Case 2:22-cv-01305-FB-ST Document 74 Filed 11/22/22 Page 1 of 29 PageID #: 3559
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Case No. 2:22-cv-01305-FB-ST
`
`x::::::::::::::::::::::::x
`
`Defendant-Intervenor.
`
`PLAINTIFFS’ COMBINED OPPOSITION TO FEDERAL DEFENDANTS’
`MOTION TO DISMISS AND DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR SOUTH
`FORK WIND’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
`
`Dated: October 26, 2022
`
`
`{00327333.DOCX}
`
`
`
`
`
`HICKS THOMAS LLP
`
`
`/s/ Eric Grant
`
`Eric Grant (admitted pro hac vice)
`grant@hicks-thomas.com
`John B. Thomas (admitted pro hac vice)
`jthomas@hicks-thomas.com
`Crystal V. Venning (New York Bar No. 5294681)
`cvenning@hicks-thomas.com
`Justin R. Braga (admitted pro hac vice)
`jbraga@hicks-thomas.com
`700 Louisiana Street, Suite 2300
`Houston, Texas 77002
`Telephone: (713) 547-9100
`Facsimile:  (713) 547-9150
`
`Counsel for Plaintiffs
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
`---------------------------------------------------------
`
`PAMELA MAHONEY;
`MICHAEL MAHONEY;
`LISA SOLOMON; and
`MITCH SOLOMON,
`
`
`
`
`
`U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE
`INTERIOR; BUREAU OF OCEAN
`ENERGY MANAGEMENT; U.S.
`DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY; and
`U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,
`
`
`
`
`
`SOUTH FORK WIND, LLC,
`
`
`
`---------------------------------------------------------
`
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`-vs-
`
`Defendants,
`
`and
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01305-FB-ST Document 74 Filed 11/22/22 Page 2 of 29 PageID #: 3560
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii 
`
`INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1 
`
`ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................2 
`
`I. 
`
`Plaintiffs have Article III standing. ......................................................................................2 
`
`A. 
`
`Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged injury-in-fact ....................................................3 
`
`1. 
`
`2. 
`
`Plaintiffs allege a legally sufficient “concrete interest,”
`which Defendants wholly ignore .................................................................3 
`
`If the Court even reaches the issue, it should reject
`Defendants’ attacks on Plaintiffs’ additional allegations
`of contamination-related injury....................................................................6 
`
`II. 
`
`III. 
`
`B. 
`
`C. 
`
`The challenged agency actions caused Plaintiffs’ injury .........................................9 
`
`Plaintiffs’ injury is redressable by this Court ........................................................13 
`
`Plaintiffs state a claim under the Clean Water Act and the APA ......................................17 
`
`Plaintiffs’ claim for relief under OCSLA and the APA is not subject
`to dismissal.........................................................................................................................20 
`
`A. 
`
`B. 
`
`C. 
