throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571.272.7822
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Paper No. 76
`
`
` Filed: April 30, 2020
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`MICROSOFT CORPORATION,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`FG SRC LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`IPR2018-01604
`Patent 7,421,524 B2
`____________
`
`
`Before KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, JUSTIN T. ARBES, and
`CHRISTA P. ZADO, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`DESHPANDE, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`JUDGMENT
`Final Written Decision
`Determining All Challenged Claims Unpatentable
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a)
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01604
`Patent 7,421,524 B2
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`A. Background
`Microsoft Corporation (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition requesting an
`inter partes review of claims 1, 2, and 13‒15 of U.S. Patent No. 7,421,524
`B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’524 patent”). Paper 2 (“Pet.”). FG SRC LLC (“Patent
`Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 313. Paper
`15 (“Prelim. Resp.”).1
`On May 3, 2019, we issued a Decision ordering that “an inter partes
`review is hereby instituted with respect to all grounds set forth in the
`Petition.” Paper 21 (“Dec.”), 29. After institution, Patent Owner filed a
`Patent Owner’s Response (Paper 38, “PO Resp.”). In reply, Petitioner filed
`a Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s Response (Paper 56, “Pet. Reply”).
`In response, Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner’s Sur-Reply (Paper 62,
`“PO Sur-Reply”). Petitioner and Patent Owner also filed Motions to
`Exclude Evidence (Papers 63 (“Pet. Mot.”), 64 (“PO Mot.”)), Oppositions to
`the Motions (Papers 65 (“Pet. Opp. Mot.”), 66) and Replies to the
`Oppositions (Papers 68, 69). Petitioner and Patent Owner presented oral
`arguments on February 3, 2020, and a transcript has been entered into the
`record. Paper 75 (“Tr.”).
`The Board has jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. In this Final Written
`Decision, after reviewing all relevant evidence and arguments, we determine
`that Petitioner has met its burden of showing, by a preponderance of the
`
`
`1 Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, originally named as Patent Owner, assigned
`the ’524 patent to DirectStream, LLC on May 21, 2019. Paper 27, 1.
`DirectStream, LLC assigned the ’524 patent to FG SRC LLC on January 22,
`2020. Paper 73, 1.
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01604
`Patent 7,421,524 B2
`
`evidence, that claims 1, 2, and 13‒15 of the ’524 patent are unpatentable.
`Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude is denied-in-part and dismissed-in-part.
`Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is denied-in-part and dismissed-in-part.
`B. Related Proceedings
`The parties indicate that the ’524 patent currently is involved in SRC
`
`Labs, LLC et al. v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 2-18-cv-00321 (W.D.
`Wash.), which was transferred from SRC Labs, LLC et al. v. Microsoft
`Corp., Civil Action No. 1-17-cv-01172 (E.D. Va.). Pet. 3; Prelim. Resp. 4–
`5. The following proceedings, before the Board, also involve the same
`parties: IPR2018-01594, IPR2018-01599, IPR2018-01600, IPR2018-01601,
`IPR2018-01602, IPR2018-01603, IPR2018-01605, IPR2018-01606, and
`IPR2018-01607.2
`
`C. The ʼ524 Patent (Ex. 1001)
`The ’524 patent is directed to the field of computer architecture, and,
`specifically, “a switch/network adapter port (‘SNAP’) for clustered
`computers employing a chain of multi-adaptive processors (‘MAP[]’) . . . in
`a dual in-line memory module (‘DIMM’) format.” Ex. 1001, 1:29–37.
`A block diagram of an exemplary MAP element is disclosed in
`Figure 3:
`
`
`2 IPR2018-01602 and IPR2018-01603 have been consolidated with
`IPR2018-01601. IPR2018-01606 and IPR2018-01607 have been
`consolidated with IPR2018-01605.
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01604
`Patent 7,421,524 B2
`
`
`
`
`Figure 3 illustrates memory bank 120 for a MAP element-based
`system computer architecture (not depicted in Figure 3). Id. at 4:60–64.
