`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`No. 1:20-cv-02715
`
`Hon. Timothy J. Kelly
`
`Iowa Citizens for Community Improvement, Animal
`Legal Defense Fund, Association of Irritated
`Residents, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy,
`Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., Waterkeepers
`Chesapeake,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`Council on Environmental Quality and
`Mary Neumayr, in her official capacity as
`Chair of the Council on Environmental Quality,
`Defendants,
`American Farm Bureau Federation, American Forest
`Resource Council, American Fuel & Petrochemical
`Manufacturers, American Petroleum Institute,
`American Road & Transportation Builders
`Association, Chamber of Commerce of the United
`States of America, Federal Forest Resource Coalition,
`Interstate Natural Gas Association of America,
`Laborers’ International Union of North America, and
`National Cattlemen’s Beef Association,
`Proposed Intervenors.
`
`MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
`MOTION TO INTERVENE AS DEFENDANTS
`
`Michael B. Kimberly (D.C. Bar. No. 991549)
`Matthew A. Waring (D.C. Bar No. 1021690)
`McDermott Will & Emery LLP
`500 North Capitol Street, NW
`Washington, D.C. 20001
`(202) 756-8000
`
`Counsel for Proposed Intervenors
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02715-TJK Document 16-1 Filed 12/10/20 Page 2 of 18
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Table of Authorities ........................................................................................................................ ii
`Introduction ......................................................................................................................................1
`Background ......................................................................................................................................2
`Legal Standard .................................................................................................................................4
`Argument .........................................................................................................................................5
`A. The Proposed Intervenors are entitled to intervene as of right. .....................................5
`B. Alternatively, the Proposed Intervenors should be allowed to intervene
`permissively .................................................................................................................11
`C. Conditions for Plaintiffs’ non-opposition ....................................................................12
`Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................13
`
`
`
`i
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02715-TJK Document 16-1 Filed 12/10/20 Page 3 of 18
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`Alphapointe v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,
`2019 WL 7290853 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2019) ..............................................................................9
`Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA,
`278 F.R.D. 98 (M.D. Pa. 2011) ..................................................................................................8
`Amador Cty., Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,
`772 F.3d 901 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ...................................................................................................5
`California v. Bureau of Land Mgm’t,
`2018 WL 3439453 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2018) ............................................................................6
`California v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,
`381 F. Supp. 3d 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2019) .....................................................................................6
`Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
`788 F.3d 312 (D.C. Cir. 2015) .............................................................................................9, 11
`Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co. v. FDIC,
`717 F.3d 189 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ...................................................................................................5
`Dimond v. District of Columbia,
`792 F.2d 179 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ...................................................................................................8
`Eagle Pharm., Inc. v. Price,
`322 F.R.D. 48 (D.D.C. 2017) .....................................................................................................9
`EEOC v. Nat’l Children’s Ctr., Inc.,
`146 F.3d 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1998) .................................................................................................5
`Feller v. Brock,
`802 F.2d 722 (4th Cir. 1986) .....................................................................................................9
`Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Norton,
`322 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ...............................................................................................6, 8
`Georgia v. Wheeler,
`418 F. Supp. 3d 1336 (S.D. Ga. 2019) .....................................................................................11
`Kleppe v. Sierra Club,
`427 U.S. 390 (1976) ...................................................................................................................2
`Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania,
`140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020) ...............................................................................................................5
`California ex rel. Lockyer v. United States,
`450 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 2006) ...................................................................................................10
`McDonald v. E. J. Lavino Co.,
`430 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1970) .................................................................................................12
`N.Y. Pub. Interest Research Grp., Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y.,
`516 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1975)...................................................................................................7, 8
`Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
`894 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2018).........................................................................................................6
`New York v. Abraham,
`204 F.R.D. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) .................................................................................................6
`
`ii
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02715-TJK Document 16-1 Filed 12/10/20 Page 4 of 18
`
`
`Cases—continued
`New York v. Scalia,
`2020 WL 3498755 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2020) ...........................................................................6
`S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt,
`2018 WL 2184395 (D.S.C. May 11, 2018)................................................................................6
`Sierra Club v. Espy,
`18 F.3d 1202 (5th Cir. 1994) .....................................................................................................9
`Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg,
`268 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2001) .....................................................................................................9
`Town of Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe Estates, Inc.,
`137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017) ...............................................................................................................5
`United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
`642 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1980) .................................................................................................6
`Utah Ass’n of Ctys. v. Clinton,
`255 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2001) .................................................................................................8
`Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Indian Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,
`2020 WL 1465886 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 2020) .................................................................................6
`Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill,
`139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019) ...............................................................................................................5
`In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig.,
`2001 WL 34088808 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2001).............................................................................5
`Washington All. of Tech. Workers v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
`395 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2019) ...........................................................................................8, 9
`Wildearth Guardians v. Jewel,
`2014 WL 7411857 (D. Ariz. Dec. 31, 2014) .............................................................................6
`Statutes, Rules, and Regulations
`5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq........................................................................................................................4
`42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) ............................................................................................................1, 2, 3
`Fed. R. Civ. P.
