Case 1:19-cv-11974-IT Document 107 Filed 03/29/20 Page 1 of 21
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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`MELODY CUNNINGHAM and FRUNWI
`MANCHO, on behalf of themselves and all
`others similarly situated,
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`v.
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`LYFT, INC., LOGAN GREEN, and JOHN
`ZIMMER,
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`C.A. No. 1:19-cv-11974
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`Plaintiffs,
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`Defendants.
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`DEFENDANTS’ EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STATUS CONFERENCE AND TO
`CONFIRM STAY OF PROCEEDINGS PENDING APPEAL
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`Case 1:19-cv-11974-IT Document 107 Filed 03/29/20 Page 2 of 21
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`PAGE
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`INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1
`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................3
`I.
`The Court Should Schedule a Status Conference. ...............................................................3
`II.
`The Court Should Stay All Further Proceedings Pending Appeal. ......................................3
`A.
`Defendants’ appeal divests this Court of jurisdiction ..............................................3
`B.
`Alternatively, a discretionary stay is appropriate. ...................................................7
`III.
`Motion. ...............................................................................................................................13
`IV.
`Defendants to Seek Relief From the First Circuit. .............................................................14
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`The Court Should Stay Proceedings While It Decides This Motion, or at Least
`Extend by Three Days Defendants’ Time to Oppose the Preliminary Injunction
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`If the Court Denies This Motion, It Should Grant a Brief Interim Stay to Permit
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`i
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`Case 1:19-cv-11974-IT Document 107 Filed 03/29/20 Page 3 of 21
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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`PAGE
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`FEDERAL CASES
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`14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,
`556 U.S. 247 (2009) ...................................................................................................................5
`
`Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.,
`570 U.S. 228 (2013) ...........................................................................................................11, 13
`
`AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
`563 U.S. 333 (2011) ...........................................................................................................11, 12
`
`Austin v. DoorDash, Inc.,
`No. 1:17-CV-12498-IT, 2019 WL 4804781 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2019) ....................................9
`
`Bekele v. Lyft, Inc.,
`918 F.3d 181 (1st Cir. 2019) ....................................................................................................10
`
`Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC,
`366 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2004) .............................................................................................4, 5
`
`Bombardier Corp. v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,
`333 F.3d 250 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ...................................................................................................4
`
`Boston Taxi Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Boston,
`187 F. Supp. 3d 339 (D. Mass. 2016) ........................................................................................7
`
`Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc.,
`128 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 1997) .............................................................................................4, 5, 6
`
`Brennan v. King,
`139 F.3d 258 (1st Cir. 1998) ......................................................................................................8
`
`Britton v. Co-op Banking Grp.,
`916 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1990) ...................................................................................................6
`
`C.B.S. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp.,
`716 F. Supp. 307 (W.D. Tenn. 1989).......................................................................................12
`
`Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,
`532 U.S. 105 (2001) ...................................................................................................................8
`
`Combined Energies v. CCI, Inc.,
`495 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Me. 2007) ...........................................................................................5
`
`Cuevas v. United States,
`778 F.3d 267 (1st Cir. 2015) ......................................................................................................8
`
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`ii
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`Case 1:19-cv-11974-IT Document 107 Filed 03/29/20 Page 4 of 21
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(CONTINUED)
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`PAGE
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`Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc.,
`482 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2007).......................................................................................................4
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`Furtado v. Republic Parking Sys., LLC,
`No. 19-CV-11481-DJC, 2020 WL 996849 (D. Mass. Mar. 2, 2020) ......................................11
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`Gadson v. SuperShuttle Int’l,
`No. 10-CV-01057-AW, 2011 WL 1231311 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2011), vacated
`on other grounds sub nom..........................................................................................................8
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`Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co.,
`459 U.S. 56 (1982) (per curiam) ......................................................................................3, 6, 13
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`Hilton v. Braunskill,
`481 U.S. 770 (1987) ...................................................................................................................7
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`Intergen N.V. v. Grina,
`No. CIV.A. 01-11774-REK, 2003 WL 1562200 (D. Mass. Feb. 21, 2003) ..............................5
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`Kowalewski v. Samandarov,
`590 F. Supp. 2d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ........................................................................................8
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`Levin v. Alms & Assocs., Inc.,
`634 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 2011) .....................................................................................................4
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`McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc.,
`413 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2005) .............................................................................................4, 5
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`Mendez-Matos v. Municipality of Guaynabo,
`498 F. Supp. 2d 473 (D.P.R. 2007) ............................................................................................6
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`Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan,
`388 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2004).........................................................................................................6
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`Muriithi v. Shuttle Exp., Inc.,
`712 F.3d 173 (4th Cir. 2013) .....................................................................................................8
