Case 1:21-cv-06296-JMF Document 48 Filed 11/08/21 Page 1 of 44
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
`
`
`
`
`IN RE: IBM ARBITRATION
`AGREEMENT LITIGATION
`
`
`No. 1:21-CV-6296 (JMF)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`CONSOLIDATED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
`DEFENDANT IBM’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND
`OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 1:21-cv-06296-JMF Document 48 Filed 11/08/21 Page 2 of 44
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1
`BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................... 2
`STANDARD OF REVIEW ........................................................................................................... 7
`ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................. 8
`I.
`All of Plaintiffs’ Claims Should Be Dismissed Under Rule 12(b)(6). .............................. 8
`A.
`For the Plaintiffs Who Already Arbitrated and Lost, Their Complaints
`Must Be Dismissed As Untimely Attempts to Vacate the Arbitration
`Awards. .................................................................................................................. 8
`Plaintiffs’ Attack on the Arbitral Timeliness Provision Fails as a Matter of
`Law. ..................................................................................................................... 11
`1.
`The FAA requires arbitration agreements to be enforced according
`to their terms. ........................................................................................... 12
`The FAA requires enforcement of the timeliness provision here. ........... 14
`(a)
`“Piggybacking” does not create a substantive, non-
`waivable right to file outside of the ordinary time period. .......... 15
`The statutory filing period for an ADEA claim is
`procedural, not substantive. ......................................................... 18
`The Sixth Circuit has rejected the view that the ADEA
`prohibits the shortening of the filing period in arbitration. .......... 20
`The other cases relied on by Plaintiffs are inapposite. ................. 22
`(d)
`Plaintiffs’ Attack on the Arbitral Confidentiality Provision Fails as a
`Matter of Law. ..................................................................................................... 24
`1.
`New York law does not prohibit confidentiality agreements. ................. 25
`(a)
`New York law applies under the choice-of-law provision. ......... 26
`(b)
`New York law does not prohibit confidential arbitration. ........... 26
`The FAA would preempt any New York ban on arbitral
`confidentiality. ......................................................................................... 30
`(a)
`State law cannot discriminate against confidentiality in
`arbitration. .................................................................................... 30
`Confidentiality is a fundamental attribute of arbitration. ............. 31
`(b)
`Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment Should Be Denied Without
`Considering Any of the Confidential Materials Attached to Plaintiffs’ Briefing. ........... 33
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 36
`
`
`(b)
`
`(c)
`
`2.
`
`2.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`II.
`
`
`
`i
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`

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`Case 1:21-cv-06296-JMF Document 48 Filed 11/08/21 Page 3 of 44
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page
`
`CASES
`
`14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,
`556 U.S. 247 (2009) .....................................................................................................13, 14, 19
`
`Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.,
`570 U.S. 228 (2013) ......................................................................................................... passim
`
`Am. Fam. Life Assurance Co. of New York v. Baker,
`778 F. App’x 24 (2d Cir. 2019) ...............................................................................................28
`
`AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
`563 U.S. 333 (2011) ......................................................................................................... passim
`
`Baron v. Vullo,
`699 F. App’x 102 (2d Cir. 2017) .............................................................................................24
`
`Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP,
`814 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2016).....................................................................................................35
`
`Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP,
`No. 14-CV-6867, 2016 WL 1071107 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2016) ............................................35
`
`Bettencourt v. Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc.,
`No. 09-CV-1200, 2010 WL 274331 (D. Or. Jan. 14, 2010) ....................................................32
`
`Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co.,
`No. 97 Civ. 2858, 2010 WL 3377503 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2010), aff’d, 675
`F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2012)............................................................................................................34
`
`Billie v. Coverall N. Am., Inc.,
`444 F. Supp. 3d 332 (D. Conn. 2020) ................................................................................29, 30
`
`Browning v. AT&T Paradyne,
`120 F.3d 222 (11th Cir. 1997) .................................................................................................19
`
`Calloway v. Partners Nat’l Health Plans,
`986 F.2d 446 (11th Cir. 1993) .................................................................................................15
