By: Andrew W. Schultz, Reg. No. 66,869
`
`Pepper Hamilton LLP
`
`125 High Street, High Street Tower
`
`Boston, MA 02110
`
`(617) 204-5100 (telephone)
`
`schultza@pepperlaw.com
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`___________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`___________________
`
`GOOGLE INC.
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`IXI IP, LLC
`Patent Owner
`
`___________________
`
`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
`___________________
`
`PATENT OWNER’S RESPONSE
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Page(s)
`
`Table of Authorities ................................................................................................. iii
`Table of Exhibits ...................................................................................................... vi
`I.
`Statement Of Relief Requested ....................................................................... 1
`II. Overview Of The ’124 Patent ......................................................................... 2
`III. Claim Construction And Ordinary Skill In The Art ....................................... 4
`A.
`Person Having Ordinary Skill In The Art ............................................ 5
`B.
`Claim Construction .............................................................................. 6
`IV. Petitioner Fails To Establish That The Instituted Claims Are Obvious
`Over Maes In View Of Preston ...................................................................... 6
`Summary of Maes ................................................................................ 7
`A.
`Summary of Preston ............................................................................. 8
`B.
`Petitioner fails to establish that Maes discloses “parsing the
`C.
`high-level code for the keywords” ..................................................... 10
`Petitioner fails to demonstrate that Maes determines and utilizes
`“implementation” as required by claim 1 ........................................... 16
`Exhibit 1002 is entitled to little, if any, weight .................................. 22
`E.
`Petitioner Fails To Establish That The Instituted Claims Are Obvious
`Over Pazandak In View Of White And Manson .......................................... 23
`Summary of Pazandak ....................................................................... 24
`A.
`Summary of White .............................................................................. 26
`B.
`Summary of Manson .......................................................................... 27
`C.
`Petitioner fails to establish that Pazandak discloses “receiving a
`D.
`high-level code comprising one or more keywords, wherein the
`high-level code is provided by a user. . .without having to select
`from menu items” ............................................................................... 28
`Petitioner fails to establish that Pazandak discloses “parsing the
`high-level code for the keywords” ..................................................... 32
`Petitioner fails to establish that Pazandak discloses
`“determining whether high-level code comprises keywords
`
`D.
`
`V.
`
`E.
`
`F.
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
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`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`i
`
`

`

`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
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`
`G.
`
`defining one or more relationships and conditions
`corresponding to the operative language” .......................................... 35
`Petitioner fails to establish that White discloses “determining
`level of complexity and implementation of the high-level code” ...... 36
`Petitioner fails to establish that a person of ordinary skill in the
`art would have combined Pazandak, White, and Manson as
`alleged................................................................................................. 37
`Inter Partes Review Is Unconstitutional ...................................................... 40
`VI.
`VII. Conclusion .................................................................................................... 41
`
`
`H.
`
`ii
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`

`

`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`CASES
`Bicon Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ............................ 15, 34
`
`Page(s)
`
`CAE Screenplates, Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG,
`224 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000) .......................................................................... 17
`
`CallCopy, Inc. v. Verint Americas, Inc., IPR2013-00486,
`Paper 11 (PTAB Feb. 5, 2014) ..................................................................... 20, 37
`
`CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int’l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ................. 10, 28
`
`Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. v. Int’l Securities Exchange, LLC,
`677 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .......................................................................... 17
`
`In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ........................................................ 5
`
`Dominion Dealer Solutions, LLC v. Autoalert, Inc., IPR2013-00225,
`Paper 15 (PTAB Oct. 10, 2013) .................................................................... 20, 30
`
`Endo Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Depomed, Inc., IPR2014-00656,
`Paper 12 (PTAB Sep. 29, 2014) ........................................................................... 5
`
`Endo Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Depomed, Inc., IPR2014-00652,
`Paper 12 (PTAB Sep. 29, 2014) ................................................................... 10, 28
`
`Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ............ 19, 21
`
`Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,
`93 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ............................................................................ 17
`
`Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) ....................................................... 18
`
`Honeywell Int’l. Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 341 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ....... 21
`
`In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ...................................................... 39
`
`Kinetic Techs., Inc. v. Skywork Solutions, Inc., IPR2014-00529,
`Paper 8 (PTAB Sep. 23, 2014) ........................................................................... 23
`
`iii
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`