`
`OCSLA’s pre-suit notice provision does not apply here .......................................21 
`
`Plaintiffs state a claim under OCSLA and the APA ..............................................22 
`
`Plaintiffs are within OCSLA’s zone of interests....................................................23 
`
`CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................24 
`
`
`
`
`
`{00327333.DOCX}
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01305-FB-ST Document 74 Filed 11/22/22 Page 3 of 29 PageID #: 3561
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`Allco Renewable Energy Ltd. v. Haaland,
`No. 1:22-cv-10921 (D. Mass Aug. 10, 2021) ....................................................................22
`
`Airport Neighbors Alliance Inc. v. United States,
`90 F.3d 426 (10th Cir. 1996) .............................................................................................16
`
`Amerada Hess Corp. v. Department of Interior,
`170 F.3d 1032 (10th Cir. 1999) ...................................................................................21–22
`
`Bank of New York v. First Millennium, Inc.,
`607 F.3d 905 (2d Cir. 2010).................................................................................................6
`
`Bank v. GoHealth, LLC,
`2021 WL 1884671 (E.D.N.Y. May 11, 2021),
`aff’d, 2022 WL 1132503 (2d Cir. Apr. 18, 2022) ..............................................................10
`
`Barry’s Cut Rate Stores Inc. v. Visa, Inc.,
`2019 WL 7584728 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2019) ...................................................................14
`
`Biediger v. Quinnipiac University,
`691 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2012)...................................................................................................7
`
`Center for Biological Diversity v. Export-Import Bank of the United States,
`894 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2018) ...........................................................................................13
`
`Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
`567 U.S. 142 (2012) ...........................................................................................................20
`
`Connecticut Fund for the Environment, Inc. v. U.S. General Services
`Administration, 285 F. Supp. 3d 525 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) ...................................................3, 5
`
`Cunningham v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc.,
`2010 WL 11627806 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2010) ................................................................22
`
`Dean v. Town of Hempstead,
`527 F.Supp.3d 347 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) ...................................................................6–7, 10, 14
`
`DeSuze v. Carson,
`442 F. Supp. 3d 528 (E.D.N.Y. 2020),
`aff’d, 990 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 2021) .....................................................................................13
`
`Duke Energy Field Services Assets, L.L.C. v. FERC,
`150 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.D.C. 2001) ...................................................................................22
`
`{00327333.DOCX}
`
`ii
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01305-FB-ST Document 74 Filed 11/22/22 Page 4 of 29 PageID #: 3562
`
`
`
`Fisheries Survival Fund v. Haaland,
`858 Fed. Appx. 371 (D.C. Cir. 2021) ................................................................................21
`
`Friends of Hamilton Grange v. Salazar,
`2009 WL 650262 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2009) .....................................................................17
`
`Fund for Animals v. Babbitt,
`89 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 1996).................................................................................................17
`
`Hillsdale Environmental Loss Prevention, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
`702 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2012) ...........................................................................................8
`
`Hornbeck Offshore Services, L.L.C. v. Salazar,
`696 F. Supp. 2d 627 (E.D. La. 2010) .................................................................................22
`
`In re Commodity Exchange, Inc.,
`213 F. Supp. 3d 631 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) ..................................................................................6
`
`Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
`504 U.S. 555 (1992) .............................................................................................................3
`
`National Audubon Society v. Hoffman,
`132 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1997) ....................................................................................................8
`
`National Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Semonite,
`925 F.3d 500 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ...........................................................................................16
`
`New York v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
`896 F. Supp. 2d 180 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) .................................................................................3
`
`New York v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
`969 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2020),
`cert. dismissed, 141 S. Ct. 1292 (2021) .............................................................................24
`
`NRDC v. U.S. EPA,
`658 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2011)...............................................................................................19
`
`NRDC, Inc. v. FAA,
`564 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 2009).................................................................................................4
`
`NRDC, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
`457 F. Supp. 2d 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ..................................................................................8
`
`Osborn v. Visa Inc.,
`797 F.3d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ...........................................................................................6
`
`OXY USA Inc v. Babbitt,
`122 F.3d 251 (5th Cir. 1997) .......................................................................................21–22
`
`{00327333.DOCX}
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01305-FB-ST Document 74 Filed 11/22/22 Page 5 of 29 PageID #: 3563
`
`
`
`Save Our Sound OBX, Inc. v. North Carolina Department of Transportation,
`914 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2019) .............................................................................................18
`
`Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
`803 F.3d 31 (D.C. Cir. 2015) .............................................................................................16
`
`Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
`985 F.3d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2021),
`cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1187 (2022) ..................................................................................16
`
`Summers v. Earth Island Institute,
`555 U.S. 488 (2009) .........................................................................................................3–4
`
`United States v. Grundhoefer,
`916 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1990)...............................................................................................23
`
`Vengalattore v. Cornell University,
`36 F.4th 87 (2d Cir. 2022) ...................................................................................................2
`
`Warth v. Seldin,
`422 U.S. 490 (1975) .............................................................................................................6
`
`Statutes
`
`Administrative Procedure Act,
`5 U.S.C. § 706 ........................................................................................................15, 20–21
`
`Clean Water Act,
`33 U.S.C. § 1344 ..........................................................................................................15, 17
`
`National Environmental Policy Act,
`42 U.S.C. § 4332 ................................................................................................................16
`
`Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,
`43 U.S.C. § 1337 ..........................................................................................................22–24
`
`
`
`43 U.S.C. § 1349 ..........................................................................................................20–22
`
`Regulations
`
`33 C.F.R. § 320.4 ...........................................................................................................................18
`
`33 C.F.R. Part 325, Appendix B, § 7 .............................................................................................19
`
`Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines,
`40 C.F.R. § 230.10 .......................................................................................................17–18
`
`{00327333.DOCX}
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01305-FB-ST Document 74 Filed 11/22/22 Page 6 of 29 PageID #: 3564
`
`
`
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Defendants U.S Department of the Interior, et al. (“Federal Defendants”) issued permits
`
`that were a necessary condition for Defendant-Intervenor South Fork Wind, LLC (“South Fork”)
`
`to begin construction of a massive trench to house a 138-kilovolt electrical cable that is part of the
`
`South Fork Wind project. That cable trench wends its way through the narrow residential lanes of
`
`the Town of East Hampton, New York via a route that is, in places, adjacent to an active Superfund
`
`site. Though Plaintiffs own and live on properties literally adjacent to that construction, and though
`
`Plaintiffs have credibly alleged that the construction will exacerbate contamination of their prop-
`
`erties with cancer-causing PFAS, Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint on the
`
`baseless ground that Plaintiffs have not even alleged injury-in-fact. In addition to their “more con-
`
`tamination isn’t a problem” argument, Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) and
`
`South Fork’s like motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) argue that this Court is
`
`powerless to redress Plaintiffs’ injury because the onshore cable construction lies outside the de-
`
`fendant federal agencies’ limited offshore “jurisdiction.” But Defendants’ jurisdictional argument
`
`is belied by Federal Defendants’ 1,317-page Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”). As required
`
`by the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), that EIS rightly encompassed the onshore
`
`components of the integrated South Fork Wind project, including a discussion (albeit perfunctory
`
`and legally inadequate) specifically of admitted PFAS contamination in the section that addresses
`
`“Onshore Groundwater.”
`
`
`
`Defendants do not expressly and forthrightly argue that this federal court should “defer” to
`
`a state administrative agency, nor do they argue that the agency’s “findings” are binding on Plaintiffs
`
`under principles of preclusion. But Defendants’ motions essentially ask this Court to abdicate its
`
`independent authority and duty to enforce federal statutory obligations on federal agencies and rather
`
`simply rubber-stamp proceedings of the New York Public Service Commission, which are not the
`
`subject of Plaintiffs’ complaint. In any event, those proceedings remain unresolved and under re-
`
`view in the state appellate courts at the behest of other parties, and they will take care of themselves.
`
`{00327333.DOCX}
`
`1
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01305-FB-ST Document 74 Filed 11/22/22 Page 7 of 29 PageID #: 3565
`
`
`
`This action, however, involves the final decisions of federal agencies that purported to comply —
`
`but in truth failed to comply — with their obligations under NEPA, the Clean Water Act, and the
`
`Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”). As elaborated herein, Plaintiffs have Article III
`
`standing to assert claims under those statutes, and they state claims under all three. Therefore, the
`
`Court should deny Defendants’ motions and allow the parties to proceed to the merits based on the
`
`administrative record that will have been submitted by the time the Court takes up the motions.
`
`
`
`As explained in Section I.A.1 below (pp. 3–5), resolution of the pending motions should
`
`turn not on whether South Fork’s construction activities in fact have deposited or will deposit addi-
`
`tional cancer-causing PFAS onto Plaintiffs’ properties; it should turn on whether Plaintiffs have
`
`alleged a concrete interest affected by Federal Defendants’ procedural violations. But if the Court
`
`were inclined to conclude otherwise, it should authorize the narrow discovery from South Fork that
`
`Plaintiffs have repeatedly requested, namely, the data from the well-testing that South Fork has al-
`
`ready conducted (and any other relevant data in South Fork’s possession), which would undoubtedly
`
`shed light on the extent and spread of contamination from the construction activities.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`
`
`Defendants attack Plaintiffs’ complaint on three grounds, arguing that Plaintiffs (1) lack
`
`Article III standing, (2) fail to state a claim under the Clean Water Act, and (3) failed to provide
`
`the requisite “notice” to assert a claim under OCSLA and otherwise fail to state a claim thereunder.