`
`
`
`ii
`
`

`

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`
`Castellanos v. Raymours Furniture Co.,
`291 F. Supp. 3d 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) ...............................................................................22, 23
`
`CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95 (2012) ..............................................................22
`
`Corbett v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp.,
`No. 1:21-CV-06380 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2021) ..........................................................................4
`
`Couch v. AT & T Servs., Inc.,
`No. 13-CV-2004, 2014 WL 7424093 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2014) ............................................30
`
`Cyber Imaging Sys., Inc. v. Eyelation, Inc.,
`No. 5:14-CV-901, 2015 WL 12851390 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 4, 2015) .............................................8
`
`Desiderio v. National Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc.,
`191 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 1999).....................................................................................................27
`
`DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C.,
`622 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2010)...................................................................................................3, 7
`
`Dylan 140 LLC v. Figueroa,
`No. 19-CV-02897, 2019 WL 2235884 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2019) ..........................................10
`
`Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis,
`138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) ..................................................................................................... passim
`
`Estle v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp.,
`2020 WL 5633154 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2020) .........................................................................24
`
`Ferring B.V. v. Serenity Pharms., LLC,
`391 F. Supp. 3d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) ........................................................................................7
`
`Flannery v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp.,
`No. 1:21-CV-06384 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2021) ......................................................................4, 5
`
`Foster v. Ruhrpumpen, Inc.,
`365 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2004) ...............................................................................................16
`
`Garda USA, Inc. v. Sun Cap. Partners, Inc.,
`194 A.D.3d 545 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021) ..................................................................................31
`
`Garfield v. J.C. Nichols Real Estate,
`57 F.3d 662 (8th Cir. 1995) .....................................................................................................19
`
`
`
`iii
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`

`

`Case 1:21-cv-06296-JMF Document 48 Filed 11/08/21 Page 5 of 44
`
`Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A.,
`534 N.E.2d 824 (N.Y. 1988) ....................................................................................................27
`
`Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
`500 U.S. 20 (1991) ........................................................................................................... passim
`
`Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co.,
`43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994) ...................................................................................................23
`
`Grayson v. K Mart Corp.,
`79 F.3d 1086 (11th Cir. 1996) .................................................................................................15
`
`Guyden v. Aetna, Inc.,
`544 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2008).........................................................................................25, 28, 31
`
`Holowecki v. Fed. Exp. Corp.,
`440 F.3d 558 (2d Cir. 2006), aff’d, 552 U.S. 389 (2008) ........................................................17
`
`Howell v. Rivergate Toyota, Inc.,
`144 F. App’x 475 (6th Cir. 2005) ............................................................................................21
`
`Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC,
`379 F.3d 159 (5th Cir. 2004) ...................................................................................................31
`
`In re A2P SMS Antitrust Litig.,
`No. 12 CV 2656, 2014 WL 2445756 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ...........................................................32
`
`In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig.,
`415 F. Supp. 2d 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ......................................................................................29
`
`JPay, Inc. v. Kobel,
`904 F.3d 923 (11th Cir. 2018) .................................................................................................32
`
`Kamienski v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp.,
`No. 1:21-CV-06331 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2021) ..........................................................................5
`
`Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark,
`137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017) .......................................................................................................30, 31
`
`King v. Marsh & McLennan Agency, LLC,
`126 N.Y.S.3d 312 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020), aff’d, 138 N.Y.S.3d 323 (2021) ..............................31
`
`
`
`iv
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`

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`Kopple v. Stonebrook Fund Mgmt., LLC,
`2004 N.Y. Slip Op 51948, 875 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct. 2004), aff’d, 794
`N.Y.S.2d 648 (2005) ..........................................................................................................26, 28
`
`Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit Casino,
`939 F.3d 824 (6th Cir. 2019) .......................................................................................20, 21, 22
`
`Markham v. Rosenbaum,
`No. 20-cv-6039, 2020 WL 3316099 (W.D.N.Y. June 18, 2020), appeal
`dismissed, No. 20-2223, 2021 WL 3027159 (2d Cir. May 13, 2021) .....................................33
`
`Mehulic v. New York Downtown Hosp.,
`979 N.Y.S.2d 320 (2014) .........................................................................................................31
`
`Morrison v. Cir. City Stores, Inc.,
`317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc) ...................................................................................21
`
`Moton v. Maplebear Inc.,
`No. 15 CIV. 8879 (CM), 2016 WL 616343 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2016) .....................................32
`
`Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`834 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2016).....................................................................................................12
`
`Northwell Health, Inc. v. Lexington Ins.,
`No. 21-cv-1104, 2021 WL 3163273 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2021) .................................................33
`
`Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l Inc.,
`2015 WL 7306420 (D.N.J. Nov. 18, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Opalinski v. Robert
`Half Int’l Inc, 677 F. App’x 738 (3d Cir. 2017) ......................................................................32
`
`Oparaji v. Mun. Credit Union,
`No. 19 Civ. 4034, 2021 WL 2414859 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2021) ..............................................8
`
`Perez-Abreu v. Metropol Hato Rey LLC,
`5 F.4th 89 (1st Cir. 2021) ...................................................................................................15, 16
`
`Ragone v. Atlantic Video at Manhattan Ctr.,
`595 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2010)...............................................................................................23, 27
`
`Reed Elsevier, Inc. ex rel. LexisNexis Div. v. Crockett,
`734 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2013) ...................................................................................................32
`
`Rusis v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp.,
`No. 18-CV-8434 (VEC), 2021 WL 1164659 ................................................................... passim
`v
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`
`
`

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`Case 1:21-cv-06296-JMF Document 48 Filed 11/08/21 Page 7 of 44
`
`Software for Moving, Inc. v. La Rosa Del Monte Exp., Inc.,
`No. 08 CIV. 986 (JGK), 2009 WL 1788054 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2009), aff’d
`sub nom. Software for Moving, Inc. v. La Rosa Del Monte Express, Inc., 419
`F. App’x 41 (2d Cir. 2011) ......................................................................................................30
`
`Spira v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.,
`466 F. App’x 20 (2d Cir. 2012) ...............................................................................................19
`
`Stedman v. Great Am. Ins.,
`No. 4:06-CV-101, 2007 WL 1040367 (D.N.D. Apr. 3, 2007) .............................................9, 10
`
`Suqin Zhu v. Hakkasan NYC LLC,
`291 F. Supp. 3d 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) ......................................................................................26
`
`Thompson v. Fresh Products, LLC,
`985 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2021) .......................................................................................20, 21, 22
`
`Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. Occidental Gems, Inc.,
`41 A.D.3d 362 (2007), aff’d, 11 N.Y.3d 843 (2008) ...............................................................26
`
`Tolliver v. Xerox Corp.,
`918 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1990).............................................................................................15, 16
`
`Travelers Ins. v. Carpenter,
`411 F.3d 323 (2d Cir. 2005).....................................................................................................29
`
`Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Central School District,
`49 F.3d 886 (2d Cir. 1995)...........................................................................................18, 19, 20
`
`Zavalidroga v. Cuomo,
`No. 6:11-CV-831, 2012 WL 3137110 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2012) ............................................34
`
`STATUTES
`
`9 U.S.C. § 2 ....................................................................................................................................12
`
`9 U.S.C. § 11(c) ...............................................................................................................................9
`
`9 U.S.C. § 12 ......................................................................................................................4, 8, 9, 10
`
`29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) .....................................................................................................................13
`
`29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) ................................................................................................................3, 11
`
`
`
`vi
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`

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`Case 1:21-cv-06296-JMF Document 48 Filed 11/08/21 Page 8 of 44
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`Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 .......................................... passim
`
`Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 ............................................................................. passim
`
`Fair Labor Standards Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 ......................................................................22, 23
`
`Older Workers’ Benefits Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 623, 626, 630 ..................................24
`
`Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. ............................15, 16, 23
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 .........................................................................................................................7, 8
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).......................................................................................................... passim
`
`
`
`
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`Case 1:21-cv-06296-JMF Document 48 Filed 11/08/21 Page 9 of 44
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`INTRODUCTION
`
`
`
`These lawsuits are a last-ditch effort by Plaintiffs’ counsel to deflect the blame for their
`
`own failure to follow basic requirements such as filing timely claims and obeying standard
`
`confidentiality rules. But as Judge Valerie Caproni has already explained—in another case where
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`Plaintiffs improperly tried to raise many of the same issues—their arguments are both “far-
`
`fetched” and “patently absurd.” Rusis v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., No. 18-CV-8434 (VEC),
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`2021 WL 1164659, at *6 n.8. They had every opportunity to pursue their claims in arbitration
`
`but they inexplicably failed to do so. They now seek to “set the fault at IBM’s feet when they
`
`need look no further than their own counsel for the appropriate locus of blame” in failing to file
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`timely claims. Id. The arbitral timeliness provisions and the ordinary confidentiality agreements
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`that they signed are not remotely unlawful—they are simply unliked. Indeed, the utter lack of
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`merit in their arguments is underscored by their reliance on wholly irrelevant confidential
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`documents and inapposite case law from outside of New York and the Second Circuit.
`
`
`
`For the reasons explained below, Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law on the face of
`
`their complaints and should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
`
`
`
`First, 23 out of the 25 Plaintiffs in these consolidated matters should have their
`
`complaints dismissed because they already arbitrated and lost their Age Discrimination in
`
`Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (“ADEA”) claims against IBM, and they failed to
`
`challenge those dismissals by the means required by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-
`
`16 (“FAA”). Specifically, the arbitrators in these 23 proceedings dismissed the Plaintiffs’
`
`respective claims because they were untimely under their arbitral timeliness provisions. The 23
`
`Plaintiffs then failed to challenge those dismissals because they failed to file timely vacatur
`
`actions within the three-month FAA deadline. Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot now seek
`
`declaratory relief that would have the effect of overturning the arbitration awards that they lost.
`1
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`

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`Case 1:21-cv-06296-JMF Document 48 Filed 11/08/21 Page 10 of 44
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`
`
`Second, Plaintiffs’ attack on the arbitral timeliness provision—which all 25 failed to
`
`comply with—is legally defective. Under the FAA, Plaintiffs’ arbitration agreements must be
`
`enforced according to their terms as long as Plaintiffs had a fair opportunity to pursue their
`
`ADEA claims in arbitration. They had a fair opportunity to do so because the agreements
`
`allowed them to file their ADEA claims within the ordinary 300/180-day filing period that the
`
`ADEA typically provides. There is no basis for their novel claim that the “piggybacking”
`
`doctrine somehow gives them a “substantive, non-waivable right” to file a claim in arbitration
`
`outside of the ordinary ADEA filing period incorporated into their arbitration agreements.
`
`
`
`Third, Plaintiffs’ challenge to arbitral confidentiality is both moot and meritless. Their
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`sole claim on this point is that the confidentiality clause impedes them from effectively pursuing
`
`their ADEA claims in arbitration. But it is not the confidentiality clause that stands in their
`
`way—it is their counsel’s failure to file timely claims. Since all of their ADEA claims are
`
`untimely, it is entirely moot for them to argue that confidentiality impedes them from effectively
`
`pursuing those claims. But regardless, even if it were not moot, their attack on arbitral
`
`confidentiality fails as a matter of law under both New York law and the FAA.
`
`
`
`As to Plaintiffs’ summary-judgment motion, it should be denied as moot. The Court need
`
`not and should not reach it because Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law on the face of the
`
`complaints, requiring the dismissal of their actions pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Even if this Court
`
`were to reach Plaintiffs’ summary-judgment motion, it should be denied on the merits due to the
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`legal defects in the underlying claims.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`
`
`Plaintiffs are former IBM employees. At the end of their employment, IBM offered them
`
`a voluntary severance package. In exchange for a severance payment, Plaintiffs each signed an
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`agreement to resolve any claims under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act
`2
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`

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`Case 1:21-cv-06296-JMF Document 48 Filed 11/08/21 Page 11 of 44
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`(“ADEA”) through confidential individual arbitration, and to release certain other claims. See,
`
`e.g., Compl. of William Chastka ¶¶ 11, 24, ECF No. 1 (“Chastka Compl.”); Decl. of Shannon
`
`Liss-Riordan, Ex. 2, Sample IBM Separation Agreement, ECF No. 40-2 (“Agreement”) at 22-
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`23.1 The Agreement expressly advised employees to consult with an attorney before choosing to
`
`accept the agreement. Agreement at 24. The Agreement also gave them 21 days to decide
`
`whether to sign. Id. at 23. All Plaintiffs here chose to sign the Agreement, and accepted
`
`payments from IBM in exchange. See, e.g., Chastka Compl. ¶¶ 11-12.
`
`
`
`The Agreement provides that Plaintiffs may pursue any ADEA claim against IBM
`
`through individual arbitration subject to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), but may not
`
`pursue any such claim in court or on a class or collective basis. See Agreement at 25. The
`
`Agreement also includes a timeliness provision, which gives the Plaintiffs the same amount of
`
`time to file any ADEA claim in arbitration that they would otherwise have had to file an
`
`administrative charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
`
`(“EEOC”) or equivalent state agency, the first step in pursuing an ADEA claim in court. Id. at
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`26. Depending on whether Plaintiffs resided in non-deferral or deferral jurisdictions, this filing
`
`period was either 180 or 300 days. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1). Significantly, under the
`
`Agreement, Plaintiffs had no obligation to file an administrative charge with the EEOC or state
`
`agency before filing a demand for arbitration.
`
`
`1 In deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court can consider documents that are incorporated
`by reference in or “integral” to the complaint, like the arbitration agreement here, in addition the
`allegations in the complaint. See DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
`
`
`
`3
`
`

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`Case 1:21-cv-06296-JMF Document 48 Filed 11/08/21 Page 12 of 44
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`
`
`Despite having a reasonable opportunity to pursue their ADEA claims in arbitration,
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`Plaintiffs failed to file timely arbitration demands within the 180/300-day deadlines specified in
`
`their Agreements.2 See, e.g., Chastka Compl. ¶¶ 12-15, 19, 21.
`
`
`
`When 23 of the 25 Plaintiffs did eventually file their untimely arbitration demands, the
`
`result was predictable. All of the arbitrators dismissed their claims as untimely. See, e.g., Chastka
`
`Compl. ¶¶ 15, 21. Prior to or during those arbitration proceedings, Plaintiffs chose not to seek
`
`declaratory relief from any court challenging the validity of their arbitral timeliness provisions,
`
`which is the required procedure to challenge the validity of any term of the arbitration
`
`agreement. Specifically, the Agreement provides that “any issue concerning the validity or
`
`enforceability of this Agreement . . . shall be decided only by a court of competent jurisdiction.”
`
`Agreement at 24. Despite this plain language in the Agreement, and the fact that Plaintiffs were
`
`represented by counsel, Plaintiffs directed their challenge to the timeliness provision to the
`
`arbitrators. See, e.g., Chastka Compl. ¶ 15. Unsurprisingly, the arbitrators rejected that argument,
`
`found Plaintiffs’ ADEA claims untimely, and entered awards in favor of IBM. See id. ¶¶ 15, 21.