`

`Kinetic Techs., Inc. v. Skywork Solutions, Inc., IPR2014-00530,
`Paper 8 (PTAB Sep. 29, 2014) ........................................................................... 23
`
`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
`
`
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) .......................................... 18, 39
`
`In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ........................................................... 18
`
`In re Magnum Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................ 21
`
`McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman & Co., 169 U.S. 606 (1898) .......... 40
`
`Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 353 F.3d 928 (Fed. Cir. 2003) .............................. 19
`
`Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ....... 15, 34
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ....................... 5
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., IPR2012-00026,
`Paper 17 (PTAB Dec. 21, 2012) ......................................................................... 10
`
`In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ....................................................... 5
`
`In re Royka, 490 F.2d 981 (CCPA 1974) ................................................................ 10
`
`Stumbo v. Eastman Outdoors, Inc., 508 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ................ 15, 34
`
`In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ........................... 5, 16, 34
`
`In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ....................... 5, 13, 27
`
`TRW Automotive U.S., LLC v. Magna Electronics, Inc., IPR2015-00949,
`Paper 7 (PTAB Sep. 17, 2015) ............................................................................. 5
`
`United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888)......................................... 40
`
`Warner-Lambert Co. v. Purepac Pharm. Co.,
`503 F.3d 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2007) .................................................................... 14, 34
`
`Wowza Media Sys, LLC et al. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., IPR2013-00054,
`Paper 12 (PTAB Apr. 8, 2013) ........................................................................... 23
`
`
`
`iv
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`

`

`CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
`
`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
`
`
`U.S. CONST. amend. VII .......................................................................................... 40
`
`U.S. CONST. art. III .................................................................................................. 40
`
`
`
`STATUTES
`35 U.S.C. § 312 .................................................................................................passim
`
`35 U.S.C. § 314 .................................................................................................. 10, 28
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316 ........................................................................................................ 21
`
`
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100 ..................................................................................................... 4
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104 ............................................................................................passim
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.123 ................................................................................................... 21
`
`Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756 (Aug. 14, 2012) ............... 4
`
`
`
`v
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
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`
`PATENT OWNER’S TABLE OF EXHIBITS
`
`
`Exhibit Description
`
`Previously filed
`
`Exhibit No.
`
`2001
`
`Declaration of Lin Chase, Ph.D.
`
`
`New
`
`Exhibit No.
`
`Exhibit Description
`
`2002
`
`“Keyword spotting,” downloaded from Wikipedia: The Free
`Encyclopedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keyword_spotting
`(June 29, 2017).
`
`2003
`
`U.S. Patent No. 8,433,611 of Lax et al., assigned to Google Inc.
`
`
`
`
`
`vi
`
`

`

`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.120, IXI IP, LLC (“Patent Owner”) hereby
`
`IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
`
`
`submits this Response to the Petition seeking inter partes review of U.S. Patent
`
`No. 7,552,124 (“the ’124 Patent”), and to the grounds for which a trial was
`
`instituted pursuant to the Institution Decision dated March 8, 2017 (Paper 9,
`
`“Institution Decision”). This filing is timely under 35 U.S.C. §311-319 and 37
`
`C.F.R. § 42.120 as it is being filed by June 29, 2017, pursuant to the parties’ Joint
`
`Notice of Stipulation to Amend the Scheduling Order (Paper 11).
`
`I.
`
`STATEMENT OF RELIEF REQUESTED
`
`The Board instituted this trial as to claims 1-5 of the ’124 Patent. In the
`
`Institution Decision, the Board found that Petitioner established a reasonable
`
`likelihood of demonstrating that U.S. Patent No. 7,003,463 of Maes et al. (Ex.
`
`1005, “Maes”) in view of U.S. Pub. No. 2003/0046061 of Preston et al. (Ex. 1006,
`
`“Preston”) render claims 1-5 obvious. The Board also found that Petitioner
`
`established a reasonable likelihood of demonstrating that these same claims are
`
`obvious over U.S. Patent No. 7,027,975 of Pazandak et al. (Ex. 1007, “Pazandak”)
`
`in view of U.S. Pub. No. 2002/0072918 of White et al. (Ex. 1008, “White”) and
`
`U.S. Patent No. 7,085,708 of Manson (Ex. 1009, “Manson”).
`
`Though the Board preliminarily determined at institution that Petitioner met
`
`the lower burden for the grounds identified above, Petitioner’s positions of
`
`unpatentability fail to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that claims
`
`1
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`

