throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Paper 8
`Entered: September 28, 2017
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`——————
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`——————
`EVERNOTE CORPORATION,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`TALSK RESEARCH, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`
`——————
`Case IPR2017-01154
`Patent 7,178,097 B1
`
`——————
`
`Before SALLY C. MEDLEY, GARTH D. BAER, and
`CHRISTOPHER L. OGDEN, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`OGDEN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01154
`Patent 7,178,097 B1
`
`
`Petitioner Evernote Corporation filed a Petition (“Pet.”) to institute an
`inter partes review of claims 1–28 of U.S. Patent No. 7,178,097 (Ex. 1001,
`“the ’097 patent”) pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 311 et seq. Patent Owner Talsk
`Research, Inc. filed a preliminary response (“Prelim. Resp.”) to the Petition.
`We have authority under 35 U.S.C. § 314.
`Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the
`information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that
`there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect
`to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a);
`see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108.
`Upon consideration of the Petition, we conclude that the information
`presented shows there is a reasonable likelihood that Petitioner would
`prevail in establishing the unpatentability of claims 1–28 of the ’097 patent.
`
`I.
`
`BACKGROUND
`THE ’097 PATENT (EX. 1001)
`A.
`
`The ’097 patent issued on February 13, 2007, based on U.S. Patent
`Application No. 09/711,791, filed Nov. 13, 2000. See Ex. 1001, front page.
`The patent is directed to “a method and system for using a communications
`network such as the Internet to archive and retrieve bibliography information
`and reference material cited in a manuscript.” Id. at 1:10–13.
`The ’097 patent states that “[a]uthors of manuscripts and documents
`such as books and research papers frequently cite material such as articles
`and other books in a bibliography section,” id. at 1:17–19, and that
`“[a]uthors and researchers are now starting to cite information from websites
`in their manuscripts,” id. at 1:48–49. However, according to the ’097 patent,
`
`2
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01154
`Patent 7,178,097 B1
`
`
`“[t]he problem with citing a website is that the fluid, ever modifiable
`potential of the content of the website does not guarantee availability and
`true verification of the material actually used by the author.” Id. at 2:16–19;
`see also Prelim. Resp. 3. Sources may, for example, be modified, moved,
`removed from the Internet, or made inaccessible, often without notice. See
`Ex. 1001, 1:58–63; see also Prelim Resp. 3.
`The ’097 patent states that “in light of the [e]ffect the cited web based
`material might have had on a given manuscript, it becomes important for
`referees, editors, other researchers, and the audience of the manuscript to
`ascertain the credibility of the cited information available on those Internet
`websites (sources).” Id. at 2:41–45. Therefore, the ’097 patent describes a
`method and system to “protect the cited information from continuous
`modification and removal of the reference material by providing an avenue
`for the audience to gain access to an exact copy of the reference material
`cited by the author of the manuscript,” and to “provide a means of
`verification of the reference material.” Id. at 4:57–62. The system includes
`a database that acts as the bibliography of the manuscript, and that stores a
`verbatim copy of the website as it existed as of the date of access by the
`author. See id. at 5:46–56.
`An embodiment is depicted in Figure 1 of the ’097 patent, reproduced
`below:
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01154
`Patent 7,178,097 B1
`
`
`
`
`Figure 1 is a block diagram depicting a system 10, which includes a
`communications network such as Internet 12, author 14 of a manuscript,
`audience 16 of the manuscript, and database 18. See id. at 5:64–6:4. As the
`patent describes, author 14 cites reference material from a source on Internet
`12 in a bibliography that contains an identification of the cited reference
`material, while audience 16 may use the identification to obtain, review, and
`verify a copy of the material from database 18. See id. at 6:4–12. The
`system assigns a “distinctive key” to the website identification and to the
`copy of the website on database 18. See id. at 6:34–50.
`
`B.
