices.
`As a result, Apple exerts monopoly power in the mobile app store market, controlling access to more
`than 100 million iPhones and iPads in the U.S.”).
`15 Id. at 17.
`16 Id.
`17 Plaintiffs alternatively refer to Apple’s commission as a fee.
`18 More recently, as discussed in ¶ 117 below, Apple has established a Small Business Program,
`which lowers the commission rate for apps and in-app products under certain circumstances, and up
`to a specific dollar value, to 15% for qualified developers. (See, e.g., “App Store Small Business
`Program,” available at: https://developer.apple.com/app-store/small-business-program/ (last accessed
`July 27, 2022).) Another current exception is auto-renewable subscriptions, where the rate drops to
`15% after a year if the subscription remains in place for that long. (E.g., “Auto-renewable
`Subscriptions,” available at: https://developer.apple.com/app-store/subscriptions/ (last accessed July
`27, 2022).)
`19 See, e.g., Epic Games, 559 F. Supp. 3d at 991 (“[I]n 2009, Apple introduced IAP using the
`same 30% commission.”).
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 6
`Case No.:
`011083-11/1969605 V1
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`Case 4:22-cv-04437-KAW Document 1 Filed 08/01/22 Page 12 of 251
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`Further, Apple dictates minimum and greater price points, such that iOS developers
`17.
`cannot offer paid products at less than USD $.99 or at price points ending in anything other than
`USD $.99 (or, in general, their analogues/equivalents at foreign App Store digital “storefronts,” such
`as the French iOS App Store digital storefront20).
`18.
`Thus, while Apple is fond of pointing to impressive-sounding sales numbers and
`dollars earned by developers, nonetheless, the foregoing—its exorbitant fee for distribution (or retail-
`sales) and IAP services, coupled with its USD $99 (or equivalent) annual fee and pricing mandates—
`have cut unlawfully into what would and should have been developers’ earnings in a competitive
`atmosphere.
`Also, Apple’s overly expensive default 30% commission, its USD $99 (or equivalent)
`19.
`annual developer fee, and its pricing mandates have depressed output of paid apps and in-app-
`products, such that sales of app and IAP distribution services likewise depressed. End-users of apps
`and in-app products favor low-priced or free apps.21 Developers and would-be developers who are or
`were able to earn only the default 70% on the dollar on each paid app or in-app product, and who
`must pay Apple USD $99 (or equivalent) annually for their digital products to be sold in or via the
`App Store (or in or via apps acquired therefrom), must consider whether to spend the effort, time,
`and energy that is required to design and program an app or related product; bring it to market in the
`single store available; and endeavor to recoup costs and make a reasonable profit. For many, the
`calculus, including financial investments, makes no economic sense. And so they do not proceed.
`This state of affairs, which is ongoing, leads to less output in iOS app-distribution and IAP services.
`20.
`Furthermore, for those who nonetheless soldier on towards offering paid digital
`products to Apple device owners, another output-depressing scenario presents itself: discoverability.
`
`
`20 See, e.g., “App Store Pricing, Effective August 2021,” available at: https://itunespartner
`.apple.com/assets/downloads/072821-Apps-Pricing-SAfr-UK-EUR.pdf (last accessed July 27, 2022)
`(setting forth,