`“Each memory bank 120 includes a bank control logic block 122
`bi-directionally coupled to the computer system trunk lines, for example, a
`72 line bus 124.” Id. at 4:64–66. Memory array 130 is coupled to bank
`control logic 122 via bi-directional data bus 126 and address bus 128. Id. at
`4:67–5:3. “MAP element 112 comprises a control block 132 coupled to the
`address bus 128.” Id. at 5:5–6. “[C]ontrol block 132 is also bi-directionally
`coupled to a user field programmable gate array (‘FPGA’),” and “user
`FPGA 134 is coupled directly to the data bus 126.” Id. at 5:6–10. The
`’524 patent discloses that MAP element 112 has direct memory access
`(DMA) capability, which permits it to write to memory, and “it is possible to
`allow a MAP element 112 to feed results to another MAP element 112
`through use of a chain port” because MAP element 112 receives operands
`via writes to memory. Id. at 5:50–54.
`Computer system 200 including MAP element 212 in DIMM format
`is depicted in Figure 5:
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01604
`Patent 7,421,524 B2
`
`
`
`Figure 5 illustrates “computer system 200 includ[ing] one or more
`processors 2020 and 2021 which are coupled to an associated PC memory
`and I/O controller 204.” Id. at 7:42–45. “[C]ontroller 204 is . . .
`conventionally coupled to a number of DIMM slots 214 by means of a much
`higher bandwidth DIMM bus 216 capable of data transfer rates of 2.1
`GB/sec. or greater.” Id. at 7:56–59. DIMM MAP element 212 is associated
`with, or physically located within, one of DIMM slots 214, which may be
`coupled to another clustered computer MAP element by a cluster
`interconnect fabric connection 220 that is connected to MAP chain ports. Id.
`at 7:59–62, 7:65–8:1.
`The ’524 patent discloses that because DIMM MAP element 212 is
`placed in one of DIMM slots 214, FPGA 134 of DIMM MAP element 212
`accepts normal memory “read” and “write” transactions, and converts them
`to a format used by an interconnect switch or network. Id. at 8:13–17.
`According to the ’524 patent, however, “the electrical protocol of the
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01604
`Patent 7,421,524 B2
`
`DIMMs is such that once the data arrives at the receiver, there is no way for
`a DIMM module within the DIMM slots 214 to signal the microprocessor
`202 that it has arrived.” Id. at 8:29–33. The “efforts of the processor 202
`would have to be synchronized through the use of a continued polling of the
`DIMM MAP elements 212 to determine if data has arrived.” Id. at 8:29–36.
`According to the ’524 patent, this would consume the processor and much of
`its bandwidth, thereby stalling all other bus agents. Id. at 8:36–38.
`To address this issue, the ’524 patent discloses connection 218
`interconnecting DIMM MAP element 212 and PCI bus 210 such that DIMM
`MAP element 212 may generate communications packets and send them via
`PCI bus 210 to processor 202. Id. at 7:62–65; 8:39–43. According to the
`’524 patent, because these packets would account for a very small
`percentage of the data moved, low bandwidth effects of PCI bus 210 would
`be minimized. Id. at 8:43–47.
`D. Illustrative Claim
`Petitioner challenges claims 1, 2, and 13‒15 of the ’524 patent.
`Pet. 12–80. Claim 1 is the only independent claim at issue. Claim 1 is
`illustrative of the challenged claims and is reproduced below:
`1.
`A processor element for a memory module bus of a
`computer system, said processor element comprising:
`a field programmable gate array configurable to perform
`an identified algorithm on an operand provided thereto and
`operative to alter data provided directly thereto on said memory
`module bus; and
`field
`to said
`a direct data connection coupled
`programmable gate array for providing said altered data directly
`from said memory module bus to an external device coupled
`thereto.
`Ex. 1001, 9:42‒10:4.