`
`24................................................................................................................................................4
`
`24(a) .......................................................................................................................................4, 5
`24(b)(1)(B) .................................................................................................................................5
`24(b)(3) ......................................................................................................................................5
`
`24(c) ...........................................................................................................................................7
`
`40 C.F.R.
`§ 1502.4......................................................................................................................................3
`§ 1502.7......................................................................................................................................3
`§ 1502.14–.16.............................................................................................................................3
`§ 1502.19....................................................................................................................................3
`§ 1503.1......................................................................................................................................3
`§ 1505.2......................................................................................................................................3
`§ 1508.9......................................................................................................................................2
`§ 1508.22....................................................................................................................................3
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iii
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02715-TJK Document 16-1 Filed 12/10/20 Page 5 of 18
`
`
`Statutes, Rules, and Regulations—continued
`83 Fed. Reg. 28,591 (June 20, 2018) ...............................................................................................4
`85 Fed. Reg. 1,684 (January 10, 2020) ............................................................................................4
`85 Fed. Reg. 43,304 (July 16, 2020) ..................................................................................1, 3, 7, 10
`
`Other Authorities
`Juliet Eilperin & Felicia Sonmez, Trump scales back landmark environmental law, saying it
`will help restart the economy, Wash. Post., July 15, 2020 ......................................................11
`National Environmental Policy Act, GAO-14-370 (April 2014) .....................................................3
`
`
`iv
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02715-TJK Document 16-1 Filed 12/10/20 Page 6 of 18
`
`
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`The complaint in this case challenges a final rule of the Council on Environmental Quality
`(CEQ) titled “Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National
`Environmental Policy Act,” and published at 85 Fed. Reg. 43,304 (July 16, 2020). The rule became
`effective on September 14, 2020. See id. This rule (the “NEPA Rule”) updates and streamlines
`CEQ’s implementing regulations for the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which re-
`quires federal agencies to evaluate the environmental impact of “major Federal actions signifi-
`cantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Federal actions
`covered by NEPA often include federal permitting decisions under separate and distinct laws like
`the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act.
`Over the years, NEPA reviews have become increasingly burdensome, expensive, and
`time-consuming to prepare, ultimately impeding business operations and development projects
`across the nation. The NEPA Rule addresses this problem by clarifying the requirements for NEPA
`review and the scope of relevant considerations, improving coordination among agencies involved
`in reviewing a single federal project, and providing for more orderly public input.
`The Proposed Intervenors are nine national trade associations and a leading North Ameri-
`can labor union: the American Farm Bureau Federation, American Forest Resource Council,
`American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, American Petroleum Institute, American Road &
`Transportation Builders Association, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America,
`Federal Forest Resource Coalition, Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, Laborers’ In-
`ternational Union of North America, and National Cattlemen’s Beef Association. The Proposed
`Intervenors’ members include builders, owners, operators, and employees of agricultural, manu-
`facturing, energy, and infrastructure facilities of all kinds. These organizations frequently engage
`in operations and development projects that require federal permits and thus NEPA reviews.
`The Proposed Intervenors have a significant stake in CEQ’s decision to update its NEPA
`regulations. Under the NEPA Rule, the statute will continue to live up to Congress’s original pur-
`pose of ensuring that federal agencies give “consideration [to] the environmental impact of their
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02715-TJK Document 16-1 Filed 12/10/20 Page 7 of 18
`
`
`
`
`actions in [major] decisionmaking” (Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409 (1976)), while
`providing much needed clarity and stability regarding the scope of review. If plaintiffs here obtain
`a vacatur of the Rule, CEQ’s reform of the NEPA review framework would be undone, and the
`Proposed Intervenors’ members would once again be subject to an uncertain and overly-burden-
`some regulatory scheme that invites obstructive litigation and needlessly delays important projects
`and operations.
`The Proposed Intervenors sought and were granted intervenor status in each of the other
`pending lawsuits challenging the NEPA Rule. See Order Granting Mot. to Intervene, Wild Va. v.
`Council on Envtl. Quality, No. 3:20-cv-45 (W.D. Va. Aug. 31, 2020), ECF No. 72 (one Proposed
`Intervenor did not intervene in this case); Stipulation and Order Regarding Intervention, Envtl.
`Justice Health All. v. Council on Envtl. Quality, No. 1:20-cv-6143 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2020), ECF
`No. 34; Order Granting Mot. to Intervene, Alaska Cmty. Action on Toxics v. Council on Envtl.
`Quality, No. 3:20-cv-5199 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2020), ECF No. 37; Order Granting Mot. to Inter-
`vene, California v. Council on Envtl. Quality, No. 3:20-cv-6057 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2020), ECF
`No. 68. This Court should likewise permit the Proposed Intervenors to intervene as defendants in
`this case. The motion is timely; the Proposed Intervenors have a legal interest in the NEPA Rule,
`which may be impaired if they are denied intervention; and CEQ, as a government entity charged
`with protecting the interests of the public at large, cannot be counted upon to represent the private
`interests of the regulated business community. The Proposed Intervenors thus satisfy all of the
`requirements for intervention as of right and permissively.
`
`BACKGROUND
`NEPA provides that, for any “major Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of
`the human environment,” the federal agencies with jurisdiction over the action must prepare “a
`detailed statement” on “the environmental impact of the proposed action.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
`The first step in this process is an environmental assessment, or EA, which determines whether
`the federal action is “major” and whether it will have a “significant” effect on the environment.
`See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9. If a proposed action meets these requirements, the agency must prepare
`
`
`
`
`2
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02715-TJK Document 16-1 Filed 12/10/20 Page 8 of 18
`
`
`
`
`an environmental impact statement, or EIS. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4.
`Under CEQ regulations first promulgated in 1978, when an agency determines that an EIS
`is required, it must publish a notice of intent in the Federal Register giving the public an oppor-
`tunity to comment. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.22. The EIS, in turn, must contain information on “the envi-
`ronmental impact of the proposed action” and “any adverse environmental effects which cannot
`be avoided should the proposal be implemented.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Historically, the EIS
`must identify and discuss “all reasonable alternatives” to the proposed action (including those not
`within the jurisdiction of the reviewing agency), and explain why the alternatives were not taken.
`See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14–.16, 1502.19. After completing the EIS, which typically takes many
`years to prepare, the agency must take additional comment. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1. This is followed
`by a waiting period and the issuance of a Record of Decision, or ROD. An ROD describes the
`agency’s decision, the alternatives the agency considered, and the agency’s plans for mitigation
`and monitoring of environmental effects, if necessary. 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2.
`Due largely to the risk of litigation and inconsistent judicial interpretations of key NEPA
`terms and requirements, federal agencies have implemented progressively more complex and bur-
`densome requirements under NEPA over the years. When CEQ’s regulations were first promul-
`gated more than 40 years ago, they stated that EISs normally should be less than 150 pages, with
`a maximum length of 300 pages for proposals of “unusual scope or complexity.” 40 C.F.R.
`§ 1502.7. Today, compliance with those limits is the exception rather than the norm. The average
`length for a final EIS now exceeds 650 pages, and a quarter of all final statements exceed 750
`pages. See 85 Fed. Reg. at 43,305. CEQ previously recommended that completing an EIS should
`not take longer than one year; in reality, the average time now approaches five years. Id.; accord
`GAO, National Environmental Policy Act, GAO-14-370, at 14 (April 2014), perma.cc/9UTJ-
`3C4N.
`More fundamentally, agencies undertaking NEPA reviews have gathered and analyzed
`boundless amounts of data and evidence concerning distantly indirect effects for use in analyses
`that have often been irrelevant to their decisionmaking processes, all to minimize the risk that a
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02715-TJK Document 16-1 Filed 12/10/20 Page 9 of 18
`
`
`
`
`court will later find the record insufficient. Along the way, regulated entities have been required
`to produce redundant documents to multiple agencies participating in a largely uncoordinated pro-
`cess. Yet this vast over-inclusion and repetition has not, in fact, reduced the risk of litigation, which
`has persisted in the face of unclear and inconsistent interpretations of terms. Nor has it enhanced
`the quality of agency decisions, because the review process is scattered rather than focused.
`To address these problems, CEQ published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking on
`June 20, 2018 (83 Fed. Reg. 28,591) and a notice of proposed rulemaking on January 10, 2020 (85
`Fed. Reg. 1,684) proposing to “modernize and clarify the CEQ regulations” and “to facilitate more
`efficient, effective, and timely NEPA reviews” by “simplifying regulatory requirements, codifying
`certain guidance and case law relevant to these proposed regulations, revising the regulations to
`reflect current technologies and agency practices, [and] eliminating obsolete provisions.” See 85
`Fed. Reg. at 1,685. CEQ received and considered more than 8,000 unique comments on the NPRM,
`including from each of the Proposed Intervenors. See Yates Decl. (Ex. 1) ¶ 6; Imbergamo Decl.
`(Ex. 2) ¶ 9; Moskowitz Decl. (Ex. 3) ¶ 6; Macchiarola Decl. (Ex. 4) ¶ 6; Goldstein Decl. (Ex. 5)
`¶ 6; Mortimer Decl. (Ex. 6) ¶ 6; Dreskin Decl. (Ex. 7) ¶ 6; Farner Decl. (Ex. 8) ¶ 6; Yager Decl.
`(Ex. 9) ¶ 6.
`CEQ published the final NEPA Rule on July 16, 2020, and it became effective September
`14, 2020. The NEPA Rule reforms the NEPA process in numerous respects, including by clarify-
`ing the proper scope of NEPA reviews, facilitating coordination for reviews involving more than
`one agency, and identifying presumptive page and time limits for reviews.
`Plaintiffs, a group of environmental organizations, filed this lawsuit on September 23,
`2020. Dkt. 1. They allege that the NEPA Rule violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
`5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. See Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 74-98. Plaintiffs ask the Court to set aside the NEPA Rule as
`unlawful and enjoin CEQ from implementing or enforcing it. Id. at p. 32.
`
`LEGAL STANDARD
`Federal Civil Rule 24 provides for intervention as of right and permissively. Under Rule
`24(a), “a district court must grant a motion to intervene [as of right] if the motion is timely, and
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02715-TJK Document 16-1 Filed 12/10/20 Page 10 of 18
`
`
`
`
`the prospective intervenor claims a legally protected interest in the action, and the action threatens
`to impair that interest, unless that interest is adequately represented by existing parties.” Amador
`Cty., Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 772 F.3d 901, 903 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Under current D.C.
`Circuit precedent, an intervenor under Rule 24(a) must also demonstrate that it has Article III
`standing. See, e.g., Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co. v. FDIC, 717 F.3d 189, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2013).1
`A court may alternatively grant permissive intervention by anyone who “has a claim or
`defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
`24(b)(1)(B). Permissive intervention requires “(1) an independent ground for subject matter juris-
`diction; (2) a timely motion; and (3) a claim or defense that has a question of law or fact in common
`with the main action.” EEOC v. Nat’l Children’s Ctr., Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
`The court also “must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudi-
`cation of the original parties’ rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). “The requirements for permis-
`sive intervention are to be construed liberally, with all doubts resolved in favor of permitting in-
`tervention.” In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 2001 WL 34088808, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2001)
`(quotation marks omitted).
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`The Proposed Intervenors are entitled to intervene as of right.
`A.
`The Proposed Intervenors meet all four requirements for intervention as of right under Rule
`24(a): They have concrete economic interests in the regulatory changes at issue in this litigation,
`and CEQ, as an executive branch agency, will not adequately represent those interests or align
`with the Proposed Intervenors’ view of the relevant issues. Courts often allow national trade asso-
`
`
`1 Recent Supreme Court decisions make clear that parties like the Proposed Intervenors, who
`seek to intervene as defendants and do not seek additional relief beyond that sought by the other
`parties, are not required to demonstrate independent Article III standing. See, e.g., Little Sisters of
`the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2379 n.6 (2020) (citing
`Town of Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2017)); Va. House of Dele-
`gates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1951-52 (2019). But the continued viability of circuit prec-
`edent is beside the point here because Proposed Intervenors have standing, as explained below.
`
`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02715-TJK Document 16-1 Filed 12/10/20 Page 11 of 18
`
`
`
`
`ciations to intervene as defendants in APA suits in which the plaintiffs challenge federal regula-
`tions with which the associations’ members must comply. See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Nat’l
`Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 894 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 2018) (noting that trade associations had
`intervened); New York v. Scalia, 2020 WL 3498755, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2020) (granting
`permissive intervention); New York v. Abraham, 204 F.R.D. 62, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting
`permissive intervention); see also, e.g., California v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 381 F. Supp. 3d
`1153, 1158 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (granting intervention to national trade associations and conserva-
`tions associations in an APA case challenging Department of Interior regulations); S.C. Coastal
`Conservation League v. Pruitt, 2018 WL 2184395, at *9 (D.S.C. May 11, 2018) (granting inter-
`vention to several of the Proposed Intervenors in an APA challenge to a federal regulation under
`the Clean Water Act); California v. Bureau of Land Mgm’t, 2018 WL 3439453, at *8 (N.D. Cal.
`July 17, 2018) (granting intervention to national trade associations as defendants in an APA case
`concerning an oil extraction regulation); Wildearth Guardians v. Jewel, 2014 WL 7411857, at *3
`(D. Ariz. Dec. 31, 2014) (granting intervention in an APA challenge to a final agency action under
`the Endangered Species Act).
`The same outcome is warranted here.
`1. The motion is timely. “[T]imeliness is to be judged in consideration of all the circum-
`stances, especially weighing the factors of time elapsed since the inception of the suit, the purpose
`for which intervention is sought, the need for intervention as a means of preserving the applicant’s
`rights, and the probability of prejudice to those already parties in the case.” United States v. Am.
`Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1980); accord, e.g., Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah &
`Ouray Indian Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 2020 WL 1465886, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 5,
`2020) (same).
`These factors indicate straightforwardly that the motion here is timely. This motion has
`been filed less than three months after the commencement of this lawsuit on September 23, 2020.
`There is no risk of prejudice because the case is in its earliest stages, and the government’s motion
`to dismiss remains pending. See Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Norton, 322 F.3d 728, 734-35 (D.C. Cir.
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02715-TJK Document 16-1 Filed 12/10/20 Page 12 of 18
`
`
`
`
`2003) (finding it “not difficult at all” to find timely a motion to intervene filed “less than two
`months after the plaintiffs filed their complaint and before the defendants filed an answer”).2
`2. The Proposed Intervenors have a “legally protected interest” implicated by Plaintiffs’
`challenge to the NEPA Rule. Under this standard, a trade association generally has “a sufficient
`interest to permit it to intervene [when] the validity of a regulation from which its members benefit
`is challenged,” where lifting the regulation “might well lead to significant changes in the profes-
`sion and in the way [the members] conduct their businesses.” N.Y. Pub. Interest Research Grp.,
`Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 516 F.2d 350, 352 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
`That is the case here. The NEPA Rule improves regulatory certainty—and reduces the reg-
`ulatory burden and likelihood of litigation—for the Proposed Intervenors’ members. It does so by
`clarifying NEPA’s key terms, more appropriately calibrating the regulations’ scope to the words
`that Congress used. In addition, the Rule will make NEPA reviews less time consuming, more
`efficient, and less costly by encouraging coordination among agencies involved in a single federal
`project (see 85 Fed. Reg. at 43,325) and setting predictable and enforceable rules concerning time-
`lines and page limits (id. at 43,362-64). It also will eliminate the need to categorize effects as
`“direct” or “indirect” and situate the concept of “cumulative” effects within the proximate cause
`framework, focusing appropriately on whether effects are reasonably foreseeable and have a rea-
`sonably close causal relationship to the proposed action. Id. at 43,343-44.
`All of this together will make NEPA reviews significantly more efficient and less burden-
`some for the Proposed Intervenors’ members, who frequently must participate in the NEPA review
`process in connection with permits for their ongoing operations and development projects. See
`Yates Decl. ¶ 7; Imbergamo Decl. ¶ 10; Moskowitz Decl. ¶ 7; Macchiarola Decl. ¶ 7; Goldstein
`Decl. ¶ 7; Mortimer Decl. ¶ 7; Dreskin Decl. ¶ 7; Farner Decl. ¶¶ 7-13; Yager Decl. ¶¶ 7-9. The
`clarified and simplified procedures under the NEPA Rule will save the Proposed Intervenors’
`
`2 Consistent with Rule 24(c), the Proposed Intervenors attach a response to the complaint. In the
`event the Court grants our motion to intervene and denies the government’s pending motion to
`dismiss in whole or in part, we ask that the Court deem the response filed on the same date that
`the government files its own response to the complaint.
`
`
`
`
`7
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02715-TJK Document 16-1 Filed 12/10/20 Page 13 of 18
`
`
`
`
`members from significant regulatory burdens and obstructive delays that Congress never intended
`them to bear, allowing them to dedicate more of their resources to their businesses—including
`projects like efficient mass transit lines and renewable energy facilities. See Yates Decl. ¶¶ 8-9;
`Imbergamo Decl. ¶¶ 11-12; Moskowitz Decl. ¶¶ 8-9; Macchiarola Decl. ¶¶ 8-9; Goldstein Decl.
`¶¶ 8-9; Mortimer Decl. ¶¶ 8-9; Dreskin Decl. ¶¶ 8-9; Farner Decl. ¶¶ 14-15; Yager Decl. ¶¶ 10-11.
`This sort of direct economic interest in defending a regulation is readily sufficient to sup-
`port intervention. See N.Y. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 516 F.2d at 352; see also, e.g., Washington
`All. of Tech. Workers v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 395 F. Supp. 3d 1, 16, 19-20 (D.D.C. 2019)
`(association had legally protected interest based on potential for “economic harm” to members if
`program at issue were vacated).
`3. The resolution of this case may impair the Proposed Intervenors’ ability to protect their
`interests. “To satisfy this element of the intervention test, a would-be intervenor must show only
`that impairment of its substantial legal interest is possible if intervention is denied. This burden is
`minimal.” Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 278 F.R.D. 98, 108 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (quoting Utah
`Ass’n of Ctys. v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246, 1253 (10th Cir. 2001)).
`Although Plaintiffs here focus their arguments on the NEPA Rule’s effect on one particular
`industry (animal feeding operations), the relief they seek is effectively a complete vacatur of the
`NEPA Rule. If this Court entered a judgment granting that relief, the Proposed Intervenors’ mem-
`bers would remain subject to the prior NEPA regulatory framework and its many burdens. To
`protect their interests, it is essential that the Proposed Intervenors be allowed to participate in this
`case.
`
`4. The Proposed Intervenors cannot rely on CEQ to adequately represent their interests.
`Here, again, “this requirement of the Rule is satisfied if the applicant shows that representation of
`his interest ‘may be’ inadequate; and the burden of making that showing should be treated as
`minimal.” Fund For Animals, Inc., 322 F.3d at 735 (quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g.,
`Dimond v. District of Columbia, 792 F.2d 179, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (explaining that the
`inadequate-representation requirement “is not onerous”).
`
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-02715-TJK Document 16-1 Filed 12/10/20 Page 14 of 18
`
`
`
`
`The D.C. Circuit “look[s] skeptically on government entities serving as adequate advocates
`for private parties.” Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 788 F.3d
`312, 321 (D.C. Cir. 2015). That is for good reason. As a general matter, “the government’s position
`is defined by the public interest,” not just “the interests of a particular group of citizens.” Feller v.
`Brock, 802 F.2d 722, 730 (4th Cir. 1986); accord Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1208 (5th
`Cir. 1994) (“The government must represent the broad public interest, not just the economic
`concerns” of private business interests). Courts thus routinely grant intervention i