Case 3:21-cv-00807-MAB Document 58 Filed 09/20/21 Page 1 of 24 Page ID #141
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
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`Case No. 3:21-cv-00807-MAB
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`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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`Defendants.
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`DEFENDANTS’ JOINT OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND
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`VILLAGE OF SHILOH,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`NETFLIX, INC., et al.,
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`Case 3:21-cv-00807-MAB Document 58 Filed 09/20/21 Page 2 of 24 Page ID #142
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii 
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`I. 
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`II. 
`
`Background ......................................................................................................................... 2 
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`Standard of Review ............................................................................................................. 3 
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`III. 
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`Argument ............................................................................................................................ 5 
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`A. 
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`The City of Fishers decision does not require remand. .......................................... 5 
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`1. 
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`2. 
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`Application of the Levin factors to the facts of this case favors remaining
`in federal court because of the presence of the previously-filed East St.
`Louis Case. .................................................................................................. 6 
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`Remand of this case would guarantee duplicative litigation, which a
`federal court has a duty to avoid. ................................................................ 7 
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`B. 
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`This case implicates additional factors that counsel against remand. ................... 10 
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`1. 
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`2. 
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`3. 
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`Comity should not be applied to require an exception for all state tax or
`fee cases under CAFA. ............................................................................. 10 
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`Comity does not warrant remand because this ordinary action for money
`damages offers no reason for deference to the State Court. ..................... 13 
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`Federal courts are competent to decide issues of state law. ...................... 14 
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`IV. 
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`Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 16 
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`i
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`Case 3:21-cv-00807-MAB Document 58 Filed 09/20/21 Page 3 of 24 Page ID #143
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`A.F. Moore & Assocs., Inc. v. Pappas,
`948 F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 2020) ...................................................................................................14
`
`Adkins v. VIM Recycling, Inc.,
`644 F.3d 483 (7th Cir. 2011) ...................................................................................................14
`
`AmSouth Bank v. Dale,
`386 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2004) .....................................................................................................8
`
`Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,
`546 U.S. 500 (2006) .................................................................................................................10
`
`Arbuckle Mountain Ranch of Tex., Inc. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp.,
`810 F.3d 335 (5th Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................................12
`
`Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard, Inc.,
`538 U.S. 691 (2003) .................................................................................................................12
`
`Brown v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc.,
`No. 6:11-CV-06070, 2012 WL 12919480 (W.D. Ark. July 26, 2012), aff’d,
`738 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2013) ...................................................................................................15
`
`Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc.,
`958 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2020) ...................................................................................................16
`
`City of Chicago v. F.C.C.,
`199 F.3d 424 (7th Cir. 1999) .....................................................................................................6
`
`City of East St. Louis v. Netflix, Inc., et al.,
`No. 3:21-cv-00561-MAB ................................................................................................. passim
`
`City of Eugene, Oregon v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n,
`998 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 2021) .....................................................................................................6
`
`City of Fishers v. DIRECTV,
`5 F.4th 750 (7th Cir. 2021) .............................................................................................. passim
`
`City of Reno, Nevada v. Netflix, Inc., et al.,
`No 3:20-cv-499, 2021 WL 4037491 (D. Nev. Sept. 3, 2021) ..............................................7, 16
`
`ii
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`

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`Case 3:21-cv-00807-MAB Document 58 Filed 09/20/21 Page 4 of 24 Page ID #144
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`Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
`424 U.S. 800 (1976) ...................................................................................................................3