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01604
`Patent 7,421,524 B2
`
`
`E. The Alleged Grounds of Unpatentability
`The information presented in the Petition sets forth grounds of
`unpatentability of claims 1, 2, and 13‒15 of the ’524 patent as follows (see
`Pet. 12–80):3,4
`
`Claim(s) Challenged 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis
`
`1, 2, 13–15
`
`1, 2, 13–15
`
`1, 2, 13–15
`
`2
`
`14
`
`15
`
`§ 102
`
`§ 103
`
`§ 103
`
`§ 103
`
`§ 103
`
`§ 103
`
`Tsutsui5
`
`Tsutsui
`
`Tsutsui, Tsutsui II6
`Tsutsui, Stone,7 with or
`without Tsutsui II
`Tsutsui, Collins,8 with or
`without Tsutsui II
`Tsutsui, Hayashi,9 with or
`without Tsutsui II
`
`
`
`3 Petitioner supports its challenge with the Declaration of Scott Hauck, Ph.D.
`Ex. 1003.
`4 All references to 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 herein are pre-AIA.
`5 Akihiro Tsutsui et al., YARDS: FPGA/MPU Hybrid Architecture for
`Telecommunication Data Processing, Proceedings of Association for
`Computing Machinery / Special Interest Group for Design Automation
`(ACM/SIGDA) FPGA ’97, 93–99, (1997) (Ex. 1007, “Tsutsui”).
`6 A. Tsutsui et al., Special Purpose FPGA for High-speed Digital
`Telecommunications Systems, 1995 IEEE International Conference on
`Computer Design: VLSI in Computers & Processors, pp. 486–491 (1995)
`(Ex. 1009, “Tsutsui II”).
`7 Harold S. Stone, MICROCOMPUTER INTERFACING 1–41 (Tom Robbins et al.
`2d ed. 1983) (Ex. 1010, “Stone”).
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01604
`Patent 7,421,524 B2
`
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`A. Motions to Exclude
`The party moving to exclude evidence bears the burden of proof to
`establish that it is entitled to the relief requested—namely, that the material
`sought to be excluded is inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
`See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.20(c), 42.62(a). For the reasons discussed below,
`Petitioner’s Motion is denied-in-part and dismissed-in-part, and Patent
`Owner’s Motion is denied-in-part and dismissed-in-part.
`1. Petitioner’s Motion to Exclude
`a. Exhibits 2067 and 2086
`Petitioner moves to exclude the declaration of one of the named
`inventors of the ’524 patent, Jon Huppenthal (Exhibit 2067), “in its entirety
`as not being relevant to any issue on which trial has been instituted, and for
`lacking foundation, containing hearsay, and/or causing undue prejudice.”
`Pet. Mot. 3–6. Petitioner additionally moves to exclude portions of
`“Mr. Huppenthal’s declaration (Ex. 2067 ¶¶ 80, 82–86) due to his refusal to
`answer questions concerning those portions of the declaration.” Id. at 1–3
`(citing Paper 51, 7–8).
`Petitioner also moves to exclude a transcript (Exhibit 2086) of a
`deposition of Petitioner’s declarant from other inter partes reviews as “not
`being relevant to any issue on which trial has been instituted, for containing
`
`
`8 U.S. Patent No. 5,671,355, issued September 23, 1997 (Ex. 1008,
`“Collins”).
`9 K. Hayashi et al., Reconfigurable Real-Time Signal Transport System using
`Custom FPGAs, IEEE Symposium on FPGAs for Custom Computing
`Machines, IEEE (1995) (Ex. 1013, “Hayashi”).
`8
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01604
`Patent 7,421,524 B2
`
`hearsay, and/or causing undue prejudice.” Id. at 6–7. Petitioner argues that
`allowing the transcript in the record would be “highly prejudicial as it
`presents itself with the indicia of expert testimony while being totally devoid
`from the necessary context of the matter from which it originates.” Id. at 6.
`Patent Owner cites Exhibits 2067 and 2086 in its Response and Sur-Reply.
