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`
`
`
`COOLEY LLP
`WHITTY SOMVICHIAN (194463)
`(wsomvichian@cooley.com)
`MAX A. BERNSTEIN (305722)
`(mbernstein@cooley.com)
`KELSEY R. SPECTOR (321488)
`(kspector@cooley.com)
`LIZ SANCHEZ SANTIAGO (333789)
`(lsanchezsantiago@cooley.com)
`3 Embarcadero Center, 20th Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94111-4004
`Telephone:
`+1 415 693 2000
`Facsimile:
`+1 415 693 2222
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`GOOGLE LLC
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`SAN JOSE DIVISION
`
`JOSEPH TAYLOR, EDWARD MLAKAR,
`MICK CLEARY, EUGENE ALVIS, and
`JENNIFER NELSON, individually and on
`behalf of all others similarly situated,
`
`Case No. 5:20-cv-07956-VKD
`
`GOOGLE LLC’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
`
`v.
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`Defendant.
`
`Date:
`Time:
`Judge:
`
`
`March 29, 2022
`10:00 a.m.
`Hon. Virginia K. DeMarchi
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`GOOGLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ FAC
`CASE NO. 5:20-CV-07956-VKD
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`COOLEY LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`SAN FRANCISCO
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`
`
`Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 65 Filed 01/31/22 Page 2 of 25
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`Page
`
`
`
`NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS ................................................................. 1
`STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT ........................................................................................... 1
`STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED ............................................................................. 1
`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITY ................................................................... 1
`I.
`INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................... 1
`II.
`BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................... 3
`A.
`The Android Operating System. ................................................................. 3
`B.
`The Google Terms and Policies. ................................................................. 3
`C.
`Procedural History. ..................................................................................... 4
`D.
`Plaintiffs’ Current Allegations. ................................................................... 6
`LEGAL STANDARD ................................................................................................... 7
`III.
`IV. ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................. 7
`A.
`Plaintiffs Have Failed to State a Claim for Conversion. ............................. 7
`1.
`The FAC offers no new allegations to alter the Court’s
`holding that cellular data allowances are not personal
`property. .......................................................................................... 8
`Plaintiffs have not alleged the remaining elements of
`conversion. .................................................................................... 11
`a.
`No interference. ................................................................. 11
`b.
`No damages. ...................................................................... 13
`c.
`Plaintiffs’ conversion claim fails because they
`consented to the data transfers at issue. ............................ 14
`Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to Recover in Quantum Meruit. ..................... 16
`1.
`The Court correctly ruled that Plaintiffs’ quantum meruit
`claim is a common count that falls with their conversion
`claim. ............................................................................................. 16
`Even if Plaintiffs’ quantum meruit count were considered
`independently of conversion, it would still fail. ............................ 18
`CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 19
`
`2.
`
`2.
`
`B.
`
`V.
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`COOLEY LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`SAN FRANCISCO
`
`
`
`
`
`i
`
`GOOGLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ FAC
`CASE NO. 5:20-CV-07956-VKD
`
`
`
`Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 65 Filed 01/31/22 Page 3 of 25
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Advanced Engineering Solutions Co., LLC v. Personal Corner, LLC,
`No. CV 20-5955-JFW (PLA), 2021 WL 1502705 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2021) ........................ 19
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) .................................................................................................................. 7
`
`Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly,
`550 U.S. 544 (2007) .................................................................................................................. 7
`
`Boon Rawd Trading Int’l Co. v. Paleewong Trading Co.,
`688 F. Supp. 2d 940 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ...................................................................................... 8
`
`Chen v. Fleetcor Techs., Inc.,
`No. 16-CV-00135-LHK, 2017 WL 1092342 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2017) ............................... 18
`
`E.J. Franks Constr., Inc. v. Sahota,
`226 Cal. App. 4th 1123 (2014).......................................................................................... 18, 19
`
`English & Sons, Inc. v. Straw Hat Restaurants, Inc.,
`176 F. Supp. 3d 904 (N.D. Cal. 2016) .................................................................................... 14
`
`Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Zerin,
`53 Cal. App. 4th 445 (1997)...................................................................................................... 8
`
`Farrington v. A. Teichert & Son, Inc.,
`59 Cal. App. 2d 468 (1943) ................................................................................................. 7, 14
`
`In re Forchion,
`198 Cal. App. 4th 1284 (2011).................................................................................................. 8
`
`Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont Gen. Corp.,
`148 Cal. App. 4th 97 (2007).......................................................................................... 7, 13, 15
`
`French v. Smith Booth User Co.,
`56 Cal. App. 2d 23 (1942) ....................................................................................................... 14
`
`Ikeda v. San Francisco Firemen Credit Union,
`No. 20-cv-08071-TSH, 2021 WL 4776705 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2021)................................... 18
`
`Jogani v. Super. Ct.,
`165 Cal. App. 4th 901 (2008)............................................................................................ 16, 18
`
`Jordan v. Talbot,
`55 Cal. 2d 597 (1961) ....................................................................................................... 11, 12
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`COOLEY LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`SAN FRANCISCO
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`
`
`
`ii
`
`GOOGLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ FAC
`CASE NO. 5:20-CV-07956-VKD
`
`
`
`Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 65 Filed 01/31/22 Page 4 of 25
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page
`
`Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g,
