Trials@uspto.gov Paper 16
`571-272-7822 Entered: January 14, 2014
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`
`
`TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`AMERICAN VEHICULAR SCIENCES
`Patent Owner.
`
`
`
`Case IPR2013-00424
`Patent 5,845,000
`
`
`
`Before JAMESON LEE, TREVOR M. JEFFERSON, and
`BARBARA A. PARVIS, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`JEFFERSON, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
`571-272-7822 Entered: January 14, 2014
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`
`
`TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`AMERICAN VEHICULAR SCIENCES
`Patent Owner.
`
`
`
`Case IPR2013-00424
`Patent 5,845,000
`
`
`
`Before JAMESON LEE, TREVOR M. JEFFERSON, and
`BARBARA A. PARVIS, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`
`JEFFERSON, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`
`DECISION
`Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2013-00424
`Patent 5,845,000
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`On July 8, 2013, Toyota Motor Corporation (“Toyota” or
`“Petitioner”) filed a petition requesting an inter partes review of claims 10,
`11, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 23 of U.S. Patent No. 5,845,000 (Ex. 1001, “the ’000
`patent”). Paper 2 (“Pet.”). American Vehicular Sciences (“AVS” or “Patent
`Owner”) filed a preliminary response (Paper 13, “Prelim. Resp.”) on
`October 17, 2013. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 314.
`The standard for instituting an inter partes review is set forth in
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) which provides as follows:
`THRESHOLD -- The Director may not authorize an inter partes
`review to be instituted unless the Director determines that the
`information presented in the petition filed under section 311
`and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a
`reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with
`respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.
`
`Upon consideration of Toyota’s petition and AVS’s preliminary
`response, we determine that there is a reasonable likelihood that Toyota
`would prevail in showing the unpatentability of each of claims 10, 11, 16,
`17, 19, 20, and 23 of the ’697 patent. Accordingly, pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
`§ 314, we institute an inter partes review as to claims 10, 11, 16, 17, 19, 20,
`and 23 of the ’000 patent.
`
`A. Related Proceedings
`Toyota indicates that the ’000 patent has been asserted by AVS in the
`
`following district court cases: (1) American Vehicular Sciences LLC v.
`Toyota Motor Corp., Civil Action No. 6:12-CV-406 (E.D. Tex.); (2)
`American Vehicular Sciences LLC v. BMW Grp. A/K/A BMW AG, Civil
`Action No. 6:12-CV-413 (E.D. Tex.); and (3) American Vehicular Sciences
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`LLC v. Mercedes-Benz U.S. Intl., Inc., Civil Action No. 6:13-CV-308 (E.D.
`Tex.). Pet. 1.
`
`B. The ’000 Patent
`The disclosed invention of the ’000 patent is directed to a vehicle
`interior monitoring system that monitors, identifies, and locates occupants
`and other objects in the passenger compartment of a vehicle and objects
`outside of the vehicle. Ex. 1001, Abstract: 1-4. Objects are illuminated with
`electromagnetic radiation, and a lens is used to focus the illuminated images
`onto the arrays of a charge coupled device (CCD). Id. at Abstract: 1-9; col.
`7, ll. 26-40. Computational means using trained pattern recognition analyzes
`the signals received at the CCD to classify, identify, or locate the contents of
`external objects, which, in turn, are used to affect the operation of other
`vehicular systems. Id. at Abstract: 10-12. The ’000 patent discloses that a
`vehicle computation system uses a “trainable or a trained pattern recognition
`system” which relies on pattern recognition to process signals and to
`“identify” an object exterior to the vehicle or an object within the vehicles
`interior. Id. at col. 3, ll. 21-44.
`Figures 7 and 7A, reproduced below, illustrate portions of the sensor
`system that use transmitters, receivers, circuitry, and processors to perform
`pattern recognition of external objects in anticipation of a side-impact
`collision:
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`Figure 7, with Figure 7A inset, depicts vehicle 720 approaching the side of
`another vehicle 710 and shows transmitter 730 and receivers 734 and 736.