`Petitioner’s Motion is dismissed as moot, as we do not rely on the
`testimony in a manner adverse to Petitioner in this Decision. As explained
`below, even if the testimony is considered, we are not persuaded by Patent
`Owner’s arguments regarding the state of the art or alleged nonobviousness
`of the challenged claims, and Patent Owner has not shown proof of
`secondary considerations that would support a conclusion of
`nonobviousness. See supra Sections II.C–II.D.
`b. Exhibit 2102
`Petitioner moves to exclude paragraph 133 of the declaration of Patent
`Owner’s declarant, Houman Homayoun, Ph.D., which refers to Exhibit
`2067. Pet. Mot. 8. Because we do not exclude that exhibit, and do not rely
`on paragraph 133 of the Homayoun Declaration, we also dismiss as moot
`Petitioner’s Motion with respect to Exhibit 2102.
`c. Exhibits 2060, 2062–2064, 2066, 2072-2080, 2085, 2088, 2092,
`2094, 2096–2101, 2103, 2104, 2106–2145, 2147, 2148, 2157, and
`2160
`Petitioner moves to exclude a number of exhibits as “not being
`relevant to any issues on which trial has been instituted, lacking foundation,
`and/or causing undue prejudice” because the exhibits were not discussed
`substantively and/or cited in Patent Owner’s Response and Sur-Reply. Pet.
`Mot. 7–8. Petitioner’s Motion is dismissed as moot, as we do not rely on the
`exhibits in a manner adverse to Petitioner in this Decision. We note,
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01604
`Patent 7,421,524 B2
`
`however, that in evaluating Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability,
`we only consider substantive arguments made by the parties in their papers
`during trial (i.e., the Petition, Response, Reply, and Sur-Reply). To the
`extent a document is filed in the record but never discussed in a paper, there
`is no substantive argument pertaining to that document that can be
`considered.
`d. Patent Owner’s Response
`Petitioner moves to exclude portions of Patent Owner’s Response
`referring to the exhibits that Petitioner seeks to exclude. Pet. Mot. 8. Patent
`Owner’s Response is a paper with attorney arguments, not evidence that
`may be excluded.10 Further, we do not exclude any of the exhibits referred
`to in the identified portions of the Response. Petitioner’s Motion is denied
`as to Patent Owner’s Response.
`2. Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude
`a. Exhibits 1007, 1036 and 1038
`Patent Owner first objected to the authenticity of Exhibit 1007 in its
`Patent Owner Response. PO Mot. 5 (citing PO Resp. 48). Now, Patent
`Owner moves to exclude Exhibits 1007, 1036, and 1038 as unauthenticated
`under Federal Rule of Evidence 901 because Petitioner’s declarant, Stephen
`Trimberger, Ph.D., “admits that his original declaration did not properly
`authenticate EX1007.” PO Mot. 5–7 (citing Ex. 1034 ¶ 7). Patent Owner
`argues that Petitioner attempts to authenticate Exhibit 1007 using evidence
`submitted for the first time in Petitioner’s Reply, which violates Patent
`
`10 Petitioner did not seek authorization to file a motion to strike Patent
`Owner’s Response. See Patent Trial and Appeal Board Consolidated Trial
`Practice Guide (Nov. 2019), 80–81, available at https://www.uspto.gov/
`TrialPracticeGuideConsolidated (“Trial Practice Guide”).
`10
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01604
`Patent 7,421,524 B2
`
`Owner’s due process and administrative rights. Id. at 6. Patent Owner
`further argues that Exhibits 1036 and 1038, which are identical copies of
`Exhibit 1007, should be excluded “for the same reasons” as Exhibit 1007.
`Id. at 5, 7.
`“Any objection to evidence submitted during a preliminary
`proceeding must be filed within ten business days of the institution of the
`trial. . . . The objection must identify the grounds for the objection with
`sufficient particularity to allow correction in the form of supplemental
`evidence.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(1); see 37 C.F.R. § 42.2 (defining a
`“preliminary proceeding” as the time period beginning “with the filing of a
`petition for instituting a trial” and ending “with a written decision as to
`whether a trial will be instituted”). This process allows the party that
`originally submitted the evidence to attempt to cure the objection by serving
`supplemental evidence. 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(b)(2). If the submitting party
`does not serve supplemental evidence, or if the supplemental evidence does
`not cure the objection, “[a] motion to exclude evidence must be filed to
`preserve [the] objection. The motion must identify the objections in the
`record in order and must explain the objections.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.64(c).
