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`Case 1:22-cv-00712-APM Document 24 Filed 10/28/22 Page 1 of 39
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
`
`
`FOTOBOM MEDIA, Inc.
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`GOOGLE LLC,
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case No. 22-cv-00712 (APM)
`
`HON. AMIT P. MEHTA
`
`PLAINTIFF FOTOBOM MEDIA, INC.’S OPPOSITION TO
`DEFENDANT GOOGLE LLC’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`
`

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`Case 1:22-cv-00712-APM Document 24 Filed 10/28/22 Page 2 of 39
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii 
`
`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 
`
`BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 3 
`
`LEGAL STANDARD ................................................................................................................... 10 
`
`ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................ 11 
`
`I. 
`
`Fotobom Has Antitrust Standing To Pursue Its Claims .................................................... 11 
`
`II. 
`
`III. 
`
`A. 
`
`B. 
`
`Fotobom Has Antitrust Standing Because It Competes With Google .................. 13 
`
`Fotobom Has Standing Regardless Of Whether It Competes With Google ......... 15 
`
`Fotobom Has Plausibly Alleged Unlawful Exclusive Dealing ......................................... 17 
`
`Fotobom Has Plausibly Alleged Unlawful Tying And Attempted Monopolization ........ 20 
`
`A. 
`
`B. 
`
`Rule 12(g)(2) Procedurally Bars Google’s Arguments For Dismissal ................. 20 
`
`Fotobom Has Plausibly Alleged Unlawful Tying ................................................. 22 
`
`1. 
`
`2. 
`
`Fotobom Has Plausibly Alleged A Per Se Tying Claim........................... 22 
`
`Fotobom Has Plausibly Alleged Tying Under The Rule Of Reason ........ 26 
`
`C. 
`
`Fotobom Has Plausibly Alleged Attempted Monopolization ............................... 27 
`
`IV. 
`
`Fotobom Has Plausibly Alleged Violations of California State Law ............................... 30 
`
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 31 
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`Case 1:22-cv-00712-APM Document 24 Filed 10/28/22 Page 3 of 39
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Adams v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 683 (D.D.C. 1986) ................... 12, 18
`
`*Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Blue Source Grp., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 3d 945 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ..................... 31
`
`Aerotec Int’l, Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 836 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2016) .................................. 26
`
`Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litig., In re, 833 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2016)............................... 12
`
`*Am. Ad Mgmt., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) ....................... 12, 15
`
`Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ........................... 11, 12
`
`Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
`459 U.S. 519 (1983) ................................................................................................................ 11
`
`Barton & Pittinos, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 118 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 1997) .................. 15
`
`Beverly v. Network Sols., Inc., 1998 WL 917526 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 1998) ............................... 30
`
`*Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982) .......................................................................... 15
`
`Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., 675 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2012) ................................................. 27
`
`*Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007) ....................................... 28, 29
`
`Brown v. Gov’t of Dist. of Columbia, 390 F. Supp. 3d 114 (D.D.C. 2019) .................................. 29
`
`Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977) ..................................... 11, 14
`
`Carpet Grp. Int’l v. Oriental Rug Importers Ass’n, Inc., 227 F.3d 62 (3d Cir. 2000) .................. 15
`
`Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527 (Cal. 1999) ............... 30
`
`City of Las Cruces v. Lofts at Alameda, LLC, --- F. Supp. 3d ---,
`2022 WL 715124 (D.N.M. Mar. 10, 2022) ............................................................................. 21
`
`*Collins Inkjet Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 781 F.3d 264 (6th Cir. 2015) ................................ 26
`
`Crimpers Promotions Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 724 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1983) ..................... 16
`
`Cyntegra, Inc. v. IDEXX Labs., Inc., 322 F. App’x 569 (9th Cir. 2009) ...................................... 12
`
`*Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 60 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1995) ....................................... 25
`
`- ii -
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`Case 1:22-cv-00712-APM Document 24 Filed 10/28/22 Page 4 of 39
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`*Dealer Mgmt. Sys. Antitrust Litig., In re 313 F. Supp. 3d 931 (N.D. Ill. 2018) ................... 17, 18
`
`Doctor’s Hosp. v. Se. Med. Alliance, Inc., 123 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 1997) ..................................... 18
`
`Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1984) ......................... 29
`
`*E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 637 F.3d 435 (4th Cir. 2011) ......................... 20
`
`Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) .................................. 22, 25
`