`
`EXEMPLARY CLAIMS
`
`Claims 8 and 17 of the ’097 patent illustrate the subject matter at issue
`in the Petition:
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01154
`Patent 7,178,097 B1
`
`
`8. A method for archiving reference material cited in a
`bibliography of a manuscript by an author of the manuscript,
`the method comprising:
`(a) an author of a manuscript using a web site on the Internet as
`a reference for the manuscript;
`(b) the author transmitting the address of the webs site to a
`database connected to the Internet using a first
`communications device connected to the Internet;
`(c) the database obtaining a copy of the web site from the
`Internet upon receiving the web site address from the
`author such that the copy of the web site obtained by the
`database is verbatim to the web site as on the Internet at
`the time the author transmitted the web site address to
`the database;
`(d) associating a distinctive key to the copy of the web site;
`(e) storing at the database the copy of the web site with the
`distinctive key;
`(f) the author citing the web site as being a reference for the
`manuscript by listing identification of the web site along
`with the distinctive key in the bibliography of the
`manuscript;
`(g) an audience of the manuscript obtaining the distinctive key
`from the bibliography of the manuscript;
`(h) the audience transmitting the distinctive key to the database
`using a second communications device connected to the
`Internet in order to request the database for the copy of
`the web site; and
`(i) the database transmitting a copy of the stored copy of the
`web site to the audience via the Internet and the second
`communications device in response to the database
`receiving the distinctive key from the audience such that
`the copy of the web site transmitted from the database to
`the audience is verbatim to the web site as on the
`Internet at the time the author transmitted the web site
`address to the database.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01154
`Patent 7,178,097 B1
`
`
`17. A system for storing a reference material using a
`communications network, the system comprising:
`(a) a first communications device connected to the
`communications network for an author of a manuscript
`to use, wherein the author uses the first communications
`device to transfer a copy of the reference material and
`reference material availability information to the
`communications network, wherein the author lists in the
`manuscript a distinctive key associated with both the
`copy of the reference material and the reference material
`availability information;
`(b) a second communications device connected to the
`communications network for an audience of the
`manuscript to use, wherein the audience uses the second
`communications device to request and receive a copy of
`the reference material and the reference material
`availability information from the communications
`network; and
`(c) a database connected to the communications network to
`communicate with the author and the audience via the
`communications network, wherein the database receives
`a copy of the reference material and the reference
`material availability information from the author,
`wherein the database stores an immutable copy of the
`reference material and the reference material availability
`information and the distinctive key associated with the
`copy of the reference material and the reference material
`availability information;
`(d) wherein, if the reference material is available, the database
`transmits a copy of the reference material to the
`audience in response to receiving a request having the
`distinctive key from the audience for a copy of the
`reference material;
`(e) wherein, if the reference material is not available, the
`database transmits a copy of the reference material
`availability information to the audience in response to
`receiving a request having the distinctive key from the
`audience for a copy of the reference material.
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01154
`Patent 7,178,097 B1
`
`
`Ex. 1001, 10:47–11:14, 12:7–43 (Petitioner’s reference letters added to
`identify claim limitations).
`
`C. ASSERTED GROUNDS OF UNPATENTABILITY
`
`Petitioner challenges claims 1–28 of the ’097 patent on the following
`grounds:
`Reference(s)
`Caplan1 and Kahn2
`APA,3 Gemteq,4 and Kahn
`Pet. 3.
`
`Challenged Claims
`1–28
`1–16 and 18–28
`
`Basis
`§ 103
`§ 103
`
`D. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`
`The Board interprets a challenged claim using the “broadest
`reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it
`appears.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see also Office Patent Trial Practice Guide,
`77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 48766 (Aug. 14, 2012). Consistent with the broadest
`reasonable construction, there is a “heavy presumption” that a claim term
`carries its ordinary and customary meaning. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick
`Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). While an inventor may give a
`term a meaning other than its ordinary and customary one, “this must be
`
`1 Priscilla Caplan & Willian Y. Arms, Reference Linking for Journal Articles,
`5 D-LIB MAGAZINE, July–August 1999, http://www.dlib.org/dlib/july99/
`caplan/07caplan.html [hereinafter Caplan] (Ex. 1004).
`2 Kahn et al., U.S. Patent No. 6,135,646 (issued Oct. 24, 2000) [hereinafter
`Kahn] (Ex. 1005).