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`Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Constellation Energy Commodities Grp., Inc.,
`563 F. Supp. 2d 325 (D.R.I. 2008).............................................................................................5
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`Optum, Inc. v. Smith,
`366 F. Supp. 3d 156 (D. Mass. 2019) ..................................................................................4, 12
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`Randle v. Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris Cty.,
`No. CV H-18-1770, 2018 WL 4701567 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2018).............................................8
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`iii
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`Case 1:19-cv-11974-IT Document 107 Filed 03/29/20 Page 5 of 21
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(CONTINUED)
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`PAGE
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`Reaves v. Dep’t of Correction,
`404 F. Supp. 3d 520 (D. Mass. 2019) ........................................................................................7
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`Saxon v. Sw. Airlines Co.,
`No. 19-CV-0403, 2019 WL 4958247 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 2019) ..................................................8
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`Scaccia v. Uber Techs., Inc.,
`No. 3:18-CV-00418, 2019 WL 2476811 (S.D. Ohio June 13, 2019), report
`and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 4674333 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2019) ........................8
`
`Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc.,
`939 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2019)...............................................................................................7, 8, 9
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`Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp.,
`797 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1986) ......................................................................................................12
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`Vargas v. Delivery Outsourcing, LLC,
`2016 WL 946112 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2016) .............................................................................9
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`Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`404 F. Supp. 3d 335 (D. Mass. 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-1848 (1st Cir.
`2019) ..........................................................................................................................................9
`
`Wallace v. Grubhub Holdings Inc.,
`No. 18 C 4538, 2019 WL 1399986 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2019) ...................................................9
`
`Weingarten Realty Inv’rs v. Miller,
`661 F.3d 904 (5th Cir. 2011) .....................................................................................................6
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`STATE CASES
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`Dixon v. Perry & Slesnick, P.C.,
`75 Mass. App. Ct. 271 (2009) ..................................................................................................10
`
`Feeney v. Dell Inc.,
`454 Mass. 192 (2009) ..........................................................................................................9, 10
`
`Machado v. System4 LLC,
`465 Mass. 508 (2013) ................................................................................................................9
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`Machado v. System4 LLC,
`471 Mass. 204 (2015) ..............................................................................................................10
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`Tze-Kit Mui v. Massachusetts Port Auth.,
`478 Mass. 710 (2018) ..............................................................................................................11
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`iv
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`Case 1:19-cv-11974-IT Document 107 Filed 03/29/20 Page 6 of 21
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`(CONTINUED)
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`PAGE
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`FEDERAL STATUTES
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`9 U.S.C. § 1 ..............................................................................................................................2, 3, 8
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`9 U.S.C. § 16(a) .......................................................................................................................3, 4, 6
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`9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1) ...........................................................................................................................6
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`9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(1) ..........................................................................................................................6
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`Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) ........................................................................................................1
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`STATUTES - OTHER
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`G.L. c. 149, § 150 ............................................................................................................................1
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`M. G. L. c. 149 § 148C(c) ..............................................................................................................12
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`RULES - OTHER
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`Local Rule 7.1(a)(2) .......................................................................................................................14
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`v
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`Case 1:19-cv-11974-IT Document 107 Filed 03/29/20 Page 7 of 21
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Defendants Lyft, Inc., Logan Green, and John Zimmer (collectively, “Lyft”) move this
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`Court to stay further proceedings pending their appeal from the Court’s order denying their
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`motion to compel arbitration. Six circuit courts and every district court in this Circuit to consider
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`the issue have held that an appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration divests a
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`district court of jurisdiction over the case and thus requires a mandatory stay of further
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`proceedings until the appeal is resolved. No sound reason exists for this Court to depart from the
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`consensus view. Even if the mandatory stay were inapplicable, this Court should exercise its
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`discretion to stay proceedings pending appeal. The appeal raises substantial legal questions,
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`which are highly contested, regarding the proper scope of the Federal Arbitration Act’s (FAA)
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`“transportation worker” exemption and Massachusetts law regarding class action waivers under
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`G.L. c. 149, § 150. Allowing a sprawling class action to proceed—one that jeopardizes the
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`relationship between Lyft and tens of thousands of Massachusetts drivers–only to later discover
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`that this matter belonged in arbitration would undermine tens of thousands of arbitration
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`agreements, waste massive party and Court resources, and risk an inconsistent judgment from an
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`arbitrator.