`
`Plaintiffs address these three arguments in turn, demonstrating that all fail as a matter of law.
`I.
`
`Plaintiffs have Article III standing.
`
`
`
`Plaintiffs agree with Defendants that to “have Article III standing, (1) the plaintiff must have
`
`suffered an injury in fact, (2) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
`
`complained of, and (3) it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
`
`redressed by a favorable decision.” Federal Memorandum at 11 (quoting Vengalattore v. Cornell
`
`University, 36 F.4th 87, 112–13 (2d Cir. 2022)). Plaintiffs accordingly address injury-in-fact, causal
`
`connection (or traceability), and redressability in the following three sections.
`
`{00327333.DOCX}
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01305-FB-ST Document 74 Filed 11/22/22 Page 8 of 29 PageID #: 3566
`
`
`
`
`
`A.
`
`Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged injury-in-fact.
`
`South Fork contends that “Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege an injury-in-fact caused
`
`by Federal Defendants’ approvals for the Project,” or to say the same thing, that “Plaintiffs have
`
`not sufficiently pleaded injury-in-fact.” South Fork Memorandum at 8 (emphasis added; capitali-
`
`zation altered). Federal Defendants join this argument, similarly contending that Plaintiffs “do not
`
`allege any actual, present injury.” Federal Memorandum at 12 (emphasis added). As elaborated
`
`below, Defendants are wrong: Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient as a matter of law.
`1.
`
`Plaintiffs allege a legally sufficient “concrete interest,” which Defendants
`wholly ignore.
`
`
`
`Plaintiffs here allege violations primarily of procedural rights, principally the right to have
`
`Federal Defendants comply with NEPA’s “hard look” requirement and with similar mandates in
`
`the Clean Water Act and OCSLA. See Complaint at 8, ¶ 50 (Doc. 1, filed Mar. 9, 2022); id. at 9,
`
`¶ 58; id. at 10, ¶ 66. But as Defendants rightly observe, “bare procedural injuries are not sufficient
`
`for Article III standing.” South Fork Memorandum at 10 (capitalization altered). Or, as this Court
`
`has opined, “the deprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest being impaired
`
`— the deprivation of a ‘procedural right in vacuo’ — does not confer standing.” New York v. U.S.
`
`Army Corps of Engineers, 896 F. Supp. 2d 180, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Summers v. Earth
`
`Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 496–97 (2009)). Rather, a “plaintiff can show her standing to enforce
`
`a procedural right ‘without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy’ but
`
`must show a concrete interest affected by the procedural breach.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting
`
`Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992)). In environmental cases in particular
`
`(like this one), “plaintiffs can demonstrate their standing by showing they do or intend to use the
`
`relevant environment for, inter alia, fishing, camping, swimming, and bird watching; they may also
`
`show that property rights are less valuable as a consequence of the challenged actions.” Id. at 189–
`
`90, quoted in Connecticut Fund for the Environment, Inc. v. U.S. General Services Administration,
`
`285 F. Supp. 3d 525, 533 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)). Indeed, the Second Circuit has long recognized that
`
`{00327333.DOCX}
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01305-FB-ST Document 74 Filed 11/22/22 Page 9 of 29 PageID #: 3567
`
`
`
`in NEPA actions like this one, “harm that ‘affects the recreational or even the mere esthetic inter-
`
`ests’ of [individuals] will ‘suffice’ to establish particularized injury” in fact. NRDC, Inc. v. FAA,
`
`564 F.3d 549, 555 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Summers, 555 U.S. at 494).
`
`
`
`Plaintiffs easily satisfy this “concrete interest” requirement. As described by South Fork,
`
`the portion of the project challenged by Plaintiffs is “a segment of terrestrial underground cable
`
`running from the transition vault under Town roads and in the Long Island Railroad right-of-way.”
`
`South Fork Memorandum at 3. Plaintiffs allege (and at summary judgment will easily prove) that
`
`they own and reside on real property that is literally adjacent to the massive trenches that will house
`
`that cable:
`
` “Plaintiffs Pamela and Michael Mahoney own real property on Beach Lane in Wainscott,”
`and they “have lived there most of the time” since 2020. Complaint at 3, ¶¶ 12, 15.
`
` “Plaintiffs Lisa and Mitch Solomon also own real property in Wainscott, located on Wain-
`scott Northwest Road,” which property “has been the principal residence for the Solomons
`for the past six years.” Id. at 4, ¶¶ 20–21.
`
` “The cable will make landfall on Beach Lane in Wainscott, beginning underground at the
`buried sea-to-shore vault near the south end of Beach Lane and extending northwest along
`Beach Lane (adjacent to the Mahoney Property). On its way to a so-called “interconnection
`facility” that will connect the cable to the local electrical power grid, the cable will follow
`Wainscott Northwest Road (adjacent to the Solomon Property).” Id. at 5, ¶ 25.
`
` “Plaintiffs are suffering injury in fact because they not only use the relevant environment;
`they live there. Moreover, their property is less valuable because of the challenged actions.”
`Id. at 7, ¶ 38.
`
`Defendants do not contest that the cable trench will take — indeed, it has already taken — the route
`
`alongside Plaintiffs’ respective properties. See, e.g., Federal Memorandum at 4–5 (describing the
`
`route of the cable). Under this Court’s case law, these allegations alone are sufficient to establish
`
`the requisite concrete interest that undergirds injury-in-fact.
`
`
`
`In New York, for example, individuals who were members of the plaintiff organizations had
`
`the requisite “concrete interest” to challenge regulations that would allegedly authorize oil and gas
`
`development in the Delaware River Basin because the individuals (among other things) “own[ed]
`
`properties close to the Delaware River,” “use[d] the River recreationally,” and “own[ed] land in
`
`{00327333.DOCX}
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01305-FB-ST Document 74 Filed 11/22/22 Page 10 of 29 PageID #: 3568
`
`
`
`the Basin and use[d] that land for hiking, bird watching, and organic gardening.” 896 F. Supp. 2d
`
`at 191–92; cf. id. at 193 (ultimately denying standing because the agency defendants had not “acted
`
`in the form of a final order, regulation, plan, denial of a request, or statute”). In Connecticut Fund,
`
`the plaintiff organizations satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement “by alleging that their members
`
`have used and will continue to use the Plum Island environment for bird-watching, animal-watching,
`
`etc.,” even though none owned property or lived on Plum Island. 285 F. Supp. 3d at 538. Plaintiffs
`
`here live literally adjacent to the cable construction that they are challenging, and so their esthetic
`
`and real property interests more than suffice to allege a concrete interest supporting injury-in-fact.
`
`
`
`Plaintiffs have twice previously cited the above-discussed authorities in their memoranda
`
`of law. See Doc. 7 (Mar. 10, 2022); Doc. 38 (Apr 1, 2022). Defendants do not grapple with these
`
`authorities in their pending motions, demonstrating that they have no response. Defendants instead
`
`focus exclusively on Plaintiffs’ additional allegations of injury, i.e., that as “a preferential pathway
`
`for PFAS, [the subject] cable trench will harm Plaintiffs because it will facilitate the movement of
`
`higher concentrations of PFAS onto the Mahoney Property and the Solomon Property,” which in
`
`turn “will more likely than not contaminate or further contaminate the water supply in the wells
`
`located on the Mahoney Property [and] the Solomon Property.” Complaint at 5, ¶ 28; see also id.
`
`at 5, ¶ 31 (alleging distinct injury of contamination-related “risks to groundwater, private wells, and
`
`public wells [including Plaintiffs’ own] in the vicinity of the cable corridor” (emphasis added)).