`3 “Admitted Prior Art” including Ex. 1001, 1:17–20, 1:32–41, 1:48–57, 2:2–
`15, 2:20–29 [hereinafter APA]. See Pet. 10–11; Declaration of Stephen Gray
`¶¶ 47–49, Mar. 24, 2017, Ex. 1002.
`4 Gulati et al., WO 00/39713 (published July 6, 2000) [hereinafter Gemteq]
`(Ex. 1006).
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01154
`Patent 7,178,097 B1
`
`
`done with reasonably clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” In re Paulsen,
`30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
`For purposes of this decision, we construe certain claim limitations as
`follows:
`
`1.
`
`“A Database”
`
`The challenged claims, including independent claim 8, recite
`operations involving “a database.” See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 10:53, 55, 58, 60, 62,
`11:3–5, 7, 9, 12, 14. Petitioner argues that the term “a database” may
`include either a single database or network element, or a combination of
`databases or network elements. Pet. 22–23, 25. Petitioner’s expert Stephen
`Gray also points to a statement in Caplan that “[t]he act of reference lookup
`does not necessarily have to be implemented as a separate step, with a
`separate database, from the resolution of the identifier, as shown in the
`model.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 86 (quoting Ex. 1004, 8–9). Thus, Mr. Gray argues that
`a person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that a single
`database could perform the same functionality as a database with multiple
`network elements such as in Caplan. See id.
`Petitioner also cites as supporting evidence the Second Complaint in
`the related co-pending district court litigation.5 Pet. 22–23. In the Second
`Complaint, Patent Owner alleged that the “Evernote Reference Preservation
`System,” which according to Petitioner “includes end-user software
`applications, various network elements, servers, and databases, and various
`different end-users, performs the various steps of the challenged claims.” Id.
`
`
`5 Talsk Research Inc. v. Evernote Corp., Case No. 1:16-cv-02167 (TMD)
`(N.D. Ill.).
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01154
`Patent 7,178,097 B1
`
`
`(citing Ex. 1011 ¶ 24, Sept. 16, 2016); see also Ex. 1002 ¶ 87 (“[I]n my
`opinion the challenged claims are not limited to a single network element
`(the ‘database’) performing all the claimed method steps.”). Mr. Gray
`testifies, citing to supporting evidence, that a database is “an organized
`collection of logically related data. A database may be of any size and
`complexity.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 16 (citing Ex. 1019, 4).
`Patent Owner argues that Petitioner has not met its burden to clearly
`set forth its position as to the meaning of “a database.” Prelim. Resp. 25–26
`n.1 (citing In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
`2016)).
`We determine that Petitioner has clearly articulated its position that “a
`database” may include more than a single network element, and has
`submitted supporting evidence to that effect. Moreover, we note that the
`’097 patent describes database 18 by its function, rather than by its internal
`structure. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 6:2–9:6. We find nothing in the Specification
`that is inconsistent with interpreting “a database” as including a structure
`with multiple network elements.
`Based on the above evidence, including the text of the ’097 patent, we
`interpret “a database” for the purpose of this Decision as meaning any
`structure that organizes logically related data, which may include multiple
`network elements.
`
`2.
`
`Other Terms
`
`All other terms in each of the challenged claims need not be construed
`further at this time. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d
`
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01154
`Patent 7,178,097 B1
`
`
`795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in
`controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`
`We turn now to Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability and
`Patent Owner’s arguments in its Preliminary Response to determine whether
`Petitioner has met the threshold standard of 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
`
`A. ASSERTED OBVIOUSNESS OF CLAIMS 1–28 OVER CAPLAN IN
`VIEW OF KAHN
`
`Petitioner first argues that claims 1–28 of the ’097 patent are unpatentable
`under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Caplan in view of Kahn.
`Petitioner contends that Caplan was published in the July/August 1999
`edition of the online D-Lib Magazine, and was publically available more
`than a year before the earliest filing date of the ’097 patent. See Pet. 11–12;
`Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 51–54; Ex. 1008, 1; Ex. 1009, 1; Ex. 1013). Patent Owner does
`not dispute this contention.