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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
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`1-5 are invalid as obvious on the basis of either instituted ground. Further, because
`
`the inter partes review process extinguishes private property rights through a non-
`
`Article III forum, Patent Owner hereby challenges the constitutionality of the
`
`process to the extent any claims are found invalid in this proceeding.
`
`II. OVERVIEW OF THE ’124 PATENT
`The ’124 Patent, entitled “Natural Language for Programming a Specialized
`
`Computing System,” is generally directed to methods and systems for
`
`“programming a mobile communication device based on a high-level code
`
`comprising operative language [].” (Ex. 1001, Title, Abstract). The ’124 Patent
`
`allows a user to program a mobile communication device (e.g., a cell phone) by
`
`providing high level inputs in a natural human language. (Id. at Abstract, 1:55-58).
`
`The natural language input is processed, and as a result, is automatically
`
`turned into low level executable code that can be run on the mobile communication
`
`device, thereby eliminating the need for the user to interact with menu items
`
`available at the operating system level of the mobile communication device. (Id. at
`
`Abstract, 2:1-13, 5:5-10, FIG. 2). The ’124 Patent thus makes it possible for a
`
`“less technically inclined” user to program the device using high-level natural
`
`human language, as opposed to more sophisticated technical controls or code. (Id.
`
`at 1:41-48).
`
`2
`
`

`

`The user provides “high-level code 150 [which] may comprise one or more
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
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`sentences, wherein each sentence comprises at least one operative language (i.e.
`
`keyword) defining an instruction for a function or an operation to be performed.”
`
`(Id. at 4:17-23). To process natural language inputs, the ’124 Patent relies, in part,
`
`on the identification of keywords, the automated determination of the level of
`
`complexity and implementation of the high level input, and the designation of the
`
`best application software used to produce the executable code. (Id. at 4:58-5:4,
`
`9:14-17, 10:18-21). Given the wide range of words and user intentions in the
`
`possible range of high level inputs, the processing required to respond
`
`appropriately to the input might need to take place in a specific fashion available in
`
`a specific place in the network (e.g., depending on implementation). (See id. at
`
`4:58-5:4, 9:14-17, 10:18-21).
`
`To turn the high-level code into executable code, the ’124 Patent initially
`
`parses the input utilizing a parsing technique referred to as “keyword spotting.”
`
`The high-level code is scanned to recognize keywords indicative of “operative
`
`language” corresponding to operations of the mobile communication device as
`
`well as keywords indicative of “relationships and conditions corresponding to the
`
`operative language.” (Id. at Abstract, 2:1-9, 5:31-61, 9:1-9, 10:5-13). Clearly, not
`
`every “keyword” is “operative language,” nor does every keyword constitute
`
`“relationships and conditions corresponding to the operative language.” That is,
`
`3
`
`

`

`only after identifying keywords, does the ’124 Patent determine which of those
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`keywords represent “operative language” and which of those identified keywords
`
`represent “relationships and conditions corresponding to the operative language.”
`
`The ’124 Patent also describes that the high-level code input by the user is
`
`further processed to ultimately produce executable code for execution by a
`
`microcontroller of the mobile communication device. (Id. at Abstract, 2:8-9, FIG.
`
`2). Not all of the computation for the processing of the high-level code is required
`
`to happen on the mobile communication device. Rather, depending on the
`
`determined complexity and implementation of the input high-level code, the high-
`
`level code input to the mobile communication device is converted into executable
`
`code on the mobile communication device, a server networked with the mobile
`
`communication device, or both. (See id. at 1:55-2:55, 4:49-5:4, FIGS. 1 and 2).
`
`In accordance with various aspects of the above exemplary teachings, the
`
`instituted claims of the ’124 Patent are directed to methods for programming a
`
`mobile communication device based on a high-level code. (Id. at 8:59-9:38).
`
`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AND ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART
`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are interpreted
`
`according to the “broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification in
`
`which [they] appear.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Office Patent Trial Practice Guide,
`
`77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,766 (Aug. 14, 2012). “Under that standard, and absent
`
`4
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
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`any special definitions, we give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning,
`
`as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
`
`invention.” Endo Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Depomed, Inc., IPR2014-00656, Paper
`
`12 at 6 (Sep. 29, 2014) (citing In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257
`
`(Fed. Cir. 2007)); see also TRW Automotive U.S., LLC v. Magna Electronics, Inc.,
`
`IPR2015-00949, Paper 7 at 9 (Sep. 17, 2015). Even under the broadest reasonable
`
`interpretation standard, claim construction “cannot be divorced from the
`
`specification . . . and must be consistent with the one that those skilled in the art
`
`would reach.” Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2015) (internal quotations removed, citing In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2011); In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Indeed, “claims
`
`should always be read in light of the specification and teachings in the underlying
`
`patent.” In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010). In sum,
`
`a construction is “unreasonably broad” if it does not “reasonably reflect the plain
`
`language and disclosure.” See Microsoft Corp., 789 F.3d at 1298.
`
`Person Having Ordinary Skill In The Art
`
`A.
`Petitioner alleges that a hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the field of
`
`the ’124 Patent at the time of the invention “would have had a Bachelor’s degree or
`
`equivalent in computer science, electrical engineering, or a similar related field, as
`
`well as 1-2 years of experience working with natural language programming.”
`
`5
`
`