`512 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 2008) ................................................................................................... 19
`
`Levi Strauss & Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
`184 Cal. App. 3d 1479 (1986) ................................................................................................. 15
`
`McBride v. Boughten,
`123 Cal. App. 4th 379 (2004).................................................................................................. 17
`
`McKell v. Wash. Mut., Inc.,
`142 Cal. App. 4th 1457 (2006)................................................................................................ 15
`
`MKB Mgm’t, Inc. v. Melikian,
`184 Cal. App. 4th 796 (2010).................................................................................................. 16
`
`Monster Energy Co. v. Vital Pharms., Inc.,
`No. EDCV 18-1882 JGB (SHKx), 2019 WL 2619666 (C.D. Cal. May 20,
`2019) ......................................................................................................................................... 8
`
`Moore v. Regents of Univ. Cal.,
`51 Cal. 3d 120 (1990) ....................................................................................................... 11, 15
`
`Navarro v. Block,
`250 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2001) ..................................................................................................... 7
`
`PCO, Inc. v. Christen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP,
`150 Cal. App. 4th 384 (2007).................................................................................................. 13
`
`In re S and B Surgery Center,
`No. 20-56171, 2021 WL 4706214 (9th Cir. Oct. 8, 2021) ...................................................... 17
`
`San Joaquin Light & Power Corp. v. Costaloupes,
`96 Cal. App. 322 (1929) .......................................................................................................... 10
`
`In re Section 1031 Exch. Litig.,
`716 F. Supp. 2d 415 (D.S.C. 2010) ........................................................................................... 8
`
`Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,
`578 U.S. 330 (2016) ................................................................................................................ 10
`
`Supply Pro Sorbents, LLC v. RingCentral, Inc.,
`No. 16-cv-02113-JSW, 2017 WL 4685705, (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2017), aff’d
`743 F. App’x 124 (9th Cir. 2018) ........................................................................................... 12
`
`Sutherland v. Francis,
`No. 12-CV-05110-LHK, 2013 WL 2558169 (N.D. Cal. 2013) .............................................. 18
`
`COOLEY LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`SAN FRANCISCO
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`GOOGLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ FAC
`CASE NO. 5:20-CV-07956-VKD
`
`
`
`Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 65 Filed 01/31/22 Page 5 of 25
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(continued)
`
`Page
`
`Terrace Water Co. v. San Antonio Light & Power Co.,
`1 Cal. App. 511 (1905) ............................................................................................................ 10
`
`Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A.,
`140 S. Ct. 1615 (2020) ............................................................................................................ 10
`
`Virtanen v. O’Connell,
`140 Cal. App. 4th 688 (2006).................................................................................................... 7
`
`Wade v. Sw. Bank,
`211 Cal. App. 2d 392 (1962) ................................................................................................... 14
`
`Warth v. Seldin,
`422 U.S. 490 (1975) ................................................................................................................ 10
`
`Worldwide Travel, Inc. v. Travelmate US, Inc.,
`No. 14-cv-00155-BAS (DHB), 2015 WL 1013704 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2015) ........................ 15
`
`In re Yahoo Mail Litig.,
`7 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ...................................................................................... 15
`
`Zaslow v. Kroenert,
`29 Cal. 2d 541 (1946) ............................................................................................................. 12
`
`Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp.,
`552 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2009) ................................................................................................... 19
`
`Statutes
`
`Cal. Civ. Code § 3336 ............................................................................................................. 13, 14
`
`Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) .................................................................................. 1, 7
`
`Other Authorities
`
`3 California Torts § 40.48(2) (2019) ............................................................................................. 14
`
`4 Witkin Cal. Proc. 6th Plead § 572 (2021) .................................................................................. 16
`
`5 Witkin, Summary 11th Torts § 810 (2020) .................................................................... 11, 12, 13
`
`1 Corbin on Contracts (rev. ed. 1993) § 1.18 ................................................................................ 18
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`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`SAN FRANCISCO
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`iv
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`GOOGLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ FAC
`CASE NO. 5:20-CV-07956-VKD
`
`
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`Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 65 Filed 01/31/22 Page 6 of 25
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`NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS
`
`TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD
`
`PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on March 29, 2022, at 10:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter
`
`as the motion may be heard, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
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`California, Defendant Google LLC (“Google”) will move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended
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`Complaint (“FAC”). Google’s Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) is made pursuant to Federal Rules
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`of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the accompanying
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`Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Google’s simultaneously filed Request for Judicial Notice,
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`the Declaration of Kelsey Spector in support of Google’s prior Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’
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`Complaint and the exhibits thereto, (see ECF No. 33-1 (“Spector Decl.”) & ECF Nos. 33-2-33-6)),
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`all pleadings and papers on file in this matter, and such matters as may be presented to the Court at
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`the time of the hearing or otherwise.