`Caplan (Exhibit 1004) is directed in general to static reference linking
`for links to journal articles, “and to the selective resolution of identifiers,
`methods by which a client can specify which of several copies of an item is
`accessed.” Ex. 1004, 1. In particular, it discloses a typical model for
`reference linking as shown in Figure 1, reproduced below:
`
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01154
`Patent 7,178,097 B1
`
`
`
`
`Figure 1 of Caplan is a schematic diagram depicting interactions between a
`publisher (the information provider) and a client (accessor of the
`information), and depicts a reference database and a location database, as
`well as a content store. Ex. 1004, 4–5. According to Caplan, “[e]ach work
`has a unique identifier and one or more copies.” Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
`The reference database contains metadata about the stored information. See
`id. “A client that wishes to find the content associated with a reference
`sends a query to the reference database. This database returns a list of
`identifiers for works that match the query.” Id. The location database stores
`specific uniform resource locators (URLs) for each stored copy of the stored
`object. See id. “A client sends an identifier to the location database, which
`returns one or more URLs. The client selects the URL to retrieve the
`object.” Id.
`
`
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01154
`Patent 7,178,097 B1
`
`
`Kahn (Exhibit 1005) is a U.S. patent filed Feb. 28, 1997, and
`Petitioner contends that the reference qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C.
`§§ 102(a) and (e). See Pet. 13. Kahn describes a system for storing digital
`objects in a repository. See Ex. 1005, 5:61–63. “Digital objects” are defined
`very broadly as “any set of sequences of bits or digits,” including
`“conventional digital representations of works (books, papers, images,
`sounds, software), and more broadly any digital material which is capable of
`producing desired manifestations for a computer user.” Id. at 1:11–12, 17–
`21. Each digital object has a handle: “a concise unique identifier for a
`digital object used for storage and retrieval operations.” Id. at 6:22–24.
`Digital objects may also have associated with them a set of access rights
`(e.g., copyrights, trade secrets, or contractual rights). See id. at 1:14–15, 25–
`29.
`
`Petitioner argues that Caplan teaches each of the limitations of claim 8
`except for limitation 8(c):
`the database obtaining a copy of the website from the Internet
`upon receiving the web site address from the author such that
`the copy of the web site obtained by the database is verbatim
`to the web site as on the Internet at the time the author trans-
`mitted the web site address to the database . . . .
`See Pet. 21–29. However, Petitioner argues that Kahn teaches
`limitation 8(c), specifically that the database obtains a copy of a digital
`object (e.g., a website) based on information (e.g., a URL) transmitted from
`the user. Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1005, 7:67–8:3 (“The [user agent device] may
`be used to initiate storage of an object within a repository . . . by transmitting
`information which the repository can use to retrieve the document.”)); see
`also Ex. 1002 ¶ 91. Petitioner argues that this interaction between the author
`
`
`
`
`12
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01154
`Patent 7,178,097 B1
`
`
`and the database occurs over the Internet, Pet. 24 (citing Ex. 1005, 7:24–27),
`and that “Kahn teaches that the copy of the digital object obtained (in this
`case a website) must be ‘unaltered’ (i.e., verbatim to the original[]),” id.
`(citing Ex. 1005, 3:42–46, 4:46–49, 9:26–40, 10:10–13). See also Ex. 1002
`¶¶ 91–92. Petitioner also argues that Kahn teaches other limitations of claim
`8, and that it would have been obvious at the time of invention to combine
`the teachings of Kahn with the reference linking system of Caplan. See Pet.
`32–56; Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 70–106.
`The issues regarding claim 8 are common to the other challenged
`claims, and we discuss these issues in more detail as follows:
`
`“The Audience Transmitting the Distinctive Key to the
`1.
`Database . . . in Order to Request the Database for the Copy of
`the Web Site; and the Database Transmitting a Copy of the
`Stored Copy of the Website to the Audience . . . in Response to
`the Database Receiving the Distinctive Key from the Audience”
`
`Limitation 8(h) recites “the audience transmitting the distinctive key
`to the database . . . in order to request the database for the copy of the web
`site,” and limitation 8(i) recites “the database transmitting a copy of the
`stored copy of the web site to the audience . . . in response to the database
`receiving the distinctive key from the audience.” Ex. 1001, 11:3–10.