`

`(Petition at 4). Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s proposed POSITA standard for
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
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`the purposes of this proceeding without prejudice.
`
`B. Claim Construction
`The only term in the instituted claims for which Petitioner proposed a
`
`construction is “operative language.” In particular, Petitioner asserted that claim
`
`1’s recitation of “operative language” should be construed as “language associated
`
`with one or more operations to be performed.” (Petition at 7). Though the
`
`Institution Decision indicated that Petitioner’s construction is “generally
`
`consistent” with the specification of the ’124 Patent, the Board declined to adopt
`
`Petitioner’s construction at institution. (Institution Decision at 6).
`
`Solely for purposes of this proceeding, Patent Owner applies Petitioner’s
`
`proposed construction of “operative language” without prejudice.
`
`IV. PETITIONER FAILS TO ESTABLISH THAT THE INSTITUTED
`CLAIMS ARE OBVIOUS OVER MAES IN VIEW OF PRESTON
`
`The Board instituted this proceeding on the ground that claims 1-5 are
`
`obvious over Maes in view of Preston. As discussed in detail below, the Petition
`
`fails to demonstrate that the proffered combination of Maes and Preston discloses
`
`or suggest all material limitations recited in independent claim 1. Petitioner has
`
`therefore failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Maes and
`
`Preston render obvious the instituted claims.
`
`6
`
`

`

`A.
`Summary of Maes
`Maes, entitled “System and Method for Providing Network Coordinated
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`
`Conversational Services,” is generally directed to a “system and method for
`
`providing automatic and coordinated sharing of conversational resources, e.g.,
`
`functions and arguments, between network-connected servers and devices and their
`
`corresponding applications.” (Ex. 1005 at Abstract). Maes provides a computing
`
`system architecture (including both software and hardware) that automates control
`
`of load assignment and load distribution for computational tasks performed in
`
`response to requests from third party applications to provide conversational
`
`services. Maes explains that “with the emergence of pervasive computing, it is
`
`expected that billions of low resource client devices (e.g., PDAs, smartphones,
`
`etc.) will be networked together.” (Id. at 1:36-38). Maes further provides that
`
`these low resource client devices may not be able to perform complex
`
`conversational tasks. (Id. at 1:50-60). Maes therefore expresses the need for “a
`
`system and method that allows a network device with limited resources to perform
`
`complex specific conversational tasks automatically using networked resources in
`
`a manner which is automatic and transparent to a user.” (Id. at 2:27-31).
`
`Maes provides applications access to conversational services that are, in
`
`general, complex, resource-intensive, and expensive to operate (e.g., speech
`
`recognition, natural language understanding, text-to-speech generation, natural
`
`7
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
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`language generation, and speaker identification). (See, e.g., id. at 1:49-60, 4:24-29,
`
`4:57-62, 8:13-16). Maes does not particularly describe how these conversational
`
`services are designed or function, but focuses instead on the sharing of these
`
`conversational services among networked devices.
`
`Maes describes how various conversational services (e.g., speech
`
`recognition, natural language understanding, text-to-speech, etc.) offered by
`
`networked devices can be catalogued and deployed in a distributed fashion, and
`
`how automated location and execution of these services can be accomplished
`
`whenever a request arrives for the specific use of one of the available services. In
`
`particular, Maes describes a system in which networked devices are made
`
`“conversationally aware” of each other by using conversational network protocols
`
`to transmit messages, processed by dialog managers, to automatically share
`
`conversational resources and functions among the networked devices, and the
`
`method of operating such a system. (Id. at 2:35-48, 5:19-25).
`
`B.
`Summary of Preston
`Preston, entitled “Apparatus for Automatically Generating Source Code,”
`
`provides “[a] method of automatically generating software from one or more
`
`predefined functions in accordance with an input statement entered in natural
`
`language.” (Ex. 1006 at Abstract). Preston further “relates to apparatus for
`
`automatically generating source code, and is particularly, but not exclusively,
`
`8
`
`

