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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`HEWLETT-PACKARD ENTERPRISE CO.; HP ENTERPRISE
`SERVICES LLC; and TERADATA OPERATIONS, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`REALTIME DATA LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2016-00783
`Patent 6,597,812 B1
`____________
`
`Record of Oral Hearing
`Held: June 30, 2017
`____________
`
`
`
`
`BEFORE: GEORGIANNA W. BRADEN, J. JOHN LEE, and
`JASON J. CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges.
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`Case IPR2016-00783
`Patent 6,597,812 B1
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`APPEARANCES:
`
`ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
`J. CHRISTOPHER CARRAWAY, ESQUIRE
`Klarquist Sparkman, LLP
`One World Trade Center
`121 SW Salmon Street, Suite 1600
`Portland, Oregon 97204
`
`and
`
`JAMIE R. LYNN, ESQUIRE
`Baker Botts, LLP
`1299 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20004
`
`ON BEHALF OF PATENT OWNER:
`KAYVAN B. NOROOZI, ESQUIRE
`WILLIAM P. ROTHWELL, ESQUIRE
`Noroozi, P.C.
`1299 Ocean Avenue, Suite 450
`Santa Monica, California 90401
`
`
`The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on Friday,
`
`June 30, 2017, commencing at 1:01 p.m., at the U.S. Patent and
`Trademark Office, 600 Dulany Street, Alexandria, Virginia.
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`Case IPR2016-00783
`Patent 6,597,812 B1
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`
`P R O C E E D I N G S
`- - - - -
`JUDGE CHUNG: This is the hearing for case
`IPR2016-00783 pertaining to the U.S. patent number 6,597,812.
`With me on the panel are Judge Georgianna Braden, who is
`sitting remote, and Judge John Lee, and myself, Jason Chung.
`Who do we have for petitioner?
`MR. CARRAWAY: Petitioner, Your Honor, we have
`lead counsel, Jamie Lynne, and I am backup counsel, Chris
`Carraway.
`JUDGE CHUNG: Who do we have for patent owner?
`MR. NOROOZI: We have lead counsel, Mr. William
`Rothwell, and myself, Kayvan Noroozi.
`JUDGE CHUNG: Each side will have 30 minutes to
`present their argument. Petitioner will go first. Petitioner may
`reserve part of that 30 minutes as rebuttal time. Would petitioner
`like to reserve any of that rebuttal time at this moment?
`MR. CARRAWAY: Yes, Your Honor, seven minutes,
`
`please.
`
`JUDGE CHUNG: And the panel would like to remind
`the parties respectfully to speak into the microphone clearly
`because one of the judges is remote, and also identify the slide
`number when referring to -- when the slide is in the presentation
`so that our remote judge can follow along to the conversation.
`At this moment, the petitioner may begin.
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`Case IPR2016-00783
`Patent 6,597,812 B1
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`MR. CARRAWAY: May it please the Board, I am
`again Chris Carraway, counsel for the three petitioners,
`Hewlett-Packard Enterprise, Hewlett-Packard Enterprise
`Services, and Teradata. On slide 2, we have the grounds raised
`by this petition and on which the Board has instituted the IPR for
`the '812 patent. Ground 1 addresses method claims 1 to 4 and 8
`and system claim 28 using O'Brien and Nelson. Ground 2
`addresses claims 14 to 17 and 21, which are CRM claims for
`software that performs the same steps as method claims 1 to 4
`and 8.
`
`The addition of the Welch prior art for ground 2 is
`because O'Brien uses hardware circuitry to perform its
`compression method, and Welch shows that this type of
`compression can be implemented on either hardware or software.
`Because these two software claims track the method claims, most
`of the disputes for ground 2 are going to be the same as ground 1.
`We'll move to slide 5, please. On slide 5, I want to start
`by just quickly doing an overview of the '812 patent and the
`O'Brien patent, which is the primary prior art reference at issue.