`Petitioner argues that “Caplan proposes the use of identifiers that a
`reader (or an audience) can obtain directly from an embedded citation.”
`Pet. 27; see also id. at 28–29. According to Petitioner’s expert Mr. Gray,
`“Caplan discloses that a reader can use the identifier to get a copy of the
`cited website.” Ex. 1002 ¶ 103 (citing Ex. 1004, 4 (“A client sends an
`
`
`
`
`13
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01154
`Patent 7,178,097 B1
`
`
`identifier to the location database, which returns one or more URLs. The
`client selects the URL to retrieve the object.”), Fig. 1).
`Petitioner argues that Kahn also discloses these limitations, in which
`the user can transmit a unique “handle” to the database requesting a copy of
`the digital object and/or “reference information.” See Pet. 28. According to
`Mr. Gray, Kahn discloses the transmission of a stored copy of an object
`directly in response to a “retrieve-object message” that includes the object’s
`distinctive handle 798. Ex. 1002 ¶ 104 (citing Ex. 1005, 25:31–35).
`Patent Owner argues that “Petitioner does not show that Caplan, in
`view of Kahn, discloses or suggests ‘the database transmitting a copy of the
`stored copy of the web site to the audience.’” Prelim. Resp. 23. In
`particular, Patent Owner argues that “Caplan’s database functions by
`transmitting URLs that link to an object in response to receiving an identifier
`from an audience. The object itself is not provided in response to the
`identifier, as claimed in the ’097 patent.” Prelim. Resp. 24; see also Ex.
`20016 ¶¶ 9–11. According to Patent Owner’s expert Jon Scarbrough, “it is
`clear that the identifier is not used to directly retrieve or return the cited
`work. Two additional steps are required where a) the identifier is used to get
`a list of URLs and b) one must pick a URL before retrieving the cited
`content.” Ex. 2001 ¶ 11. Patent Owner argues that this indirection is a
`mandatory feature of Caplan’s disclosure, to allow “resolution to multiple
`items” stored in the databases. See Prelim. Resp. 24. Moreover, Patent
`Owner argues that “[b]ecause multiple-resolution is a necessary principle by
`which Caplan’s system operates, it would be a change in operating principle
`
`
`6 Declaration of Jon Scarbrough, July 6, 2017, Ex. 2001.
`
`14
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01154
`Patent 7,178,097 B1
`
`
`to modify Caplan’s location database to also store objects/content/websites
`and then transmit a particular stored object in response to receiving an
`identifier.” Id. at 25; see also Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 12–13.
`Patent Owner also argues that Kahn does not disclose the direct
`transmission of a copy in response to a user handle, but merely the
`transmission of “reference information,” which “is merely metadata,
`reference information about an object.” Prelim. Resp. 27 (citing Ex. 1005,
`2:40–46); see also Ex. 2001 ¶ 14.
`On this record and for purposes of this Decision, we determine the
`Petition persuasive as to limitations 8(h) and 8(i) of the ’097 patent. The
`language of claim 8 requires that the copy be sent to the audience “in
`response to the database receiving the distinctive key from the audience,”
`but does not explicitly require that the transmission be “directly” in response
`to receiving the key. We also note that the preamble of claim 8 recites a
`method “comprising” a set of steps, which does not exclude additional steps.
`See Solvay S.A. v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 742 F.3d 998, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
`(“The well-established meaning of ‘“comprising” in a method claim
`indicates that the claim is open-ended and allows for additional steps.’”)
`(quoting Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 327 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed.
`Cir. 2003)). Thus, under the broadest reasonable interpretation of claim 8
`and according to its plain meaning, there could be intermediate steps
`between receipt of the distinctive key from the audience and transmission of
`the copy of the stored object. We find nothing in the Specification
`inconsistent with this interpretation.
