`
`
`Filed: February 7, 2020
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`____________________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`___________________
`
`FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
`
`PETITIONER,
`
`V.
`
`CARRUM TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
`
`PATENT OWNER.
`___________________
`
`Case No. IPR2020-00055
`U.S. Patent No. 7,512,475
`
`TITLE: AUTOMATIC LATERAL ACCELERATION LIMITING
`AND NON THREAT TARGET REJECTION
`___________________
`
`PATENT OWNER’S PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
`UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 313 AND 37 C.F.R. § 42.107
`
`

`

`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`
`I. 
`
`INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1 
`
`LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL ................................................................... 2 
`
`II. 
`III.  OVERVIEW OF THE ’475 INVENTION .................................................... 2 
`CHALLENGED CLAIMS ............................................................................. 6 
`
`IV. 
`
`V. 
`
`VI. 
`
`VII. 
`
`PROSECUTION HISTORY ........................................................................ 11 
`
`CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ......................................................................... 13 
`
`STANDARD FOR INSTITUTING IPR ...................................................... 13 
`
`IPR SHOULD NOT BE INSTITUTED ....................................................... 15 
`
`VIII. 
`A.  Petitioner Has Failed to Demonstrate a Motivation to Combine the
`Asserted Prior Art References. ..................................................................... 15 
`1.  A POSA Would Not Have Been Motivated to Combine the Brochure
`with Schmitt—A Combination Required by Each of Grounds 1-5
`(Claims 1-12). ............................................................................................. 15 
`2.  Grounds 2, 4 (Claims 2-3, 7): A POSA Would Not Have Been
`Motivated to Combine the Brochure and Schmitt with Ishizu. ................... 28 
`3.  Ground 5 (Claims 10-12): A POSA Would Not Have Been Motivated to
`Combine the Brochure and Schmitt with Khodabhai. ................................ 32 
`B.  Petitioner Has Failed to Demonstrate that the Prior Art Renders Obvious
`Every Element of the Challenged Claims. ................................................... 35 
`1.  Claims 1-12 (Grounds 1-5): The Brochure Does Not Disclose
`“Measuring a Lateral Acceleration from a Lateral Acceleration Sensor.” . 35 
`2.  Claims 1-12 (Grounds 1-5): The Brochure Does Not Disclose
`“Detecting a Change in a Vehicle Lateral Acceleration Based on a
`Change in the Measured Lateral Acceleration.” ......................................... 36 
`
`
`
`i
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`

`

`3.  Claims 1-12 (Grounds 1-5): Petitioner Does Not Identify Disclosure of
`“Reducing the Vehicle Speed According to the Determination that the
`Vehicle is in the Turn and the Detected Change in Vehicle Lateral
`Acceleration.” ............................................................................................. 38 
`4.  Claims 4, 8-9 (Grounds 1, 3): Petitioner Does Not Identify “determining
`the vehicle’s position within the turn.” ....................................................... 41 
`5.  Claims 5, 9 (Ground 1, 3): The Brochure Does Not Disclose Reducing
`Vehicle Speed if the Vehicle Lateral Acceleration Exceeds a
`Predetermined Limit. .................................................................................. 43 
`6.  Claims 2, 3, 7 (Grounds 2, 4): Ishizu Does Not Disclose Measuring a
`Rate of Change in the Vehicle Yaw Rate. .................................................. 46 
`7.  Claim 12 (Grounds 5): Petitioner Does Not Identify Disclosure of
`“Verifying that the Object is in the Vehicle’s Path. ................................... 48 
`ADJUDICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PATENT VIOLATES THE
`IX. 
`U.S. CONSTITUTION ............................................................................................ 49 
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 50 
`
`X. 
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`ii
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`