`“To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of
`evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a
`finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Fed. R. Evid.
`901(a). Certain evidence, though, is “self-authenticating” and “require[s] no
`extrinsic evidence of authenticity in order to be admitted.” Fed. R. Evid.
`902.
`
`Petitioner asserts that Patent Owner waived its objection by failing to
`timely object to Exhibit 1007 as lacking authenticity. Pet. Opp. Mot. 1. We
`
`
`
`11
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01604
`Patent 7,421,524 B2
`
`agree. Patent Owner admits that it objected to the authenticity of Exhibit
`1007 in its Response. PO Mot. 5. Patent Owner submitted its Response on
`August 5, 2019, more than ten business days after we instituted this
`proceeding on May 3, 2019. Therefore, Patent Owner’s objection to Exhibit
`1007 based on authenticity is untimely.
`Petitioner further asserts that Exhibits 1007, 1036, and 1038 are
`authentic. Pet. Opp. Mot. 1–4. First, Petitioner asserts Exhibit 1007 is
`authentic under Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) because the record
`evidence unambiguously shows that Exhibit 1007 is a copy of the Tsutsui
`reference. Id. at 2. Second, Petitioner asserts that Exhibits 1036 and 1038
`are self-authenticating as ancient documents under Federal Rule of Evidence
`901(b)(8) because each is “in a condition that creates no suspicion about its
`authenticity,” “was in a place where, if authentic, it would likely be,” and “is
`at least 20 years old when offered.” Id. at 2–3. Because Exhibits 1036 and
`1038 are self-authenticating, and Exhibits 1007, 1036, and 1038 are
`identical, then Exhibit 1007 is also self-authenticating according to
`Petitioner. Id. Third, Petitioner argues that Exhibits 1007, 1036, and 1038
`are Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) publications that each
`include “an ACM trade inscription, copyright symbol, and [International
`Standard Book Number (ISBN)],” and therefore, these documents self-
`authenticate under Federal Rules of Evidence 902(6) and 902(7). Id. at 3–4.
`Finally, Petitioner asserts that Exhibits 1007, 1036, and 1038 are also
`authenticated under Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(4) based on the totality
`of the circumstances and because Patent Owner does not identify anything to
`suggest the exhibits are not authentic. Id. at 4.
`
`
`
`12
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01604
`Patent 7,421,524 B2
`
`
`We agree with Petitioner that Exhibits 1007, 1036, and 1038 are
`self-authenticating under Federal Rules of Evidence 902(6) and 902(7), and
`that Exhibits 1036 and 1038 are ancient documents under Federal Rule of
`Evidence 901(b)(8) for the reasons stated by Petitioner. Exhibits 1007,
`1036, and 1038 include an ACM trade inscription, copyright symbol, and
`ISBN number. Exhibits 1036 and 1038 are authentic as ancient documents,
`as they meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(8).
`Accordingly, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Exhibits
`1007, 1036, and 1038.
`b. Exhibits 1034, 1035, and 1039
`Patent Owner moves to exclude certain portions of Exhibits 1034,
`1035, and 1039 because many portions of the reply declarations allegedly
`“are not based on the personal knowledge of the witness, are impermissible
`hearsay, and/or are impermissible expert opinions from a witness
`unqualified to provide such opinions.” PO Mot. 7–8. We are not persuaded.
`Patent Owner does not identify any particular “statement” in any of the
`exhibits that is being offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the
`statement,” and thus fails to meet its burden to prove inadmissibility as
`hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). Petitioner further
`establishes that the declarations were each based on the declarant’s personal
`knowledge and qualifications. Pet. Opp. Mot. 5–7 (citing Ex. 1034 ¶¶ 2, 4,
`9, 16, 30; Ex. 1035 ¶¶ 7–8, 17 (citing Ex. 1039 ¶¶ 2, 5–6)); see Ex. 1034 ¶ 2
`(“I am submitting this declaration based on my own personal knowledge of
`the facts stated here . . . .”). Accordingly, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion
`to Exclude Exhibits 1034, 1035, and 1039.