`Second, based on the evidence on this record, we find persuasive the
`testimony of Petitioner’s expert Mr. Gray that Kahn discloses the
`
`15
`
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01154
`Patent 7,178,097 B1
`
`
`transmission of a stored copy of an object directly in response to a message
`that includes the object’s distinctive handle. Ex. 1002 ¶ 104. Kahn teaches
`that after the database sends a pointer or list of pointers to stored digital
`objects, the user sends back a “retrieve object message” that includes “the
`object’s handle 798.” Ex. 1005, 25:32–35. Directly in response to receiving
`this message including the handle, the repository transmits data including
`“the object, signed by the repository.” Id. at 26:31–38. Thus, at this stage
`and based on this record, Petitioner has established sufficiently that either
`Caplan discloses limitations 8(h) and (i), or that these limitations would have
`been obvious in light of Kahn’s teaching to include the distinctive key in the
`message to which the database directly responds in sending a copy of the
`stored object.
`Finally, while Caplan teaches that the ability to perform “selective
`resolution” among multiple copies of the same work is an important and
`necessary feature of the disclosed system, see, e.g., Ex. 1004, 2, 6, Patent
`Owner’s arguments do not persuade us, on the basis of this record, that
`selective resolution would rule out either (1) sending a copy indirectly in
`response to receiving the distinctive key, or (2) sending the copy directly in
`response to receiving the key as taught by Kahn. Moreover, the evidence on
`this record does not show that Caplan rules out the omission of selective
`resolution when there is just one copy of a stored work. See id. at 4 (“Each
`work has . . . one or more copies . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. at 6 (“In the
`model, it is assumed that multiple copies of a creation may exist . . . .”
`(emphasis added)). Thus, based on this record we do not find Caplan’s
`description of a selective resolution feature to “criticize, discredit or
`
`
`
`
`16
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01154
`Patent 7,178,097 B1
`
`
`otherwise discourage the solution” in limitations 8(h) and 8(i). In re Fulton,
`391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
`
`2.
`
`“A Database”
`
`Limitations 8(b), (e), (h), and (i) refer to “a database” that
`communicates with the author and audience. See Ex. 1001, 10:52–11:12.
`Petitioner claims that Caplan discloses such a database. See Pet. 22–23.
`According to Petitioner, “[a]lthough Caplan Figure 1 illustrates three
`separate databases, a [person of ordinary skill in the art] would have
`recognized that a single database could perform the functions described in
`Caplan.” Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 86). Petitioner also argues that the
`term “a database” is broader than “a single database or network element.”
`Id. at 23 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 87). Petitioner’s expert Mr. Gray also opines that
`“Caplan recognizes that separate databases are not necessary for the
`system.” Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 86, 96. As evidence, Mr. Gray points to a passage in
`Caplan, see id. ¶ 86 (quoting Ex. 1004, 8–9), which we reproduce here with
`additional context:
`The act of reference lookup does not necessarily have to be im-
`plemented as a separate step, with a separate database, from the
`resolution of the identifier, as shown in the model. However,
`lookup and resolution are conceptually distinct steps, and they
`are likely to be implemented as separate systems. Different agen-
`cies may want to provide the different services. Also, citation
`lookup may require more processing power than resolution, ar-
`guing for technical separation. Further, it cannot be expected that
`every lookup of citation information will yield unique, unambig-
`uous results. Lookups resulting in more than one hit may require
`some negotiation with the party initiating the lookup, or may re-
`turn multiple identifiers, leaving it up to the user to select which
`
`
`
`
`17
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01154
`Patent 7,178,097 B1
`
`
`to resolve. Functionally, this complexity is best dealt with by sep-
`arating resolution from lookup.
`Ex. 1004, 8–9.
`Petitioner further argues that Kahn discloses a database in which the
`distinctive key is stored in the same repository as the digital object. See
`Pet. 22, 25–26; Ex. 1002 ¶ 97.
`Patent Owner argues that Petitioner has not met its burden to show
`that Caplan discloses “a database.” Prelim. Resp. 25–26 n.1. While Patent
`Owner does not appear to dispute that a person of ordinary skill in the art
`would have had reason to combine reference and location databases, Patent
`Owner argues that “there is absolutely no evidence offered for Petitioner’s
`argument that Caplan’s reference and location databases could or would be
`combined with the content servers. Caplan only discusses combining the
`functionality of the reference and location databases.” Id. (citing Ex. 1004,
`8–9).
`
`Patent Owner also argues that “Petitioner’s bare assertion that
`Caplan’s system could be reduced to a single database goes directly against
`Caplan’s requirement for each identifier to resolve to multiple content
`locations.” Prelim. Resp. 25 n.1.
`On this record, Petitioner persuasively argues that Caplan teaches “a
`database” as recited in claim 8. For the reasons discussed above in the
`“Claim Interpretation” section, we interpret “a database” for the purpose of
`this Decision as meaning any structure that organizes logically related data,
`which may include multiple network elements. Thus, whether or not
`Caplan’s content server is combined with the reference and location servers,
`
`
`
`
`18
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01154
`Patent 7,178,097 B1
`
`
`the combined server structure is a database because it functions to organize
`logically related data about the stored websites.
`In addition, Petitioner’s argument that Kahn teaches storing the
`distinctive key in the same repository as the digital object is persuasive.
`Kahn teaches that “[c]opies of the digital object are stored in a repository,”
`Ex. 1005, 3:42, that “[t]here may be multiple repositories,” id. at 3:54–55,
`that “[t]he repository may contain other related information . . . as well as
`management systems,” id. at 5:63–64, and that the repository may include a
`“property record” that includes the unique handle, see id. at 6:21–28, 32–35.
`Thus, Petitioner has established a reasonable likelihood that it would have
`been obvious in light of Caplan and Kahn to use a single database for storing
`both stored copies of websites and related information including the
`distinctive key.
`
`3.
`
`Reason to Combine Caplan with Kahn
`
`Petitioner argues that Caplan and Kahn are analogous references
`because “both disclosures relate to the same field of archiving content cited
`in reference materials.” Pet. 20 (citing In re Johnston, 435 F.3d 1381, 1386
`(Fed. Cir. 2006)). According to Petitioner, it would have been obvious to
`combine the teachings of Kahn with the system of Caplan because such a
`combination “would have involved no more than the predictable use of prior
`art techniques according to the functions established in the respective prior
`art disclosures.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 75). Moreover, Petitioner argues that
`a skilled artisan would have expected Kahn’s system for managing and
`archiving digital objects to work successfully in the context of Caplan’s
`system because “both systems call for the use of conventional database and
`
`
`
`
`19
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01154
`Patent 7,178,097 B1
`
`
`networking technology to operate in accordance with functions established
`in the respective prior art disclosures.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002 ¶ 77).
`Petitioner’s expert Mr. Gray further testifies that
`a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated
`to modify the “reference linking” approach disclosed by Caplan
`to use the system for creating, storing and sharing “digital ob-
`jects” taught by Kahn because doing so would have resulted in
`creating an immutable database of cited reference material that
`could be accessed later by readers of an original work.
`Ex. 1002 ¶ 75. Mr. Gray also cites, as a factor, “the well-developed nature
`of the field of art by 2000,” and opines that “the method and system of
`archiving and managing digital objects disclosed by Kahn is well-suited to
`be employed in the context contemplated by Caplan.” Id. ¶ 71.
`Patent Owner argues that Petitioner does not adequately articulate a
`basis for unpatentability of claim 8 or the other challenged claims.
`According to Patent Owner, Petitioner cites Caplan and Kahn for many of
`the same limitations, “leaving Patent Owner guessing as to which references
`are being combined with which and how this presentation in any way
`comports with the Graham factors.” Prelim. Resp. 7 (citing Graham v. John
`Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966)). Patent Owner argues that, “for each
`element of each of the claims, Petitioner explains how every one of the
`references allegedly describes such elements.” Id. at 2. Thus, Patent Owner
`accuses Petitioner of seeking “to frustrate Patentee’s ability to address the
`petition, or to goad it into addressing the universe of art cited in the
`petition.” Id.
`As examples, Patent Owner refers to Petitioner’s discussion regarding
`claim limitation 8(a), in which Petitioner “first asserts that Caplan authors
`
`
`
`
`20
`
`

`

`Case IPR2017-01154
`Patent 7,178,097 B1
`
`
`[are] including citations to URLs for websi

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket