Case 3:20-cv-02992-WHO Document 1 Filed 04/30/20 Page 1 of 18
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`
`
`Megan E. Jones (Cal. Bar No. 296274)
`Seth R. Gassman (Cal. Bar No. 311702)
`HAUSFELD LLP
`600 Montgomery Street, Suite 3200
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Telephone: (415) 633-1908
`mjones@hausfeld.com
`sgassman@hausfeld.com
`
`Will Thompson (CA Bar No. 289012)
`BURNS CHAREST LLP
`900 Jackson Street, Suite 500
`Dallas, Texas 75202
`Telephone: (469) 904-4550
`wthompson@burnscharest.com
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`CASE NO.
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT:
`
`(1) Violation of Illinois Biometric
`Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS
`14/1 et seq., § 15
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`DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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`P. S., a minor, by and through her Guardian,
`Cherise Slate, and M. T. W., a minor, by and
`through her Guardian, Brenda Washington,
`individually and on behalf of all others
`similarly situated,
`
`
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`
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`TIKTOK, INC., a corporation, and
`BYTEDANCE, INC., a corporation,
`
`
`
`Plaintiff(s),
`
`vs.
`
`Defendant(s).
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:20-cv-02992-WHO Document 1 Filed 04/30/20 Page 2 of 18
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 
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`PARTIES ........................................................................................................................................ 2 
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE ..................................................................................................... 2 
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`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS ......................................................................................................... 3 
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`A.  Biometric Information and BIPA. ..................................................................................3 
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`B.  The Evolution of TikTok. ..............................................................................................4 
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`C.  Defendants have collected, captured, received, obtained, stored and/or
`used biometric identifiers and/or information in violation of Section 15(b)
`of BIPA. .........................................................................................................................6 
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`D.  Defendants’ failure to provide a written, publicly available policy regarding
`the retention and destruction of biometric information violated Section 15(a)
`of BIPA. .........................................................................................................................9 
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`E. 
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`Plaintiffs’ Personal Experiences. ...................................................................................9 
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`CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS ............................................................................................. 10 
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`CAUSES OF ACTION ................................................................................................................. 13 
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`First Cause of Action ............................................................................................................13 
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`PRAYER FOR RELIEF ............................................................................................................... 14 
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`DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL .................................................................................................... 15 
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:20-cv-02992-WHO Document 1 Filed 04/30/20 Page 3 of 18
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`Plaintiffs P. S., a minor, by and through her guardian Cherise Slate, and M. T. W., a minor,
`by and through her guardian Brenda Washington, on behalf of themselves and other similarly
`situated individuals, bring this Class Action Complaint against Defendants TikTok, Inc.,
`(“TikTok”) both individually and as a successor-in-interest to Musical.ly, Inc. (“musical.ly”) and
`ByteDance, Inc., (“ByteDance”) (collectively referred to herein as “Defendants”) and allege as
`follows:
`
`INTRODUCTION
`1.
`TikTok, Inc. has created one of the most popular social media networking apps in
`the United States (“TikTok App” or the “App”). The App allows users to create, view, and share
`three to fifteen-second videos of dancing, lip-syncing, and other forms of self-expression, as well
`as short looping videos of three to sixty seconds.
`2.
`The App’s playful features belie Defendants’ reliance on users’ private, biometric
`information. The App scans a user’s facial geometry before running an algorithm to determine the
`user’s age. The App also uses facial scans to allow users to superimpose animated facial filters
`onto the moving faces of video subjects.
`3.
`Defendants do not inform the App’s users that their biometric data is being
`collected, captured, received, obtained, stored, and/or used by the App. Nor do Defendants disclose
`what they do with that data, who has access to that data, and whether, where, and for how long
`that data is stored.
`4.
`By collecting, capturing, receiving, obtaining, storing and/or using facial scans
`without obtaining informed consent and by failing to make public their data use and retention
`policy, Defendants violate the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), 740 ILCS
`14/1 et seq.
`5.
`Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of proposed classes in order
`to enjoin Defendants’ continued violation of BIPA and to recover statutory damages for
`Defendants’ unauthorized collection, capture, receipt, storage, and/or use of biometric information
`belonging to TikTok App users in Illinois.
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:20-cv-02992-WHO Document 1 Filed 04/30/20 Page 4 of 18
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`PARTIES
`6.
`Plaintiff P. S., a minor, is and has been at all relevant times, a resident and citizen
`of the state of Illinois. P. S. brings this case by and through her guardian, Cherise Slate, a resident
`and citizen of the state of Illinois. P. S. began using TikTok in 2019.
`7.
`Plaintiff M. T. W., a minor, is and has been at all relevant times, a resident and
`citizen of the state of Illinois. M. T. W. brings this case by and through her guardian, Brenda
`Washington, a resident and citizen of the state of Illinois. M. T. W. began using TikTok in 2018.
`8.
`Defendant TikTok, Inc. is, and at all relevant times was, a California corporation
`with its principal place of business in Culver City, California. Defendant also maintains offices in
`Palo Alto and Mountain View, California.
`9.
`TikTok, Inc. is sued in its individual capacity and as the successor-in-interest to
`Musical.ly, Inc., a California Corporation formerly headquartered in Palo Alto, California.
`10.
`Defendant ByteDance, Inc. is, and at all relevant times was, a Delaware corporation
`with its principal place of business in Palo Alto, California.
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
`11.
`This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action Fairness
`Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (“CAFA”) because (i) the proposed class consists of well over 100
`members; (ii) the parties are minimally diverse as all members of the proposed class, including
`Plaintiffs, are citizens of Illinois—a state different from Defendants’ home states of California and
`Delaware; and (iii) the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, exclusive of interest
`and costs. The estimated number of Illinois TikTok users impacted by Defendants’ conduct
`multiplied by BIPA’s statutory liquidated damages figure ($5,000 for each intentional or reckless
`violation and $1,000 for each negligent violation) exceeds CAFA’s $5,000,000 threshold.
`12.
`This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because (i) both Defendants’
`principal places of business are in the State of California, and Defendant TikTok, Inc. is
`incorporated in the State of California; and (ii) because the allegations in this Complaint arise from
`Defendants’ misconduct occurring within this State.
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`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`Case 3:20-cv-02992-WHO Document 1 Filed 04/30/20 Page 5 of 18
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`13.
`In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1391, venue is proper in this District because:
`(i) Defendant ByteDance, Inc.’s principal place of business is in this District; and (ii) a substantial
`part of the conduct giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in or emanated from this District.
`FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
`A. Biometric Information and BIPA.
`14.
`In 2008, Illinois enacted BIPA in light of the “very serious need [for] protections
`for the citizens of Illinois when it comes to [their] biometric information.”1
`15.
`Biometrics are unlike other unique identifiers used to access finances or other
`sensitive information. “For example, social security numbers, when compromised, can be changed.
`Biometrics, however, are biologically unique to the individual; therefore, once compromised, the
`individual has no recourse, is at heightened risk for identity theft, and is likely to withdraw from
`biometric-facilitated transactions.”2
`16.
`To address this legitimate concern, Section 15(b) of BIPA provides that:
`
`(2)
`
`No private entity may collect, capture, purchase, receive through
`trade, or otherwise obtain a person’s or a customer’s biometric
`identifier or biometric information, unless it first:
`(1)
`informs the subject or the subject’s legally authorized
`representative in writing that a biometric identifier or
`biometric information is being collected or stored;
`informs the subject or the subject’s legally authorized
`representative in writing of the specific purpose and
`length of term for which a biometric identifier or
`biometric information is being collected, stored, and
`used; and
`receives a written release executed by the subject of the
`biometric identifier or biometric information or the
`subject’s legally authorized representative.3
`
`(3)
`
`
`1 95th Ill. Gen. Assem. House Proceedings, May 30, 2008, at 249 (statement of Representative Ryg), available at
`http://www.ilga.gov/house/transcripts/htrans95/09500276.pdf.
`
` 2
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` 3
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` 740 ILCS 14/5(c).
`
` 740 ILCS 14/15(b).
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`17.
`
`Section 15(a) of BIPA further provides that:
`A private entity in possession of biometric identifiers or biometric
`information must develop a written policy, made available to the
`public, establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for
`permanently destroying biometric
`identifiers and biometric
`information when the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining such
`identifiers or information has been satisfied or within 3 years of the
`individual’s last interaction with the private entity, whichever
`occurs first.4
`18.
`For BIPA purposes, a “biometric identifier” is any personal feature that is unique
`to an individual and specifically includes scans of facial geometry.5
`19.
`BIPA defines “biometric information” as “any information, regardless of how it is
`captured, converted, stored, or shared, based on an individual’s biometric identifier used to identify
`an individual.”6
`B. The Evolution of TikTok.
`20.
`ByteDance Ltd., the parent of ByteDance, Inc., is a Beijing-based company
`founded in 2012 by Zhang Yiming.
`21.
`ByteDance Ltd. first launched the TikTok App (originally called “A.me” in China
`but now called “Douyin”) for the China market in September 2016. In 2016, the App was launched
`for iOS and Android in markets outside of China.
`22.
`In November 2017, TikTok’s parent company, ByteDance, spent up to $1 billion
`to purchase musical.ly, a startup based in Shanghai with an office in Santa Monica, California.
`Musical.ly was a social media video platform that, like the TikTok App, allowed users to create
`short lip-sync and comedy videos (“musical.ly App”).7
`
`4 740 ILCS 14/15(a).
`
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` 5
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` 6
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` 740 ILCS 14/10.
`
` Id.
`
` 7
`
` Liza Lin & Rolfe Winkler, Social Media App Musical.ly Is Acquired for as Much as $1 Billion, Wall Street J.
`(Nov. 9, 2017 at 8:46 p.m.), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lip-syncing-app-musical-ly-is-acquired-for-as-much-as-1-
`billion-1510278123.
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`23.
`The musical.ly App was first launched in 2014, and, like the TikTok App, used
`facial scans to allow users to superimpose animated facial filters onto the moving faces of video
`subjects.8
`24.
`In order to leverage musical.ly’s young user base, TikTok merged the App with
`musical.ly on August 2, 2018 to create a larger video community, with existing accounts and data
`consolidated into one app, keeping the App title “TikTok.” This ended musical.ly and made the
`TikTok App a world-wide app.
`25.
`In the United States, the TikTok App is generally a young person’s app. Sixty
`percent of active users are between the ages of 16 and 24,9 and about seventy percent of ten-year-
`old girls with smartphones used the App at some point in 2019.10
`26.
`The App has become one of the world’s fastest-growing social media platforms and
`enjoys a massive American audience. It has been downloaded more than 1.3 billion times
`worldwide and more than 120 million times in the United States.
`27.
`The App is the most downloaded non-game app in the world. On the Apple and
`Google app stores it routinely outranks competitors such as Facebook, Snapchat, and Instagram.
`28.
`As of March 2019, the average user opened the App more than eight times per day
`and spent approximately 45 minutes on the App daily.
`29.
`Defendants implemented an artificial intelligence tool in the App that automatically
`scans the faces of individuals in videos to estimate the subjects’ ages.11
`
`
`8 Americanoize, 5 Great Musically Face Filters, Medium (Nov. 16, 2017), https://medium.com/@americanoize/5-
`great-musically-face-filters-b88c41ea32c8.
`
` Greg Roumeliotis, et al., Exclusive: U.S. Opens National Security Investigation Into TikTok – Sources (Nov. 1,
`2019 at 8:21 a.m.), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tiktok-cfius-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-opens-national-security-
`investigation-into-tiktok-sources-idUSKBN1XB4IL.
`
`10 Georgia Wells & Yoree Koh, TikTok Wants to Grow Up, but Finds It Tough to Keep Kids Out (Feb. 16, 2020 at
`8:00 a.m.), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktok-wants-to-grow-up-but-finds-it-tough-to-keep-kids-out-
`11581858006.
`
`11 Id.
`
`
` 9
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`30.
`The TikTok App, like the musical.ly App before it, also features a variety of popular
`face filters that users can superimpose onto a subject’s moving face or even allow editing of certain
`facial features.12
`31.
`To work, both of these tools require the scanning and/or mapping of a user’s
`biologically unique facial geometry and/or facial landmarks.
`32.
`Upon information and belief, TikTok, Inc. shared the biometric information it
`collected, captured, received, obtained, stored, and/or used from users of the App with other
`members of its corporate family during the Class period, including Defendant ByteDance, Inc.
`33.
`As recently as August of 2018, the TikTok App’s U.S. Privacy Policy stated: “We
`will also share your information with any member or affiliate of our group, in China…”13 Even
`today, the TikTok App’s U.S. Privacy Policy states: “We may share your information with a
`parent, subsidiary, or other affiliate of our corporate group.”14
`34.
`TikTok users are never told that Defendants collect, capture, receive, obtain, store,
`and/or use their biometric information. Similarly, users never gave consent for such use.
`
`C. Defendants have collected, captured, received, obtained, stored and/or used
`biometric identifiers and/or information in violation of Section 15(b) of BIPA.
`
`35.
`Defendants’ use of Illinois TikTok App users’ face scans, including, but not limited
`to, scans of facial geometry and/or facial landmarks, violates all three prongs of Section 15(b) of
`BIPA.
`
`36.
`First, Defendants never informed TikTok users that they would collect, capture,
`receive, otherwise obtain, store, and/or use their face scans or any other biometric information.
`
`
`12 Maxing out the beauty filter, TikTok (last accessed April 28, 2020), https://www.tiktok.com/music/Maxing-out-
`the-beauty-filter-6705111720496614150.
`
`13 Privacy Policy, TikTok (last updated Aug. 2018),
`https://web.archive.org/web/20180829183230/http:/www.tiktok.com/i18n/privacy#how-share (emphasis added).
`
`14 Privacy Policy, TikTok (last updated Jan. 1, 2020), https://www.tiktok.com/legal/privacy-policy?lang=en.
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`Case 3:20-cv-02992-WHO Document 1 Filed 04/30/20 Page 9 of 18
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`37.
`None of the following words occur at all in the App’s current U.S. Terms of Service
`(last updated February 2019) or Privacy Policy (last updated January 1, 2020): “biometric,”
`“facial,” “recognition,” “face,” “scan,” “faceprint,” “geometry,” or “landmark.”
`38.
`Defendants’ parent company, ByteDance, Ltd. knows how to inform users that it
`will collect facial landmarks and/or geometry. For example, the Privacy Policy of another
`ByteDance app, VigoVideo, explicitly states that the information the app collects and uses includes
`“your face landmarks or face contour for creation of face stickers.”15
`39.
`Similarly, the privacy policy of Douyin, the app ByteDance uses inside China and
`the progenitor of TikTok, states, “We may also use part of the facial feature value
`information . . . to provide you with the face sticker function to provide better visual effects.”16
`40.
`The U.S. TikTok App also allows users to add face stickers but fails to make the
`same disclosures. Moreover, the App also has a face tracker lens effect. With that, once the lens
`detects a user’s face through biometrics, it will automatically zoom in.
`41.
`Second, Defendants do not and have never informed TikTok App users of the
`specific purpose and length of time for which their face scans or other biometric information and
`identifiers are collected, captured, received, otherwise obtained, stored, and/or used.
`42.
`In fact, the TikTok Privacy Policy for users over the age of thirteen residing in the
`United States does not disclose the length of time that any user content, much less biometric
`information, will be retained by Defendants.
`43.
` Third, Defendants never received a written release or consent from TikTok App
`users or their legal authorized representatives before Defendants began collecting, capturing,
`receiving, otherwise obtaining, storing, and/or using the face scans or other biometric information.
`
`
`15 Vigo-Privacy Policy, VigoVideo (last updated Jan. 1, 2020),
`https://www.vigovideo.net/privacy_policy?vigo_lang=en.
`
`16 Douyin Privacy Policy, Douyin (last updated Feb. 13, 2020),
`https://www.douyin.com/agreements/?id=6773901168964798477 (translated using Google Translate).
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`44.
`Defendants’ flagrant disregard for the privacy rights of the App’s users comes as
`no surprise. In the few short years of the App’s existence, Defendants have taken an evasive, often
`cavalier, approach to U.S. privacy laws. Defendants’ violation of BIPA is part of this pattern of
`abuse.
`
`45.
`For example, the App has been the subject of multiple lawsuits alleging violations
`of users’ privacy. One recent lawsuit alleged that the App targeted minor children and collected
`their personal identifying information without parental consent. Another lawsuit alleged that data
`collected in the App was transferred to Defendants’ corporate parent, ByteDance Ltd.,
`headquartered in China.
`46.
`In 2019, Defendant TikTok settled a claim brought by the Federal Trade
`Commission (“FTC”), which alleged that TikTok violated the Children’s Online Privacy
`Protection Act. The $5.7 million settlement was, at that time, the largest penalty ever imposed for
`violations of children’s privacy.17 Two FTC commissioners went so far as to file a separate
`statement asserting that, in their view, TikTok’s misconduct “reflected the company’s willingness
`to pursue growth even at the expense of endangering children.”18
`47.
`Currently, the United States is investigating the App’s collection of user data as a
`national security concern.19 Describing the TikTok App as a cyber threat, the United States Army
`banned its use on government phones in late 2019, and the Navy soon followed suit.20
`48.
`Defendants’ readiness to sacrifice the privacy rights of the TikTok App’s users is
`particularly troubling given their demographic makeup, which consists of many minor users.
`
`
`17 Patrick Thomas, TikTok Settles with FTC Over Data Collection from Children, Wall Street J. (Feb. 27, 2019 at
`4:36 p.m.), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktok-settles-with-ftc-over-data-collection-from-children-
`11551303390?mod=article_inline.
`
`18 Farnoush Amiri, TikTok to Pay $5.7 Million Over Alleged Violation of Child Privacy Law, NBCNews (Feb. 27,
`2019 at 12:55 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/tiktok-pay-5-7-million-over-alleged-violation-child-
`privacy-n977186.
`
`19 Roumeliotis, et al., supra n.9.
`
`20 Brian Barrett, Security News This Week: The Army Bans TikTok, Wired (Jan. 4, 2020 at 9:00 a.m.),
`https://www.wired.com/story/army-bans-tiktok-cloud-hopper-email-scam/.
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`D. Defendants’ failure to provide a written, publicly available policy regarding the
`retention and destruction of biometric information violated Section 15(a) of BIPA.
`49.
`Defendants have also violated Section 15(a) of BIPA.
`50.
`The TikTok App’s U.S. Terms of Service and Privacy Policy do not set forth any
`information regarding retention of biometric information or guidelines for the destruction of such
`information.
`51.
`Thus, in direct violation of Section 15(a), Defendants have not developed a written,
`publicly available policy establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for permanently
`destroying TikTok App users’ biometric identifiers and biometric information.
`E. Plaintiffs’ Personal Experiences.
`52.
`Plaintiff P. S. is a minor and a resident of Illinois who brings this action by and
`through her guardian, Cherise Slate, a resident of Illinois. P. S. has been a registered user of TikTok
`since at least 2019.
`53.
`Since registering with TikTok, P. S. has uploaded and posted many videos to the
`App that include images of her face, and, upon information and belief, her face has appeared in
`other users’ uploaded videos.
`54.
`P. S. has also used facial filters in uploaded videos.
`55.
`Plaintiff M. T. W. is a minor and a resident of Illinois who brings this action by and
`through her guardian, Brenda Washington, a resident of Illinois. M. T. W. has been a registered
`user of TikTok since at least 2018.
`56.
`Since registering with TikTok, M. T. W. has uploaded and posted many videos to
`the App that include images of her face, and upon information and belief, her face has also
`appeared in other users’ uploaded videos.
`57. M. T. W. has also used facial filters in uploaded videos.
`58.
`Defendants have collected, captured, received, otherwise obtained, stored, and/or
`used P.S.’s and M. T. W.’s face scans including, but not limited to, scans of their facial geometry
`and/or facial landmarks.
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`59.
`Neither P. S. and M. T. W., nor their legally authorized representatives, Cherise
`Slate and Brenda Washington, ever received notice that Defendants would collect, capture,
`receive, otherwise obtain, store, and/or use their face scans.
`60.
`Defendants never informed P. S. or M. T. W. or their legally authorized
`representatives of the specific purpose and length of time for which their face scans or any other
`biometric information would be collected, captured, received, otherwise obtained, stored, and/or
`used.
`
`61.
`Neither P. S. and M. T. W. nor their legally authorized representatives ever signed
`a written release authorizing Defendants to collect, capture, receive, otherwise obtain, store, and/or
`use their face scans or any other biometric information.
`CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
`62.
`Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and (3) of the Federal Rules
`of Civil Procedure on behalf of the following proposed class (the “Class”):
`
`Any user of the musical.ly App or the TikTok App who, while
`residing in Illinois, used face filters, face stickers, or the face tracker
`lens on an image or video of that user’s own face or whose face
`appeared in a video uploaded to the musical.ly App and/or the
`TikTok App while the user resided in Illinois.
`
`63.
`If additional information is obtained through further investigation and discovery,
`the foregoing definition of the Class may be expanded or narrowed by amendment or amended
`complaint.
`64.
`Specifically excluded from the Class are (i) Defendants; (ii) Defendants’ officers,
`directors, agents, trustees, representatives, employees, principals, servants, partners, and joint-
`venturers; (iii) any entities controlled by Defendants; (iv) Defendants’ heirs, successors, assigns,
`or other persons or entities related to or affiliated with Defendants, their officers, or their directors;
`and (v) the judge assigned to this action and any member of that judge’s immediate family.
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`65.
`Ascertainability. Members of the Class are readily ascertainable because the Class
`is defined using objective criteria, such as geography and the specific uses of the app, so as to
`allow prospective members to determine if they are part of the Class.
`66.
`Numerosity. The Class is so numerous that individual joinder is impracticable. At
`a minimum, the Class contains tens of thousands of members. Although the precise number of
`Class members is unknown to Plaintiffs, the true number of members of the Class is known by
`Defendants.
`67.
`Commonality. Common questions of law and fact exist and predominate over
`questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Such questions include:
`a. whether Defendants collected, captured, received, otherwise obtained, stored,
`and/or used biometric identifiers or biometric information from Plaintiffs and the
`members of the Class;
`b. whether Defendants informed Plaintiffs and the members of the Class that they
`would be collecting, capturing, receiving, otherwise obtaining, storing, and/or using
`their biometric identifiers or biometric information;
`c. whether Defendants informed Plaintiffs and the members of the Class of the
`specific purpose and length of term for which their biometric identifiers or
`biometric information would be collected, captured, received, otherwise obtained,
`stored, and/or used;
`d. whether Defendants obtained a written release from Plaintiffs and the members of
`the Class authorizing Defendants to collect, capture, receive, otherwise obtain,
`store, and/or use their biometric identifiers and biometric information;
`e. whether Defendants used biometric identifiers and biometric information to
`identify Plaintiffs and the members of the Class;
`f. whether Defendants provided a publicly available written policy establishing a
`retention schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers
`and biometric information;
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`g. whether Defendants’ violations of BIPA were committed intentionally, recklessly,
`or negligently;
`h. whether Plaintiffs and the members of the Class are entitled to statutory damages
`under BIPA and the correct measure of those damages; and
`i. whether Plaintiffs and the members of the Class are entitled to declaratory and
`injunctive relief.
`68.
`Typicality. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those of the other members of the Class
`because, among other things, Defendants collected, captured, received, otherwise obtained, stored,
`and/or used their biometric information without informed consent in the exact same manner for
`each Class member.
`69.
`Adequacy of Representation. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the
`interests of the Class. Plaintiffs have retained counsel experienced in complex class actions and
`intend to vigorously prosecute this case on behalf of the Class. Further, Plaintiffs have no interests
`that are antagonistic to the Class.
`70.
`Superiority. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and
`efficient adjudication of this controversy. The damages suffered by each individual member of the
`Class are relatively small compared to the burden and expense required to litigate a BIPA claim
`against Defendants. It would thus be impossible for members of the Class, on an individual basis,
`to obtain effective redress for the wrongs committed against them.
`71.
`Individualized litigation also risks inconsistent or contradictory judgments and
`increases the cost of legal resolution of this matter for all parties and for the court system. By
`contrast, the proposed class action presents far fewer management difficulties and offers the
`benefits of a single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single
`court.
`
`CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
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`CAUSES OF ACTION
`First Cause of Action
`Violations of 740 ILCS 14/1, et seq.
`(On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class)
`72.
`Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the Class, incorporate the foregoing
`allegations as if fully set forth herein.
`73.
`Defendants are “private entities” as defined by 740 ILCS 14/10.
`74.
`Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class are individuals who had their
`biometric information collected, captured, received, obtained, stored, and/or used by Defendants
`through the TikTok App’s collection and use of their biometric identifiers.
`75.
`Defendants systematically collected, captured, received, otherwise obtained,
`stored, and/or used Plaintiffs’ and the other Class members’ biometric identifiers and information
`without first obtaining the written release required by 740 ILCS 14/15(b)(3).
`76.
`Defendants failed to inform Plaintiffs or the other members of the Class in writing
`that their biometric identifiers and biometric information were being collected, captured, received,
`otherwise obtained, stored, and/or used on the App. Defendants also failed to inform Plaintiffs or
`the other members of the Class in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which their
`biometric identifiers and biometric information were being collected, captured, received, otherwise
`obtained, stored, and/or used as required by 740 ILCS 14/15(b)(1)–(2).
`77.
`Additionally, Defendants possess the biometric identifiers or information of
`Plaintiffs and other members of the Class but do not publicly provide a retention schedule or
`guidelines for permanently destroying such identifiers or information, as required by 740 ILCS
`14/15(a).
`78.
`By collecting, capturing, receiving, otherwise obtaining, storing, and/or using
`Plaintiffs’ and the other Class members’ biometric identifiers and biometric information,
`Defendants violated the right of ea