`Eastman v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 2015 WL 7566805 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2015) .................... 20
`
`EpiPen (Epinephrine Injection, USP) Mktg., Sales Practices & Antitrust Litig., In re,
`2017 WL 6524839 (D. Kan. Dec. 21, 2017) ........................................................................... 20
`
`Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 559 F. Supp. 3d 898 (N.D. Cal. 2021) ....................................... 30
`
`Falcon v. City Univ. of N.Y., 2016 WL 3920223 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2016) ................................ 21
`
`Gary v. Hladik Onorato & Federman, LLP, 509 F. Supp. 3d 368 (W.D. Pa. 2020) .................... 21
`
`GCL, LLC v. Schwab, 2012 WL 4321972 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2012) ........................................... 21
`
`Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2015).................. 15
`
`Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1977) ................................ 26
`
`Hill v. A-T-O, Inc., 535 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1976) ........................................................................ 23
`
`Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) ......................................................... 22
`
`*Iskander v. Laugh Factory, Inc., 2020 WL 2114939 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2020) ....................... 31
`
`Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) ....................................................... 22
`
`Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colleges, 300 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2004) ................................... 10
`
`*Keurig Green Mountain Single-Serve Coffee Antitrust Litig., In re,
`383 F. Supp. 3d 187 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) ............................................................................... 14, 17
`
`Kim v. United States, 707 F.3d 335 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ................................................................... 21
`
`Leyse v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Ass’n, 804 F.3d 316 (3d Cir. 2015) ................................................... 20
`
`*Luxpro Corp. v. Apple Inc., 2011 WL 1086027 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2011) ............................... 31
`
`Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948) .......................... 12
`
`MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983) ........................................... 14
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`- iii -
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`Case 1:22-cv-00712-APM Document 24 Filed 10/28/22 Page 5 of 39
`
`*Methodist Health Servs. Corp. v. OSF Healthcare Sys.,
`2016 WL 5817176 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2016) ......................................................................... 19
`
`Momento, Inc. v. Seccion Amarilla USA,
`2009 WL 10696217 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2009) ......................................................... 10, 28, 30
`
`*Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207 (9th Cir. 1977) ............................................ 23
`
`N.Y. Rehabilitation Care Mgmt., LLC v. NLRB, 506 F.3d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ....................... 12
`
`Niantic, Inc. v. Global++, 2020 WL 8620002 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2020) .................................... 21
`
`Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Boatright R.R. Prods., Inc.,
`2019 WL 4455995 (N.D. Ala. May 23, 2019) ........................................................................ 21
`
`NorthBay Healthcare Grp., Inc. v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc.,
`838 F. App’x 231 (9th Cir. 2020) ........................................................................................... 16
`
`Norwest Mortg., Inc. v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 4th 214 (1999) ......................................... 31
`
`*Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 505 F.3d 302 (4th Cir. 2007) ....................................... 12, 14, 16
`
`Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 740 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1984) .......................................................... 16
`
`*Packaging Sys., Inc. v. PRC-Desoto Int’l., Inc., 268 F. Supp. 3d 1071 (C.D. Cal. 2017) .......... 30
`
`Paladin Assocs., Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2003) .................................. 23
`
`Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) ................................................................... 14
`
`Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., In re, 587 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2008) .............. 10
`
`RealPage, Inc. v. Yardi Sys., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (C.D. Cal. 2012) .................................. 25
`
`Rutherford v. Palo Verde Healthcare Dist.,
`2014 WL 12631845 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2014) ...................................................................... 21
`
`Sanner v. Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago, 62 F.3d 918 (7th Cir. 1995) ...................................... 16
`
`Silverman v. Wells Fargo & Co., 2018 WL 6046209 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2018) ........................ 31
`
`Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993) ..................................................... 27, 28
`
`Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) .............................................................. 17
`
`*Teradata Corp. v. SAP SE, 2018 WL 6528009 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2018) ................................ 26
`
`*Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O. Finley & Co.,