`
`Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens,
`574 U.S. 81 (2014) .....................................................................................................................3
`
`DeHart v. BP America, Inc.,
`No. 09-cv-0626, 2010 WL 231744 (W.D. La. Jan. 14, 2010) ...................................................8
`
`Diversified Metal Prod., Inc. v. Odom Indus., Inc.,
`No. 1:12-CV-162, 2012 WL 2872772 (D. Idaho July 12, 2012) ...............................................9
`
`Dutcher v. Matheson,
`840 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2016) ...............................................................................................11
`
`Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc.,
`449 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2006) ...............................................................................................13
`
`Firth v. Chupp,
`No. 09-cv-512, 2010 WL 5439759 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2010) ..............................................9, 10
`
`Frederick v. Easty,
`No. 14-cv-342, 2015 WL 603884 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2015) ....................................................10
`
`Hammer v. United States Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,
`905 F.3d 517 (7th Cir. 2018) .....................................................................................................3
`
`Hart v. FedEx Ground Package Sys. Inc.,
`457 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2006) ...................................................................................................11
`
`Hazlitt v. Apple Inc.,
`No. 3:20-CV-421-NJR, 2021 WL 2414669 (S.D. Ill. June 14, 2021) .................................7, 16
`
`Heritage Schooner Cruises, Inc. v. Acadia Ins. Co.,
`No. 09-CV-22579, 2009 WL 10699880 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 30, 2009) ..........................................9
`
`Hertz Corp. v. Friend,
`559 U.S. 77 (2010) .....................................................................................................................4
`
`Hibbs v. Winn,
`542 U.S. 88 (2004) ...................................................................................................................14
`
`Hostetler v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
`No. 3:15-cv-226, 2017 WL 3700345 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 28, 2017) ..............................................8
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`Implementation of Section 621(a)(1) of the Cable Commc’ns Pol’y Act of 1984 As
`Amended by the Cable Television Consumer Prot. & Competition Act of 1992,
`22 F.C.C. Rcd. 5101 (Mar. 5, 2007) ..........................................................................................6
`
`iii
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`Case 3:21-cv-00807-MAB Document 58 Filed 09/20/21 Page 5 of 24 Page ID #145
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`Implementation of Section 621(a)(1) of the Cable Commc’ns Pol’y Act of 1984 As
`Amended by the Cable Television Consumer Prot. & Competition Act of 1992,
`34 F.C.C. Rcd. 6844 (F.C.C. Aug. 2, 2019) ..............................................................................6
`
`Ironshore Indem., Inc. v. Synergy L. Grp., LLC,
`926 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Ill. 2013) .......................................................................................8
`
`JMCB, LLC v. Bd. Of Commerce & Indus.,
`293 F. Supp. 3d 580 (M.D. La. 2017) ......................................................................................14
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`Kitchin v. Bridgeton Landfill, LLC,
`3 F.4th 1089 (8th Cir. 2021) ....................................................................................................12
`
`Laures v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,
`No. 20-CV-1047-SMY, 2021 WL 3476328 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2021) .........................................4
`
`Manufacturers Hanover Tr. Co. v. Palmer Corp.,
`798 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).............................................................................................9
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`McCollough v. Smarte Carte, Inc.,
`No. 16 C 03777, 2016 WL 4077108 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2016) .................................................16
`
`Millman v. United Tech. Corp.,
`No. 16-cv-312, 2017 WL 1165081 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 28, 2017) ................................................11
`
`MLR, LLC v. U.S. Robotics Corp.,
`No. 02-cv-2898, 2003 WL 685504 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2003) ....................................................7
`
`Monroy v. Shutterfly, Inc.,
`No. 16 C 10984, 2017 WL 4099846 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2017) ...............................................16
`
`Morris v. Gulfport Energy Corp.,
`No. 2:15-CV-1342, 2015 WL 4365498 (S.D. Ohio July 16, 2015) ...........................................9
`
`Nicholson v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC of Delaware,
`No. 17-CV-1373, 2018 WL 3344408 (N.D. Ill. July 6, 2018) ...................................................7
`
`Norberg v. Shutterfly, Inc.,
`152 F. Supp. 3d 1103 (N.D. Ill. 2015) .................................................................................7, 15
`
`Norrid v. D.A.R.P., Inc.,
`No. 17-CV-401, 2018 WL 2977384 (E.D. Okla. June 13, 2018) ..............................................9
`
`Ohio Bureau of Emp. Servs. v. Hodory,
`431 U.S. 471 (1977) ...................................................................................................................7
`
`Ozinga v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,
`No. 13-cv-3292, 2013 WL 12212731 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2013) ...............................................7
`
`iv
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`Case 3:21-cv-00807-MAB Document 58 Filed 09/20/21 Page 6 of 24 Page ID #146
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`Peatry v. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc.,
`393 F. Supp. 3d 766 (N.D. Ill. 2019) .........................................................................................4
`
`Perry v. Coles Cnty.,
`906 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2018) ...................................................................................................14
`