`

`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases 
`Acclarent, Inc. v. Ford Albritton, IV,
`IPR2018-00268 (PTAB May 31, 2018) (Paper 10) ............................................. 26
`Arthrex v. Smith & Nephew,
`941 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 31, 2019) .............................................................. 49
`Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc.,
`776 F.2d 281 (Fed. Cir. 1985) .............................................................................. 27
`Celgene Corp. v. Peter,
`931 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2019) ............................................................................ 49
`Comcast Cable Comm’ns, LLC v. Rovi Guides, Inc.,
`IPR2017-01147 (PTAB Nov. 6, 2018) (Paper 41) .............................................. 19
`Comcast Cable Comm’ns, LLC v. Rovi Guides, Inc.,
`IPR2019-00297 (PTAB Apr. 22, 2019) (Paper 7) ............................................... 15
`Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc.,
`IPR2018-01310 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (Paper 7) ................................................ 14
`DSS Tech. Mgmt. v. Apple Inc.,
`Case No. 2016-2523 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 23, 2018) ................................................... 31
`Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Parenteral Meds., Inc.,
`845 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................................................................ 48
`Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Actavis LLC,
`No. 2018-1054, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 13348 (Fed. Cir. May 3,
`2019)..................................................................................................................... 22
`Google Inc. v. Koninklijke Philips N.V.,
`IPR2017-00409, (PTAB June 5, 2017) (Paper 10) ................................. 29, 34, 39
`HTC Corp. v. LeMaire Illumination Tech., LLC,
`IPR2019-00090 (PTAB Apr. 12, 2019) (Paper 7) ........................................ 20, 32
`Hyundai Motor Company v. Blitzsafe Texas, LLC,
`IPR2016-01476 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2017) (Paper 12) .............................................. 27
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`

`In re Broadcom Ltd. v. Invensas Corp.,
`IPR2017-00424 (PTAB July 3, 2017) (Paper 7) ........................................... 28, 46
`In re Butler,
`98-1555, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 5056 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 23, 1999) ...................... 47
`In re Gordon,
`733 F.2d 900 (Fed. Cir. 1984) .............................................................................. 47
`In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd.,
`829 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................ 15
`In re NuVasive, Inc.,
`842 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................ 16
`In re Zurko,
`111 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 1997) .............................................................................. 21
`
`Initiative for Medicines, Access & Knowledge v. Gilead Pharmasset
`LLC,
`IPR2018-00390 (PTAB July 29, 2018) (Paper 7) ................................................ 27
`Innogenics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs.,
`512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ............................................................................ 22
`InTouch Techs., Inc. v. VGo Comm’ns., Inc.,
`751 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ..................................................................... 34, 42
`Life Techs., Inc. v. Clontech Lab., Inc.,
`224 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ............................................................................ 18
`Lucia v. SEC,
`138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) ......................................................................................... 49
`Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. Toro Co.,
`848 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................................................................ 28
`Microsoft Corp. v. Enfish, LLC,
`662 F. App’x 981 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................... 24, 26
`One World Technologies, Inc. v. The Chamberlain Group,
`IPR2017-00126 (PTAB Oct. 24, 2018) (Paper 56) ............................................. 18
`
`
`
`iv
`
`

`

`Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
`678 F.3d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ............................................................................ 18
`Paice LLC v. Ford Motor Co.,
`881 F.3d 894 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .............................................................................. 19
`PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc.,
`491 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ............................................................................ 19
`
`Polaris Innovations Ltd. v. Kingston Tech. Co., Inc.,
`No. 2018-1768, Dkt. 90 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 8, 2019) ................................................ 50
`Roxane Labs., Inc. v. Novartis AG,
`IPR2016-01461 (PTAB Feb. 13, 2017) (Paper 9) ............................................... 42
`SAS Inst. v. Iancu,
`138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018) ......................................................................................... 13
`Securus Techs., Inc. v. Glob. Tel*Link Corp.,
`701 F. App’x 971 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............................................................... 23, 26
`Smiths Indus. Med. Sys. v. Vital Signs, Inc.,
`183 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ............................................................................ 42
`Subaru of America, Inc. v. Blitzsafe Texas, LLC,
`IPR2018-00090 (PTAB Apr. 20, 2018) (Paper 15) ............................................. 31
`Westway Feed Products, LLC v. Pellet Technology USA, LLC,
`IPR2015-01621 (PTAB Jan. 22, 2016) (Paper 8) ................................................ 24
`William Wesley Carnes, Sr., Inc. v. Seaboard Int’l Inc.,
`IPR2019-00133 (PTAB May 8, 2019) (Paper 10) ............................................... 47
`Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang,
`202 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ............................................................................ 20
`ZTE (USA) Inc. v. Fundamental Innovation Sys. Int’l LLC,
`IPR2018-00274, (PTAB Aug. 29, 2018) (Paper 17) ........................................... 36
`Statutes 
`35 U.S.C. § 103 ........................................................................................................ 11
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a) ................................................................................................... 18
`
`
`
`v
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`

`

`Rules
`
`35 U.S.C. § 282(b) ................................................................................................... 13
`35 U.S.C. § 282(b) ................................................................................................... 13
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) .............................................................................................. 2, 14
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) .............................................................................................. 2, 14
`35 U.S.C. § 316(b) ................................................................................................... 14
`35 U.S.C. § 316(b) ................................................................................................... 14
`Rules 
`37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b) .................................................................................................. 14
`37 CPR. § 42.1(b) .................................................................................................. 14
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) .............................................................................................. 13
`37 CPR. § 42.100(b) .............................................................................................. 13
`37 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(4) .......................................................................................... 48
`37 CPR. § 42.104(b)(4) .......................................................................................... 48
`37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) .......................................................................................... 27, 39
`37 CPR. § 42.65(a) .......................................................................................... 27, 39
`
`
`
`
`vi
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`Vi
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`

`

`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`On October 23, 2019, Ford Motor Company (“Petitioner”) submitted a
`
`Petition to institute IPR of the ’475 Patent” (Ex. 1001), challenging claims 1-12
`
`(the “Challenged Claims”). Ford asserts that this IPR is “substantively identical to
`
`BMW’s IPR” (IPR2019-00903) and has filed a motion to join its IPR with
`
`BMW’s. (Paper 3 at 1-2.) Carrum Technologies, LLC (“Patent Owner”) requests
`
`that the Board decline to institute IPR for the same reasons as in the BMW IPR, as
`
`set forth below.
`
`The ’475 Patent is directed to improving the performance of adaptive cruise
`
`control (“ACC”) systems when the host vehicle is in a curve. It generally discloses
`
`using a detected change in lateral acceleration to determine: (1) whether the vehicle
`
`is in a turn, (2) the vehicle’s path within a turn, (3) whether a detected object is in
`
`the path of the vehicle, and (4) whether to reduce the speed of the vehicle. (Ex.
`
`1001 at Abstract.) Claims 1-5 require, inter alia, “determining when the vehicle is
`
`in a turn based on the detected change in the vehicle lateral acceleration.” (Ex.
`
`1001 at 8:15-16.) Claims 6-12 similarly require, inter alia, determining when the
`
`vehicle is in a turn, as well as “determining the vehicle path based on the detected
`
`change in the vehicle lateral acceleration”. (Ex. 1001 at 8:43-44, 49.)
`
`In challenging all claims of the ’475 Patent, Petitioner has failed to
`
`demonstrate a motivation to combine the cited references, and has failed to
`
`
`
`1
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`

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`demonstrate that the cited references disclose every element of the Challenged
`
`Claims. These deficiencies are sufficient for the Board to find that Petitioner has
`
`not met its burden to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in
`
`showing unpatentability of any of the Challenged Claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
`
`Accordingly, Patent Owner requests that the Board deny institution on all
`
`Grounds and Challenged Claims of the ’475 Patent.
`
`II. LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL
`For purposes of this Response only, Patent Owner does not dispute
`
`Petitioner’s definition of a person of ordinary skill in the art. (Pet. at 9.)
`
`III. OVERVIEW OF THE ’475 INVENTION
`ACC is an increasingly common feature on newer vehicles and represents a
`
`significant advance in cruise control technology. (Ex. 1001 at 1:14-29.) ACC
`
`allows the vehicle to maintain a set speed when appropriate, while automatically
`
`reducing the speed when traffic conditions require it. (Id. at 1:30-38.) The ’475
`
`Patent addresses a critical deficiency in prior art ACC technology, namely, the
`
`ability of ACC systems to operate safely and comfortably when the vehicle is in a
`
`curve. (See id. at 2:47-50.)
`
`In basic cruise control systems, the driver sets the vehicle’s cruise control at
`
`a desired speed. (Id. at 1:15-17.) The vehicle maintains the set speed indefinitely,
`
`even if traffic or road conditions render the set speed unsafe. (Id. at 1:17-18.) If the
`
`
`
`2
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`

`

`vehicle encounters slower traffic, or a curve that cannot be safely handled at the set
`
`speed, the driver must manually apply the brakes or disengage the cruise control.
`
`(See id.) As a result, basic cruise control systems are of limited use to the driver
`
`except when the road is straight and has minimal traffic. (See id. at 1:27-29.)
`
`ACC attempts to overcome these limitations of basic cruise control. It uses
`
`sensors to detect cars that are in the path of the host vehicle. (Id. at 1:21-26.) If
`
`another car is in the same lane as the host vehicle, but traveling at a slower speed,
`
`the ACC will detect the obstacle. (Id.) Then, the ACC will automatically release
`
`the throttle and/or apply the brake, to slow down the host vehicle to an appropriate
`
`speed. (Id. at 1:33-38.) The ACC will then cause the host vehicle to follow behind
`
`the target vehicle at a set distance until the target speeds up or changes lanes, at
`
`which point the ACC will accelerate the host vehicle and (if appropriate) resume
`
`the cruising speed. (See id. at 1:58-60.) The most advanced ACC systems can
`
`function safely even in stop-and-go traffic conditions, without the need for the
`
`driver to manually accelerate or brake. (Id.)
`
`However, as with basic cruise control, prior art ACC systems struggled to
`
`perform well when the road curves, for two primary reasons.
`
`First, prior art ACC systems did not brake as the vehicle entered a curve.
`
`(Id. at 2:32-36.) If the vehicle entered the curve too fast, the driver and passengers
`
`would experience uncomfortable lateral acceleration (causing the feeling of being
`
`
`
`3
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`

`

`jerked to the outside edge of the car as it is turning). (Id.) In a particularly tight
`
`curve, a host vehicle utilizing prior art ACC systems may lose traction, veer into
`
`other lanes, or run off the road altogether. (Id. at 2:38-43.) Thus, in prior art ACC
`
`systems, the driver had to determine whether the set speed was too fast for an
`
`upcoming curve and, if so, manually brake or disengage the ACC system. (See id.
`
`at 2:32-43.)
`
`Second, in a curve, prior art ACC systems had difficulty determining
`
`whether an object detected by the sensor was in the vehicle’s path. (Id. at 1:64-
`
`2:3.) On a straight road, if a sensor detects an object directly in front of the host
`
`vehicle, the object necessarily presents a potential obstacle. Not so if the road is
`
`curved. The object might be a roadside street sign that presents no threat but that
`
`appears to be directly in front of the host vehicle as the road curves. (Id. at 2:13-
`
`21.) Or, the object might be a car in an adjacent traffic lane, which briefly appears
`
`to be in front of the host vehicle due to the curvature of the road. (See id.) Prior art
`
`ACC systems would incorrectly determine that these objects were within the path
`
`of the host vehicle, resulting in necessary, uncomfortable, and potentially
`
`dangerous braking. (Id. at 2:16-21.)
`
`The invention claimed in the ’475 Patent was designed to solve these
`
`problems. The ’475 Patent discloses “a system and method for enabling a vehicle
`
`having adaptive cruise control to reduce its speed in a turn according to the
`
`
`
`4
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`

`

`vehicle’s position in the turn as well as ignoring objects detected during the turn
`
`that are not in the vehicle’s path.” (Ex. 1001 at Abstract.) The disclosed ACC
`
`system “determin[es] whether the vehicle is in a turn in the vehicle’s path by
`
`detecting change in the vehicle’s lateral acceleration.” (Id.) Lateral acceleration is
`
`the sideways acceleration generated by the centrifugal force acting on the car when
`
`it turns. Excessive lateral acceleration can create discomfort or even cause the
`
`vehicle to lose control in a curve. (Id. at 2:32-43.)
`
`Lateral acceleration is a function of the vehicle’s speed and the curvature of
`
`the road (and also depends on the forces of friction between the vehicle’s tires and
`
`the road). (Id. at 6:41-43.) Thus, if an ACC system knows both the vehicle speed
`
`and the rate of change of lateral acceleration, it can better detect when the vehicle
`
`is entering a curve and predict the upcoming curvature of the road. (See id. at 6:44-
`
`54.)
`
`For example, assume the vehicle travels on a highway at a constant speed.
`
`The vehicle should experience no lateral acceleration when the vehicle is traveling
`
`in its lane on a straight highway. If lateral acceleration increases, the ACC system
`
`can infer that the vehicle is starting to enter a curve. (Id. at 5:47-49.) If lateral
`
`acceleration continues to increase (assuming the vehicle maintains a constant
`
`speed), that suggests the curve is tightening further. (Id. at 6:35-36.) Eventually,
`
`lateral acceleration should reach a peak and then begin to decrease. (Id. at 5:60-
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`64.) The point at which lateral acceleration starts to decrease (keeping speed
`
`constant) reflects the moment that the curve begins to straighten out. (Id.)
`
`The ’475 Patent discloses and claims systems and methods that detect and
`
`apply lateral acceleration data to improve an ACC system’s performance in a
`
`curve. (See id. at 8:7-10:3.) For instance, the ’475 Patent discloses methods for
`
`using detected changes in lateral acceleration to determine that the vehicle is in a
`
`turn and/or to predict the vehicle’s path. (See, e.g., id. at 8:15-16, 43-44.) By
`
`combining the detected change in lateral acceleration with other data (for instance,
`
`the vehicle’s speed or yaw rate), an ACC system can determine whether the
`
`vehicle has entered a curve at an excessive speed, and if so, to reduce the speed to
`
`a safe and comfortable level. (Id.at 6:9-43.) Additionally, the detected change in
`
`lateral acceleration allows an ACC system to better predict the host vehicle’s path
`
`on a curved road, which allows an ACC system to determine whether a detected
`
`object falls within or outside of the lane of travel. (See id. at 6:44-54.) The ’475
`
`Patent thus solves the twin problems that plagued prior art ACC systems relating to
`
`performance in a curve. (Id. at 2:47-50.)
`
`IV. CHALLENGED CLAIMS
`Petitioner challenges claims 1-12 of the ’475 Patent, of which claims 1 and 6
`
`are independent. Claim 1 recites:
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`A method of controlling a vehicle having an adaptive cruise
`
`control system capable of obtaining a vehicle speed and obtaining a
`
`vehicle lateral acceleration, said method comprising the steps of:
`
`measuring a lateral acceleration from a lateral acceleration
`
`sensor;
`
`detecting a change in a vehicle lateral acceleration based on a change
`
`in the measured lateral acceleration;
`
`determining when the vehicle is in a turn based on the detected
`
`change in the vehicle lateral acceleration; and
`
`if a vehicle is in a turn, reducing the vehicle speed according to the
`
`determination that the vehicle is in the turn and the detected change in the
`
`vehicle lateral acceleration.
`
`(Id. at 8:7-19.)
`
`Claim 2 recites:
`
`The method of claim 1, wherein said step of determining
`
`includes steps of:
`
`measuring a vehicle speed;
`
`measuring a vehicle yaw rate; and
`
`measuring a rate of change in the vehicle yaw rate.
`
`(Id. at 8:20-24.)
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`Claim 3 recites:
`
`The method of claim 2, wherein said step of determining further
`
`includes a step of utilizing speed data corresponding to the vehicle speed,
`
`yaw rate data corresponding to the vehicle yaw rate, and yaw rate of change
`
`data corresponding to the ra[t]e of change in the vehicle yaw rate.
`
`(Id. at 8:25-29.)
`
`Claim 4 recites:
`
`The method of claim 1 further comprising a step of determining the
`
`vehicle’s position within the turn.
`
`(Id. at 8:30-31.)
`
`
`
`Claim 5 recites:
`
`The method of claim 1 wherein said step of reducing the vehicle speed
`
`includes a step of reducing the speed if the vehicle lateral acceleration
`
`exceeds a predetermined limit.
`
`(Id. at 8:32-34.)
`
`
`
`
`
`Claim 6 recites:
`
`A method of controlling a vehicle, said method comprising the steps
`
`of:
`
`operating the vehicle in an adaptive cruise control mode such that the
`
`vehicle is traveling at a vehicle speed;
`
`8
`
`

`

`measuring a lateral acceleration from a lateral acceleration sensor;
`
`detecting a change in the vehicle lateral acceleration based on a
`
`change in the measured lateral acceleration;
`
`determining the vehicle path based on the detected change in the
`
`vehicle lateral acceleration;
`
`monitoring for objects;
`
`detecting a location of an object;
`
`determining whether the location of an object is within the vehicle
`
`path; and
`
`when the vehicle is determined to be in the turn, reducing the vehicle
`
`speed according to the determination that the vehicle is in the turn and the
`
`location of the object.
`
` (Id. at 8:35-51.)
`
`Claim 7 recites:
`
`The method of claim 6, wherein said step of determining
`
`whether the vehicle is in a turn includes steps of:
`
`
`
`measuring the vehicle speed;
`
`measuring a vehicle yaw rate; and
`
`measuring a change in the vehicle yaw rate.
`
`(Id. at 8:52-56.)
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`Claim 8 recites:
`
`The method of claim 6 further comprising a step of determining the
`
`vehicle’s position within the turn.
`
`(Id. at 8:57-58.)
`
`Claim 9 recites:
`
`The method of claim 8 wherein said step of reducing the
`
`vehicle speed includes a step of reducing the vehicle speed if the
`
`vehicle lateral acceleration exceeds a predetermined limit.
`
`(Id. at 8:59-61.)
`
`Claim 10 recites:
`
`The method of claim 6 wherein said step of detecting an object
`
`includes steps of:
`
`measuring object range;
`
`measuring object range rate, said object range rate corresponding to a
`
`rate that the distance between the vehicle and the object is changing;
`
`measuring object angle; and
`
`determining the radius of curvature of the vehicle’s path.
`
`(Id. at 8:62-9:2.)
`
`Claim 11 recites:
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`The method claim of 10 wherein said step of monitoring
`
`includes a step of determining whether the detected object is in the
`
`vehicle’s path.
`
`(Id. at 9:3-5.)
`
`
`
`Claim 12 recites:
`
`The method of claim 11 wherein said step of monitoring includes a
`
`step of verifying that the object is in the vehicle[’]s path.
`
`(Id. at 10:1-3.)
`
`V.
`
`PROSECUTION HISTORY
`The ’475 Patent was filed as application no. 10/804,745 on March 19, 2004,
`
`and issued on March 31, 2009. (Ex. 1001 at Cover.)
`
`During prosecution of the ’475 Patent, the Examiner first issued a § 103
`
`rejection over Sielagoski (U.S. Patent No. 6,317,679) and Tsutumi (U.S. Patent
`
`6,175,799). (Ex. 1002 at 97-103.) In response, the Applicant argued, inter alia, that
`
`the references did not teach “utilization of a change in lateral acceleration to
`
`determine when a vehicle is in a turn.” (Ex. 1002 at 111-124 (emphasis in
`
`original).)
`
`In response, the Examiner issued a § 103 rejection over Sielagoski in view
`
`of Kawazoe (U.S. Patent No. 6,295,493) or Kato (U.S. Patent. App.
`
`2004/0239179), and in further view Butsuen (U.S. Patent No. 5,467,283). (Ex.
`
`
`
`11
`
`