`676 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1982) .......................................................................................... 19, 27
`
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`Case 1:22-cv-00712-APM Document 24 Filed 10/28/22 Page 6 of 39
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`*United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ............................ 14, 17, 18, 23, 27, 28
`
`Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 2020) .................................................. 26
`
`Wafra Leasing Corp. 1999-A-1 v. Prime Cap. Corp.,
`247 F. Supp. 2d 987 (N.D. Ill. 2002) ...................................................................................... 21
`
`*Xerox v. Media Scis. Int’l., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 2d 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ..................................... 17
`
`ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012) .................................................... 19
`
`Statutes
`
`15 U.S.C. § 6a ............................................................................................................................... 17
`
`Rules
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)................................................................................................................. 10
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2)................................................................................................... 2, 3, 20, 21
`
`Other Materials
`
`John Battelle, The Search (2005) .................................................................................................. 14
`
`IIA Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law (5th ed. 2022) .......................... 11-12
`
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`Case 1:22-cv-00712-APM Document 24 Filed 10/28/22 Page 7 of 39
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`INTRODUCTION
`
`
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`Google provides the most used search engine by far – garnering upwards of 90 percent of
`
`all search traffic in the United States and an even greater portion of mobile search traffic.
`
`Google’s efforts to grow and maintain its monopoly search position are the subject of an antitrust
`
`enforcement action before this Court brought by the U.S. Department of Justice and 15 states.
`
`See United States v. Google LLC, No. 20-3010, ECF No. 94 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 15, 2021)
`
`(“United States v. Google, Am. Compl.”). Those efforts have also led to $5 billion in fines by
`
`the European Commission. The heart of those suits and this suit is Google’s use of exclusionary
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`contracts to control “search access points” – the apps that direct queries to a search engine (like
`
`web browsers). Google’s contracts force mobile device manufacturers and carriers to preload
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`Google’s versions of search access points (like the web browser Google Chrome) as the default
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`so that Google can funnel search traffic to its own search engine.
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`
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`Plaintiff Fotobom Media, Inc. is a direct victim of Google’s efforts. Fotobom offers a
`
`smart keyboard app for mobile devices with enhanced functionality like predictive text and,
`
`importantly, search functionality that can direct users to content based on what they are typing.
`
`Google feared that smart keyboards like Fotobom’s may be “the next big search access point”
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`that could be a “[b]ridge” to rival search engines. United States v. Google, Am. Compl. ¶ 151.
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`Google has thus used its contracts with mobile manufacturers and carriers to ensure that upstart
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`search access points like Fotobom’s keyboard do not gain traction. See id. ¶¶ 80, 151. Google’s
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`actions have successfully foreclosed Fotobom’s efforts to distribute its product. As Fotobom
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`was preparing to launch its keyboard as the preloaded default on millions of mobile devices in a
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`partnership with América Móvil, Google threatened to “penalize[]” América Móvil for purported
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`violations of an “agreement” between Google and América Móvil that required “preload[ing]
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`[of] Google’s keyboard.” América Móvil then backed away from the partnership.
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`Case 1:22-cv-00712-APM Document 24 Filed 10/28/22 Page 8 of 39
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`Google’s efforts to obtain dismissal of Fotobom’s claims lack merit.
`
`I.
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`Google argues that Fotobom lacks standing because it is not a competitor or
`
`consumer in any relevant market. Both the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit have rejected
`
`Google’s proposed “competitor or consumer” test. Antitrust standing also exists for plaintiffs
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`(like Fotobom) who have suffered injury to their business where that injury was the means by
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`which a monopolist (like Google) pursued its anticompetitive goals. Even if Google’s
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`“competitor or consumer” test were the correct one, Fotobom would still have standing because
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`it competes with Google on certain niche searches, where Fotobom’s keyboard suggests content.
`
`
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`II.