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`Defendants also respectfully request that the Court issue an interim stay while it decides
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`this motion. If the majority of circuits and all the district courts in this Circuit are correct that the
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`notice of appeal effectuates an automatic, mandatory stay, then it would be improper to force the
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`parties to continue litigating this matter. In the alternative, Defendants request a modest three-
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`day extension of their time to oppose the pending preliminary injunction motion, noting that
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`Plaintiffs unilaterally took five additional days to refine and file their motion papers. Given that
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`and the substantial impact of the Court’s recent order denying arbitration, Defendants suggest
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`that three extra days is not an unreasonable request.
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`1
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`Case 1:19-cv-11974-IT Document 107 Filed 03/29/20 Page 8 of 21
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`Finally, should the Court deny this motion, Defendants request a brief stay to give them
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`time to seek emergency relief from the First Circuit.
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`RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
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`On September 17, 2019, Plaintiff Melody Cunningham filed this putative class action
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`alleging that Lyft misclassifies drivers as independent contractors rather than employees,
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`contrary to Massachusetts law. Six days later, on September 23, 2019, Cunningham filed a
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`motion for a preliminary “public injunction” ordering Lyft to immediately reclassify all
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`Massachusetts drivers from independent contractors to employees. In the motion, Cunningham
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`specifically did not seek relief for herself separate from the “public injunction.” ECF 4. On
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`December 13, 2019, at the Court’s invitation at a December 9, 2019 hearing, Cunningham
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`amended her complaint to add Frunwi Mancho as a plaintiff. Mancho claims he drove riders
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`across state lines twice—from Massachusetts to New Hampshire—while using Lyft’s platform.
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`Otherwise, however, his allegations are identical to Cunningham’s and he seeks the same relief.
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`Lyft’s Terms of Service, to which Plaintiffs assented multiple times, require individual
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`arbitration of all such disputes. Defendants accordingly moved to compel arbitration on October
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`3, 2019, arguing that the arbitration agreement was enforceable, covered Plaintiff’s claims, and
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`was not exempt from the FAA by that statute’s “transportation worker” exemption. By
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`stipulation dated January 6, 2020, the parties agreed that the existing briefing on the motion to
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`compel arbitration of Cunningham’s claims would apply equally to Mancho’s identical claims.
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`On March 27, 2020, this Court denied Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration of both
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`Plaintiffs’ claims. ECF 98. The Court concluded that (1) the exception in the FAA for
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`“contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
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`in foreign or interstate commerce,” 9 U.S.C. § 1, applies to workers engaged in the transportation
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`of passengers as well as goods; (2) “Plaintiffs are within a class of transportation workers
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`Case 1:19-cv-11974-IT Document 107 Filed 03/29/20 Page 9 of 21
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`excluded from coverage by Section 1 of the FAA”; and (3) “the arbitration agreement between
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`the parties is not enforceable under Massachusetts law as it contravenes Massachusetts’ public
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`policy against class action waivers of Wage Act claims.”
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`Defendants filed a notice of appeal from the Court’s order denying its motion to compel
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`arbitration on the same day. ECF 102. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a). Currently pending before the Court
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`is Plaintiffs’ emergency motion for a preliminary injunction. Defendants’ opposition to that
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`motion is due on March 31.
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`I.
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`The Court Should Schedule a Status Conference.
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`ARGUMENT
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`Given the issues raised in this motion and the potential impact of the denial of the motion
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`to compel arbitration and Defendants’ appeal therefrom, Defendants respectfully suggest that a
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`brief telephone status conference would be helpful.
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`II.
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`The Court Should Stay All Further Proceedings Pending Appeal.
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`A.
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`Defendants’ appeal divests this Court of jurisdiction.
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`The FAA provides an interlocutory appeal as of right from the denial of a motion to
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`compel arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a). It is axiomatic that a “notice of appeal confers jurisdiction
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`on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case
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`involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per
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`curiam). Because Defendants seek arbitration of all issues in this case for all plaintiffs, the
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`present appeal divests the Court of jurisdiction over the entire case, and the entire case must be
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`stayed. There are no issues that are not “aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” A reversal
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`on appeal would require that all proceedings on the merits be conducted as part of an arbitration.
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`To proceed in federal court during the appeal would deprive Defendants of their statutory right to
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`immediate appeal granted by Congress.
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`For these reasons, six courts of appeals have confirmed that a stay pending appeal from
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`Case 1:19-cv-11974-IT Document 107 Filed 03/29/20 Page 10 of 21
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`the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is mandatory (unless the appeal is frivolous or
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`forfeited, neither of which is the case here). See Levin v. Alms & Assocs., Inc., 634 F.3d 260, 266
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`(4th Cir. 2011) (“We therefore hold that an appeal on the issue of arbitrability automatically
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`divests the district court of jurisdiction over the underlying claims and requires a stay of the
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`action, unless the district court certifies the appeal as frivolous or forfeited.”); Ehleiter v.
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`Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 215 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007) (expressing “agreement with the
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`majority rule of automatic divestiture where the Section 16(a) appeal is neither frivolous nor
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`forfeited”); McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 413 F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 2005)
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`(“[W]e hold that the district court is divested of jurisdiction while a non-frivolous § 16(a) motion
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`is pending.”); Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 366 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004)
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`(“When a litigant files a motion to stay litigation in the district court pending an appeal from the
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`denial of a motion to compel arbitration, the district court should stay the litigation so long as the
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`appeal is non-frivolous.”); Bombardier Corp. v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 333 F.3d 250, 252
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`(D.C. Cir. 2003) (“Amtrak’s appeal of the motion to dismiss was facially non-frivolous and thus
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`the district court was divested of jurisdiction over the underlying action until we could determine
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`the threshold issue of whether the dispute between the parties is arbitrable under the FAA.”);
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`Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc., 128 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir.
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`1997) (Section 16(a) appeals are “poor candidates for exceptions to the principle that a notice of
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`appeal divests the district court of power to proceed with the aspects of the case that have been
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`transferred to the court of appeals”).
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`The First Circuit has not addressed the issue, likely because district courts in this Circuit
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`uniformly have followed the lead of the majority of circuit courts. See, e.g., Optum, Inc. v. Smith,
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`366 F. Supp. 3d 156, 159 (D. Mass. 2019) (“[T]he court finds that it should stay this case during
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`the pendency of Smith’s appeal…As explained earlier,…a stay is automatic because an appeal
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`Case 1:19-cv-11974-IT Document 107 Filed 03/29/20 Page 11 of 21
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`always divests a district court of jurisdiction.”); Combined Energies v. CCI, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 2d
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`142, 143 (D. Me. 2007) (“[T]he Court concludes that the better view is the [mandatory stay]
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`view.”); Intergen N.V. v. Grina, No. CIV.A. 01-11774-REK, 2003 WL 1562200, at *3 (D. Mass.
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`Feb. 21, 2003) (“[S]everal factors guide this court to adopt the [mandatory stay] approach.”); see
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`also Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Constellation Energy Commodities Grp., Inc., 563 F. Supp. 2d
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`325, 328 (D.R.I. 2008) (“The Court…essentially concurs with[] the well-reasoned[] recent
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`decision” favoring a mandatory stay).
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`This Court should likewise follow that well-reasoned majority view. The very purpose of
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`Defendants’ appeal is to decide who will adjudicate the parties’ dispute—the Court or an
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`arbitrator. Whether to litigate the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims in Court thus “is not an issue
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`collateral to the question presented by [Defendants’] appeal…; it is the mirror image of the
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`question presented on appeal.” Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 505. If this Court’s denial of
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`Defendants’ motion is in error, continued proceedings would “largely defeat[] the point of the
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`appeal and create[] a risk of inconsistent handling of the case by two tribunals.” Id.
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`Absent a stay, Defendants could be stripped of the benefit of their bargain: that disputes
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`will be settled in proceedings that are more streamlined, more informal, and less costly.
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`Arbitration agreements exist precisely to avoid the costs of litigation, and courts generally
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`hesitate to upend that bargained-for benefit. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 257
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`(2009). By the same token, arbitration agreements give “the party moving to enforce [it] a right
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`not to litigate the dispute in a court and bear the associated burdens.” Blinco, 366 F.3d at 1252.
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`As one court of appeals explained, “the failure to grant a stay pending . . . appeal results in a
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`denial or impairment of the appellant’s ability to obtain its legal entitlement to avoidance of
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`litigation.” McCauley, 413 F.3d at 1162.
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`Those policy concerns explain (at least in part) why Congress has allowed immediate
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`Case 1:19-cv-11974-IT Document 107 Filed 03/29/20 Page 12 of 21
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`appeals from orders denying arbitration but not from those compelling it. Compare 9 U.S.C.
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`§ 16(a)(1) with 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(1). Congress did so to avoid unnecessarily burdening the parties
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`and the court with continued litigation, all of which will be for naught if the court of appeals later
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`decides that the case belonged in arbitration all along. See Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 506
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`(“These benefits are eroded, and may be lost or even turned into net losses, if it is necessary to
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`proceed in both judicial and arbitral forums, or to do this sequentially.”).
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`A few courts have held that a stay pending a § 16(a) appeal is not strictly mandatory.
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`Weingarten Realty Inv’rs v. Miller, 661 F.3d 904, 908 (5th Cir. 2011); Motorola Credit Corp. v.
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`Uzan, 388 F.3d 39, 54 (2d Cir. 2004); Britton v. Co-op Banking Grp., 916 F.2d 1405, 1410 (9th
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`Cir. 1990). These courts give two reasons for their view. First, they explain that a mandatory
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`stay might allow a party to stall by filing and appealing a frivolous motion to compel arbitration.
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`But that risk is not present here because, as explained below and in Lyft’s motion to compel
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`arbitration, Lyft’s appeal presents novel, unsettled issues. See infra pp. 7-10. Second, the
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`minority view argues that under the Griggs standard the merits of the case are not necessarily
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`“aspects of the case involved in the appeal” of the arbitration issue. See, e.g., Weingarten, 661
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`F.3d at 909. But Griggs is meant to address situations in which there are parts of a case that can
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`be completely divorced from the portion on appeal, e.g., attorneys’ fees claims. See, e.g.,
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`Mendez-Matos v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 498 F. Supp. 2d 473, 475 (D.P.R. 2007). In the case
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`of a motion to compel arbitration, Defendants believe the majority of circuits have the correct
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`view because the issue on appeal here is whether this Court can decide the merits of the case at
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`all. That is, the appeal “presents the question whether the district court must stay its own
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`proceedings pending arbitration. Whether the litigation may go forward in the district court is
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`precisely what the court of appeals must decide.” Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 506. If the First
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`Circuit here rules that arbitration is required, any proceedings by this Court in the meantime
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`Case 1:19-cv-11974-IT Document 107 Filed 03/29/20 Page 13 of 21
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`would be ultra vires and in violation of the FAA. The merits are, thus, “aspects of the case
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`involved in the appeal.”
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`The Court should stay further proceedings on Plaintiffs’ claims until Defendants’ pending
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`appeal is resolved because it lacks jurisdiction to proceed.
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`B.
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`Alternatively, a discretionary stay is appropriate.
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`Even if this Court follows the minority view and concludes that a stay is not mandatory,
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`it should nonetheless exercise its discretion to stay proceedings pending appeal. Four factors
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`guide the discretionary stay analysis. See Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987).
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`(1) whether “the appeal raises serious and difficult questions of law in an area where the
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`law is somewhat unclear.” Reaves v. Dep’t of Correction, 404 F. Supp. 3d 520, 522 (D. Mass.
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`2019) (explaining that when a motion to stay pending appeal is sought from a district court, the
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`first Hilton factor is applied in this way); Boston Taxi Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Boston, 187
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`F. Supp. 3d 339, 341 (D. Mass. 2016).
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`“(2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay;
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`(3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the
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`proceeding; and
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`(4) where the public interest lies.” Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776.
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`Each factor favors a stay in this case.
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`Serious Questions of Law. This standard is easily met here for each of the three distinct
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`issues that Lyft may raise on appeal.
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`First, Defendants will argue that the FAA’s transportation-worker exemption applies
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`only to the transportation of goods, not passengers. The Court’s decision acknowledges that
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`“[t]he case law is not so clear.” ECF 98 at 8. The only authority cited by this Court on this point
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`is Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., 939 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2019), which is (by the Third Circuit’s own
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`Case 1:19-cv-11974-IT Document 107 Filed 03/29/20 Page 14 of 21
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`account) the first published appellate opinion rejecting a goods-versus-passengers distinction. Id.
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`at 224 & n.8. As the First Circuit has itself explained, however, “most circuits, including this
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`one, have held that the exclusion is confined to workers who are engaged in the transportation of
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`goods in interstate commerce.” Brennan v. King, 139 F.3d 258, 264 n.5 (1st Cir. 1998) (emphasis
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`added). Even if, as this Court concluded, that limitation to “transportation of goods” were dicta,
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`it would be dicta straight from the Supreme Court. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532
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`U.S. 105, 121 (2001) (explaining that the enumerated types of workers in the exception
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`“demonstrate concern with transportation workers and their necessary role in the free flow of
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`goods” (emphasis added)). It may therefore be binding. See Cuevas v. United States, 778 F.3d
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`267, 272–73 (1st Cir. 2015) (Supreme Court dicta should not be ignored).
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`Many district courts have also disagreed with Singh’s conclusion. See, e.g., Saxon v. Sw.
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`Airlines Co., No. 19-CV-0403, 2019 WL 4958247, at *3–5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 2019); Scaccia v.
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`Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:18-CV-00418, 2019 WL 2476811, at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 13, 2019),
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`report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 4674333 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2019); Randle v.
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`Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris Cty., No. CV H-18-1770, 2018 WL 4701567, at *4 (S.D. Tex.
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`Oct. 1, 2018); Gadson v. SuperShuttle Int’l, No. 10-CV-01057-AW, 2011 WL 1231311, at *5
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`(D. Md. Mar. 30, 2011), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Muriithi v. Shuttle Exp., Inc., 712
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`F.3d 173 (4th Cir. 2013); Kowalewski v. Samandarov, 590 F. Supp. 2d 477, 484 (S.D.N.Y.
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`2008).
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`Second, Defendants will argue on appeal that Plaintiffs are not part of a “class of workers
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`engaged in . . . interstate commerce,” 9 U.S.C. § 1, because the class of drivers who use Lyft’s
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`platform are, as a whole, engaged in local rather than interstate commerce. Plaintiffs had the
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`burden of proof on this issue and submitted minimal evidence on this point. There is little
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`authority to suggest that Section 1’s reference to “interstate commerce” applies to “gig-
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`Case 1:19-cv-11974-IT Document 107 Filed 03/29/20 Page 15 of 21
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`economy” drivers. See Austin v. DoorDash, Inc., No. 1:17-CV-12498-IT, 2019 WL 4804781, at
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`*2–3 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2019) (exception does not apply to DoorDash drivers who do not cross
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`state lines); Wallace v. Grubhub Holdings Inc., No. 18 C 4538, 2019 WL 1399986, at *3–5
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`(N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2019) (same for Grubhub drivers); cf. Waithaka v. Amazon.com, Inc., 404 F.
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`Supp. 3d 335, 343 (D. Mass. 2019) (exception applies to Amazon drivers), appeal docketed, No.
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`19-1848 (1st Cir. 2019). Even Singh did not decide that issue. See 939 F.3d at 226–28
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`(remanding for the district court to address this in the first instance for Uber drivers). And the
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`Court has not cited any other case for its conclusion that the fact that some drivers use the Lyft
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`platform to transport passengers to or from Logan Airport means that all drivers are part of a
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`“practical continuity of movement” so as to make them engaged in interstate rather than local
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`commerce. That conclusion seems wholly novel and contrary to existing precedent. See, e.g.
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`Vargas v. Delivery Outsourcing, LLC, 2016 WL 946112, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2016) (airport
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`“luggage delivery service is not engaged in interstate commerce because it is not in the business
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`of shipping goods across state lines, even though it delivers good that once travelled interstate”).
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`Third, Defendants will argue that, even if the FAA does not apply, Massachusetts law
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`requires arbitration of Plaintiffs’ entire claim. There are substantial reasons to believe that
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`Massachusetts public policy voids class action waivers only where they operate as exculpatory
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`provisions. See Machado v. System4 LLC, 465 Mass. 508, 513 (2013); Feeney v. Dell Inc., 454
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`Mass. 192, 202, 205–08 (2009). Indeed, this Court’s view that Massachusetts bars all class action
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`waivers is not one the First Circuit or the Supreme Judicial Court has ever espoused. In Feeney,
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`the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court refused to enforce an arbitration agreement because of
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`a class action waiver, but the court did not establish a general presumption against all class
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`action waivers. Instead, the court specifically relied on the “strong public policy in favor of the
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`aggregation of small consumer protection claims.” Id. at 201. The SJC expressed concern that
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`Case 1:19-cv-11974-IT Document 107 Filed 03/29/20 Page 16 of 21
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`in some cases “aggregation of small claims is likely the only realistic option for pursuing a
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`claim.” Id. at 202. The SJC was narrowly concerned with waivers that as a practical matter
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`extinguish legitimate claims. See id. at 202, 205–08. This case obviously does not involve small
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`consumer protection claims that cannot be individually litigated. Notably, thousands of
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`arbitrations have been filed relating to the issues in this case; the size of the claims has not been a
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`bar to vindication.
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`Thus, applying Feeney I to bar all class action waivers notwithstanding the
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`Commonwealth’s “strong public policy favoring arbitration,” Dixon v. Perry & Slesnick, P.C.,
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`75 Mass. App. Ct. 271, 278 (2009), is a misreading of the decision. And it is inconsistent with
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`First Circuit precedent that Massachusetts law takes a “case-by-case approach” to whether
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`provisions of arbitration agreements are enforceable—one that “looks not at the contract in the
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`abstract nor at other potential litigants but at the individual claimant.” Bekele v. Lyft, Inc., 918
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`F.3d 181, 189 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding that a provision requiring a driver to split arbitration fees
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`with Lyft was enforceable where Lyft agreed to pay the fees because, in those particular
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`circumstances, the fees did not make it impractical for the driver to pursue his claims in
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`arbitration); see also Machado v. S