`Ex. 1001, col. 9, ll. 48-52; col. 18, ll. 28-40. Figure 7A provides a detailed
`view of the electronics that drive transmitter 730 and circuitry 744
`containing neural computer 745 to process signals reflected or received from
`the external object using pattern recognition. Id. at col. 18, ll. 33-40.
`Figure 8 also illustrates an exterior monitoring system and is
`reproduced below:
`
`
`Figure 8 depicts a system for detecting the headlights or taillights of other
`vehicles used in conjunction with an automatic headlight dimming system.
`Ex. 1001, col. 9, ll. 54-58. CCD array in Figure 8 is designed to be sensitive
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`to visible light and does not use a separate source of illumination as depicted
`in Figure 7. Id.
`The Summary of the Invention discusses an invention related to
`detection of object in the interior of the vehicle and objects external to the
`vehicle. Id. at col. 7, ll. 25-30. Specifically, external objects are illuminated
`with “electromagnetic, and specifically infrared, radiation,” and lenses are
`used to focus images onto one or more CCDs arrays. Id. The disclosure
`further states that the invention provides (1) an “anticipatory sensor” located
`within the vehicle to “identify about-to-impact object[s] in the presence of
`snow and/or fog”, (2) “a smart headlight dimmer system” to sense and
`identify headlights and taillights and distinguish them from other reflective
`surfaces, and (3) blind spot detection. Id. at col. 8, ll. 37-53.
`
`C. Exemplary Claims
`Petitioner challenges independent claims 10, 16, and 23. The
`remaining challenged claims are dependent claims 11, 17, 19, and 20, which
`each depend directly on either claim 10 or claim 16. Claims 10, 16, and 23
`are reproduced below:
`10.
`In a motor vehicle having an interior and an exterior, a
`monitoring system for monitoring at least one object exterior to
`said vehicle comprising:
`a) transmitter means for transmitting electromagnetic
`waves to illuminate the at least one exterior object;
`b) reception means for receiving reflected
`electromagnetic illumination from the at least one exterior
`object;
`c) processor means coupled to said reception means for
`processing said received illumination and creating an electronic
`signal characteristic of said exterior object based thereon;
`d) categorization means coupled to said processor means
`for categorizing said electronic signal to identify said exterior
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`object, said categorization means comprising trained pattern
`recognition means for processing said electronic signal based
`on said received illumination from said exterior object to
`provide an identification of said exterior object based thereon,
`said pattern recognition means being structured and arranged to
`apply a pattern recognition algorithm generated from data of
`possible exterior objects and patterns of received
`electromagnetic illumination from the possible exterior objects;
`and
`
`e) output means coupled to said categorization means for
`affecting another system in the vehicle in response to the
`identification of said exterior object.
`
`In a motor vehicle having an interior and an exterior, an
`16.
`automatic headlight dimming system comprising:
`a) reception means for receiving electromagnetic
`radiation from the exterior of the vehicle;
`b) processor means coupled to said reception means for
`processing the received radiation and creating an electronic
`signal characteristic of the received radiation;
`c) categorization means coupled to said processor means
`for categorizing said electronic signal to identify a source of the
`radiation, said categorization means comprising trained pattern
`recognition means for processing said electronic signal based
`on said received radiation to provide an identification of the
`source of the radiation based thereon, said pattern recognition
`means being structured and arranged to apply a pattern
`recognition algorithm generated from data of possible sources
`of radiation including lights of vehicles and patterns of received
`radiation from the possible sources; and
`d) output means coupled to said categorization means for
`dimming the headlights in said vehicle in response to the
`identification of the source of the radiation.
`
`23. A method for affecting a system in a vehicle based on an
`object exterior of the vehicle, comprising the steps of:
`a) transmitting electromagnetic waves to illuminate the
`exterior object;
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`b) receiving reflected electromagnetic illumination from
`the object on an array;
`c) processing the received illumination and creating an
`electronic signal characteristic of the exterior object based
`thereon;
`d) processing the electronic signal based on the received
`illumination from the exterior object to identify the exterior
`object, said processing step comprising the steps of generating a
`pattern recognition algorithm from data of possible exterior
`objects and patterns of received electromagnetic illumination
`from the possible exterior objects, storing the algorithm within
`a pattern recognition system and applying the pattern
`recognition algorithm using the electronic signal as input to
`obtain the identification of the exterior object; and
`e) affecting the system in the vehicle in response to the
`identification of the exterior object.
`
`Ex. 1001, col. 21, ll. 35-61; col. 22, ll. 17-39; col. 23, l. 19 – col. 24,
`l. 2.
`
`
`D. Prior Art Relied Upon
`Toyota relies upon the following prior art references:
`
`Title
`Reference
`Lemelson U.S. Patent No. 6,553,130, issued
`on April 22, 2003 from an
`application that is a continuation of
`U.S. Application No. 08/105,304
`filed on Aug. 11, 1993
`’304 Appl. U.S. Application No. 08/105,304
`Asayama U.S. Patent No. 5,214,408
`Pomerleau Dean Pomerleau, Neural Network
`Perception for Mobile Robot
`Guidance (February 16, 1992) (Ph.
`D. Thesis, Carnegie Mellon
`University) (Defense Technical
`Information Center AD-A249927)
`
`Date
`Jan. 1, 1995
`
`Exhibit
`Ex. 1002
`
`Aug. 11, 1993 Ex. 1003
`
`Ex. 1004
`May 12, 1992 Ex. 1005
`
`7
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`
`
`
`Ex. 1007
`
`June 15, 1987 Ex. 1008
`
`Exhibit
`Date
`Sept. 22, 1994 Ex. 1006
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`Title
`Reference
`Mizukoshi Mizukoshi, Japanese Unexamined
`Patent Application Publication No.
`H06-267303
`English translation of Mizukoshi,
`H06-267303
`Yanagawa Japanese Unexamined Patent
`Application Publication No. S62-
`131837
`English Translation of Yanagawa,
`No. S62-131837
`Lemelson is a continuation of parent application 08/105,304 (“the
`’304 application”), and claims priority to the filing date of the ’304
`application, i.e., August 11, 1993. Thus, Toyota assumes the effective filing
`date of Lemelson is August 11, 1993.
`In its preliminary response, AVS does not assert a priority date earlier
`than that acknowledged by Toyota for the claims of the ’000 patent. Prelim.
`Resp. 7. The earliest priority date, acknowledged by Toyota, for claims 10,
`11, 19 and 23 is May 23, 1994, and the earliest priority date, acknowledged
`by Toyota, for claims 16, 17 and 20 is June 7, 1995. Id.; Pet. 3.
`In an inter partes review, the burden is on Petitioner to show a
`reasonable likelihood that it would prevail on a ground of unpatentability.
`With respect to entitlement to earlier effective filing dates, the Patent Owner
`is not presumed to be entitled to the earlier filing dates of ancestral
`applications which do not share the same disclosure. But, the issue first has
`to be raised by Petitioner in its petition. Once raised, the Patent Owner has to
`make a sufficient showing of entitlement to earlier filing date or dates, in a
`manner that is commensurate in scope with the specific points and
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Ex. 1009
`
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`contentions raised by Petitioner. See Polaris Wireless, Inc. v. Trueposition,
`Inc., IPR No. 2013-00323, slip. op. at 29 (Nov. 15, 2013).
`Based on the record before us, Lemelson is prior art under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 102(e).
`
`E. Alleged Grounds of Unpatentability
`Toyota seeks to cancel claims 10, 11, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 23 of the
`’000 patent based on the alleged grounds of unpatentability set forth in the
`table below:
`
`Reference[s]
`Lemelson
`Lemelson and Asayama
`Pomerleau
`Mizukoshi
`
`Yanagawa
`
`Basis
`§ 102(e)
`§ 103(a)
`§ 102(b)
`§ 102(a) and/or
`§ 103(a)
`§ 102(b) and/or
`§ 103(a)
`§ 103(a)
`Yanagawa and Lemelson
`Yanagawa and Mizukoshi § 103(a)
`
`Claims Challenged
`10, 11, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 23
`10, 11, 19, and 23
`10, 11, 19, and 23
`16, 17, and 20
`
`16 and 17
`
`16, 17, and 20
`16, 17, and 20
`
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`
`A. Claim Construction
`The Board interprets claims of an unexpired patent in an inter partes
`review according to “the broadest reasonable construction in light of the
`specification of the patent in which [they] appear[].” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b);
`see also Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,766
`(Aug. 14, 2012). The terms are also given their ordinary and customary
`meaning as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the
`context of the disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257
`(Fed. Cir. 2007).
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`There is a “heavy presumption” that a claim term carries its ordinary
`
`and customary meaning. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d
`1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). However, a “claim term will not receive its
`ordinary meaning if the patentee acted as his own lexicographer and clearly
`set forth a definition of the disputed claim term in either the specification or
`prosecution history.” Id. “Although an inventor is indeed free to define the
`specific terms used to describe his or her invention, this must be done with
`reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d
`1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). If an inventor acts as his or her own
`lexicographer, the definition must be set forth in the specification with
`reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs
`Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
`
`“Comprising” is a term of art used in claim language, which means
`that the named elements are essential, but other elements also may be
`included to constitute additional components within the scope of the claim.
`Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
`
`1. “pattern recognition algorithm” (Claims 10 and 16)
`The ’000 patent expressly states that “pattern recognition,” as used in
`the disclosure, means:
`any system which processes a signal that is generated by an
`object, or is modified by interacting with an object, in order to
`determine which one of a set of classes that the object belongs
`to. Such a system might determine only that the object is or is
`not a member of one specified class, or it might attempt to
`assign the object to one of a larger class set of specified classes,
`or find that it is not a member of any of the classes in the set.
`
`Ex. 1001, col. 3, ll. 21-28.
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`Petitioner contends that during prosecution of U.S. Application No.
`08/247,760 (the “’760 Appl.”) the Board of Patent Appeals and
`Interferences1 defined a “pattern recognition” system as one that “determines
`whether or not an object is a member of but a single particular class.” Pet.
`6-7. Furthermore, Petitioner asserts that the ’000 patent disclosure includes
`a neural network, fuzzy logic, and a sensor fusion as types of pattern
`recognition systems. Id.
`We agree with the Patent Owner (Prelim. Resp. at 9) that the decision
`of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences in the ’760 Appl. does not
`provide a construction for “pattern recognition,” but merely gives an
`example of a system that performs pattern recognition as defined in the ’760
`Appl. Ex. 1010, 188-189. We also disagree with Toyota’s argument urging
`a construction of “pattern recognition algorithm” that includes specific
`embodiments related to neural networks.
`In light of the special definition for “pattern recognition” in the ’000
`patent, we determine that pattern recognition algorithm is “an algorithm
`which processes a signal that is generated by an object, or is modified by
`interacting with an object, for determining to which one of a set of classes
`the object belongs.” See Id., col. 3, ll. 21-28.
`
`
`1 Section 7 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
`125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), designated the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`as the successor to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. See 35
`U.S.C. § 6(a).
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`2. “trained pattern recognition means for . . .” (Claims 10 and 16)
`The parties dispute whether “trained pattern recognition means . . .”,
`as recited in claims 10 and 16, falls within section 112, ¶ 6,2 as a means for
`performing a specified function.
`Claim 10 recites:
`trained pattern recognition means for processing said electronic
`signal based on said received illumination from said exterior
`object to provide an identification of said exterior object based
`thereon, said pattern recognition means being structured and
`arranged to apply a pattern recognition algorithm generated
`from data of possible exterior objects and patterns of received
`electromagnetic illumination from the possible exterior objects .
`. . .
`
`Ex. 1001, col 21, ll. 50-58.
`Claim 16 recites
`trained pattern recognition means for processing said electronic
`signal based on said received radiation to provide an
`identification of the source of the radiation based thereon, said
`pattern recognition means being structured and arranged to
`apply a pattern recognition algorithm generated from data of
`possible sources of radiation including lights of vehicles and
`patterns of received radiation from the possible sources . . . .
`
`Ex. 1001, col 22, ll. 28-36.
`Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, a claim element may be
`expressed as a means or a step for performing a specified function without
`the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such an
`element would cover the corresponding structure, material or acts described
`
`
`2 Section 4(c) of the AIA, re-designated 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, as 35 U.S.C.
`§ 112(f). Because the ’000 patent has a filing date before September 16,
`2012 (effective date of AIA), we use the citation “§ 112, ¶ 6.
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`in the specification and equivalents thereof. To determine what is covered
`by a means-plus-function element, we look to the specification to identify
`the corresponding structure, material, or acts which are described as
`performing the recited function. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6; In re Donaldson Co.,
`16 F.3d 1189, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
`“Use of the term ‘means’ in a claim limitation creates a presumption
`that section 112, paragraph 6 has been invoked, but that presumption may be
`rebutted if the properly construed claim limitation itself recites sufficiently
`definite structure to perform the claimed function.” Kemco Sales, Inc. v.
`Control Papers Co., Inc., 208 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citation
`omitted). “A claim term recites sufficient structure if the term, as the name
`for structure, has a reasonably well understood meaning in the art.” Allen
`Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
`(internal quotations and citations omitted). Construing means-plus-function
`claim language in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6, is a two-
`step process: (1) “to define the particular function of the claim limitation”;
`and (2) “look to the specification and identify the corresponding structure for
`that function” where the “structure disclosed in the specification is
`corresponding structure only if the specification or prosecution history
`clearly links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claim.”
`Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1333-34 (Fed. Cir.
`2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
`Toyota contends that the recited function in the clause at issue in
`claim 10 is “for processing said electronic signal based on said received
`illumination from said exterior object to provide an identification of said
`exterior object based thereon.” Pet. 7-8. Similarly, Toyota asserts that the
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`recited function for claim 16 is “for processing said electronic signal based
`on said received radiation to provide an identification of the source of the
`radiation based thereon.” Toyota contends that these identified functions
`should be read according to their plain and ordinary meaning. Toyota
`further argues that the corresponding structures for performing the functions
`found in the specification are neural computers and processors that perform
`pattern recognition. Id.; Ex. 1001, col. 18, ll. 36-38, col. 17, ll. 3-21, col. 5,
`ll. 2-5.
`AVS contends that because the “trained pattern recognition means” of
`claims 10 and 16 apply a “pattern recognition algorithm,” the “pattern
`recognition algorithm” provides sufficient structure for performing the stated
`function. Prelim. Resp. 12. Thus, according to AVS, the specific inclusion
`of structure rebuts the presumption that “trained pattern recognition means”
`is construed under section 112, ¶ 6. Prelim. Resp. 12.
`We are not persuaded by AVS’s argument that the phrase “said
`pattern recognition means being structured and arranged to apply a pattern
`recognition algorithm” provides specific structure for performing the recited
`function of the associated means, on the basis that it refers to use of
`algorithm. Ex. 1001, col. 22, ll. 53-55 (claim 10), col. 23, ll. 30-32 (claim
`16) (emphasis added). Merely stating that an algorithm is used and what the
`algorithm achieves does not present sufficient structure for a special purpose
`computer which implements the algorithm to perform the recited function.
`No specifics or particular aspects of the algorithm are provided in the claim,
`just the results of performing the algorithm. Thus, we agree with Toyota and
`determine that “trained pattern recognition means” as recited in claims 10
`and 16 falls within section 112, ¶ 6, as a means-plus-function element.
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`We conclude that for claim 10, the function performed by the “trained
`pattern recognition means” is “for processing said electronic signal based on
`said received illumination from said exterior object to provide an
`identification of said exterior object based thereon,” and for claim 16 the
`function performed by the “trained pattern recognition means” is “for
`processing said electronic signal based on said received radiation to provide
`an identification of the source of the radiation based thereon.”
`We agree with Toyota that the’000 patent disclosure links a
`“microprocessor” and “neural computer” to pattern recognition noting that
`“implementation can be carried out by those skilled in the art of pattern
`recognition using neural networks.” Ex. 1001, col. 17, ll. 6-10; see also id.
`at col. 18, ll. 36-38 (stating that “[c]ircuitry 744 contains a neural computer
`745 which performs the pattern recognition determination”); col. 5, ll. 2-5
`(stating that “implementation with neural networks and similarly trainable
`pattern recognition technologies permits the use of low cost
`microprocessors.”).
`AVS further asserts that “trained” pattern recognition means “is not
`simply a neural network computer or processor, but rather one specifically
`trained for pattern recognition, as the the ’000 patent defines “[a] trainable or
`a trained pattern recognition system as . . . a pattern recognition system
`which is taught various patterns by subjecting the system to a variety of
`examples.” Id.; see Prelim. Resp. 12. We agree with AVS that the neural
`computer or microprocessor must be trained for pattern recognition in order
`to perform the recited functions.
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`Accordingly, we construe “trained pattern recognition means” recited
`in claims 10 and 16 as covering a neural computer or microprocessor trained
`for pattern recognition, and equivalents thereof.
`
`3. “identify” and “identification” (Claims 10, 16 and 23)
`The terms “identify” and “identification” appear in claims 10
`(limitations (d) and (e)), 16 (limitations (c) and (d)), and 23 (limitations (d)
`and (e)).
`We agree with AVS that the ’000 patent sets forth a definition for the
`term “identify,” as meaning “to determine that the object belongs to a
`particular set or class.” Id., col. 3, ll. 38-45. We are not persuaded by
`Toyota, however, that the specification’s examples of classes limit the
`construction. Pet. 8. Thus, we construe the term “identify” and
`“identification” in accordance with the specification’s definition for identify
`as meaning determining that the object belongs to a particular set or class.
`See Ex. 1001, col. 3, ll. 38-45.
`
`4. “Transmitter means for transmitting electromagnetic waves to
`illuminate the at least one exterior object” (Claim 10)
`The parties dispute whether “transmitter means for transmitting
`electromagnetic waves to illuminate the at least one exterior object,” as
`recited in claim 10, constitutes a means-plus-function element within the
`scope of section 112 ¶ 6.
`Toyota contends that the recited function is “transmitting
`electromagnetic waves to illuminate the at least one exterior object.” Toyota
`identifies the corresponding structure from the specification as an infrared
`transmitter, radar or laser radar as found in the specification (Ex. 1001, col
`18, ll. 16-46, col. 18, l. 61 – col. 19, l. 22). Pet. 9.
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`AVS disagrees, contending that the term transmitter provides
`sufficient structure to perform the recited function. Prelim. Resp. 14.
`Therefore, AVS argues that the recitation of a transmitter within the means
`clause overcomes the presumption that the feature is a means-plus-function
`element. Based on the transmitter embodiments in the specification, AVS
`further contends that the transmitter of claim 10 should be construed as a
`“transmitter that transmits electromagnetic waves that are primarily outside
`of the visible spectrum.” Prelim. Resp. 15.
`AVS argues that the specification supports their proposed construction
`of the term “transmitter” because all the disclosed embodiments using a
`transmitter do not use visible light; specifically, the embodiments use
`infrared transmitter, radar, and pulsed GaAs laser system. Prelim. Resp. 14
`(citing Ex. 1001, col. 18, ll. 16-46, col. 18. l. 61 – col. 19, l. 22).
`Furthermore, AVS contends that the disclosed embodiment shows that
`transmitter of claim 10 is “used when the receiver is not sensitive to visible
`light.” Prelim. Resp. 15 (citing Ex. 1001, col. 19, ll. 27-31 (“In this
`embodiment, the CCD array is designed to be sensitive to visible light and a
`separate source of illumination is not used.”)). In sum, AVS contends that
`the transmitter of claim 10 is disclosed using “electromagnetic waves that
`are primarily outside of the visible spectrum.” Prelim. Resp. 15.
`We agree with AVS that transmitter means contains sufficient
`structure to perform the recited function of “transmitting electromagnetic
`waves to illuminate the at least one exterior object.” The term transmitter,
`on this record, specifies transmitter devices that are known to those with
`ordinary skill in the art.
`
`17
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`Case IPR2013-00424
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`
`AVS fails to persuade us, however, that application of the broadest
`reasonable interpretation rule would limit “transmitter” to those devices
`which emit “electromagnetic waves that are primarily outside of the visible
`spectrum.”
`We note that the ’000 patent broadly refers to receivers (transducers)
`that are “sensitive to . . . electromagnetic radiation and, if electromagnetic,
`they can be either visible light, infrared, ultraviolet or radar.” Ex. 1001, col.
`3, ll. 31-33. Thus, we find that the specification broadly includes visible
`light within the phrase “electromagnetic radiation” that can be received by
`transducers. Similarly, the ’000 patent’s Summary of Invention section
`states that “by illuminating . . . objects outside of the vehicle with
`electromagnetic, and specifically infrared, radiation and using one or more
`lenses to focus images of the contents onto one or more arrays of charge
`coupled devices (CCD arrays)” the system identifies “objects outside of a
`motor vehicle.” Ex. 1001, col. 7, ll. 26-35. Therefore, the ’000 patent
`discloses transducers (or receivers) that are sensitive to electromagnetic
`waves, including visible light, and that illuminate external objects with
`electromagnetic radiation, which includes, but is not limited to, infrared
`light. Id.
`AVS’s proposed construction of transmitter also introduces terms
`(i.e., primarily outside the visible spectrum) that rely on indeterminate
`quantities based on the amount of visible or non-visible waves that are
`contained in the source’s electromagnetic waves. We are not persuaded that
`the ordinary and customary meaning of “transmitter” as used in the ’000
`patent is limited to transmission of waves that are primarily outside of the
`visible spectrum. An extraneous limitation, which is unnecessary to make
`
`18
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`Case IPR2013-00424
`Patent 5,845,000
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`sense of the claim, should not be read into the claims. See E.I. du Pont de
`Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir.
`1988); see also Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d
`1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir.
`1994). Although the ’000 patent cites infrared, radar, and pulsed GaAs laser
`system as embodiments and infrared as the preferred embodiments of a
`transmitter (Ex. 1001, col. 18, l. 61 – col. 19, ll. 22), the patent’s disclosure
`also broadly discloses transmitter illumination by “electromagnetic
`radiation” without express limitation to light that is “primarily outside of the
`visible spectrum.”
`Accordingly, we do not adopt AVS’s construction of the term
`transmitter. Having considered the portions of the specification cited by
`AVS and Toyota, we agree with both parties that, in the context of the ’000
`patent “transmitter” as recited in claim 10 covers infrared, radar, and pulsed
`GaAs laser systems. Additionally, we determine that transmitter also covers
`transmitters which emit visible light.
`
`5. “reception means for receiving reflected electromagnetic illumination
`from the at least one exterior object” (Claim 10) and “reception
`means for receiving electromagnetic radiation from the exterior of the
`vehicle” (Claim 16)
`Both Toyota and AVS agree that “reception means” as recited in
`claims 10 and 16 invoke section 112 ¶ 6 as means-plus-function limitations.
`The parties agree, and we conclude, that the recited function of the
`“reception means” is “receiving reflected electromagnetic illumination from
`the at least one exterior object” in claim 10, and “receiving electromagnetic
`radiation from the exterior of the vehicle” in claim 16.
`
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`
`The parties disagree, however, over the corresponding structure for
`the recited function. Pet. 9, Prelim. Resp. 16-17. Toyota argues that the
`structure performing the recited functions may be an infrared receiver, radar,
`laser radar, or CCD transducers. Pet. 9. AVS argues that Toyota’s proposed
`structures are overly broad, asserting instead that CCD transducers alone are
`the corresponding structures. Prelim. Resp. 16-17.
`Turning to the Specification, we determine that a CCD array and CCD
`transducer are the corresponding structure for the recited function of the
`reception means of claims 10 and 16. Ex. 1001, col. 18, ll. 16-21, 61-64
`(discussing “CCD array receiver” and “CCD array system”); col. 19, ll. 10-
`35(discussing “CCD array” and “CCD transducers which receive reflected
`infrared waves”).
`
`6. “processor means coupled to said reception means for processing
`s
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