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`Google contends that its exclusionary contracts do not foreclose substantial
`
`competition in the general search market. Fotobom, however, also alleges substantial
`
`foreclosure of competition in the Android keyboard market; Google provides no basis to dismiss
`
`that theory. Moreover, Fotobom – like the Department of Justice – has alleged substantial
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`foreclosure in the general search market. Google’s exclusionary contracts ensure that mobile
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`devices use search access points (almost always from Google) that direct search traffic to Google
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`rather than its rivals. Google did not seek to dismiss the Department of Justice’s parallel
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`government enforcement action on this basis, and it has no valid basis to do so here.
`
`
`
`III.
`
`In its second motion to dismiss, Google raises new arguments for dismissing
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`Fotobom’s tying and attempted monopolization claims that could have been raised in its earlier
`
`motion to dismiss. Rule 12(g)(2) procedurally bars these arguments, which also have no merit.
`
`
`
`For tying, Fotobom makes well-pleaded factual allegations of coercion. Google
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`conditions access to necessary APIs and must-have Google apps on manufacturers’ agreement to
`
`preload Google’s keyboard, Gboard. That tie is reinforced by the “club” of certification: Google
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`deploys opaque requirements to block release of devices that preload competing keyboard apps.
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`Case 1:22-cv-00712-APM Document 24 Filed 10/28/22 Page 9 of 39
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`For attempted monopolization, Fotobom makes well-pleaded factual allegations of a dangerous
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`probability that Google will monopolize the Android keyboard market: Google already has more
`
`than 50 percent market share, and its contracts ensure that Google’s keyboard is preloaded on
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`virtually all Android devices while competitors face significant barriers to entry. Google’s
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`arguments for dismissing these claims raise factual disputes unfit for resolution now.
`
`
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`IV. Google’s contention that Fotobom impermissibly seeks to apply California state
`
`law extraterritorially is both procedurally barred by Rule 12(g)(2) and without merit. Fotobom is
`
`a California resident that has brought California state law claims for harm that Fotobom suffered
`
`in California and due to acts that, in significant part, occurred in California. There is no
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`extraterritorial application of California law.
`
`BACKGROUND
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`
`
`I.
`
`Fotobom is a California-based developer of a “smart keyboard app” called
`
`Keyboard+. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18, 24-37, ECF No. 19 (“Am. Compl.”). Keyboard+ enhances
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`the standard mobile keyboard with predictive text, shareable GIFs/Stickers, one-handed swipe
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`typing, and autocorrect. See id. ¶ 25. Keyboard+ also has search-related features. Keyboard+ is
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`a “search access point” that can direct a user to a general search engine (like Google, Bing, or
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`DuckDuckGo). Id. ¶¶ 3, 31, 127. In addition, “Keyboard+ offers users its own search results.”
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`Id. ¶ 3. Keyboard+ suggests content based on keywords typed by the user and other contextual
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`information – just like a search engine. Id. ¶¶ 27-32, 35-36. For example, Keyboard+ may
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`suggest a link to purchase movie tickets when the user’s actions indicate that he or she is
`
`planning a movie night or a link to a ride-sharing app when a user types a keyword like “taxi.”
`
`Id. ¶¶ 3, 27-29, 35 & Fig. 1.
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`
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`Google is the world’s fourth largest company. Google provides the most used general
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`search engine in the United States – accounting for approximately 90 percent of all general
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`Case 1:22-cv-00712-APM Document 24 Filed 10/28/22 Page 10 of 39
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`search traffic in the United States and 95 percent of mobile search traffic in the United States.
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`See id. ¶ 64. Google has a monopoly in the general search market, which is protected by
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`significant barriers to entry, including scale and Google’s anticompetitive acts (discussed infra).
`
`See generally id. ¶¶ 54-68 (market definition and market power). Google also offers a suite of
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`“must-have” apps for Android mobile phones,1 including the Google Play Store (an app that
`
`distributes other apps), Google Chrome (a web browser), and Google Maps (a navigation app).
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`Google has market power in the relevant market for each of those apps. See id. ¶¶ 85-102
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`(Google Play), ¶¶ 103-113 (Google Chrome), ¶¶ 114-123 (Google Maps).