`Rothner v. City of Chicago,
`879 F.2d 1402 (7th Cir. 1989) ...................................................................................................5
`
`Sabrina Roppo v. Travelers Com. Ins. Co.,
`869 F.3d 568 (7th Cir. 2017) .....................................................................................................4
`
`Trippe Mfg. Co. v. American Power Conversion Corp.,
`46 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 1995) .......................................................................................................7
`
`Village of Shiloh v. Netflix, Inc., et al.,
`No. 3:21-cv-00807, Dkt. 1 (Jul. 15, 2021) .................................................................................3
`
`Washington v. Burley,
`No. CIV.A. 3-12-154, 2012 WL 5289682 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2012) .....................................10
`
`Statutes
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) ..................................................................................................................12
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)-(5) ............................................................................................................11
`
`47 U.S.C. § 556(c) ...........................................................................................................................6
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`v
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`Case 3:21-cv-00807-MAB Document 58 Filed 09/20/21 Page 7 of 24 Page ID #147
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`Defendants DISH Network Corporation, DISH Network L.L.C., Netflix, Inc., Hulu, LLC,
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`Disney DTC LLC, and DIRECTV, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”) submit this joint opposition
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`to Plaintiff Village of Shiloh’s (“Shiloh”) Motion to Remand this case to the Circuit Court for the
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`Twentieth Judicial Circuit, St. Clair County, Illinois (“State Court”). See Dkts. 45-46. This case
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`should not be remanded for two reasons.
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`First, this case is a copycat litigation derived from an earlier-filed case in this District styled
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`City of East St. Louis v. Netflix, Inc., et al., No. 3:21-cv-00561-MAB (the “East St. Louis Case”),
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`which the plaintiff directly filed in federal court. It asserts the same claims under the same statute
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`on behalf of the same putative class seeking the same relief against a group of entities that includes
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`all five of the Defendants named in this action (i.e., Netflix, Hulu, Disney, DISH, and DIRECTV).
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`This case thus triggers the duty to avoid duplicative litigation of overlapping class actions, in
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`accordance with Congress’s objective in enacting the Class Action Fairness Act—i.e., to increase
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`the power of federal courts to deal with “overlapping and ‘copycat’ cases” in state court through
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`joint oversight, consolidation, or otherwise. S. Rep. No. 109–14 at 4–5 (2005), as reprinted in
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`2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 5–6.
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`Second, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in City of Fishers, Indiana v. DIRECTV, 5 F.4th
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`750 (7th Cir. 2021) (“City of Fishers”), does not require remand. The Seventh Circuit did not hold
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`that Levin comity requires deference to copycat litigation, nor did it speak to the outcome of the
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`fact-intensive comity inquiry under the different circumstances of this case. The existence of the
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`East St. Louis Case makes these circumstances dramatically different and changes the outcome of
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`the Levin test. City of Fishers did not implicate the duty of federal courts to avoid duplicative
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`litigation, either by staying, consolidating in full or in part, or managing jointly the second-filed
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`action. Moreover, the comity analysis in City of Fishers was driven primarily by the view that
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`1
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`Case 3:21-cv-00807-MAB Document 58 Filed 09/20/21 Page 8 of 24 Page ID #148
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`remand would avoid the need for a federal court to rule on the state revenue-generating scheme at
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`issue. Not so here because the plaintiff in the first-filed East St. Louis Case has already chosen to
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`litigate the issues presented here in federal court on behalf of itself and all other local government
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`units in Illinois. Whatever discretion comity may afford to remand this case is outweighed by the
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`duty to avoid duplicative litigation of actions, like these actions, that are properly before the federal
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`court. Indeed, City of Fishers recognized that “abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction
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`is the exception, not the rule.” City of Fishers, 5 F.4th at 753 (citation and quotation omitted).
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`As explained in more detail below, Defendants respectfully request that this Court deny
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`the motion for remand.1
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`I.
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`Background
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`The City of East St. Louis filed its complaint in this court on June 9, 2021. See East St.
