Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 43 Filed: 04/30/21 Page 1 of 27 PageID #:308
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
`EASTERN DIVISION
`
`
`
`In re: Clearview AI, Inc. Consumer
`Privacy Litigation
`
`
`
`
`Case No. 1:21-cv-00135
`
`Hon. Sharon Johnson Coleman
`
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`
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`
`
`CLEARVIEW DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO
`PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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`Case: 1:21-cv-00135 Document #: 43 Filed: 04/30/21 Page 2 of 27 PageID #:309
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`
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 1
`
`BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................ 3
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`Clearview’s Product and Operations .................................................................. 3
`
`Clearview’s Voluntary Changes to Its Business ................................................. 5
`
`Clearview’s Continued Commitment to Its Business Changes .......................... 6
`
`LEGAL STANDARD ................................................................................................................. 7
`
`ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................................. 8
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`Clearview’s Operations Are Exempt From BIPA .......................................................... 8
`
`Plaintiffs Cannot Show a Likelihood of Success on the Merits...................................... 9
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`BIPA Cannot Be Applied to Regulate Out-Of-State Conduct ............................ 9
`
`Plaintiffs’ Claim Is Barred by the First Amendment ........................................ 12
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`Clearview Is Engaged in Speech That Is Protected by the First
`Amendment ........................................................................................... 12
`
`BIPA Is a Content- and Speaker-Based Restriction Subject to Strict
`Scrutiny ............................................................................................... 13
`
`3.
`
`BIPA Is Subject to, and Cannot Survive, Strict Scrutiny ..................... 14
`
`C.
`
`Clearview’s Operations Are Exempt From BIPA ............................................ 15
`
`III.
`
`The Harms to Clearview and to the Public Weigh Against Entry of an Injunction...... 15
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Plaintiffs Will Not Be Irreparably Harmed Absent an Injunction .................... 15
`
`Clearview Will Be Irreparably Harmed If Plaintiffs’ Requested Injunctive
`Relief Is Granted ............................................................................................... 17
`
`C.
`
`The Public Will Be Harmed If Clearview’s Activities Are Enjoined ............... 19
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`IV.
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`Plaintiffs Have Not Demonstrated That They Lack an Adequate Remedy at Law ...... 20
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`CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 20
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`i
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`
`
`Cases
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`ACLU v. Alvarez,
`679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012) ...................................................................................................19
`
`Air Serv Corp. v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc. 1,
`225 F. Supp. 3d 745 (N.D. Ill. 2016) .......................................................................................18
`
`Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
`216 Ill. 2d 100, 835 N.E.2d 801 (2005) .....................................................................................9
`
`Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc.,
`958 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2020) ...................................................................................................14
`
`Cassell v. Snyders,
`458 F. Supp. 3d 981 (N.D. Ill. 2020) .........................................................................................9
`
`Doe I v. Yesner,
`No. 3:19-CV-0136-HRH, 2019 WL 4196054 (D. Alaska Sept. 4, 2019)................................13
`
`Elrod v. Burns,
`427 U.S. 347 (1976) .................................................................................................................19
`
`Goodman v. Ill. Dep’t of Fin. & Prof’l Regulation,
`430 F.3d 432 (7th Cir. 2005) .................................................................................................1, 7
`
`Guest v. Leis,
`255 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001) ...................................................................................................13
`
`Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc.,
`491 U.S. 324 (1989) .................................................................................................................10
`
`Kessler v. Pass,
`No. 18-cv-530, 2018 WL 5307821 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2018) ...................................................17
`
`Landau v. CNA Fin. Corp,
`381 Ill. App. 3d 61, 886 N.E.2d 405 (1st Dist. 2008) ..............................................................10
`
`Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
`107 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1997)..................................................................................................6
`
`Maxim’s Ltd. v. Badonsky,
`772 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1985) ...................................................................................................17
`
`
`
`ii
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`
`
`Mazurek v. Armstrong,
`520 U.S. 968 (1997) ...................................................................................................................7
`
`Medeco Sec. Locks, Inc. v. Swiderek,
`680 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1981) .......................................................................................................7
`
`Midwest Title Loans, Inc. v. Mills,
`593 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2010) .............................................................................................10, 11
`
`Monroy v. Shutterfly, Inc.,
`No. 16 C 10984, 2017 WL 4099846 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2017) ...........................................9, 10
`
`Nieman v. VersusLaw, Inc.,
`512 F. App’x 635 (7th Cir. 2013) ............................................................................................12
`
`Outdoor Lighting Perspectives Franchising, Inc. v. Stubbs,
`No. 11-cv-2524, 2012 WL 12904016 (D.S.C. June 15, 2012) ................................................16
`
`Pac. Trellis Fruit, LLC v. Agricola Yaurilla, S.A.,
`No. 16-cv-4160, 2016 WL 9226379 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2016) ..............................................16
`
`Piekosz-Murphy v. Bd. of Educ. of Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 230,
`858 F. Supp. 2d 952 (N.D. Ill. 2012) .........................................................................................7
`
`Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
`576 U.S. 155 (2015) .................................................................................................................13
`
`Reno v. ACLU,
`521 U.S. 844 (1997) .................................................................................................................14
`
`Rivera v. Google Inc.,
`238 F. Supp. 3d 1088 (N.D. Ill. 2017) .................................................................................9, 10
`
`Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc.,
`749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984) .......................................................................................15, 19, 20
`
`S. New England Tel. Co. v. Glob. NAPs Inc.,
`624 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2010).....................................................................................................18
`
`Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co.,
`443 U.S. 97 (1979) ...................................................................................................................12
`
`Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
`564 U.S. 552 (2011) ...........................................................................................................12, 13
`
`TD Bank N.A. v. Hill,
`928 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2019).....................................................................................................20
`
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`iii
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`
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`Teamsters Loc. Unions Nos. 75 & 200 v. Barry Trucking, Inc.,
`176 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 1999) ...................................................................................................9
`
`Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc.,
`132 F.3d 1167 (7th Cir. 1997) ...................................................................................................7
`
`United States v. Caira,
`833 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................................14
`
`United States v. Khan,
`No. 15-cr-286, 2017 WL 2362572 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2017) ..................................................12
`
`United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,
`327 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2004) ...........................................................................................19
`
`White v. Rozum,
`No. 06-cv-244, 2007 WL 218709 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2007) ...................................................17
`
`Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
`555 U.S. 7 (2008) ...............................................................................................................15, 19
`
`Statutes
`
`740 ILCS 14/10 ..............................................................................................................................13
`
`740 ILCS 14/25 ......................................................................................................................1, 8, 13
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c) ......................................................................................................................18
`
`Kashmir Hill & Gabriel J.X. Dance, Clearview’s Facial Recognition App Is
`Identifying Child Victims of Abuse, N.Y. Times (Feb. 7, 2020) ..............................................19
`
`A1911, Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) ......................................................................................11
`
`A9793, Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018) ......................................................................................11
`
`S1203, Senate, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) ..........................................................................................11
`
`S8547, Senate, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018) ..........................................................................................11
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`
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`iv
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Plaintiffs ask the Court to do something that no court appears to have ever done before—
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`issue a preliminary injunction under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”).
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`Plaintiffs make their unprecedented request based on no evidence of a BIPA violation or imminent
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`harm to the putative class. They submit not a single affidavit or declaration in support, and offer
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`nothing more than citations to newspaper articles in support of their claims. That alone is sufficient
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`reason to deny Plaintiffs’ motion, which requires them to come forward with evidence in support
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`of their claims. Instead of providing evidence, Plaintiffs focus on their own, unsubstantiated and
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`speculative opinions of the “dangers” of Clearview’s product, while ignoring the substantial,
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`concrete harm that Clearview and the public would experience if an injunction issued. Plaintiffs’
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`speculation does not warrant a grant of the “extraordinary and drastic remedy” of a preliminary
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`injunction. Goodman v. Ill. Dep’t of Fin. & Prof’l Regulation, 430 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 2005).
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`Because it fails to satisfy every element necessary for an injunction to issue, Plaintiffs’ motion
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`should be denied.
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`As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs have failed to show that Clearview’s current operations
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`violate BIPA. And Defendants have submitted substantial evidence—in the form of sworn
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`affidavits and declarations—that demonstrates that Clearview does not because, among other
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`things, it operates solely as an agent or subcontractor of governments and government agencies.
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`See 740 ILCS 14/25(e). Plaintiffs ground their motion on the demonstrably false and entirely
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`unsupported suggestion that the record evidence is untrue or cannot be trusted. However, because
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`the uncontroverted record evidence establishes that Clearview operates within an exemption to
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`BIPA, Plaintiffs cannot show (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm, or
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`(3) that the balance of equities favors an injunction.