`The '812 patent is directed to a combination of two compression
`techniques, run length encoding and dictionary encoding. Run
`length encoding and codes are a run of characters like five As in a
`row. Dictionary compression instead maps characters and strings
`to an index or code in the dictionary. Now, the '812 patent admits
`that both of these compression techniques were old and then
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`Case IPR2016-00783
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`purports to try to claim the combination, but the combination was
`old as well. That is shown by the O'Brien patent.
`Slide 5 shows overview diagrams for these two patents
`in both. An input is monitored by a run length encoder which is
`shaded orange on slide 5. Both of these look for runs of a certain
`number of characters. In O'Brien it's three. And in both if such a
`run is encountered, it is encoded using three components, a code
`telling the character that is being repeated, a code indicating that
`the -- telling the decoder that what is coming is going to be a run
`length and should be treated that way, and three, the number of
`times to repeat. And then in both --
`JUDGE CHUNG: Excuse me. Can we spend some
`time on the second thing that you discussed, the code telling the
`run length that a run length is approaching. Would you be able to
`point to me in your petition where you map reference value to the
`control code word and how reference value indicates that a run is
`approaching. Reference value from Table 8 that is the O'Brien
`reference.
`MR. CARRAWAY: Yes, Your Honor. I'm pulling up
`Exhibit 1005, which is the first Creusere declaration filed with
`our petition. Your Honor, this is page 51, paragraph 80 of
`Dr. Creusere's declaration. In it Dr. Creusere explains how
`O'Brien's compression system encodes a run length by three
`things: A reference value that represents the character being
`repeated, a run length reference value selected from table A
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`Case IPR2016-00783
`Patent 6,597,812 B1
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`which indicates a run length that's been detected and indicates the
`number of bits used for the repeat count and then the repeat count
`for the run.
`Now, if you look down, we cited to column 5, lines 45
`to 50. And in our demonstratives we cited to column 3 for this
`very same point. It's -- the sentence is repeated. I just used the
`wrong location from where it was in our petition, which was 5:45
`to 50.
`
`JUDGE CHUNG: So in the demonstrative you cited to
`the new column 3 is what you're saying?
`MR. CARRAWAY: I accidentally used the first time
`the same sentence appears instead of the second time the sentence
`appears. It's the exact same sentence. In that it says runs of three
`or more repeated bytes are encoded using three things: A
`predetermined set of reserve reference values to indicate that the
`preceding character was repeated a number of times specified by
`the repeat code. That's three values, all of which are identified in
`O'Brien as being used.
`I want to go back to -- go into more detail about this
`particular element. On slide 18 when it comes up, we have the
`first of those three components, the code word signifying the
`character being repeated. And column 9, lines 10 to 47 of
`O'Brien sets the stage by explaining how run length encoding
`starts. The run length encoder circuit 303 monitors three data
`bytes looking for a run. It monitors the data byte that's in the
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`Case IPR2016-00783
`Patent 6,597,812 B1
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`reference value encoder, it monitors what's in the holding register
`behind that, and then it monitors what's in the path behind the
`holding register. When it identifies that there's three in a row,
`this is where this segment of the O'Brien patent that's on slide 18
`states when all of these inputs are the same, run length encoder
`circuit 303 transmits a run length detect signal to reference value
`encoder 304 via leads 313 which then encodes the last character it
`received and then transfers control of the run length encoder
`circuit 303. So that's where we know that the character has been
`encoded by the reference value.
`JUDGE CHUNG: So that detect signal from or via
`circuit 303 is what triggers the reference value?
`MR. CARRAWAY: The reference value for the
`character because of course the characters are stored.
`JUDGE CHUNG: And the reference value being the
`control code word, mapped to the claim control code word?
`MR. CARRAWAY: That's the code word for the value
`in the dictionary for the character. So again there's three words
`that are required by the claim. One is a control code word
`indicating that a run length is coming. That's telling the decoder.