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`STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
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`Google requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs’ FAC in its entirety and with prejudice for
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`failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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`12(b)(6).
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`STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED
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`1.
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`Whether Plaintiffs have stated a cause of action for conversion where (a) this Court
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`has already held Plaintiffs do not have a cognizable property interest in their cellular data
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`allowances, (b) Plaintiffs fail to allege any interference with that purported interest or resulting
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`damage, and (c) Google disclosed and Plaintiffs consented to the challenged conduct.
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`2.
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`Whether Plaintiffs have stated a common count for quantum meruit where (a) that
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`claim is derivative of Plaintiffs’ conversion claim, and (b) Plaintiffs fail to allege the parties
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`understood Google would pay Plaintiffs for cellular data transmissions from their Android devices.
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`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITY
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
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`Plaintiffs’ FAC fails to cure the fundamental deficiencies that led this Court to dismiss their
`
`Complaint the first time. Like before, Plaintiffs allege that their cell phones, which run on the
`
`COOLEY LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`SAN FRANCISCO
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`
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`1
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`GOOGLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ FAC
`CASE NO. 5:20-CV-07956-VKD
`
`
`
`Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 65 Filed 01/31/22 Page 7 of 25
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`Android operating system, function by communicating with Google’s servers over cellular
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`networks at times when users are not “actively” engaged with their device. But Plaintiffs offer no
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`new allegations that can demonstrate that these data transfers entitle them to recover under the
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`conversion and quantum meruit claims this Court previously rejected.
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`First, as this Court previously held, Plaintiffs do not have a personal property interest in
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`their cellular data allowances, which are contractual rights to receive a service that is not exclusive
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`to any one user. Because there are no new facts that could change that conclusion, Plaintiffs instead
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`offer a series of cosmetic revisions in the FAC, including a change to the verbiage used to describe
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`Plaintiffs’ purported property interest and the introduction of a new Plaintiff who has a pay-per-
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`gigabyte plan. These allegations, however, do not change the fundamental nature of Plaintiffs’
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`cellular data plans. Nor do Plaintiffs’ new allegations analogizing their cellular data allowances to
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`utilities, which merely rehash Plaintiffs’ prior failed legal arguments made when opposing
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`Google’s prior motion to dismiss. The Court rejected that argument before and should do so again.1
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`Second, in response to this Court’s prior holding that cellular data plans do not constitute
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`property, Plaintiffs pivot and focus their FAC on their quantum meruit count, contending that this
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`claim survives independent of their conversion claim. But this too fails to save Plaintiffs’ FAC.
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`As this Court already held, Plaintiffs’ quantum meruit claim, as a common count under California
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`law, falls alongside their conversion claim because it is based on the same facts and seeks the same
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`recovery. The FAC offers no new facts that could change that conclusion. Moreover, even if the
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`quantum meruit claim could be considered on its own, it would still fail because Plaintiffs have not
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`alleged that Google and Plaintiffs understood Google would pay Plaintiffs for data transmissions
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`occurring over cellular data.
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`In sum, Plaintiffs’ FAC suffers from the same basic defects of their original Complaint.