`
`
`
`13
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01604
`Patent 7,421,524 B2
`
`
`c. Exhibit 1032
`Patent Owner moves to exclude Exhibit 1032 because it is “irrelevant
`to this case” and because Petitioner “failed to properly authenticate” Exhibit
`1032. PO Mot. 8–9. Patent Owner also asserts that, to the extent Petitioner
`attempts to meet its burden of proof using Exhibit 1032, Petitioner’s use of
`the document is impermissible hearsay. Id. at 9. Petitioner argues that
`Exhibit 1032 is the specific copy of the Tsutsui reference that Dr. Hauck
`relied on for purposes of his declaration, and was not initially filed with the
`Petition (but was filed with the Reply). Pet. Opp. Mot. 7–8. Petitioner also
`asserts that “extensive testimony entered into the record by Dr. Trimberger”
`authenticates Exhibit 1032. Id. at 8.
`We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner has not set forth sufficient
`argument and evidence to exclude Exhibit 1032 as irrelevant. We are also
`persuaded that Dr. Trimberger’s testimony authenticates Exhibit 1032. See,
`e.g., Ex. 1034 ¶¶ 7 (“I understand that the version of the Tsut[su]i paper
`which I refer to as Exhibit 1007 (included here as EX1032 and referred to as
`Tsutsui-1032) was not included with my original declaration, and a different
`version of the same paper was included in its place.”), 5 (“Tsutsui-1007 and
`Tsutsui-1032 are substantively identical.”). Accordingly, Patent Owner’s
`Motion to Exclude Exhibit 1032 is denied.11
`
`d. Exhibits 1033, 1036, 1038, 1040, 1041, 1043–1050, 1053–1057
`Patent Owner moves to exclude Exhibits 1040, 1041, 1043, and 1045–
`1049 because none of these exhibits “are cited, discussed, or relied upon by
`
`
`11 To be clear, Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability are based on
`the version of Tsutsui filed as Exhibit 1007, not Exhibit 1032. See Dec. 7–8,
`29; Pet. 4; Pet. Opp. Mot. 8.
`
`
`
`14
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01604
`Patent 7,421,524 B2
`
`any expert witness or fact witness in this case.” PO Mot. 9. Patent Owner
`also moves to exclude Exhibits 1033, 1036, 1038, 1044, 1050, and 1053–
`1057 because they are “not cited in any of Petitioner’s papers.” Id. at 12.
`We see no basis to exclude the exhibits for that reason and dismiss Patent
`Owner’s request, but again note that in evaluating Petitioner’s asserted
`grounds of unpatentability, we only consider substantive arguments made by
`the parties in their papers during trial (i.e., the Petition, Response, Reply,
`and Sur-Reply). To the extent a document is filed in the record but never
`discussed in a paper, there is no substantive argument pertaining to that
`document that can be considered.
`Patent Owner further moves to exclude Exhibits 1040, 1043, and 1049
`as unauthenticated under Federal Rule of Evidence 901. Id. at 10–11.
`Petitioner argues that “Patent Owner identifies nothing about the documents
`themselves that brings into question their authenticity,” and “Patent Owner
`bears the burden as movant to demonstrate these documents are not
`authentic.” Pet. Opp. Mot. 10. Petitioner further asserts that Exhibits 1040
`and 1049 are IEEE publications that each include “a trade inscription,
`copyright symbol, and ISBN,” and, therefore, these documents
`self-authenticate under Federal Rules of Evidence 902(6) and 902(7). Id. at
`10–11. Petitioner further argues that Exhibits 1040, 1043, and 1049 are
`authenticated under Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(4) “based on the
`totality of the circumstances based on their appearance alone, as nothing
`about those exhibits suggests that [they] are not what the[y] purport to be,
`and Patent Owner never identifies anything to suggest otherwise.” Id. at 11.
`Petitioner also argues that Exhibit 1040 is an ancient document because it is
`over twenty years old and meet the requirements of Federal Rule of
`
`
`
`15
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01604
`Patent 7,421,524 B2
`
`Evidence 901(b)(8). Id. at 11. We agree with Petitioner that Patent Owner
`has not set forth sufficient argument and evidence to exclude Exhibits 1040,
`1043, and 1049 as unauthenticated, and we further agree that Exhibit 1040 is
`self-authenticating and an ancient document for the reasons stated by
`Petitioner.
`Patent Owner further moves to exclude Exhibits 1040, 1041, 1043,
`and 1045–1049 as containing inadmissible hearsay under Federal Rule of
`Evidence 802. PO Mot. 10–11. Patent Owner states that Petitioner in its
`Reply “cites each of these documents to prove the truth of technical matters
`allegedly asserted in such documents, i.e. to support Petitioner’s specific
`factual assertions regarding a technical issue.” Id. at 10. We are not
`persuaded. Patent Owner does not identify any particular “statement” in any
`of the exhibits that is being offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted
`in the statement,” and thus fails to meet its burden to prove inadmissibility
`as hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). Even if Patent
`Owner had done so, Petitioner cites the exhibits to show what a person of
`ordinary skill in the art would have known at the time of the ’524 patent
`about the technical features and developments in the pertinent art. Pet. Opp.
`Mot. 12 (citing Ex. 1040 and 1041). The exhibits are not being offered for
`the truth of any particular matter discussed in the references. Accordingly,
`we deny Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude Exhibits 1040, 1041, 1043, and
`1045–1049.
`Patent Owner appears to move to exclude uncited portions of
`deposition testimony from Mr. Huppenthal and Dr. Homayoun (Exhibits
`1033 and 1055–1057) because “Petitioner has failed to establish [their]
`relevance to this case.” PO Mot. 13. We see no basis to exclude the exhibits
`
`
`
`16
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01604
`Patent 7,421,524 B2
`
`for that reason and dismiss Patent Owner’s request, but again note that in
`evaluating Petitioner’s asserted grounds of unpatentability, we only consider
`substantive arguments made by the parties in their papers during trial (i.e.,
`the Petition, Response, Reply, and Sur-Reply). To the extent a document is
`filed in the record but never discussed in a paper, there is no substantive
`argument pertaining to that document that can be considered.
`e. Exhibits 1051 and 1052
`Patent Owner moves to exclude certain portions of the transcripts of
`two depositions of Steven A. Guccione, Ph.D., because the questions asked
`were “vague and ambiguous.” PO Mot. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1052, 51:1–7;
`Ex. 1051, 38:14–39:6). Patent Owner’s Motion is dismissed as moot, as we
`do not rely on the disputed portions of the testimony in rendering our
`Decision.
`Additionally, Patent Owner appears to move to exclude uncited
`portions of deposition testimony from Dr. Guccione because “Petitioner has
`failed to establish [their] relevance to this case.” Id. at 13. We see no basis
`to exclude the exhibits for that reason and dismiss Patent Owner’s request,
`but again note that in evaluating Petitioner’s asserted grounds of
`unpatentability, we only consider substantive arguments made by the parties
`in their papers during trial (i.e., the Petition, Response, Reply, and Sur-
`Reply). To the extent a document is filed in the record but never discussed
`in a paper, there is no substantive argument pertaining to that document that
`can be considered. Accordingly, Patent Owner’s Motion with respect to
`uncited portions of Dr. Guccione’s testimony is dismissed.
`
`
`
`17
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01604
`Patent 7,421,524 B2
`
`
`B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art for a challenged
`patent, we look to “1) the types of problems encountered in the art; 2) the
`prior art solutions to those problems; 3) the rapidity with which innovations
`are made; 4) the sophistication of the technology; and 5) the educational
`level of active workers in the field.” Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654,
`666–667 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan
`Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962–963 (Fed. Cir. 1986). “Not all such factors
`may be present in every case, and one or more of them may predominate.”