`
`
`
`Under the FAA, a party wishing to contest an arbitration award has three months to file a
`
`motion to “vacate, modify, or correct” the award. 9 U.S.C. § 12. The 23 Plaintiffs who had gone
`
`through arbitration could have filed vacatur motions challenging the validity of the arbitral
`
`timeliness provisions that the arbitrators relied on to reject their ADEA claims. But despite
`
`having three months to do so, Plaintiffs did not file any motions to vacate the adverse awards.
`
`
`2 Out of the 25 consolidated Plaintiffs, 23 filed arbitration demands before the present lawsuit was
`commenced. See, e.g., Chastka Compl. ¶¶ 12-18. One Plaintiff, Brian Flannery, had not filed an
`arbitration demand as of the time that he filed his lawsuit and thus does not refer in his complaint to any
`such filing. See Complaint ¶ 21, Flannery v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 1:21-CV-06384 (S.D.N.Y. July
`27, 2021) (“Flannery Compl.”). Another Plaintiff, Phillip Corbett, does not and cannot allege that he filed
`an arbitration demand at any time. See Complaint ¶ 21, Corbett v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 1:21-CV-
`06380 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2021).
`
`
`
`4
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`

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`Case 1:21-cv-06296-JMF Document 48 Filed 11/08/21 Page 13 of 44
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`
`
`Notwithstanding their individual arbitration agreements—and their express waiver of the
`
`right to pursue ADEA claims in court or a on collective basis—23 of the 25 Plaintiffs filed opt-in
`
`notices seeking to join a pending collective action before Judge Valerie Caproni, Rusis v. Int’l
`
`Bus. Machines Corp., No. 18-CV-8434 (VEC), 2021 WL 1164659, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26,
`
`2021); see, e.g., Chastka Compl. ¶ 16.3 These Plaintiffs were among a group of other former
`
`employees who sought to join the Rusis case despite having signed individual arbitration
`
`agreements. Rusis at *3. All of these former employees were represented by the same counsel
`
`who represents Plaintiffs in the instant case.
`
`
`
`IBM promptly filed a motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss Plaintiffs (and other
`
`employees) from the Rusis case. Plaintiffs asked the court to issue a “threshold ruling” that they
`
`should be allowed to opt into the court proceeding. In the alternative, they also asked that their
`
`arbitral timeliness provisions be deemed “unenforceable” due to the “piggybacking” doctrine,
`
`which they claimed would have allowed them to opt into the Rusis court proceeding if they had
`
`not agreed to pursue their ADEA claims in individual arbitration. Id. at *4.
`
`
`
`On March 26, 2021, Judge Caproni granted IBM’s motion to dismiss and held that
`
`Plaintiffs (and the other former employees) could not participate in the Rusis collective action
`
`due to their individual arbitration agreements. Id. at *7. The “clear and unambiguous language”
`
`of their arbitration agreements prevented them from “pressing their ADEA claims in a putative
`
`class and collective action” in court through the “opt in” process. Id. at *6. As a result, they
`
`could “not opt in [to Rusis] for any purpose, whether to seek declaratory relief concerning the
`
`
`3 Plaintiffs Deborah Kamienski and Brian Flannery allege that they opted into Rusis, but these
`allegations appear to be errors because, as the Rusis docket reflects, they did not file opt-in notices in
`Rusis. See Complaint ¶ 16, Kamienski v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 1:21-CV-06331 (S.D.N.Y. July 26,
`2021); Flannery Compl. ¶ 16; see generally Notice of Opt-in Consent Form Filings, Rusis v. Int’l Bus.
`Machines Corp., No. 18-CV-8434 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y Sept. 17, 2018).
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`Case 1:21-cv-06296-JMF Document 48 Filed 11/08/21 Page 14 of 44
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`scope or enforceability of their separation agreement or to seek substantive relief on their ADEA
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`claims.” Id. at *7.
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`While Plaintiffs argued in Rusis that refusing to allow them to opt in would “prevent
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`[them] from pursuing their claims in any forum,” the court rejected that argument as “patently
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`absurd.” Id. at *6 n.8. The court noted that Plaintiffs “conveniently ignore[d]” that they could
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`have pursued their ADEA claims if they had “file[d] timely arbitration demands in the first
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`instance.” Id.; see supra pp. 3-4. Indeed, they did not “identify any obstacle, let alone one
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`imposed by IBM, that prevented [them] from filing an arbitration demand on their ADEA claims
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`within the . . . deadline established by the separation agreements.” Rusis, 2021 WL 1164659, at
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`*6 n.8. Had they done so, “there would be no need to resort to a (far-fetched) argument that the
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`piggybacking doctrine saves their untimely demands, and they could have received any relief to
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`which they were entitled in an individual arbitration, as contemplated by IBM’s separation
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`agreements.” Id. The court thus noted that it would “not countenance Plaintiffs’ attempts to set
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`the fault at IBM’s feet when they need look no further than their own counsel for the appropriate
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`locus of blame” in failing to file timely claims. Id.
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`The court went on to explain that, in light of Plaintiffs’ collective-action waiver, it was
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`not proper for them to opt into the Rusis collective action as a vehicle to challenge the validity of
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`their arbitral timeliness provisions. See id. at *6, *7 n.10. Instead, the appropriate course would
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`have been for them to file separate court actions seeking “declaratory relief on the enforceability
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`or validity of the arbitration filing deadline provision in IBM’s separation agreement prior to
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`arbitrating their claims.” Id. at *7 n.10 (emphasis added). The court was careful to note,
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`however, that the procedural propriety of “seeking preemptive judicial relief in an individual
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`Case 1:21-cv-06296-JMF Document 48 Filed 11/08/21 Page 15 of 44
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`action” was “a decision left to the sound discretion of whichever district court receives any
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`subsequently filed individual actions.” Id.
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`After being dismissed from Rusis, Plaintiffs began filing the present declaratory-
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`judgment actions in July. They have now filed 25 separate actions that were consolidated here. In
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`their complaints, they ask the Court to declare invalid not only the arbitral timeliness provisions,
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`but also the standard confidentiality provision in their arbitration agreements.
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`The confidentiality provision provides that both IBM and Plaintiffs must maintain the
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`confidentiality of all materials related to any arbitration proceedings between them. Agreement
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`at 27. In challenging this provision, Plaintiffs attached as exhibits a slew of arbitration
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`materials—covered by the same confidentiality agreements—which they apparently obtained
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`from different employees who are represented in their arbitrations by the same counsel who
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`represents Plaintiffs here. According to Plaintiffs, the confidentiality provision is invalid because
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`it hinders them “from advancing their claims” in arbitration “under the ADEA” by preventing
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`them from permissibly sharing confidential arbitration material among themselves. See, e.g.,
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`Chastka Compl. ¶ 25.
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`STANDARD OF REVIEW
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`Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss must be granted if the plaintiff’s claims fail as a
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`matter of law even assuming all of the facts alleged in the complaint to be true. For these
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`purposes, a court may consider documents that are incorporated by reference in, or are otherwise
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`“integral” to, the complaint, as well as those matters that are judicially noticeable. DiFolco v.
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`MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Ferring B.V. v. Serenity
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`Pharms., LLC, 391 F. Supp. 3d 265, 287 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (citing Global Network Commc’ns,
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`Inc. v. City of N.Y., 458 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2006). Under Rule 56, summary judgment is
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`appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
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`Case 1:21-cv-06296-JMF Document 48 Filed 11/08/21 Page 16 of 44
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`to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If a plaintiff’s claims are dismissed under
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`Rule 12(b)(6), then his summary-judgment motion should