`
`That is no surprise, as the Court itself expressed skepticism that Plaintiffs could cure those
`
`
`1 For these reasons, Plaintiffs again have failed to demonstrate any property interest in their cellular
`data plans, which is sufficient reason to dispose of their conversion claim for a second time. But
`should the Court reach the remaining elements of Plaintiffs’ conversion claim, Plaintiffs have failed
`to demonstrate those elements are satisfied either, as explained in Google’s original Motion to
`Dismiss and as explained again here for convenience.
`
`
`
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`2
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`GOOGLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ FAC
`CASE NO. 5:20-CV-07956-VKD
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`Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 65 Filed 01/31/22 Page 8 of 25
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`deficiencies when granting Plaintiffs leave to amend. The Court should not grant Plaintiffs a third
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`bite at the apple and should dismiss their FAC with prejudice.
`
`II.
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`BACKGROUND
`
`A.
`
`The Android Operating System.2
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`Google operates the Android operating system for mobile devices, which supports software
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`applications and other modern smartphone functions. (FAC ¶¶ 17, 25.) To enable these features,
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`Android devices are in regular communication with Google via the Internet. (FAC ¶ 55; Spector
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`Decl., Ex. B at 3 (describing “check ins” between Android devices and Google’s servers aimed as
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`confirming device health and providing security updates, bug fixes, new content, and other data).)
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`These data transfers happen automatically as part of the day-to-day functioning of Android devices.
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`Additionally, many of the mobile applications (“apps”) that run on Android also must
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`communicate with Google servers. For example, the Gmail app must communicate with Google
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`servers to send and receive emails, and Chrome must communicate with Google servers to “check
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`for updates” and to “validate the current time.” (FAC ¶ 58; see also Spector Decl., Exs. B at 3, E
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`at 2.) Further, third-party applications that run on the Android operating system rely on Android’s
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`services, and these application-related data exchanges are also handled by the Android operating
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`system. (FAC ¶ 52.)
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`Transmissions of data from Android devices can occur over Wi-Fi networks when a Wi-Fi
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`network is available and the device is connected. Otherwise, when a user is not connected to Wi-
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`Fi, data will generally be transmitted over cellular data networks, pursuant to a user’s cellular data
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`plan. (FAC ¶ 29.) For example, a user may receive a security patch from Google, even while out
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`for the day and not connected to Wi-Fi, or may get routing information in Google Maps, even while
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`driving. (See id. ¶¶ 29, 55, 57.) Some users do not regularly connect their Android devices to Wi-
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`Fi networks at all, instead relying on their cellular data networks. (Cf. id. ¶ 30.)
`
`B.
`
`The Google Terms and Policies.
`
`That Android devices communicate with Google is no secret. Google expressly discloses
`
`
`2 While Google recognizes the Court is already familiar with the facts of this case, see ECF No. 51,
`Google repeats the basic background facts for context.
`
`
`
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`3
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`GOOGLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ FAC
`CASE NO. 5:20-CV-07956-VKD
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`SAN FRANCISCO
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`Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 65 Filed 01/31/22 Page 9 of 25
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`as much, which Plaintiffs acknowledge. (FAC ¶ 53 (admitting that Android users must enter
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`various agreements with Google to use Android and other Google services).) Specifically, among
`
`other contracts, Plaintiffs and other users agree to the Terms of Service, the Managed Google Play
`
`Agreement, and the Google Play Terms of Service, and Google also presents users with its Privacy
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`Policy and the Google Chrome Privacy Notice (collectively, “the Terms and Policies”). (Id. ¶ 54.)
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`The Terms and Policies contain a number of provisions and disclosures regarding the transfer of
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`data between Android devices and Google, none of which require Google to wait until the user is
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`connected to Wi-Fi for the transfer to occur. Examples include:
`
` “If you’re using an Android device with Google apps, your device periodically
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`contacts Google servers to provide information about your device and connection to
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`our services. This information includes things like your device type, carrier name,
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`crash reports, and which apps you’ve installed.” (Spector Decl., Ex. B at 3; see also
`
`FAC ¶ 55.)
`
` “We collect information about the apps, browsers, and devices you use to access
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`Google services . . . . We collect this information when a Google service on your
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`device contacts our servers—for example, . . . when a service checks for automatic
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`updates.” (Spector Decl., Ex. B at 3; see also FAC ¶ 55.)
`
` “Chrome periodically sends information to Google to check for updates, get
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`connectivity status, validate the current time, and estimate the number of active
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`users.” (Spector Decl., Ex. E at 2; see also FAC ¶ 58.)
`
` “[U]sage statistics and crash reports are sent to Google to help us improve our
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`products.” (Spector Decl., Ex. E at 3; see also FAC ¶ 58.)
`
` “You may incur access or data fees from third parties (such as Your internet or
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`mobile carrier) in connection with Your use of Applications and Service. You are
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`responsible for all such fees.” (Spector Decl., Ex. C at 6.)
`
`C.
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`Procedural History.
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`In their original Complaint, Plaintiffs Taylor, Mlakar, Cleary, and Alvis—four individuals
`
`who use Android cell phones—alleged that Google stole their cellular data allowances when their
`
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`COOLEY LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`SAN FRANCISCO
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`4
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`GOOGLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ FAC
`CASE NO. 5:20-CV-07956-VKD
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`Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 65 Filed 01/31/22 Page 10 of 25
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`Android devices transmitted information to Google servers over cellular networks at times when
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`they were not “actively” using their devices. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 32, 65-66.) Plaintiffs asserted claims
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`for conversion and quantum meruit. (Id. ¶¶ 62-74.)
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`Google moved to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety, which the Court granted on October
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`1, 2021. (See generally ECF No. 51.) Regarding the conversion claim, the Court found that
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`Plaintiffs lack a property interest in their cellular data plans, explaining as follows:
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`[A] data allowance provides subscribers, such as plaintiffs, with a
`contractual right of access to a service, i.e., access to a service
`provider’s cellular data network that enables users to send and
`receive information over the internet without a Wi-Fi connection. . . .
`[T]hat right of access is not exclusive of others’ right of access to the
`same network, and no subscriber possesses or controls a particular
`byte or bytes of data in the network. . . .Thus, while plaintiffs assert
`that their service provider contracts give them a possessory interest
`in cellular data that exists independent of the contacts, the
`complaint’s allegations indicate that plaintiffs’ purported property
`right in purchased data allowances is a right to obtain services
`conferred by their contracts with the service providers.
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`(Id. at 9-10 (quotations and citations omitted).) Because cellular data allowances are not “personal
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`property” but rather contractual rights, the Court dismissed the conversion claim as a matter of law.
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`(Id. at 13.) The Court did not reach Google’s remaining arguments for why Plaintiffs’ conversion
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`claim fails as the Court’s finding on Plaintiffs’ lack of a property interest was dispositive. (Id.)
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`Further, while the Court granted leave to amend, it expressed skepticism that Plaintiffs could
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`successfully amend to state the facts needed to support a conversion claim: “Plaintiffs have not
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`articulated any additional facts that could be alleged on an amendment to support a plausible claim
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`for conversion. For the reasons stated above, the Court doubts whether they can do so.” (Id. at 15.)
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`The Court next held that Plaintiffs’ common count of quantum meruit claim fell alongside
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`their conversion claim. (See ECF No. 51 at 13-14.) For context, Google had argued that Plaintiffs’
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`quantum meruit claim—as a common count under California law—failed along with the conversion
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`claim because it relied on the same facts (the alleged use of cellular data) and sought the same
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`recovery (the value of that cellular data) as did their conversion claim. (ECF No. 33 at 19.) In their
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`opposition, Plaintiffs did not contest that quantum meruit is a common count or meaningfully
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`contest this characterization of their quantum meruit claim. (ECF No. 39 at 27-28; ECF No. 51 at
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`COOLEY LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`SAN FRANCISCO
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`5
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`GOOGLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ FAC
`CASE NO. 5:20-CV-07956-VKD
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`Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 65 Filed 01/31/22 Page 11 of 25
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`14-15.) At oral argument, however, Plaintiffs argued that their quantum meruit theory entitles them
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`to recover not just the value of their cellular data allowances (the same remedy sought on their
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`conversion claim) but also the value of the personal data contained in the alleged passive transfers.
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`(See ECF No. 51 at14-15.) The Court rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments across the board. Applying
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`the standard for common counts, the Court held the quantum meruit theory failed because it
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`“indisputably is based on all the same facts as the conversion claim” and “appears to seek precisely
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`the same monetary recovery.” (See ECF No. 51 at 14-15.) Further, the Court held there was no
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`support in the Complaint or Plaintiffs’ opposition for the theory that Plaintiffs were entitled to
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`recover the purported value of their personal data and barred Plaintiffs from pursuing any such
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`theory in their FAC. (See id. at 15.) Given its ruling, the Court did not reach Google’s additional
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`arguments that Plaintiffs’ quantum meruit claim would still fail even if it could survive
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`independently. (See id. at 13-14.)
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`D.
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`Plaintiffs’ Current Allegations.
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`Plaintiffs’ FAC largely repeats the same allegations that this Court previously found
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`insufficient to state a claim for relief. Specifically, Plaintiffs are individuals who use cell phones
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`that run on the Android operating system and who contracted with various providers to receive
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`cellular data services: Plaintiff Taylor purchased a monthly unlimited data plan from Metro by T-
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`Mobile; Plaintiff Mlakar purchased a monthly unlimited plan from Sprint; Plaintiff Cleary
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`purchased a monthly unlimited plan from Verizon; Plaintiff Alvis purchased a monthly limited plan
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`from Verizon; and Plaintiff Nelson, a new addition to this case, purchased a pay-per-gigabyte plan
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`from Spectrum Mobile. (FAC ¶¶ 12-16.) Plaintiffs Taylor, Mlakar, and Cleary—by virtue of
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`having an unlimited plan—have no caps on their data usage and incur no additional charges based
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`on the volume of data they use. (Id. ¶ 31.) Plaintiff Alvis is subject to a limit on his monthly data
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`usage and has changed that limit “from time to time.” (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff Nelson pays a fixed
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`price for each gigabyte of data she uses and is charged for an additional gigabyte each time she
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`exceeds the prior gigabyte of data. (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiffs allege their “cellular data” is property that
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`Google tortiously converts when Plaintiffs’ Android devices transmit data to Google over cellular
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`networks. (Id. ¶¶ 100-104.) Like before, no Plaintiff alleges that these data transfers ever interfered
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`COOLEY LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`SAN FRANCISCO
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`6
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`GOOGLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ FAC
`CASE NO. 5:20-CV-07956-VKD
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`
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`Case 5:20-cv-07956-VKD Document 65 Filed 01/31/22 Page 12 of 25
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`with the use of their devices or data plans, or that they were charged more due to the alleged
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`“conversion.”
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`The FAC also introduces a few categories of nominally new allegations. First, Plaintiffs
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`introduce Plaintiff Nelson and describe how her data plan differs from the other Plaintiffs’. (FAC
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`¶¶ 16, 31.) Second, Plaintiffs change the nomenclature they use to refer to their “property interest”
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`from one in “cellular data allowances” to one in “cellular data.” (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 6-7.) Third,
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`Plaintiffs introduce new allegations that analogize their cellular data allowances to utilities in an
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`attempt to show they have a property interest. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 53-76.) Fourth, Plaintiffs contend their
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`quantum meruit claim is not a common count and does not depend on a viable conversion claim.
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`(See id. ¶¶ 3, 5, 10, 77-83.) Fifth, Plaintiffs introduce allegations purporting to show Google
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`benefits from the data transfers at issue. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 51-52.) For the reasons given below, these new
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`allegations do not cure the threshold deficiencies that caused Plaintiffs’ original Complaint to fail.
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`III. LEGAL STANDARD
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`To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that
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`is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Threadbare recitals
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`of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to
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`save a claim from dismissal. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Where “there is no
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`cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal
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`theory,” the claim must be dismissed. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).
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`IV. ARGUMENT
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`A.
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`Plaintiffs Have Failed to State a Claim for Conversion.
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`To plead conversion, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) the plaintiff’s ownership or right of
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`possession of personal property; (2) the defendant’s disposition of the property in a manner that is
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`inconsistent with the plaintiff’s property rights; and (3) resulting damages.” Fremont Indem. Co.
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`v. Fremont Gen. Corp., 148 Cal. App. 4th 97, 119 (2007). A plaintiff must also show that they did
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`not consent to the alleged conduct, as consent defeats a conversion claim. See, e.g., Virtanen v.
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`O’Connell, 140 Cal. App. 4th 688, 716-17 (2006); Farrington v. A. Teichert & Son, Inc., 59 Cal.
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`App. 2d 468, 474 (1943). Plaintiffs’ conversion claim fails at each of these gateways.
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`COOLEY LLP
`ATTORNEYS AT LAW
`SAN FRANCISCO
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`
`
`
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`7
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`GOOGLE’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`PLAINTIFFS’ FAC
`CASE NO. 5:20-CV-07956-