`

`1002 at 100-103, 135-138, 176-179.) The Examiner also issued a § 103 rejection of
`
`certain claims over Sielagoski in view of Kawazoe, and in further view Fukada
`
`(U.S. Patent No. 5,627,756). (Ex. 1002 at 178.) The Examiner argued, in relevant
`
`part, that Kato disclosed or made obvious “the use of the change in lateral
`
`acceleration to determine when the vehicle is [in a turn].” (Ex. 1002 at 136, 176-
`
`177). The Examiner also argued that “it is obvious that the lateral acceleration can
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`be calculated based on the yaw rate and vehicle speed or can be measured as
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`shown in figure 5 of Kato et al.” (Ex. 1002 at 137.)
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`In response to these rejections, Applicant primarily argued that (1) detecting
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`a change in the yaw rate (as taught in Sielagoski and Butsuen) is not the same as
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`detecting a change in lateral acceleration (Ex. 1002 at 156-157, 197-200); and (2)
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`using lateral acceleration deviation to detect vehicle slip, spin, or response to other
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`environment disturbances (as taught in Kato) is not the same as using a detected
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`change in lateral acceleration to determine when the vehicle is in a turn and the
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`vehicle’s position in the turn. (See, e.g., Ex. 1002 at 154-155.) Applicant
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`successfully overcame these rejections by establishing, inter alia, that none of the
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`references upon which the Examiner relied teach using detected changes in lateral
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`acceleration to determine that the vehicle is in a turn or the vehicle’s position in the
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`turn, as required by the Challenged Claims. (See Ex. 1002 at 179, 197-198). In
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`light of Applicant’s arguments, the Examiner withdrew the rejections recited above
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`and issued the Challenged Claims. (Ex. 1002 at 210-211.)
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`VI. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
`The Challenged Claims of the ’475 Patent are construed “using the same
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`claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil
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`action under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b).” 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (Nov. 13, 2018). The ’475
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`Patent claim terms are therefore construed “in accordance with the ordinary and
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`customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art
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`and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent.” Id.
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`Patent Owner agrees with Petitioner that, for purposes of this Response only,
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`all terms of the ’475 Patent have their plain and ordinary meaning.
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`VII. STANDARD FOR INSTITUTING IPR
`A petition for IPR may only be granted when “the information presented in
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`the petition…shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would
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`prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C.
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`§ 314(a); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). Petitioner has the burden of proof to
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`show that the statutory threshold is satisfied. (See Office Patent Trial Practice
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`Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48756 (Aug. 14, 2012).)
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`IPR institution is discretionary. See SAS Inst. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1356
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`(2018) (“[Section] 314(a) invests the Director with discretion on the question
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`whether to institute review …”) (emphasis omitted). “In exercising that discretion,
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`[the Board is] guided by the statutory requirement, in promulgating regulations for
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`inter partes review, to consider the effect of any regulations on ‘the efficient
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`administration of the Office [and] the ability of the Office to timely complete
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`proceedings,’ 35 U.S.C. § 316(b), as well as the requirement to construe the
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`PTAB’s rules to ‘secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every
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`proceeding,’ 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b).” Deeper, UAB v. Vexilar, Inc., IPR2018-01310,
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`slip op. at 43 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2019) (Paper 7) (informative) (“On this record, and
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`based on the particular facts of this proceeding, instituting a trial with respect to all
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`twenty-three claims and on all four grounds based on evidence and arguments
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`directed to only two claims and one ground would not be an efficient use of the
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`Board’s time and resources.”).
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`For example, “the Board may consider the number of claims and grounds
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`that meet the reasonable likelihood standard when deciding whether to institute
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`inter partes review under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).” Id. at 42.
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`The Board may also consider the number of sequential and concurrent
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`petitions that Petitioner and others have filed against the Challenged Claims and
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`related patents, because this practice of filing multiple petitions against a single
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`patent “presents a significant burden for the Board, because, among other things,
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`the Board endeavors to assign all such cases to the same panel … this [practice]
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`can undermine the Office’s ability to complete proceedings in a timely manner and
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`may place an unfair burden on the Patent Owner.” Comcast Cable Comm’ns, LLC
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`v. Rovi Guides, Inc., IPR2019-00297, slip op. at 3 (PTAB Apr. 22, 2019) (Paper 7).
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`VIII. IPR SHOULD NOT BE INSTITUTED
`The Petition should be denied because it fails to demonstrate a reasonable
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`likelihood that Petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the Challenged
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`Claims. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
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`A.
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`Petitioner Has Failed to Demonstrate a Motivation to Combine the
`Asserted Prior Art References.
`The prior art references upon which the Petition relies do not disclose every
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`element of the challenged claims, as set forth in detail, infra Section VIII.B. But
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`even if those references did disclose every element, Petitioner fails to satisfy its
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`burden of establishing a POSA would have been motivated to combine the
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`references.
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`1.
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`A POSA Would Not Have Been Motivated to Combine the
`Brochure with Schmitt—A Combination Required by Each of
`Grounds 1-5 (Claims 1-12).
`The Federal Circuit has made clear that, “[t]o satisfy its burden of proving
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`obviousness, a petitioner cannot employ mere conclusory statements. The
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`petitioner must instead articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence of record,
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`to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l,
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`Ltd., 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Similarly, the Board has recently
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`reiterated that “[i]t is Petitioner’s burden to explain how the asserted prior art
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`renders the claims unpatentable. Conclusory statements alone, even those provided
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`by a declarant, are inadequate to demonstrate a rationale for why a [POSA] would
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`combine the teachings from prior art references. Instead, Petitioner’s arguments
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`must be supported by a ‘reasoned explanation.’” ipDataTel, LLC v. ICN
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`Acquisition, LLC, IPR2018-01822, slip op. at 20-21 (PTAB Apr. 22, 2019) (Paper
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`19) (denying institution) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re NuVasive, Inc.,
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`842 F.3d 1376, 1383-86 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding an obviousness determination
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`lacked support where “obtain[ing] additional information” was the only alleged
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`motivation to combine, yet the record lacked any articulation as