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`Louis Case, Dkt. 1. East St. Louis alleges that Defendants provide “video service in Illinois cities,
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`villages, incorporated towns, and counties” (id. ¶ 2) and that Defendants therefore must pay video
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`service provider fees allegedly due under the Illinois Cable and Video Competition Law of 2007
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`(the “Act”). East St. Louis asserts these claims on behalf of a putative class of “[a]ll Illinois cities,
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`villages, incorporated towns, and counties in which one or more of the Defendants provided video
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`service” (id. ¶ 59).
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`Shiloh filed this duplicate case in the State Court one week later, on June 16, 2021,
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`asserting the same claims on behalf of the same putative class as in the East St. Louis Case. All
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`five Defendants in this case (Netflix, Hulu, Disney, DISH, and DIRECTV) are named Defendants
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`in the East St. Louis Case. In both cases, the plaintiffs seek video service provider fees on behalf
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`1 This Court has several case management options that it may exercise in its discretion, including
`(i) consolidating this action, in full or in part, with the East St. Louis Case (ii) staying this action
`pending adjudication of the East St. Louis complaint, or (iii) coordinating the two proceedings to
`maximize efficiency and avoid duplication of effort.
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`2
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`of themselves and local government units in Illinois. Both complaints allege that those fees are
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`required by the Act. And both complaints allege that Defendants do not use the public internet,
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`which is exempted from video service provider fees.
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`Defendants timely removed this case to this District on July 15, 2021, where it was assigned
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`to Judge Yandle. See Village of Shiloh v. Netflix, Inc., et al., No. 3:21-cv-00807, Dkt. 1 (Jul. 15,
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`2021). On July 28, Judge Yandle issued an order to show cause why this case should not be
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`remanded in light of the Seventh Circuit’s July 21 decision in City of Fishers, and Defendants
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`responded on August 6. In response, Defendants pointed to the prior East St. Louis complaint and
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`the inefficiency that would result from two almost identical cases being adjudicated in two
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`different courts. Judge Yandle then transferred this case to Magistrate Judge Beatty on August 9,
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`noting that the earlier filed East St. Louis Case was already here. Shiloh then moved to remand to
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`the State Court, relying on the City of Fishers decision.
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`II.
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`Legal Standard
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`Federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise the jurisdiction
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`conferred by Congress. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
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`(1976). This obligation is particularly unyielding in cases, like this one, removed pursuant to the
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`Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). CAFA was enacted by Congress “to facilitate adjudication
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`of certain class actions in federal court.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574
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`U.S. 81, 89 (2014). Congress was concerned that “[m]ultiple class action cases purporting to assert
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`the same claims on behalf of the same people often proceed simultaneously in different state courts,
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`causing judicial inefficiencies and promoting collusive activity,” and thus sought to promote
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`“efficiencies in the judicial system by allowing overlapping and ‘copycat’ cases to be consolidated
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`in a single federal court ....” S. Rep. No. 109–14 at 4–6 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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`3, 5–6. “Unlike ordinary diversity cases, “‘no antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking
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`3
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`Case 3:21-cv-00807-MAB Document 58 Filed 09/20/21 Page 10 of 24 Page ID #150
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`CAFA.’” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC, 574 U.S. at 89 (emphasis added); see also
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`Hammer v. United States Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 905 F.3d 517, 526 (7th Cir. 2018) (“To
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`the extent there is a presumption against removal in ordinary diversity cases, it does not extend to
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`cases in which there is a contrary congressional policy favoring removal.”); Peatry v. Bimbo
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`Bakeries USA, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 3d 766, 768 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (noting that “the same presumption
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`against removal does not apply in CAFA cases”).
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`A party removing under CAFA is not required to prove jurisdiction; rather, CAFA-based
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`removal is subject to “the same liberal rules” that apply under Rule 8 and only requires a “short
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`and plain statement of the grounds for removal.” Sabrina Roppo v. Travelers Com. Ins. Co., 869
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`F.3d 568, 578–79 (7th Cir. 2017) (citations and quotations omitted). Where, as here, the non-
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`removing party does not challenge the allegations of jurisdictional facts (see Notice of Removal,
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`Dkt. 1 ¶ 1; see also generally Pl. Memo. in Supp. Of Mot. to Remand, Dkt. 46 (“Pl. Memo”)), no
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`further proof is required to support federal court jurisdiction. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S.