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`1
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`

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`As to the likelihood of success, Plaintiffs fail to address any of the following defenses,
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`which Clearview will
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`litigate here: applying BIPA
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`to Clearview would violate
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`the
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`extraterritoriality doctrine of Illinois and the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution;
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`applying BIPA here would violate the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; and BIPA does
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`not apply here because Clearview uses its facial recognition app solely as an agent or contractor
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`of government agencies. By failing to address any of these defenses, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate
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`on this record that they have a likelihood of success on the merits.
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`And without a violation of BIPA, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate any harm, let alone
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`irreparable harm.
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`1
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` Moreover, Clearview represents to this Court that it will inform the Court and
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`Plaintffs if, during the pendency of this litigation, Clearview changes its current practice of serving
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`solely as an agent or subcontractor of governments and government agencies. Declaration of
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`Thomas Mulcaire (“Mulcaire Decl.”) ¶ 49. Accordingly, there is no current threat of irreparable
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`harm resulting from any of Clearview’s future, speculative conduct.
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`Finally, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the balance of equities favors an
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`injunction. Given that Clearview currently operates solely as an agent or subcontractor of
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`governments and government agencies, Plaintiffs can point to no harm absent an injunction. In
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`contrast, Clearview would be significantly harmed by an injunction because, depending on the
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`relief fashioned, an injunction could force Clearview to cease operations nationwide. Moreover,
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`the injunction requested would infringe Clearview’s First Amendment rights. The public interest
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`would also suffer if an injunction were entered, since government agencies would no longer be
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`able to use Clearview’s technology—a use that is expressly permitted under BIPA and that the
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`1
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` Even if there were a violation of BIPA, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they lack an adequate
`remedy at law absent injunctive relief, given that BIPA provides for statutory damages.
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`2
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`

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`
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`declarations and affidavits submitted in support of this motion clearly establish would negatively
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`impact the public’s interest in effective law enforcement.
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`For those reasons, and those that follow, Plaintiffs’ motion should be denied.
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`A.
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`Clearview’s Product and Operations
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`BACKGROUND
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`Clearview collects publicly-available images on the Internet and organizes them into a
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`searchable database, which Clearview’s licensed users can then search by using Clearview’s app.
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`Consolidated Class Action Complaint, dkt. 29 (“Compl.”) ¶ 29; Mulcaire Decl. ¶ 7. Clearview’s
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`app is a tool used by government agencies to help solve crimes. Mulcaire Decl. ¶¶ 17-19; Affidavit
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`of Kevin Metcalf (“Metcalf Aff.”) ¶ 19; Affidavit of Jason Webb (“Webb Aff.”) ¶ 17; Affidavit of
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`Michael Williams (“Williams Aff.”) ¶ 17. Clearview does not market, license, or sell any other
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`products. Mulcaire Decl. ¶ 12.
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`Clearview collects images for its search engine without knowing the identities of the people
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`depicted in the images. Id. ¶ 9. The only information that Clearview stores from the photos are:
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`(1) the URL from which the photo was collected; (2) any metadata associated with the image itself;
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`and (3) the facial vectors from the faces that appear in the image. Id. ¶ 10. Accordingly, Clearview
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`cannot determine whether the individuals in the images it collects live in Illinois. Id. ¶ 9. At best,
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`Clearview can tell—in some instances—where a photo was taken based on its available metadata.
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`Id. Because Clearview cannot determine which individuals depicted in the photographs in its
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`database reside in Illinois, if Clearview were ordered to remove all images of Illinois residents
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`from its database, it could not do so. Id. ¶ 11. To comply with such an order, Clearview would
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`likely have to cease using its database altogether, which would shut down its operations
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`nationwide—even in states that permit Clearview’s activities. Id.
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`3
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`Under no circumstances does Clearview sell, lease, trade, disseminate, disclose, or provide
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`access to any facial vectors to its customers. Id. ¶ 15. Access to Clearview’s database of facial
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`vectors is restricted to a small number of employees with the highest administrative access at
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`Clearview. Id. ¶ 30. The only information Clearview provides to users of its app is photographs
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`and links to the websites containing those photographs. Id. ¶ 14.