`

`suitable for generating source code for communication services.” (Id. at [0001]).
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`Preston explains that a non-programmer should be able to program a system
`
`without the need to learn a particular programming language and identifies that
`
`there are “many situations where it is desirable for a non-programmer to be able to
`
`program a system so that it can subsequently act on his or her behalf without
`
`further interaction.” (Id. at [0007], [0008]).
`
`Preston therefore describes a method to allow a user (e.g., a non-
`
`programmer) to input a natural language instruction and have it analyzed to
`
`generate source code customized for carrying out the user’s wishes. (Id. at
`
`[0049]). In Preston, a user inputting a natural language instruction to create source
`
`code is only allowed to draw upon a fixed, limited library of pre-defined and pre-
`
`existing functions. In particular, Preston provides that certain natural language
`
`descriptions are associated with pre-defined functions and their relationships are
`
`stored in data storage. (Id. at [0057]). After a user inputs natural language, it is
`
`determined whether the natural language input is associated with any of the pre-
`
`defined functions in the data storage. (Id. at [0061]). If the input is associated with
`
`a function contained in the data storage, a code generator generates source code
`
`corresponding to the pre-defined function. (Id.).
`
`9
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`

`

`Petitioner fails to establish that Maes discloses “parsing the high-
`level code for the keywords”
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
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`C.
`
`The Petition fails to demonstrate the obviousness of the instituted claims by
`
`a preponderance of the evidence as required under 35 U.S.C. § 314 at least because
`
`the Petition fails to demonstrate that the combination of Maes and Preston
`
`discloses or suggests all material limitations recited in independent claim 1. In
`
`particular, the Petition fails to demonstrate that Maes, upon which Petitioner
`
`exclusively relies for the following limitation, discloses or suggests “parsing the
`
`high-level code for the keywords to recognize the operative language associated
`
`with controlling one or more operations of the mobile communication device…” as
`
`recited by independent claim 1.
`
`“To establish obviousness of a claimed invention, all the claim limitations
`
`must be taught or suggested by the prior art.” Endo Pharmaceutical, Inc. v.
`
`Depomed, Inc., IPR2014-00652, Paper 12 at 10 (Sep. 29, 2014) (citing CFMT, Inc.
`
`v. Yieldup Int’l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2003) and In re Royka, 490 F.2d
`
`981, 985 (CCPA 1974)); see also Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., IPR2012-
`
`00026, Paper 17 at 19 (Dec. 21, 2012).
`
`Petitioner asserted that the limitation of “parsing the high-level code for the
`
`keywords. . .” is met by Maes’ disclosure of a conversational engine that “includes
`
`a natural language understanding engine (NLU),” and that “Maes discloses that the
`
`local conversational engine or server conversational engine parses high-level
`
`10
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`

`

`code.” (Petition at 18-19). The Petition then reproduces FIG. 2 of Maes and
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
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`
`asserts that “Maes uses the above-described architecture to recognize operative
`
`language (e.g., ‘dial’) in the user’s command associated with controlling operations
`
`of the client device (e.g., dialing a phone number).” (Id. at 21). In the Institution
`
`Decision, the Board cites this statement in the Petition, and concludes that
`
`“Petitioner establishes sufficiently for purposes of this Decision that the
`
`combination of Maes and Preston teaches ‘parsing the high-level code for the
`
`keywords to recognize the operative language associated with controlling one or
`
`more operations of the mobile communications device.’” (Institution Decision at
`
`13).
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`Claim 1’s recitation of “parsing the high-level code for the keywords”
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`plainly refers to a parsing technique also referred to as “keyword spotting” or
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`“word spotting.” In such a technique, a parser attempts to identify one or more
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`particular “keywords” within an input sequence. See Ex. 2002 (“Keyword spotting
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`(or more simply, word spotting) is a problem that was historically first defined in
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`the context of speech processing. . . In speech processing, keyword spotting deals
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`with the identification of keywords in utterances).
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`In fact, the art cited by Petitioner further supports such an understanding of
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`claim 1’s plain language. White, for example, refers to various, distinct techniques
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`utilized in speech recognition, including the “word spotting” technique referenced
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
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`in claim 1:
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`Because each local device 14, by definition, has a processor with
`limited computing power, the respective resident VUI for a local
`device 14, taken alone, generally does not provide extensive speech
`recognition and/or speech output capability. For example, rather than
`implement a more complex and sophisticated natural language (NL)
`technique for speech recognition, each resident VUI may perform
`“word spotting” by scanning speech input for the occurrence of one or
`more “keywords.” Furthermore, each local device 14 will have a
`relatively limited vocabulary (e.g., less than one hundred words) for
`its resident VUI. As such, a local device 14, by itself, is only capable
`of responding to relatively simple commands, instructions, directions,
`or requests from a user.
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`(Ex. 1008 at [0037] (emphasis added)).
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`By way of further evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would have
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`recognized “keyword spotting” as a particular, distinct parsing technique, Patent
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`Owner respectfully directs the Board’s attention to U.S. Patent No. 8,433,611,
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`which is assigned to Petitioner Google, Inc. and is submitted herewith as Exhibit
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`2003 (“the Google Patent”). The Google Patent distinguishes between keyword
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`spotting and other forms of parsing in indicating that “[t]he speech to text module
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`210 can analyze a video to identify speech in a video or audio file or stream. . .The
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`text can be further processed to determine the subject matter of the video or audio
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
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`content item. For example, keyword spotting (e.g., word or utterance recognition),
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`pattern recognition (e.g., defining noise ratios, sound lengths, etc.), or structural
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`pattern recognition (e.g., syntactic patterns, grammar, graphical patterns, etc.) may
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`be used to determine the subject matter, including different segments, of the video
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`content item.” (Ex. 2003 at 6:42-51 (emphasis added)).
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`Maes does not describe any specific parsing technique, let alone describe
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`utilizing the specific keyword parsing technique as recited in the context of claim 1
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`as a whole. Maes merely describes a “system and method for providing automatic
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`and coordinated sharing of conversational resources” (Ex. 1005 at Abstract), which
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`includes such conversational services as natural language understanding (NLU).
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`(See, e.g., id. at 1:49-60, 4:24-29, 4:57-62, 8:13-16). In its background, Maes
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`refers to “conversational arguments or functions needed to generate the dialog
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`(e.g., parser, tagger, translator, etc.)” of an NLU service. (Id. at 2:6-10 (emphasis
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`added)). This generic indication of a “parser,” however, does not mean that the
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`parser identifies “keywords.”
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`Maes’ description of the use of a generic parser as part of its NLU service
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`would not be understood to suggest any specific parsing technique because NLU
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`services can be designed using a wide variety of parsing techniques. For example,
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`Preston discloses its own NLU service that specifically utilizes a parsing technique
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`that analyzes each character in every word provided in the input stream (as
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`opposed to particularly identifying keywords within the input stream). (See Ex.
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`Case No. IPR2016-01669
`Patent 7,552,124
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`1006 at [0085]-[0092]). Specifically, Preston describes that its NLU service
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`utilizes a “heavy” parsing technique based on syntactic grammars, which does not
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`identify keywords but instead parses all the elements of the input and their
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`relationships in order to generate results. (See id. at [0179]). Because parsing
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`techniques such as those disclosed by Preston do not parse for “keywords,”
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`Petitioner’s allegation that Maes’ reference to a generic “parser” is legally
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`insufficient to meet the specific recitations of claim 1 of the ’124 Patent.
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`Petitioner and the Board ignore the claim’s plain language by concluding
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`that Maes meets this recitation because “dial” represents “operative language.”
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`However, even assuming that “dial” represents an operation to be performed, there
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`is no indication that recognizing the word “dial” in Maes’ exemplary command is
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`performed by parsing for keywords (rather than by parsing utilizing Preston’s
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`“heavy” parsing, for example). Nowhere does Petitioner allege, or the Institution
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`Decision find, that “dial” is identified by Maes’ conversational engine as a
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`“keyword.” To the contrary, Petitioner’s and the Board’s analysis improperly
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`reads out a clear requirement of claim 1 (i.e., parsing “for the keywords”) and
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`instead simply interprets the claim to require “parsing the high-level code. . .to
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`recognize the operative language.” See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Purepac Pharm.
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`Co., 503 F.3d 1254, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (in construing the words of the claim
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`according to their ordinary meaning, one should “give[] full meaning to every word
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`of the entire claim term”) (emphasis added); see also Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms.
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`USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[a] claim construction that gives
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`meaning to all the terms of the claim is preferred over one that does not do so.”);
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`Bicon Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“claims are
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`interpreted with an eye