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`77, 96–97 (2010) (“When challenged on allegations of jurisdictional facts, the parties must
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`support their allegations by competent proof.”); Sabrina Roppo, 869 F.3d at 579 (finding that
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`uncontested allegation of amount in controversy should be accepted); Laures v. Progressive Cas.
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`Ins. Co., No. 20-CV-1047-SMY, 2021 WL 3476328, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2021) (noting that
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`proof of jurisdictional facts is required “if the plaintiff contests the defendant’s allegation”).
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`As City of Fishers recognizes, comity-based abstention “pushes against this [unflagging]
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`obligation” established by CAFA, and therefore, abstention “is the exception, not the rule.” City
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`of Fishers, 5 F.4th at 753 (quotation omitted). This is why the comity doctrine is “seldom invoked”
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`(id.); and when it is invoked, the decision whether to remand is left to the discretion of the district
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`court. Id. at 755 (“the question becomes whether the district court abused its discretion by”
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`4
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`Case 3:21-cv-00807-MAB Document 58 Filed 09/20/21 Page 11 of 24 Page ID #151
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`remanding under Levin). Because comity-based remand is discretionary, not mandatory, a district
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`court must take care not “to subvert the fairness concerns underlying [CAFA].” Rothner v. City
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`of Chicago, 879 F.2d 1402, 1407–08 (7th Cir. 1989).
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`III. Argument
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`Shiloh’s remand motion turns the foregoing principles on their head by suggesting that
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`CAFA must be strictly construed and that the discretionary comity doctrine somehow
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`transmogrifies into a mandatory jurisdictional bar in this case (and by implication, in every case
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`involving any sort of state tax or fee dispute). The motion thus misconstrues both the nature of
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`the comity doctrine, which continues to be discretionary and highly dependent on the
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`circumstances of each case, and the Seventh Circuit’s decision in City of Fishers. City of Fishers
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`did not abrogate this Court’s discretion, and the Court should exercise its discretion to deny remand
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`because of the concerns raised by Shiloh’s attempt to forum-shop and pursue unnecessary and
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`duplicative litigation in the State Court. This case presents good reasons to deny remand and to
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`continue to exercise the subject matter jurisdiction indisputably conferred by CAFA.
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`A.
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`The City of Fishers decision does not require remand.
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`City of Fishers acknowledges that comity-based remand is discretionary, not mandatory.
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`The Seventh Circuit merely held that the district court in that case did not abuse its discretion in
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`evaluating “the Levin ‘confluence of [comity] factors’” to decline jurisdiction. City of Fishers, 5
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`F.4th at 758. Nowhere in the opinion does the court state that the discretionary doctrine of comity
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`somehow deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction that has been properly asserted under
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`CAFA. The Levin factors must be considered on a case-by-case basis, and application of those
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`factors here makes clear that comity is neither required nor appropriate.
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`5
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`Case 3:21-cv-00807-MAB Document 58 Filed 09/20/21 Page 12 of 24 Page ID #152
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`1.
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`Application of the Levin factors to the facts of this case favors
`remaining in federal court because of the presence of the previously-
`filed East St. Louis Case.
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`The Levin factors do not favor remand because, in contrast with the City of Fishers case,
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`this case involves potential remand of a second-filed, duplicative litigation.2 This case was filed a
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`week after the East St. Louis Case was filed in this District, and it duplicates the same claims,
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`against the same defendants, on behalf of the same class. Because the East St. Louis plaintiff
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`already chose a federal forum for this putative class action, the City of Fishers’ analysis of the
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`Levin factors is inapposite:
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` Factor 1—Which party invokes federal court review: it was the East St. Louis
`plaintiff that first sought federal court intervention on behalf of itself and the
`putative class (which would include Shiloh if successful).
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` Factor 2—Intent of the removing parties: Defendants did not invoke federal court
`jurisdiction in this case to improve their competitive position, but rather to avoid
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`2 In fact, the prerequisite for Levin comity does not exist here because this case does not involve
`“commercial matters over which [Illinois] enjoys wide regulatory latitude.” Levin, 560 U.S. at
`431. The state’s, and Shiloh’s, latitude to impose franchise fees is circumscribed by the federal
`Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (“Cable Act”), which limits franchise fees to entities
`that operate cable systems, defines cable systems as ones crossing the public rights of way, and
`expressly preempts – the strongest form of federal preemption – any “provision of law of any State,
`political subdivision, or agency thereof, or franchising authority, or any provision of any franchise
`granted by such authority, which is inconsistent . . ..” 47 U.S.C. § 556(c) (preemption); id. § 522(7)
`(defining cable system). As the Federal Communications Commission has made clear,
`deployment of non-cable services “does not trigger the obligation to obtain a cable franchise.”
`Implementation of Section 621(a)(1) of the Cable Commc’ns Pol’y Act of 1984 As Amended by the
`Cable Television Consumer Prot. & Competition Act of 1992, 22 F.C.C. Rcd. 5101, 5155 ¶ 121
`(Mar. 5, 2007), and local franchise authorities, like Shiloh, may not “extract fees or impose
`franchise or other requirements on cable operators insofar as they are providing services other than
`cable services.” Implementation of Section 621(a)(1) of the Cable Commc’ns Pol’y Act of 1984
`As Amended by the Cable Television Consumer Prot. & Competition Act of 1992, 34 F.C.C. Rcd.
`6844, 6889 ¶ 80 (F.C.C. Aug. 2, 2019); see also City of Eugene, Oregon v. Fed. Commc’ns
`Comm’n, 998 F.3d 701, 711 (6th Cir. 2021) (agreeing with FCC that “states and localities may not
`end-run the Act’s limitations by using other governmental entities or other sources of authority to
`accomplish indirectly what franchising authorities are prohibited from doing directly” (citations
`and quotations omitted)). This confirms that Shiloh does not have any latitude—much less wide
`latitude—to impose franchise fees inconsistent with federal law, see City of Chicago v. F.C.C.,
`199 F.3d 424, 428 (7th Cir. 1999) (confirming “that the FCC is charged by Congress with the
`administration of the Cable Act”), raising serious questions as to whether Levin factors even apply.
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`6
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`Case 3:21-cv-00807-MAB Document 58 Filed 09/20/21 Page 13 of 24 Page ID #153
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`duplicative litigation. Shiloh, by contrast, is engaging in blatant forum-shopping
`by commencing copycat litigation in a state forum where it apparently hopes to
`overtake the first-filed East St. Louis Case.
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` Factor 3—Whether the state court is better positioned: the federal court is capable
`of deciding matters of state law when, as here, it has been asked to do so by a
`local government plaintiff. See, e.g., City of Reno, Nevada v. Netflix, Inc., et al.,
`No 3:20-cv-499, 2021 WL 4037491 (D. Nev. Sept. 3, 2021) (construing Nevada’s
`video franchise fee statute as a matter of first impression and granting Netflix’s
`and Hulu’s motions to dismiss); Norberg v. Shutterfly, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 3d 1103,
`1106 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (interpreting the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act
`notwithstanding the lack of “any judicial interpretation of the statute” at the time).
`
`
`See also City of Fishers, 5 F.4th at 756 (applying Levin factors). The Levin court recognized that
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`“[i]f the State voluntarily chooses to submit to a federal forum, principles of comity do not demand
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`that the federal court force the case back into the State’s own system.” 560 U.S. at 432 (citation
`
`and quotation omitted); see also Ohio Bureau of Emp. Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 480 (1977)
`
`(same).
`
`2.
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`Remand of this case would guarantee duplicative litigation, which a
`federal court has a duty to avoid.
`
`Under the first-to-file rule, courts have a “duty … to avoid duplicative litigation in more
`
`than one federal court.” Ozinga v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 13-cv-3292, 2013 WL
`
`12212731, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 2013) (citation and quotation omitted); see also Trippe Mfg.
`
`Co. v. Am. Power Conversion Corp., 46 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1995). If deferring to the first-
`
`filed case is consistent with “considerations of judicial and litigant economy, and the just and
`
`effective disposition of disputes,” courts should so defer. MLR, LLC v. U.S. Robotics Corp., No.
`
`02-cv-2898, 2003 WL 685504, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2003). There is no doubt that this case is
`
`duplicative of the East St. Louis Case because it involves the same “claims, parties, and available
`
`relief.” Nicholson v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC of Delaware, No. 17-CV-1373, 2018 WL 3344408,
`
`at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 6, 2018) (quoting Humphrey v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., No. 14-cv-
`
`7
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`

`

`Case 3:21-cv-00807-MAB Document 58 Filed 09/20/21 Page 14 of 24 Page ID #154
`
`1157, 2014 WL 3511498, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 2014)) (applying first-to-file rule where second-
`
`filed case substantially overlapped with first case).
`
`The concern for avoiding duplicative litigation is heightened under CAFA, which
`
`“protect[s] defendants from this type of activity, where different class members file separate class
`
`action lawsuits in varying jurisdictions, by providing a singular federal forum.” DeHart v. BP
`
`America, Inc., No. 09-cv-0626, 2010 WL 231744, at *12 (W.D. La. Jan. 14, 2010) (denying
`
`remand of class action where first-filed action remained pending in federal court); see also
`
`Hostetler v. Johnson Controls, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-226, 2017 WL 3700345, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Aug.
`
`28, 2017) (denying third motion to remand class action that had different named plaintiffs but
`
`otherwise overlapped with action filed in federal court).
`
`Shiloh resorts to inapposite cases in a futile attempt to avoid the impact of the first-to-file
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`rule and CAFA. See Pl. Memo. at 8. The Ironshore case involved deference to a state case that
`
`was filed first and never removed to federal court—the opposite of this case. Ironshore Indem.,
`
`Inc. v. Synergy L. Grp., LLC, 926 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1009 (N.D. Ill. 2013). The AmSouth Bank
`
`case is even more inapposite; there, the plaintiffs deceived the defendants by “participat[ing] in
`
`settlement negotiations and affirmative representations … to lull [defendants] into believing that
`
`amicable negotiation was still possible,” while plaintiffs simultaneously shopped for a favorable
`
`forum to bring a declaratory judgment action. AmSouth Bank v. Dale, 386 F.3d 763, 790 (6th Cir.
`
`2004). Shiloh’s third case, Morris, was remanded due to a lack of diversity jurisdiction and the
`
`failure of the removing party to demonstrate that the non-diverse party was fraudulently joined.
`
`Morris v. Gulfport Energy Corp., No. 2:15-CV-1342, 2015 WL 4365498, at *6 (S.D. Ohio July
`
`16, 2015). The court’s statement about the first-to-file rule being a “square peg into a round hole”
`
`was a reference to the fact that the rule cannot be invoked to establish diversity jurisdiction where
`
`8
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`

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`Case 3:21-cv-00807-MAB Document 58 Filed 09/20/21 Page 15 of 24 Page ID #155
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`the parties are not diverse. See id. (noting the existence of “a dispute as to whether jurisdiction is
`
`proper”).
`
`Contrary to Shiloh’s misguided argument, federal courts routinely apply the first-to-file
`
`rule to actions removed from state court. See, e.g., Norrid v. D.A.R.P., Inc., No. 17-CV-401, 2018
`
`WL 2977384, at *2 (E.D. Okla. June 13, 2018) (“‘When a state action is removed to federal court,
`
`for first-to-file purposes, the state court filing date is the date used.’”) (quoting Medspring Group,
`
`Inc. v. Atl. Healthcare Group, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-115, 2006 WL 581018, at *3 (D. Utah Mar. 6,
`
`2006)); Heritage Schooner Cruises, Inc. v. Acadia Ins. Co., No. 09-CV-22579, 2009 WL
`
`10699880, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 30, 2009) (same); Manufacturers Hanover Tr. Co. v. Palmer
`
`Corp., 798 F. Supp. 161, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same); see also Diversified Metal Prod., Inc. v.
`
`Odom Indus., Inc., No. 1:12-CV-162, 2012 WL 2872772, at *2 (D. Idaho July 12, 2012) (collecting
`
`additional cases).
`
`Finally, comity does not outweigh the concern for avoiding duplicative litigation. This
`
`situation is similar to the situation in which federal courts are asked to exercise supplemental
`
`jurisdiction over s