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`Clearview has never experienced a data security incident or hack related to its collection
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`of facial vectors or even its database of photos. Id. ¶ 27. Clearview has implemented reasonable
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`safeguards to secure that data, including (i) a credentialing program to confirm that any licensee
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`of the Clearview app, including a holder of a free-trial license, is who the licensee purports to be;
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`(ii) a system to ensure that any new users of the Clearview app are authorized by their employers
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`to use the app; (iii) dual-factor authentication such that by default, every log-in session is tied to a
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`proven email address; (iv) encryption of the facial vectors generated by Clearview; (v) the
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`implementation of a bug-bounty program; (vi) the deployment of anti-intrusion devices, such as
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`firewalls and virus scanners; (vii) background checks of employees and contractors;
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`(viii) employee cybersecurity training; (ix) requirements that employees use only electronic
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`devices issued by Clearview for official tasks, and that these devices be accessible to Clearview’s
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`information-technology function, which monitors the devices for security threats; (x) engaging a
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`third-party audit of the application’s code by a cyber-security and risk management firm to identify
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`and close vulnerabilities; and (xi) blocking access to Clearview’s application by IP addresses in
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`numerous countries, including high-risk countries. Id. ¶ 26.
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`Clearview’s website has a policy detailing its retention schedule and guidelines for
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`permanently destroying information that might be governed by BIPA. Id. ¶ 25 & Exh. C.
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`4
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`B.
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`Clearview’s Voluntary Changes to Its Business
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`Clearview has voluntarily changed its business practices over the past year. Clearview
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`cancelled the accounts of every customer who was not either associated with government agencies
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`or their agents or subcontractors. Id. ¶ 34. All photos in Clearview’s database that have metadata
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`associating them with a geolocation in Illinois are blocked from being searched through
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`Clearview’s app. Id. ¶ 36. Clearview constructed a “geofence” around Illinois, and stopped
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`collecting facial vectors from images that contain metadata associating them with Illinois. Id. ¶ 40.
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`Although Clearview cannot exclude with certainty every Illinois resident from its database,
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`Clearview has taken reasonable steps to avoid collecting such images, even if these steps are over-
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`inclusive and will exclude photos of many non-Illinois residents. Id. ¶ 41.
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`Clearview also implemented an opt-out mechanism for Illinois residents to exclude their
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`photos from Clearview’s search engine. Id. ¶ 42 & Exh. D. To exclude photographs from future
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`inclusion in the Clearview search engine, Clearview, by necessity, must obtain a photograph of
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`the individual who wishes to be excluded and create a facial vector that can then be used to ensure
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`that the person’s image is neither collected in the Clearview database nor included in search results
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`on the Clearview app. Id. ¶ 43. Because Clearview’s app searches only for facial vectors, and
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`stores no other personal information about an individual in a photo, without this information, there
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`would be no way to allow an individual to “opt-out” of Clearview’s database and from search
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`results on the Clearview app. Id. For this reason, Clearview’s opt-out system requires that the
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`person opting out consent to the creation of a facial vector that will be used solely for purposes of
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`excluding them from the Clearview app. Id. ¶ 44. Thus, far from “tricking Illinois residents into
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`consenting to the harvesting of their Biometric Data,” Br. at 13, Clearview informs Illinois
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`residents that it needs and uses their information solely for the opt-out system. Moreover, any
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`facial vectors created for opt-out purposes are subject to strict controls and are used solely for
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`5
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`
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`purposes of excluding the individual from the Clearview database and Clearview search results.
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`Mulcaire Decl. ¶ 45.
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`Finally, Clearview’s terms of use require users of the Clearview app to, among other things,
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`agree to use the app only for law enforcement purposes and not to upload photos of Illinois
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`residents. Id. ¶¶ 23, 38. Every customer that uses the Clearview app must also agree to “expressly
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`authorize Clearview AI to act as an agent on [their] behalf for the purpose of (i) collecting and
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`compiling publicly available images from the Internet and (ii) producing facial vectors from those
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`images for the purpose of providing the Service to [them].” Id. ¶ 21 & Exh. B.
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`C.
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`Clearview’s Continued Commitment to Its Business Changes
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`Clearview informed this Court about these changes to its business practices in May 2020.
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`Mutnick v. Clearview, 20-cv-512, ECF No. 56-2 ¶¶ 15-25. Plaintiffs assert that Clearview “cannot
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`be trusted” to maintain these changes. Br. at 1. Yet, Clearview continues to operate as it told the
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`Court it would a year ago, Mulcaire Decl. ¶ 46, and Plaintiffs do not suggest otherwise. Clearview
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`represents to the Court it “will inform the Court and Plaintiffs if, at any point during the pendency
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`of this litigation, Clearview decides to offer products or services to customers who are not law-
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`enforcement agencies or governmental entities or their agents.” Id. ¶ 49.
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`Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Clearview’s 2020 patent application “describes a much
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`broader use of [Clearview’s] technology,” Br. at 8, but this statement is grossly misleading.
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`2
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` A
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`consent-based app on an individual’s mobile phone that uses facial recognition would be fully
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`
`2
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` As Clearview has explained to Plaintiffs, Clearview applied for a patent in August 2019—before it made
`the business changes detailed above. Mulcaire Decl. ¶ 48. On August 7, 2020, Clearview filed a formal
`application with the patent office that required Clearview to use the same description as the initial
`application to preserve its intellectual property. Id.; see Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565,
`1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“the specification [in a prior application] must contain an equivalent description of
`the claimed subject matter.”). That the 2020 description matched an old description—because of a
`requirement of patent law—does not change Clearview’s commitment to its business changes.
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`
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`6
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`
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`lawful and would be similar to existing uses by other technology companies. However, whatever
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`the patent application says, at this time, Clearview does not intend to make its facial recognition
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`app available to anyone other than governmental entities or their agents or subcontractors.
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`Mulcaire Decl. ¶ 48.
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`LEGAL STANDARD
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`“[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be
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`granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Goodman v. Ill.
`
`Dep’t of Fin. & Prof’l Regulation, 430 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Mazurek v.
`
`Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (the
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`“requirement for substantial proof” on a preliminary injunction is “much higher” than that on
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`summary judgment). To justify this relief, Plaintiffs have the burden of showing that: “(1) they
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`have a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) no adequate remedy at law exists; (3)
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`they will suffer irreparable harm, which, absent injunctive relief, outweighs the irreparable harm
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`[Clearview] will suffer if the injunction is granted; and (4) the requested injunction will not harm
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`the public interest.” Goodman, 430 F.3d at 437. “[I]f [Plaintiffs] cannot satisfy any one of these
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`threshold showings, the court’s inquiry ends, and a preliminary injunction will not be issued.”
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`Piekosz-Murphy v. Bd. of Educ. of Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 858 F. Supp. 2d 952, 961 (N.D.
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`Ill. 2012). Clearview has been unable to find any reported case in which a plaintiff suing under
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`BIPA has met this burden, and there is no reason to make this case the first one.
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`Rather than litigate the issue of a preliminary injunction based on facts and evidence,
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`Plaintiffs have turned to attacks on the credibility of Clearview and its general counsel. Br. at 9.
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`For reasons that Clearview has previously explained to the Court, those attacks are unfounded.
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`See Mutnick v. Clearview, 20-cv-512, ECF No. 65. If, however, the Court has any reason to doubt
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`the credibility of Clearview or its witnesses, the appropriate next step should be an evidentiary
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`7
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`
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`hearing, not the imposition of a company-threatening injunction. See Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories,
`
`Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir. 1997) (“If genuine issues of material fact are created by the
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`response to a motion for a preliminary injunction, an evidentiary hearing is indeed required.”);
`
`Medeco Sec. Locks, Inc. v. Swiderek, 680 F.2d 37, 38 (7th Cir. 1981) (“It is well established that,
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`in general, a motion for a preliminary injunction should not be resolved on the basis of affidavits
`
`alone. Normally, an evidentiary hearing is required to decide credibility issues.”).
`
`I.
`
`Clearview’s Operations Are Exempt From BIPA
`
`ARGUMENT
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`Most importantly, Plaintiffs’ requested injunction must be rejected because the record
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`evidence establishes that Clearview’s current operations are exempt from BIPA because BIPA
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`does not apply to “a contractor, subcontractor, or agent of a State agency or local unit of
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`government when working for that State agency or local unit of government.” 740 ILCS 14/25(e).
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`Today, Clearview’s only licensed users are government agencies or their contractors or agents,
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`and each user must agree to appoint Clearview as its agent “for the purpose of (i) collecting and
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`compiling publicly available images from the Internet and (ii) producing facial vectors from those
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`images for the purpose of providing the Service to [the user].” Mulcaire Decl. ¶ 21. Because
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`Clearview is exempt from BIPA, Plaintiffs cannot show (1) a likelihood of success on the merits,
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`(2) irreparable harm, or (3) that the balance of equities favors an injunction.
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`Plaintiffs offer no meaningful argument—or any evidence at all—in response. Plaintiffs
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`first claim that Clearview’s limitation of its user base to government agencies “cannot be verified,”
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`Br. at 7, but Plaintiffs have offered no evidence in response to Clearview’s unrebutted testimony
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`that Clearview’s current users are governments or governmental agencies. Mulcaire Decl. ¶ 34.
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`Plaintiffs also attempt to sidestep this BIPA exemption by describing their “serious concerns”
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`about law enforcement agencies using Clearview’s product. Br. at 7. But Plaintiffs should take
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`up their “concerns” with the Illinois legislature, rather than ask the Court to re-write or disregard
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`the statute, which expressly permits such uses.
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`II.
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`Plaintiffs Cannot Show a Likelihood of Success on the Merits
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`To obtain an injunction, Plaintiffs are “required to establish . . . that there [is] a reasonable
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`or substantial likelihood that [they will] succeed on the merits.” Teamsters Loc. Unions Nos. 75
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`& 200 v. Barry Trucking, Inc., 176 F.3d 1004, 1011 (7th Cir. 1999). “As part of the preliminary-
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`injunction analysis, a district court may consider a nonmovant’s defenses in determining the
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`movant’s likelihood of success on the merits.” Cassell v. Snyders, 458 F. Supp. 3d 981, 990 (N.D.
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`Ill. 2020), aff’d, 990 F.3d 539 (7th Cir. 2021).
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`Without submitting any evidence beyond citing to public news stories, and without
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`addressing any of Clearview’s defenses, Plaintiffs assert that they have a “high likelihood” of
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`success on their BIPA claims. Br. at 14. In fact, the record evidence plainly supports not only the
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`applicability of BIPA’s statutory exemption for governmental agents, but also Clearview’s other
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`defenses, as set forth below.
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`A.
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`BIPA Cannot Be Applied to Regulate Out-Of-State Conduct
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`Plaintiffs’ case fails on the merits because (1) BIPA does not apply to conduct outside of
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`Illinois and (2) the application of BIPA to Clearview would violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
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`First, Illinois has a “long-standing rule of construction” that a “statute is without
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`extraterritorial effect unless a clear intent in this respect appears from the express provisions of the
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`statute.” Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 216 Ill. 2d 100, 184-85, 835 N.E.2d 801, 852
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`(2005). Because BIPA expresses no such intent, courts in Illinois have repeatedly held that BIPA
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`does not regulate out-of-state conduct. See, e.g., Rivera v. Google Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1088,
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`1104 (N.D. Ill. 2017); Monroy v. Shutterfly, Inc., No. 16 C 10984, 2017 WL 4099846, at *5 (N.D.
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`Ill. Sept. 15, 2017). The Illinois Supreme Court has explained that a “transaction may be said to
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`take place within a state if the circumstances relating to the transaction occur[red] primarily and
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`substantially” in Illinois. Avery, 216 Ill. 2d at 186, 835 N.E.2d at 853 (emphasis added). To satisfy
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`this standard, the “majority of circumstances relating to the alleged violation” of the statute must
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`have occurred in Illinois. Landau v. CNA Fin. Corp, 381 Ill. App. 3d 61, 65, 886 N.E.2d 405, 409
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`(1st Dist. 2008) (emphasis added).
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`The record evidence, however, establishes that the “majority of circumstances” giving rise
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`to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred outside of Illinois. Specifically, Clearview operates from its
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`headquarters in New York; Clearview’s servers are located outside of Illinois; and Clearview does
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`not sell its services or app to anyone in Illinois.
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`3
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` Mulclaire Decl. ¶¶ 2-5, 40. Thus, Plaintiffs’
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`BIPA claim fails under Illinois’s extraterritoriality doctrine.
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`Second, Plaintiffs’ proposed application of BIPA to Clearview violates the dormant
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`Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which “precludes the application of a state statute”
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`that has “the practical effect of . . . control[ling] conduct beyond the boundaries of the State,”
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`“whether or not the commerce has effects within the State.” Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S.
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`324, 336 (1989). Illinois courts have “t[aken] a broad[] view” of what constitutes an inconsistent
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`legal regime for dormant Commerce Clause purposes. Midwest Title Loans, Inc. v. Mills, 593 F.3d
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`660, 667 (7th Cir. 2010). Specifically, a party need not show “inconsistent obligations”; rather,
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`“the absence of [