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`
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`Finally, Google offers its own smart keyboard (Gboard) that competes directly with
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`Fotobom’s Keyboard+; several other companies also offer competing keyboard apps (including
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`Microsoft’s SwiftKey). See id. ¶ 38. Like Keyboard+, Gboard and SwiftKey previously
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`included a feature that could route users to a search engine. See id. ¶¶ 42, 46. (Google removed
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`this feature in April 2020, and Microsoft in July 2021, prompting numerous user complaints due
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`to the popularity of the feature. See id. ¶¶ 43-44, 46.) Google has even touted Gboard as
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`providing “fast access to search.” See id. ¶ 46. Today, Gboard is the dominant keyboard app
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`with at least a 50 percent share of the Android keyboard app market. See id. ¶¶ 78-84.2
`
`
`1 Android mobile phones are those that use the Android operating system. Virtually all
`mobile phones in the United States use either Apple’s operating system (iOS) or Google’s
`operating system (Android). See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 150-151. Apple makes iOS available only for
`mobile devices that Apple manufactures (the iPhone). Id. ¶¶ 72, 151. Android is open source
`but Google makes certain necessary functionalities available by license (discussed infra) to
`various mobile original equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”). See id. ¶¶ 156-166.
`2 The relevant market – which Google does not contest – is Android keyboard apps. See
`id. ¶¶ 69-84. It is therefore irrelevant whether there are “contractual restrictions” on keyboard
`apps on Apple or desktop devices. See Mem. of Points and Auth. in Supp. of Def. Google LLC’s
`Mot. to Dismiss at 3, ECF No. 21-1 (“Google Br.”).
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`Case 1:22-cv-00712-APM Document 24 Filed 10/28/22 Page 11 of 39
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`
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`Keyboard+ is a competitive threat to Google’s search monopoly. See Am. Compl. ¶ 213.
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`Smart keyboards are search access points, which Google has acknowledged can “bridge” a user
`
`to competitors’ search engines. Id. ¶¶ 132, 204. Mobile keyboards (like Keyboard+) thus
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`threaten to erode Google’s general search market share by diverting search traffic to Google’s
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`rivals. See id. ¶ 139 (quoting internal Google document on the need to control search access
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`points: “otherwise Bing or Yahoo can come and steal away our Android search distribution at
`
`any time”). Keyboard+ also provides its own context-dependent search results that may be
`
`displayed alongside Google search results. Figure 2 of the Amended Complaint, shown below,
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`illustrates how this works. Smart keyboards appear in any mobile app that allows a user to enter
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`text, such as the Google Search app shown in “Step 2.” See id. ¶ 32 & Fig. 2. This allows
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`Keyboard+ to offer its own search results that the user can select instead of Google’s search
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`results, as shown in “Step 3.” See id. (“The search results provided by Keyboard+ compete with
`
`the search results provided by Google.”).3
`
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`3 Fotobom’s software is also integrated into other apps, like a messaging app. Id. ¶ 33.
`Among others, Fotobom’s search functionality is integrated into Verizon Messages – a
`messaging app that is installed on more than 100 million phones in the U.S. Id. ¶¶ 4, 52, 229.
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`Case 1:22-cv-00712-APM Document 24 Filed 10/28/22 Page 12 of 39
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`
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`Google and other large companies like Facebook have recently purchased keyboard apps.
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`Google acquired Tenor’s GIF Keyboard in 2018 for more than $200 million, and Facebook
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`acquired GIPHY (another GIF keyboard) in 2020 for approximately $400 million. Id. ¶¶ 39-40.
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`Prior to acquiring Tenor’s keyboard app, Google had several meetings with Fotobom. Id.
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`¶¶ 140-144. Google stated it was looking to acquire a company in the keyboard space; that “it’s
`
`not a matter of if we work together, it’s a matter of when”; and that Fotobom should share with
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`Google as much as possible about its keyboard and company strategy. Id. ¶ 6.
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`II.
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`By far the most effective way for Fotobom to distribute Keyboard+ is to reach
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`deals with mobile OEMs or carriers to “preload” Keyboard+ as the default keyboard on a mobile
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`device. See id. ¶¶ 15, 81, 136-138.4 That is because consumers rarely change the preset defaults.
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`Id. ¶¶ 135-138. Consumers do not typically know how to change the default, which is a multi-
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`step process, buried within settings menus. Id. ¶ 81. Consumers therefore tend to “stick” with
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`the apps, like a keyboard, that are available from the moment they begin using a device. Id.
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`
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`Fotobom’s business strategy centers on obtaining these preloading agreements with
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`OEMs and carriers. In 2019, Fotobom reached an agreement with América Móvil – the leading
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`provider of mobile service in Latin America – to preload Fotobom’s keyboard “on as many
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`phones as possible.” Id. ¶ 8. As Fotobom was working to implement this agreement, it made
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`multiple efforts to engage with Google to ensure that pre-loading Keyboard+ would be compliant
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`with Google’s contracts with OEMs and carriers. Google first told América Móvil that
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`Keyboard+ must route all keyboard searches to Google’s search engine. See id. ¶ 220. And
`
`when Fotobom showed functionality to América Móvil that would have allowed Keyboard+ to
`
`
`4 Carriers like AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile provide the cellular and data services for
`the devices. Carriers sell the devices (made by OEMs) to consumers preloaded with various
`default app configurations and settings. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 129, 134, 178.
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`Case 1:22-cv-00712-APM Document 24 Filed 10/28/22 Page 13 of 39
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`deliver content when the keyboard was used with Google apps, América Móvil told Fotobom to
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`remove this feature because it would upset Google. See id. ¶ 221.
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`By September 2019, certain of América Móvil’s OEMs had successfully preloaded
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`Keyboard+ as the default keyboard. See id. ¶ 222. But as Fotobom and América Móvil were
`
`preparing to launch, Google made clear to América Móvil that it must cancel the project. See id.
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`¶ 223. América Móvil explained to Fotobom that Google was requiring América Móvil “to
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`instruct . . . all OEMs to preload Google’s keyboard,” and América Móvil would be “penalized”
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`for non-compliance. See id. América Móvil further explained that it had an agreement with
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`Google to preload Gboard and that “[t]his is the reason for which we can’t not [sic] preload
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`Fotobom keyboard.” Id. Google’s contracts with manufacturers and carriers have similarly
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`stymied Fotobom’s other efforts to obtain preloading agreements for Keyboard+ with carriers
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`and OEMs. See id. ¶¶ 198-99, 226, 237 (Unimax, TracFone Wireless, TeleEpoch, Senwa,
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`Vortex, Canadian carrier). Google’s assertion (at 6) that its contracts have not resulted in
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`Fotobom being unable to preinstall Keyboard+ ignores these well-pleaded allegations.
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`Fotobom has also long partnered with Verizon to integrate its software into Verizon
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`Messages – a popular app used by tens of millions of Verizon customers. Id. ¶ 229. This
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`software provides similar functionality to Keyboard+: it provides content to users depending on
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`the content of their text messages. Id. Recognizing that messaging apps may also serve as
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`search access points and could threaten Google’s search monopoly, Google recently entered into
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`agreements with Verizon (and every other major U.S. mobile carrier) to make Google Messages
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`the default messaging app. Id. ¶ 230. This will end the use of Fotobom’s software in Verizon
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`Messages as that app stops being used because it is no longer the default messaging app. Id.
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`Case 1:22-cv-00712-APM Document 24 Filed 10/28/22 Page 14 of 39
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`III. Google has foreclosed competitive entry by Fotobom and others in two,
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`interrelated ways: tying provisions in Mobile Application Distribution Agreements (“MADAs”)
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`and exclusive dealing provisions in Revenue Sharing Agreements (“RSAs”). These two types of
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`exclusionary contracts reinforce one another and prevent Fotobom from obtaining preloading
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`agreements with OEMs and carriers.
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`A.
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`Google enters into MADAs with OEMs that place restrictions on the preloaded
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`configuration of the OEMs’ devices. See id. ¶¶ 159-160. While the Android mobile operating
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`system is nominally open source and available for use by any OEM, Google offers a proprietary
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`layer – known as “Google Mobile Services” – on top of that operating system that is necessary to
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`create a commercially viable device. Id. ¶¶ 152-158. As one of Google’s senior Android
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`engineers has commented, the open-source version of Android is “less than ‘bare minimum’”
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`and “isn’t actually shipped on anything.” Id. ¶ 156. Google Mobile Services includes dominant
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`apps that are “must-haves” for consumers, including the Google Play Store, Chrome, Google
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`Maps, and YouTube. See id. ¶ 153. Google Mobile Services also includes a package of
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`application programing interfaces (“APIs”) that are necessary for many mainstream third-party
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`apps, see id. ¶ 154, and for essential functions (such as app updates), see id. ¶¶ 155, 157-158.
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`In order to have access to Google Mobile Services to make a commercially viable device,
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`OEMs must agree to the terms of the MADAs. See id. ¶¶ 175-176. Among other things,
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`MADAs require OEMs to preload a bundle of Google apps, including Gboard. See id. ¶¶ 159,
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`163, 165-166. Google’s MADAs require that Google be the “default search provider for all
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`search access points on the Device.” Id. ¶¶ 161-163 (2011 Google-Samsung MADA). That
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`requirement prevents preloading of other search access points that do not route search traffic to
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`Google (like Keyboard+, which offers its own search results). As innovative new search access
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`Case 1:22-cv-00712-APM Document 24 Filed 10/28/22 Page 15 of 39
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`points (like keyboards) have entered the market, Google has expanded its MADAs to require that
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`Google’s version of a search access point (like Gboard) be preloaded. See id. ¶¶ 165-166.
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`Google reinforces the MADAs with device certification requirements, which give Google
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`final approval over all devices. See id. ¶¶ 181-182. Google streamlines the certification process
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`for OEMs that preload only Google’s search access points (including Gboard). See id. ¶¶ 185-
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`186. For example, Google offers the “Android One” program where an OEM can receive
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`certification if it offers phones with a “software experience designed by Google” – that is, if it
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`preloads Google’s apps (like Gboard) instead of competing apps (like Keyboard+). Id. ¶ 188. If
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`an OEM chooses to depart from a Google-approved default package of apps – for example,
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`trying to preload Keyboard+ – the certification process costs more, takes longer, and creates
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`uncertainty, which can disrupt product release schedules. See id. ¶ 187; see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 191-192
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`& Fig. 4 (“express” certification program that requires exclusively preloading Gboard).
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`Internally, Google describes its certification requirements as a “poison pill” that it can use to
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`control search access points that threaten Google’s search business. See id. ¶ 181 (“obvious to
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`the [manufacturers] that we [Google] are using compatibility as a club to make them do things
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`we want”). OEMs have told Fotobom that they cannot preload Keyboard+ because of Google’s
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`device certification process. See id. ¶¶ 198-199 (Unimax: “for the type of certification we are
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`using . . . we are unable to have any other keyboard installed except for G Board”).
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`B.
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`Google also pays OEMs and carriers through RSAs. RSAs require Google’s apps
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`(including Gboard) to be exclusively preloaded on all mobile devices (or models of a device)
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`sold by a manufacturer or carrier. See id. ¶¶ 201, 205, 223. If a manufacturer preloads a
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`competing app on even one device, it must forfeit its revenue share across all devices. See id.
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`This protects Google from other search access points that are a competitive threat (like
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`Case 1:22-cv-00712-APM Document 24 Filed 10/28/22 Page 16 of 39
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`Keyboard+). See id. ¶ 202. As with MADAs, Google has expanded the scope of RSAs over
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`time to close off new search access points like smart keyboards and messaging apps. See id.
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`¶¶ 204-205. Internally, Google describes the RSAs as “really important” because otherwise
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`competitors “can come and steal away our Android search distribution at any time.” Id. ¶ 202;
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`see also id. (RSAs are an “[i]nsurance policy that preserves our search and assistant usage”). For
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`smart keyboards specifically, Google calls its RSAs a “strategic defense” to rival keyboards (like
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`Keyboard+) that can be a “bridge” to rival search engines. See id. ¶ 204. Similarly, Google has
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`made substantial payments to carriers t