`There is the character itself and there is the repeat code. Now, in
`O'Brien the order is switched.
`JUDGE CHUNG: So you are saying that the claim, if I
`may paraphrase, is ABC and then in O'Brien it's BAC?
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`Case IPR2016-00783
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`MR. CARRAWAY: I think that's right, yes, Your
`Honor. The first thing that's encoded is shown here in column 9.
`And that is the character, it's an instruction from the run length
`encoder to the reference value encoder saying encode that
`character that you currently have in the encoder.
`JUDGE CHUNG: And the reference value is the first
`column of table A, and you are mapping that reference value to
`element A, if I may state -- the control word.
`MR. CARRAWAY: Yes, Your Honor. While we are
`on this outputting, I want to go through the other ones. So now
`we get to what in the claim is A, the control code word. And
`what we have here is that looking at slide 19, the next two words
`required are the control code word and then the repeat code.
`Now, O'Brien has a table A at column 13 which O'Brien
`described as an example of a series of reserved reference values.
`Those reserved reference values are, again -- the word reserve
`reference value was discussed in the portion of column 5 that we
`saw at the beginning. Now, conveniently enough, there they are.
`They say reference values, so we know those are the reference
`values in table A. And they go 1, 2, 3, 4, all the way down to 10,
`as an example.
`Now, the way that table A works, first of all, it's very
`clear there's two values here. There's a reference value in
`column 1 and a repeat value in column 2. Each reference value
`indicates that the repeat will be in a certain range using a certain
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`Case IPR2016-00783
`Patent 6,597,812 B1
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`number of bits to encode. And the bits correspond to the
`reference value in this example.
`So just looking at the first row in table A, we have for a
`reference value of 1, that can be used to encode a repeat of 2 or 3.
`And that's in the far right column of table A using repeat codes of
`0 or 1. And so specifically the way that would work would be if
`you have a run of -- a repeat of 3, you would have a reference
`value of 1, a repeat code of 1, and that would encode a repeat of 3
`using two different codes.
`Now, it's more complicated in the '812 patent. Now, the
`way the '812 patent does it is they use one code and one code
`only. It's listed as D[1] in the '812 patent. That just indicates a
`run period. It's not a run of any range like the O'Brien patent
`does it. O'Brien explains why it does these multiple references
`instead of using one. And that's because it allows you to reduce
`the number of bits needed to encode a run. So for a more
`common repeat like 2 or 3, you can encode that using only
`one-bit number, 0 or 1, while less common repeats like 8 to 15
`would require three bits. So that way for the most common
`situations, you are going to be using fewer bits.
`Now, patent owner asserts that O'Brien only outputs
`two words. Not three. And that's just not true. And the only way
`you can get to that is by misreading O'Brien. The way that patent
`owner seems to get to that conclusion appears to be by assuming
`that that reference value in the first column of table A is the
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`Case IPR2016-00783
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`character that's being encoded. That can't be right because as we
`saw in column 5, it stated that the reference values are reserve
`reference values that indicate that the preceding character is going
`to be repeated with a repeat code.
`So there's also the question of the order. It hasn't really
`been pushed in the demonstratives, but it's fully briefed in our
`petition and in the reply. So I don't want to belabor that point.
`Your Honor, if we can go to the other issue which is --
`the other main issue which is maintaining a dictionary -- actually,
`before we go to maintaining a dictionary, I did want to hit a
`threshold point that has been raised in the demonstratives by the
`patent owner, and that is the question of obviousness in general
`versus anticipation.
`Petitioner -- or patent owner seems to say that if there
`are no differences between the challenged claims and one of the
`references in the obviousness ground, that there can't be
`obviousness. And that's just not true. First of all, I want to
`explain what we did in the petition. In the petition, we cited
`O'Brien for all the elements except for the dictionary. And the
`reason why we didn't actually use that for a dictionary was
`because, and we were very clear about this in the petition, it has a
`dictionary. It just doesn't label it a dictionary. And what we used
`the Nelson for which is the secondary reference was for that
`label. It was for a teaching to one of ordinary skill in the art that
`what was in O'Brien is actually a dictionary.
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`Case IPR2016-00783
`Patent 6,597,812 B1
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`
`We were not arguing primarily in our petition that we
`somehow need to put together O'Brien and Nelson into some kind
`of a combination. Instead, we were using the teachings of the
`two. That's all.
`Patent owner now admits that O'Brien does have a
`dictionary. So that missing element that we were using Nelson to
`show how a person would understand it is now not necessary.
`The ground is still obviousness over O'Brien and Nelson. It's just
`that Nelson's teachings are not necessary to understand O'Brien.
`Now, patent owner argues that anticipation by O'Brien
`forecloses obviousness. That would lead the Board into legal
`error because it's just not the law.
`JUDGE CHUNG: Counselor, can we just move on to
`maintaining a dictionary. If you have time at the end, maybe you
`can revisit this.
`MR. CARRAWAY: Yes, Your Honor. If we can go to
`slide 10, maintaining a dictionary, the dispute between the parties
`is largely one of claim construction. It's whether -- well, the
`petitioners have provided a plain meaning, and patent owner is
`trying to read in a limitation from the embodiment.
`In our reply, as shown on slide 11, in our reply, the
`petitioners refuted that construction and expressly set forth the
`plain and ordinary meaning that Dr. Creusere had used just when
`applying the claim terms themselves in its original declaration.
`Specifically, Dr. Creusere's declaration did three important things
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`Case IPR2016-00783
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`with respect to the term maintaining. He explained that it was not
`a term of art in the compression field and did not have a special
`meaning. He noted that the plain meaning in a standard
`dictionary was just this, to keep an existing state repair. And he
`analyzed how that term was used in the '812 patent to make sure
`he understood how it was actually being used in its plain and
`ordinary meaning.
`JUDGE CHUNG: So that wasn't a supplemental
`declaration, correct?
`MR. CARRAWAY: This was in the reply declaration,
`yes, Your Honor.
`JUDGE CHUNG: So filed after the initial declaration?
`MR. CARRAWAY: It was. In the original declaration,
`the petitioners identified four or five terms that appeared to need
`construction. Maintaining a dictionary, Dr. Creusere explained
`how that applied to O'Brien, but he didn't label a construction per
`se because it was not raised -- for the first time it was raised in the
`response.
`JUDGE CHUNG: Okay.
`MR. CARRAWAY: As shown on slide 12 --
`JUDGE CHUNG: If I may interject, if we were to --
`let's say hypothetically speaking, if we were to adopt patent
`owner's definition which, I mean, may be problematic because of
`dependent claims 4 and 5, but say for a moment hypothetically
`we were to adopt it. Would the O'Brien -- would the combination
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`Case IPR2016-00783
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`of O'Brien and Nelson teach maintaining a dictionary pursuant to
`patent owner's definition?
`MR. CARRAWAY: Yes, Your Honor. And the reason
`being that the patent owner has staked its distinction of O'Brien
`from the '812 patent on the idea that O'Brien segments data
`before it compresses it. And the problem with that is that there
`are cases where the segment may actually be smaller -- sorry,
`larger than the input stream. If that's the case, then the input
`stream is completely done before the end of the segment. And it
`would be just like any other situation where you have an input
`stream and the full thing is compressed.
`JUDGE CHUNG: Okay. Because it's a 103 here, then
`the question is obviousness, okay.
`MR. CARRAWAY: Yes, Your Honor. So I want to
`just explain why the -- go over briefly why the patent owner's
`limitation is incorrect. If we can go to -- so the patent owner has
`proposed this preferred embodiment construction that requires
`that the maintaining a dictionary is only until either the input data
`stream has been compressed or the dictionary is full. There is no
`basis -- well, there's three reasons why this is wrong. First of all,
`there's no basis to jam the details of a preferred embodiment into
`this claim term maintaining a dictionary. The patent owner hasn't
`said there's any special meaning to the term. The patent owner
`hasn't identified anything in the file history or the specification
`that would be a disavowal or lexicography. And Federal Circuit
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`canon is clear that absent these two things, you just don't read
`preferred embodiments into the claim.
`It's also inconsistent with other claim language. Claims
`1 and 14 preamble recite a lifetime limitation already
`compressing input data comprising a plurality of data blocks,
`which is a plurality of bytes. And then you have the maintaining
`a dictionary element itself which states that it only requires
`maintaining a dictionary comprising a plurality of code words.
`So the challenged claims don't require the dictionary to be large
`and they don't require it to be full. They only require
`compressing at least two data blocks and maintaining a dictionary
`of at least two code words.
`And then in addition, there is the claim differentiation
`problem for the plaintiff -- sorry, for the patent owner. And that
`is that claim 5 already includes this idea of retaining the
`dictionary until it's full and then resetting it.
`JUDGE CHUNG: With respect to your proposed
`definition, keeping a dictionary in a state of repair, I believe
`somewhere in one of your papers that you filed, you said that that
`argument was proffered initially implicitly, right? Or that's not --
`that's supported with your original petition that was filed
`implicitly?
`MR. CARRAWAY: Yes, Your Honor.
`JUDGE CHUNG: Can you point us to where, please.
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`MR. CARRAWAY: So if we can go to slide 15, so
`applying this -- the way that it was done was by applying the
`maintaining a dictionary to O'Brien. In Dr. Creusere's original
`declaration at paragraphs 35 to 40 and 83 to 84, he explained that
`O'Brien maintains a dictionary by storing its string table and then
`mapping reference values in that string table to characters and
`strings as they are encountered. That's how he viewed O'Brien as
`meeting the maintaining a dictionary term.
`In his reply declaration, he again provided his express
`construction and also --
`JUDGE CHUNG: Let's just focus on the initial filing or
`the initial declaration. So you are saying that implicitly we can
`draw from that that that is keeping a dictionary in a state of
`repair?
`
`MR. CARRAWAY: Yes, Your Honor. And that's why
`I was pointing to the reply.
`JUDGE CHUNG: Where does a state of repair come
`
`in?
`
`MR. CARRAWAY: The state of repair is from the
`Webster's dictionary. It's a generic term or it's a general
`definition for maintaining. But the important thing about his
`construction is he also explained in the paragraphs of his reply
`declaration how that is used in the '812 patent and what that term
`encompasses as shown in the '812 patent. And that is in
`paragraphs 6 and 7 of his reply declaration where he talks about
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`as used in the '812 patent, retaining or maintaining a dictionary by
`retaining it in a state of repair is shown in the '812 patent as
`storing a dictionary and adding to the dictionary as terms are
`encompassed.
`JUDGE CHUNG: Okay. So --
`JUDGE LEE: So the dictionary definition, by
`dictionary here I mean the Webster's dictionary, that definition
`that you referred to and you've highlighted in slide 11 of your
`demonstratives says to keep in an existing state. And that says
`two things to me, assuming for the moment that we apply it. First
`that it keeps something, right. Isn't it a problem for you that in
`O'Brien new dictionaries are created for each segment? So isn't
`that a problem that it's not kept? It's a new dictionary all
`together?
`And then second, I know that you chose to go with state
`of repair, but it says to keep in an existing state, at least according
`to the dictionary definition that you are applying. How does that
`apply to the -- I guess I'm having trouble applying the general
`definition to this particular context because dictionaries change,
`the contents of the dictionaries change, they are reinitialized, et
`cetera. So is that really all that applicable? It's two parts.
`MR. CARRAWAY: First part, segments. The problem
`is again there is no requirement in the claim that this thing, that
`this compression be for more than 2048 segments -- sorry,
`2048 bytes. Instead, what it is is maintaining a dictionary of a
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`Case IPR2016-00783
`Patent 6,597,812 B1
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`plurality of code words. That's not 2048, which is the exemplary
`segment size of O'Brien. Basically what O'Brien does is it starts
`before the whole compression starts, which is what the patent
`claims are about. It has broken up data into segments. Each of
`those segments meets the limitations of the claim. There's
`nothing in the claim that says you have to have nonsegmented
`data, that something hasn't been processed on the data before it
`starts. The claim is focused just on the compression, and that's
`what O'Brien meets for each segment.
`The second issue is the state of repair. Again,
`Dr. Creusere in his declaration, he said, yes, we go to Webster's
`dictionary, that's the place you start. You look at that and then
`you look at the patent itself and understand how that applies to
`this particular technology. And in paragraph 7 of his declaration,
`6 and 7 of his declaration, he looks at the portions of the patent
`that use the word "maintaining," and there when they talk about
`maintaining, can we go to maybe 14 -- this is column 3, lines 31
`to 36 --
`
`JUDGE BRADEN: Are you on slide 14?
`MR. CARRAWAY: I'm on slide 11, Judge Braden. I'm
`sorry. And it's column 3, lines 31 to 36. I see my time is about
`up.
`
`JUDGE CHUNG: Finish the question.
`MR. CARRAWAY: Thank you. There it says it's one
`of the only two places where the word "maintaining" is even used
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`Case IPR2016-00783
`Patent 6,597,812 B1
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`in the '812 patent other than the claims. And it says it's
`maintained and updated by generating a new code word
`corresponding to a built data block string if the data block string
`does not match a unique data block string in the dictionary and
`then adding it to the dictionary. So in his view, it doesn't mean
`that it never changes because of course that's not the purpose of a
`compression dictionary. It's added to.
`JUDGE LEE: I understand that you are over time and
`we'll grant a little extra time. Here it says maintained and
`updated, right. So that's two different actions, in theory, going on
`there. And again, I think that highlights sort of the difficulty or
`maybe not difficulty, but the uncertainty I have in applying the
`just general definition in this context and how does that work
`because I'm not sure what it means for a dictionary to be in repair.
`Do you repair a dictionary? That's nothing that either party has
`ever addressed. It's not discussed in the patent. I'm not sure what
`that means to be in repair in this context.
`So again, I'm just wondering if the general definition
`really has much usefulness here. It almost seems to me that what
`you are trying to say is maintain means it exists for the purposes
`of a segment. It's there. You are using it for a segment. So thus
`it is maintained. Is that really all that that claim limitation
`means?
`
`MR. CARRAWAY: I think that's what it means, Your
`Honor, and that's why we did say in a state of repair. The
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`Case IPR2016-00783
`Patent 6,597,812 B1
`
`dictionary doesn't disappear after one word is encoded. That's
`just not what happens. The dictionary is kept as you are doing
`the compression that is required by the claim. I mean, that's why
`you don't see maintaining appearing much in the specification.
`It's just a word to indicate that it continues to exist which is
`something that happens when you are describing a method and
`how something works. They may put in it's maintained during
`this process.
`JUDGE LEE: If O'Brien segmented -- let's say a
`segment in O'Brien was one byte, so after each byte you would
`have a new dictionary. Would that still be maintained in your
`understanding?
`MR. CARRAWAY: I don't think so because the claim
`requires that you maintain a dictionary of at least two code words
`and that you compress a plurality of bytes. So again, the claim
`already includes a minimum requirement, and O'Brien provides
`an exemplary segment size of 2048 bytes.
`JUDGE LEE: You are already over time. So we'll stop
`
`there.
`
`JUDGE CHUNG: We will give patent owner
`33 minutes to present their argument.
`MR. NOROOZI: Thank you, Your Honors, and may it
`please the Court, I would like to begin by responding to some of
`the points that counsel for petitioner made with respect to what is
`the invention here, what is the nature of these claims and why is it
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`Case IPR2016-00783
`Patent 6,597,812 B1
`
`that O'Brien does not teach the claims. Now, I also want to make
`sure that we touch on what I think are really critical points about
`the lack of necessary evidence to meet an obviousness
`combination and the requirement that obviousness begin with a
`difference between the reference and the challenged claim. I
`think those are absolutely fundamental, and our slides set those
`forth. But I want to get into some of these substantive points in
`response to petitioner's comments first.
`JUDGE LEE: Just because you brought it up,
`Mr. Noroozi, your position is that a given claim cannot be both
`anticipated and obvious in light of the same prior art reference; is
`that your position?
`MR. NOROOZI: That's not exactly our position, Judge.
`And I appreciate you asking that. Our position is the following:
`You can have theoretically an alternative theory where you say
`we think the reference anticipates, and here is why. But if, for
`example, you read the reference a certain way, then it would be
`different on this ground and therefore, we now have an
`obviousness combination. That issue of whether you could have
`both anticipation and obviousness is not at the core of our
`argument. The core of our argument is simply that the law is
`very clear and the logic is very clear that when you want to allege
`obviousness, there needs to be some difference between the
`primary prior art reference and the claims. Otherwise that's
`anticipation. And you need to define --
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`Case IPR2016-00783
`Patent 6,597,812 B1
`
`
`JUDGE BRADEN: Doesn't that say then anticipation is
`the epitome of obviousness? So why can that not be the case?
`MR. NOROOZI: Judge Braden, thank you for the
`question. The answer to that is that anticipation is not the
`epitome of obviousness. Anticipation is anticipation, and
`obviousness is obviousness. Congress set this forth in
`Section 102 and 103 separately because they are two separate
`things. And they have different legal requirements and they have
`different standards. So the grounds on which a petition is
`instituted define the basis on which unpatentability can be found,
`if at all.
`
`Here there is no anticipation grounds. The reason there
`is no anticipation grounds is because presumably, and we can
`only presume, petitioners didn't want to commit themselves to the
`full burden of what comes with staking your claim to anticipation.
`And whether they could have made an alternative showing or
`claim of obviousness is sort of beside the point. They didn't do it.
`And if they had done it, frankly, it would have undermined their
`anticipation claim.
`JUDGE LEE: Well, Mr. Noroozi, I understand your
`view is that anticipation is anticipation. It's not obviousness.
`And anticipation is not the epitome of obviousness. But the
`Federal Circuit seems to disagree with you. That's a direct quote
`from Federal Circuit case law. Don't we have to follow what the
`Federal Circuit tells us is the case?
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`Case IPR2016-00783
`Patent 6,597,812 B1
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`
`MR. NOROOZI: Well, Judge, I'm not sure which case
`you are referring to and it's certainly not one that's been argued in
`this proceeding so far. But without the context of the case, it's
`hard for me to address it directly. What I can say is the mere
`phrase anticipation is the epitome of obviousness sounds like a
`logical statement about the fact that if something in the prior art
`directly and perfectly anticipates a claim, then certainly that claim
`was obviousness in common parlance because someone thought
`of that exact thing.
`But when we talk about anticipation and obviousness in
`the specific legal terms of Section 102 and 103, then, no, it is not
`the case that anticipation is the epitome of obviousness. They are
`two separate grounds and they come with two separate sets of
`legal requirements for a showing. So without knowing what that
`Federal Circuit case is about, I can't directly address whether it
`refutes the point I'm making right now. But the basis of my
`argument --
`JUDGE BRADEN: Just for your future reference, it's
`Jones versus Hardy from the Federal Circuit. It's 727 F.2d 1524.
`And as Judge Lee said, that is a direct quote from the Federal
`Circuit. They bas

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