`
`
`
`Given Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations that they own and reside on real property in the
`
`cable construction corridor, Defendants’ focus on these additional allegations of contamination-
`
`related injury is designed to sidetrack the relevant issue by imposing a fallacious requirement for
`
`this litigation to continue to the merits. Under the case law discussed above, Plaintiffs’ additional
`
`allegations simply are not necessary for Plaintiffs to sufficiently allege injury-in-fact at this stage
`
`of the case. In other words, in order to resolve the injury-in-fact issue in Plaintiffs’ favor, the Court
`
`simply need not address either Plaintiffs’ allegations of contamination-related injury or Defendants’
`
`attacks thereon.
`
`{00327333.DOCX}
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01305-FB-ST Document 74 Filed 11/22/22 Page 11 of 29 PageID #: 3569
`
`
`
`
`
`2.
`
`If the Court even reaches the issue, it should reject Defendants’ attacks
`on Plaintiffs’ additional allegations of contamination-related injury.
`
`But if the Court were to depart from precedent and impose the requirement that Plaintiffs
`
`show a contamination-related injury, the Court should reject Defendants’ attacks.
`
`
`
`Most fundamentally, these attacks violate the applicable standard of review that Defendants
`
`purport to acknowledge. As explained by the Second Circuit in a decision cited by South Fork, a
`
`court faced with either a Rule 12(b)(6) motion (like that of the Federal Defendants) or a Rule 12(c)
`
`motion (like that of South Fork) “will accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and
`
`draw all reasonable inferences” in favor of the plaintiffs. Bank of New York v. First Millennium,
`
`Inc., 607 F.3d 905, 922 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added), cited in South Fork Memorandum at 7;
`
`accord Doc. 54, at (South Fork’s acknowledgment that in “evaluating either motion [by Defend-
`
`ants], the Court will accept all factual allegations in the Complaint as true and draw all reasonable
`
`inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, to “survive a Rule 12(c) motion,
`
`the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
`
`is plausible on its face.” Id. (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). The same rule
`
`applies to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenging Article III standing (like that of Federal Defendants):
`
`“In evaluating constitutional standing, courts ‘must accept as true all material allegations of the
`
`complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.’ ” Dean v. Town of
`
`Hempstead, 527 F. Supp. 3d 347, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (emphasis added) (quoting In re Commod-
`
`ity Exchange, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 3d 631, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), in turn quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422
`
`U.S. 490, 501 (1975)); accord id. (ruling that even as to Article III standing, “[a]t the pleading stage,
`
`general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice” (quoting
`
`Osborn v. Visa Inc., 797 F.3d 1057, 1063–64 (D.C. Cir. 2015))).
`
`
`
`Given this authority, the Court must — at this stage — accept as true Plaintiffs’ allegation
`
`that the cable construction “will facilitate the movement of higher concentrations of PFAS onto
`
`[their] Property” and will “more likely than not contaminate or further contaminate the water supply
`
`{00327333.DOCX}
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01305-FB-ST Document 74 Filed 11/22/22 Page 12 of 29 PageID #: 3570
`
`
`
`in [their] wells” — an allegation that clearly invokes an injury-in-fact involving a cancer-causing
`
`chemical. To be sure, at the summary judgment stage in the future, Plaintiffs will not be able to
`
`rest on allegations alone and will be required to adduce proof thereof. Cf. Dean, 527 F. Supp. 3d
`
`at 394 (“[I]n order to grant summary judgment in a plaintiff’s favor, there must be no genuine issue
`
`of material fact as to that plaintiff’s standing.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). That future albeit
`
`looming factual dispute only highlights the need for the testing data-related discovery from South
`
`Fork that Plaintiffs have repeatedly requested this Court to authorize.
`
`
`
`Federal Defendants try to escape these legal strictures by arguing that “plaintiffs’ contention
`
`that the onshore construction work will exacerbate PFAS contamination or cause a ‘preferential
`
`pathway’ for groundwater contaminated with PFAS was thoroughly reviewed and rejected by the
`
`PSC.” Federal Memorandum at 13.1 On its face, this argument asks the Court to do the opposite
`
`of accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true: Federal Defendants want the Court instead to reject the
`
`allegations as false because some administrative body to which the Court owes no deference (and
`
`whose decision is still on appeal) has purportedly said otherwise. Perhaps the PSC’s purported
`
`determination could be accepted if it were preclusive, but Defendants do not even attempt to estab-
`
`lish the elements of collateral estoppel. Federal Defendants’ nod to this Court’s decision denying
`
`a preliminary injunction, see id. at 15 (citing Doc. 42, at 6), fares no better: “A decision on a pre-
`
`liminary injunction is, in effect, only a prediction about the merits of the case”; thus, “findings of
`
`fact and conclusions of law made by a court granting a preliminary injunction are not binding,”
`
`and they “do not preclude reexamination of the merits at a subsequent trial.” Biediger v. Quinnipiac
`
`University, 691 F.3d 85, 107 (2d Cir. 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
`
`
`
`In an important sense, arguing about what the PSC predicted in March of 2021, see Federal
`
`Memorandum at 3, is beside the point. That is, the PSC stated that “[p]re-construction testing and
`
`
`1 Defendants insinuate that Plaintiffs’ allegations of such injury are fatally defective because “the
`private wells on their respective properties were already contaminated with PFAS before any on-
`shore work had begun.” Federal Memorandum at 9. That insinuation lacks merit: as quoted in the
`text, Plaintiffs allege that the work will exacerbate the contamination.
`
`{00327333.DOCX}
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01305-FB-ST Document 74 Filed 11/22/22 Page 13 of 29 PageID #: 3571
`
`
`
`the development of specific plans for handling any contamination encountered are required,” and
`
`it predicted that such testing and plans “will avoid or minimize any impacts related to potential
`
`contamination.” Id. At the pre-motion conference in August, South Fork’s counsel did not deny
`
`that South Fork has conducted groundwater testing in 2022, following its initial construction work.
`
`This testing data has not been made public or otherwise made available to Plaintiffs. It is eminently
`
`reasonable to believe that the testing data would verify or falsify the PSC’s predictions and thereby
`
`aid in proving or disproving Plaintiffs’ contamination-related allegations. If the pending motions
`
`(or any motions) were going to turn at all on the facts on and under the ground, South Fork should
`
`be ordered to produce the highly relevant testing data in its possession and not already disclosed.
`
`Plaintiffs’ request is especially well-taken in light of South Fork’s criticism that “Plaintiffs allege
`
`a speculative and unknown incremental injury.” South Fork Memorandum at 10. The testing data
`
`in South Fork’s possession can help make that injury non-speculative and known — or help prove
`
`that it does not exist at all. Either way, the data is relevant and should be produced.
`
`
`
`Finally, with respect to contamination-related injury, the Court should be especially hesitant
`
`to rely on the PSC’s determinations because they cannot be reconciled with the requirements of
`
`NEPA. Defendants rely on the fact “the PSC considered such concerns [about migration of PFAS]
`
`and created mitigation and monitoring procedures to address them.” Federal Memorandum at 8
`
`(quoting state-court order). But the Second Circuit has long held that federal agencies like Federal
`
`Defendants here may “not rely on proposed mitigation measures as an excuse to avoid preparing
`
`an EIS” that complies with NEPA. National Audubon Society v. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 17 (2d Cir.
`
`1997), quoted in NRDC, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 457 F. Supp. 2d 198, 220 (S.D.N.Y.
`
`2006); accord, e.g., Hillsdale Environmental Loss Prevention, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
`
`702 F.3d 1156, 1172 (10th Cir. 2012) (reiterating that agencies “should not rely on the possibility
`
`of mitigation as an excuse to avoid the EIS requirement” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In
`
`short, the PSC’s “dig first, fix the problem later” approach does not accord with federal law.
`
`{00327333.DOCX}
`
`*
`
`*
`
`*
`
`*
`
`*
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01305-FB-ST Document 74 Filed 11/22/22 Page 14 of 29 PageID #: 3572
`
`
`
`
`
`In sum, Plaintiffs have suf