`Ruiz, 234 F.3d at 666–667; see also Custom Accessories, 807 F.2d at 963.
`Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art, at the time
`of the ’524 patent, would have had “a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical
`Engineering, Computer Engineering, Computer Science, or in a related field,
`and four years of experience with the design or use of field programmable
`gate array based systems or network adapters.” Pet. 5 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 41).
`Petitioner alternatively argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art
`“would have had an advanced degree in one of those fields and two years of
`related experience.” Id. Moreover, such a person, according to Petitioner,
`would have been knowledgeable about computer architectures and how
`FPGAs could be included in them. Id. at 5. Such a person also would have
`been knowledgeable about software algorithms that could be implemented
`on FPGAs and how to configure FPGAs to carry out such implementation.
`Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 41).
`Patent Owner disputes Petitioner’s assessment of the level of ordinary
`skill in the art, but does not provide a proposed level of ordinary skill in the
`
`
`
`18
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01604
`Patent 7,421,524 B2
`
`art that we should apply in this proceeding.12 PO Resp. 30–33. Patent
`Owner contends Petitioner’s assessment is incorrect because a person of
`ordinary skill in the art would not have had the detailed FPGA knowledge
`assumed by Petitioner’s definition. Id. Patent Owner further contends the
`technical problem the ’524 patent sought to address is in the field of
`High-Performance Computing (“HPC”). Id. at 3. Concatenating the
`experience Petitioner argues an artisan would have had with Patent Owner’s
`assessment of the technical field, Patent Owner argues the result would have
`been a “mythical person” knowledgeable about both FPGAs and HPC. Id. at
`30–33. According to Patent Owner, it would have been rare to find a person
`knowledgeable in both disciplines, and that any such person would have had
`more education and experience than that proposed by Petitioner. Id.
`Patent Owner’s assertions are unavailing. Patent Owner relies on the
`Declaration of Dr. Guccione to support its assertion that there were few
`engineers at the time of the ’524 patent who knew how to program FPGAs
`to run software algorithms. PO Resp. 31–32 (citing Ex. 2146 ¶¶ 87, 193–
`198). Dr. Guccione testifies, for example, that implementing algorithms in
`FPGAs (i.e., hardware) is more complex than implementing algorithms in
`software, and therefore requires a different skillset. Ex. 2146 ¶ 87. Dr.
`Guccione’s testimony, however, is at odds with what is reflected in the prior
`art of the period. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
`In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). As Petitioner points out,
`“numerous prior art references disclose computer architectures with multiple
`
`
`12 Patent Owner’s declarant, Dr. Homayoun, agrees with “the level of
`education and skill” that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
`according to Petitioner. Ex. 2102 ¶ 123.
`19
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2018-01604
`Patent 7,421,524 B2
`
`processing elements and FPGAs used for network interface,” including the
`main references on which Petitioner relies, Tsutsui and Tsutsui II. Reply 4
`(citing Exs. 1007, 1009, 1040, 1041). The art of record therefore indicates
`that Petitioner’s assessment of the education and experience required in the
`field of programming FPGAs is accurate.
`Also, we find insufficient evidence that the level of ordinary skill in
`the art would have required specialized knowledge in the field of High
`Performance Computing. Patent Owner cites to portions of the ’524 patent
`that describe enhancing overall processing speed in a multiprocessor
`computer architecture incorporating a number of memory algorithm
`processors, but has not shown why these systems are HPC architectures,
`much less limited to being HPC architectures. PO Resp. 4–5. The ’524
`patent does not limit the invention to HPC, but rather more broadly states
`The present invention relates, in general, to the field of
`computer architectures incorporating multiple processing
`elements. More particularly, the present invention relates to a
`switch/network adapter port (“SNAP”) for clustered computers
`employing a chain of multi-adaptive processors (“MAP[]”) . . .
`in a dual in-line memory module (“DIMM”) format to
`significantly enha

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket