(Slip Opinion)
`
`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2012
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
` HORNE ET AL. v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
`
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE NINTH CIRCUIT
` No. 12–123. Argued March 20, 2013—Decided June 10, 2013
`
`The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA), which was
`enacted to stabilize prices for agricultural commodities, regulates
`only “handlers,” i.e., “processors, associations of producers, and others
`engaged in the handling” of covered agricultural commodities, 7
`
` U. S. C. §608c(1). Any handler that violates the Secretary of Agricul-
` ture’s marketing orders may be subject to civil and criminal penal-
`
`ties. §§608a(5), 608a(6), and 608c(14). One such order, the Califor-
`nia Raisin Marketing Order (Marketing Order or Order), established
`a Raisin Administrative Committee (RAC), which recommends set-
`ting up annual reserve pools of raisins that are not to be sold on the
`open domestic market, and which recommends what portion of a par-
`ticular year’s production should be included in the pool. The Order
`also requires handlers to pay assessments to help cover the RAC’s
`administrative costs.
`
`Petitioners, California raisin growers, started a business that pro-
`cessed more than 3 million pounds of raisins from their farm and 60
`other farms during the two crop years. When they refused to surren-
`der the requisite portions of raisins to the reserve, the United States
`Department of Agriculture (USDA) began administrative proceed-
`
`
`ings, alleging that petitioners were handlers who were required to re-
`tain raisins in reserve and pay assessments. Petitioners countered
`that as producers, they were not subject to the Order. They also
`raised an affirmative defense that the Order violated the Fifth
`Amendment’s prohibition against taking property without just com-
`pensation. An Administrative Law Judge found that petitioners were
`
`handlers, found that they had violated the AMAA and the Marketing
`Order, and rejected their takings defense. On appeal, a judicial of-
`
`ficer agreed that petitioners were handlers who had violated the
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`2
`
`
`
`HORNE v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
`
`
`Syllabus
`Marketing Order, imposed fines and civil penalties, and declined to
`address the takings claim. Petitioners sought review in the Federal
`District Court. Granting summary judgment to the USDA, it found
`that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that
`petitioners were handlers rather than producers, and it rejected peti-
`tioners’ takings claim. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. It agreed that
`petitioners were handlers subject to the Marketing Order, but con-
`
`cluded that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve the takings claim, which
`they should have raised in the Court of Federal Claims. It recognized
`
`that when a handler raises a takings defense, Court of Federal
`Claims Tucker Act jurisdiction gives way to the AMAA’s comprehen-
`sive remedial scheme, see 7 U. S. C. §608c(15), but found that peti-
`
`tioners had brought the takings claim in their capacity as producers.
`Held: The Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction to decide petitioners’ takings
`claim. Pp. 9–15.
`
`
`(a) That court incorrectly determined that petitioners brought their
`takings claim as producers rather than handlers. Petitioners argued
`that they were producers—and thus not subject to the AMAA or the
`Marketing Order—but both the USDA and the District Court con-
`cluded that they were handlers. And the fines and civil penalties for
`failure to reserve raisins were levied on them in that capacity. Be-
`
`cause the Marketing Order imposes duties on petitioners only in
`
`their capacity as handlers, their takings claim raised as a defense
`against those duties is necessarily raised in that same capacity. In
`finding otherwise, the Ninth Circuit confused petitioners’ statutory
`argument that they were producers with their constitutional argu-
`
`ment that, assuming they were handlers, their fine violated the Fifth
`Amendment. The relevant question is whether a federal court has
`jurisdiction to adjudicate a takings defense raised by a handler seek-
`
`ing review of a final agency order. Pp. 9–10.
`
`(b) The Government’s claim that petitioners’ takings-based defense
`was rightly dismissed on ripeness grounds is unpersuasive, and its
`
`reliance on Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamil-
`ton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172, is misplaced. There, a
`
`plaintiff ’s claim that a zoning decision effected a taking without just
`
`compensation was not ripe. But the claim failed because the plaintiff
`
`could not show that it had been injured by the Government’s action
`when there had been no final decision. Here, petitioners were subject
`to a final agency order imposing concrete fines and penalties. The
`takings claim in Williamson County was also not yet ripe because the
`plaintiff had not sought “compensation through the procedures [pro-
`
`vided by] the State.” Id., at 194. The Government argues that peti-
`tioners’ takings claim is premature because the Tucker Act affords a
`remedy, but, in fact, the AMAA provides a comprehensive remedial
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`3
`
`
`
` Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`
`Syllabus
`scheme that withdraws Tucker Act jurisdiction over a handler’s tak-
`
` ings claim. As a result, there is no alternative remedy. Pp. 10–14.
`(c) A takings-based defense may be raised by a handler in the con-
`
`text of an enforcement proceeding initiated by the USDA under
`§608c(14). The provision’s text does not bar handlers from raising
`
`constitutional defenses to the USDA’s enforcement action. Allowing
`handlers to do so would not diminish the incentive to file direct chal-
`lenges to marketing orders under §608c(15)(A), for a handler who re-
`
`
`
`fuses to comply with a marketing order and waits for an enforcement
`action will be liable for significant monetary penalties if the constitu-
`tional challenge fails. It would also make little sense to force a party
`to pay an assessed fine in one proceeding and then turn around and
`sue for recovery of that same money in another proceeding. See
`
`Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U. S. 498, 520. Pp. 14–15.
`673 F. 3d 1071, reversed and remanded.
`THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`
`
`
` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`
` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
`
` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
`
`
` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`
`
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 12–123
`_________________
`MARVIN D. HORNE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
`
`
`DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`
`[June 10, 2013]
`
`JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
`
`Under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of
`1937 (AMAA) and the California Raisin Marketing Order
`(Marketing Order or Order) promulgated by the Secretary
`of Agriculture, raisin growers are frequently required to
`turn over a percentage of their crop to the Federal Gov-
`ernment. The AMAA and the Marketing Order were
`adopted to stabilize prices by limiting the supply of raisins
`on the market. Petitioners are California raisin growers
`who believe that this regulatory scheme violates the Fifth
`Amendment. After petitioners refused to surrender the
`requisite portion of their raisins, the United States De-
`partment of Agriculture (USDA) began administrative pro-
`ceedings against petitioners that led to the imposition
`of more than $650,000 in fines and civil penalties. Peti-
`tioners sought judicial review, claiming that the monetary
`sanctions were an unconstitutional taking of private prop-
`erty without just compensation. The Ninth Circuit held
`that petitioners were required to bring their takings claim
`in the Court of Federal Claims and that it therefore lacked
`
`jurisdiction to review petitioners’ claim. We disagree.
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`2
`
`
`
`
` HORNE v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Petitioners’ takings claim, raised as an affirmative defense
`to the agency’s enforcement action, was properly before
`the court because the AMAA provides a comprehensive
`remedial scheme that withdraws Tucker Act jurisdiction
`over takings claims brought by raisin handlers. Accord-
`ingly, we reverse and remand to the Ninth Circuit.
`I
`
`A
`
`Congress enacted the AMAA during the Great Depres-
`
`sion in an effort to insulate farmers from competitive
`market forces that it believed caused “unreasonable fluc-
`tuations in supplies and prices.” Ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246,
`as amended, 7 U. S. C. §602(4). To achieve this goal,
`Congress declared a national policy of stabilizing prices for
`agricultural commodities. Ibid. The AMAA authorizes
`
`the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate marketing or-
`
`ders that regulate the sale and delivery of agricultural
`goods. §608c(1); see also Block v. Community Nutrition
`Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 346 (1984) (“The Act contemplates
`a cooperative venture among the Secretary, handlers, and
`producers the principal purposes of which are to raise the
`price of agricultural products and to establish an orderly
`system for marketing them”). The Secretary may delegate
`
`
`to industry committees the authority to administer mar-
`keting orders. §608c(7)(C).
`The AMAA does not directly regulate the “producer[s]”
`
`
`who grow agricultural commodities, §608c(13)(B); it only
`regulates “handlers,” which the AMAA defines as “proces-
`sors, associations of producers, and others engaged in the
`handling” of covered agricultural commodities. §608c(1).
`
`Handlers who violate the Secretary’s marketing orders
`
`may be subject to civil and criminal penalties. §§608a(5),
`608a(6), and 608c(14).
`The Secretary promulgated a marketing order for Cali-
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`3
`
`
`Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`fornia raisins in 1949.1 See 14 Fed. Reg. 5136 (codified,
`
`as amended, at 7 CFR pt. 989 (2013)). In particular,
`“[t]he Raisin Marketing Order, like other fruit and vegeta-
`ble orders adopted under the AMAA, [sought] to stabilize
`producer returns by limiting the quantity of raisins sold
`by handlers in the domestic competitive market.” Lion
`
`Raisins, Inc. v. United States, 416 F. 3d 1356, 1359 (CA
`Fed. 2005). The Marketing Order defines a raisin “han-
`dler” as “(a) [a]ny processor or packer; (b) [a]ny person
`
`who places . . . raisins in the current of commerce from
`within [California] to any point outside thereof; (c) [a]ny
`person who delivers off-grade raisins . . . into any eligible
`non-normal outlet; or (d) [a]ny person who blends raisins
`[subject to certain exceptions].” 7 CFR §989.15.
`
`The Marketing Order also established the Raisin Ad-
`ministrative Committee (RAC), which consists of 47 mem-
`
`bers, with 35 representing producers, ten representing
`handlers, one representing the cooperative bargaining
`
`associations, and one member of the public. See §989.26.
`The Marketing Order authorizes the RAC to recommend
`setting up annual reserve pools of raisins that are not
`to be sold on the open domestic market. See 7 U. S. C.
`§608c(6)(E); 7 CFR §§989.54(d) and 989.65. Each year, the
`RAC reviews crop yield, inventories, and shipments and
`makes recommendations to the Secretary whether or not
`there should be a reserve pool. §989.54. If the RAC rec-
`ommends a reserve pool, it also recommends what portion
`of that year’s production should be included in the pool
`(“reserve-tonnage”). The rest of that year’s production
`remains available for sale on the open market (“free-
`tonnage”). §§989.54(d), (a). The Secretary approves the
`——————
`1The AMAA also applies to a vast array of other agricultural prod-
`ucts, including “[m]ilk, fruits (including filberts, almonds, pecans and
`walnuts . . . , pears, olives, grapefruit, cherries, caneberries (including
`raspberries, blackberries, and loganberries), cranberries, . . . tobacco,
`vegetables, . . . hops, [and] honeybees.” §608c(2).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`4
`
`
`
`HORNE v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
`
`Opinion of the Court
`recommendation if he determines that the recommen-
`
`dation would “effectuate the declared policy of the Act.”
`§989.55. The reserve-tonnage, calculated as a percentage
`
`of a producer’s crop, varies from year to year.2
`Under the Marketing Order’s reserve requirements, a
`
`producer is only paid for the free-tonnage raisins. §989.65.
`The reserve-tonnage raisins, on the other hand, must be
`held by the handler in segregated bins “for the account” of
`the RAC. §989.66(f). The RAC may then sell the reserve-
`tonnage raisins to handlers for resale in overseas markets,
`or may alternatively direct that they be sold or given at no
`cost to secondary, noncompetitive domestic markets, such
`as school lunch programs. §989.67(b). The reserve pool
`
`sales proceeds are used to finance the RAC’s administra-
`tive costs. §989.53(a). In the event that there are any
`remaining funds, the producers receive a pro rata share. 7
`U. S. C. §608c(6)(E); 7 CFR §989.66(h). As a result, even
`
`though producers do not receive payment for reserve-
`tonnage raisins at the time of delivery to a handler, they
`retain a limited interest in the net proceeds of the RAC’s
`disposition of the reserve pool.
`
`Handlers have other duties beyond managing the RAC’s
`
`
`reserve pool. The Marketing Order requires them to file
`certain reports with the RAC, such as reports concerning
`the quantity of raisins that they hold or acquire. §989.73.
`
`They are also required to allow the RAC access to their
`premises, raisins, and business records to verify the ac-
`curacy of the handlers’ reports, §989.77, to obtain inspec-
`tions of raisins acquired, §989.58(d), and to pay certain
`assessments, §989.80, which help cover the RAC’s admin-
`istrative costs. A handler who violates any provision of
`
`
`
`——————
`2In 2002–2003 and 2003–2004, the crop years at issue here, the re-
`serve percentages were set at 47 percent and 30 percent of a producer’s
`crop, respectively. See RAC, Marketing Policy & Industry Statistics
`2012, p. 28 (Table 12).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`the Order or its implementing regulations is subject to
`a civil penalty of up to $1,100 per day. 7 U. S. C.
`§608c(14)(B); 7 CFR §3.91(b)(1)(vii). A handler who does
`not comply with the reserve requirement must “compen-
`sate the [RAC] for the amount of the loss resulting
`
`from his failure to . . . deliver” the requisite raisins.
`§989.166(c).
`
`5
`
`
`
`
`
`B
`
`Petitioners Marvin and Laura Horne have been produc-
`ing raisins in two California counties (Fresno and Madera)
`since 1969. The Hornes do business as Raisin Valley
`
`Farms, a general partnership. For more than 30 years,
`the Hornes operated only as raisin producers. But, af-
`ter becoming disillusioned with the AMAA regulatory
`scheme,3 they began looking for ways to avoid the manda-
`tory reserve program. Since the AMAA applies only to
`handlers, the Hornes devised a plan to bring their raisins
`to market without going through a traditional handler. To
`this end, the Hornes entered into a partnership with Mrs.
`Horne’s parents called Lassen Vineyards. In addition to
`its grape-growing activities, Lassen Vineyards purchased
`equipment to clean, stem, sort, and package the raisins
`from Raisin Valley Farms and Lassen Vineyards. It also
`contracted with more than 60 other raisin growers to
`clean, stem, sort, and, in some cases, box and stack their
`
`raisins for a fee. The Hornes’ facilities processed more
`——————
`3The Hornes wrote the Secretary and to the RAC in 2002 setting out
`their grievances: “[W]e are growers that will pack and market our
`raisins. We reserve our rights under the Constitution of the United
`States . . . [T]he Marketing Order Regulating Raisins has become a tool
`for grower bankruptcy, poverty, and involuntary servitude. The Mar-
`keting Order Regulating Raisins is a complete failure for growers,
`handlers, and the USDA . . . [W]e will not relinquish ownership of our
`crop. We put forth the money and effort to grow it, not the Raisin
`Administrative Committee. This is America, not a communist state.”
`App. to Pet. for Cert. 60a.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`
` HORNE v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` than 3 million pounds of raisins in toto during the 2002–
`2003 and 2003–2004 crop years. During these two crop
`years, the Hornes produced 27.4% and 12.3% of the raisins
`they processed, respectively.
`Although the USDA informed the Hornes in 2001 that
`
`their proposed operations made them “handlers” under the
`AMAA, the Hornes paid no assessments to the RAC dur-
`ing the 2002–2003 and 2003–2004 crop years. Nor did
`they set aside reserve-tonnage raisins from those produced
`and owned by the more than 60 other farmers who con-
`tracted with Lassen Vineyards for packing services. They
`also declined to arrange for RAC inspection of the rai-
`sins they received for processing, denied the RAC access
`to their records, and held none of their own raisins in
`reserve.
`On April 1, 2004, the Administrator of the Agriculture
`
`Marketing Service (Administrator) initiated an enforce-
`ment action against the Hornes, Raisin Valley Farms, and
`Lassen Vineyards (petitioners). The complaint alleged
`that petitioners were “handlers” of California raisins
`during the 2002–2003 and 2003–2004 crop years. It also
`alleged that petitioners violated the AMAA and the Mar-
`keting Order by submitting inaccurate forms to the RAC
`and failing to hold inspections of incoming raisins, retain
`raisins in reserve, pay assessments, and allow access to
`their records. Petitioners denied the allegations, counter-
`ing that they were not “handlers” and asserting that they
`did not acquire physical possession of the other producers’
`raisins within the meaning of the regulations. Petition-
`ers also raised several affirmative defenses, including a
`claim that the Marketing Order violated the Fifth Amend-
`ment’s prohibition against taking property without just
`compensation.
`
`An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded in 2006
`that petitioners were handlers of raisins and thus subject
`to the Marketing Order. The ALJ also concluded that
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
` Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`petitioners violated the AMAA and the Marketing Order
`and rejected petitioners’ takings defense based on its view
`that “handlers no longer have a property right that per-
`mits them to market their crop free of regulatory control.”
`App. 39 (citing Cal-Almond, Inc. v. United States, 30 Fed.
`Cl. 244, 246–247 (1994)).
`
`Petitioners appealed to a judicial officer who, like the
`ALJ, also found that petitioners were handlers and that
`they had violated the Marketing Order. The judicial of-
`ficer imposed $202,600 in civil penalties under 7 U. S. C.
`§608c(14)(B); $8,783.39 in assessments for the two crop
`years under 7 CFR §989.80(a); and $483,843.53 for the
`value of the California raisins that petitioners failed to
`hold in reserve for the two crop years under §989.166(c).
`The judicial officer believed that he lacked “authority to
`judge the constitutionality of the various statutes admin-
`istered by the [USDA],” App. 73, and declined to adjudi-
`cate petitioners’ takings claim.
`
`
`Petitioners filed a complaint in Federal District Court
`seeking judicial review of the USDA’s decision. See 7
`U. S. C. §608c(14)(B). The District Court granted sum-
`mary judgment to the USDA. The court held that sub-
`stantial evidence supported the agency’s determination
`that petitioners were “handlers” subject to the Marketing
`
`Order, and rejected petitioners’ argument that they were
`exempt from the Marketing Order due to their status as
`“producers” under §608c(13)(B). No. CV–F–08–1549 LJO
`
`SMS, 2009 WL 4895362, *15 (ED Cal., Dec. 11, 2009).
`Petitioners renewed their Fifth Amendment argument,
`asserting that the reserve-tonnage requirement consti-
`tuted a physical taking. Though the District Court found
`that the RAC takes title to a significant portion of a Cali-
`fornia raisin producer’s crop through the reserve require-
`
`ment, the court held that the transfer of title to the RAC
`did not constitute a physical taking. See id., at *26 (“‘[I]n
`essence, [petitioners] are paying an admissions fee or
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`7
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
` HORNE v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
`
`Opinion of the Court
`toll—admittedly a steep one—for marketing raisins. The
`Government does not force plaintiffs to grow raisins or
`to market the raisins; rather, it directs that if they grow
`and market raisins, then passing title to their “reserve
`tonnage” raisins to the RAC is the admissions ticket’” (quot-
`
`ing Evans v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 554, 563–564
`(2006))).
`
`The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed that
`petitioners were “handlers” subject to the Marketing Or-
`der’s provisions, and rejected petitioners’ argument that
`they were producers, and, thus exempt from regulation.
`673 F. 3d 1071, 1078 (2012). The court did not resolve
`petitioners’ takings claim, however, because it concluded
`that that it lacked jurisdiction to do so. The court ex-
`plained that “a takings claim against the federal govern-
`ment must be brought [in the Court of Federal Claims] in
`the first instance, ‘unless Congress has withdrawn the
`Tucker Act grant of jurisdiction in the relevant statute.’”
`
`
`Id., at 1079 (quoting Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524
`U. S. 498, 520 (1998) (plurality opinion)). The court rec-
`ognized that 7 U. S. C. §608c(15) provides an administra-
`tive remedy to handlers wishing to challenge marketing
`orders under the AMAA, and it agreed that “when a han-
`
`dler, or a producer-handler in its capacity as a handler,
`challenges a marketing order on takings grounds, Court of
`Federal Claims Tucker Act jurisdiction gives way to sec-
`tion [60]8c(15)’s comprehensive procedural scheme and
`
`administrative exhaustion requirements.” 673 F. 3d, at
`1079. But, the Ninth Circuit determined, petitioners
`
`brought the takings claim in their capacity as producers,
`not handlers. Id., at 1080. Consequently, the court was
`of the view that “[n]othing in the AMAA precludes the
`Hornes from alleging in the Court of Federal Claims that
`the reserve program injures them in their capacity as
`producers by subjecting them to a taking requiring com-
`pensation.” Ibid. This availability of a Federal Claims
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`

`
`
`Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Court action thus rendered petitioners’ takings claim un-
`
`ripe for adjudication. Ibid.
`
`We granted certiorari to determine whether the Ninth
`Circuit has jurisdiction to review petitioners’ takings
`claim. 568 U. S. ___ (2012).
`
`9
`
`
`
`
`
`
`II
`
`A
`
`
`The Ninth Circuit’s jurisdictional ruling flowed from its
`determination that petitioners brought their takings claim
`as producers rather than handlers. This determination is
`not correct. Although petitioners argued that they were
`producers—and thus not subject to the AMAA or Market-
`ing Order at all—both the USDA and the District Court
`concluded that petitioners were “handlers.” Accordingly,
`the civil penalty, assessment, and reimbursement for fail-
`ure to reserve raisins were all levied on petitioners in
`their capacity as “handlers.” If petitioners’ argument that
`they were producers had prevailed, they would not have
`been subject to any of the monetary sanctions imposed on
`them. See 7 U. S. C. §608c(13)(B) (“No order issued under
`this chapter shall be applicable to any producer in his
`capacity as a producer”).
`
`It is undisputed that the Marketing Order imposes
`
`duties on petitioners only in their capacity as handlers.
`As a result, any defense raised against those duties is
`necessarily raised in that same capacity. Petitioners ar-
`
`gue that it would be unconstitutional for the Government
`to come on their land and confiscate raisins, or to con-
`
`fiscate the proceeds of raisin sales, without paying just com-
`pensation; and, that it is therefore unconstitutional to fine
`petitioners for not complying with the unconstitutional
`
`requirement.4 See Brief for Petitioners 54. Given that
`——————
` 4The Ninth Circuit construed the takings argument quite differently,
`
`
` stating that petitioners believe the regulatory scheme “takes reserve-
` tonnage raisins belonging to producers.” 673 F. 3d 1071, 1080 (2012).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`10
`
`
`
`HORNE v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
`
`Opinion of the Court
`fines can only be levied on handlers, petitioners’ takings
`claim makes sense only as a defense to penalties imposed
`upon them in their capacity as handlers. The Ninth Cir-
`cuit confused petitioners’ statutory argument (i.e., “we are
`producers, not handlers”) with their constitutional argu-
`ment (i.e., “assuming we are handlers, fining us for refus-
`ing to turn over reserve-tonnage raisins violates the Fifth
`Amendment”).5
`
`The relevant question, then, is whether a federal court
`
`has jurisdiction to adjudicate a takings defense raised by a
`handler seeking review of a final agency order.
`B
`The Government argues that petitioners’ takings-based
`
`
`defense was rightly dismissed on ripeness grounds. Brief
`for Respondent 21–22. According to the Government, be-
`cause a takings claim can be pursued later in the Court
`of Federal Claims, the Ninth Circuit correctly refused to
`
`adjudicate petitioners’ takings defense. In support of its
`position, the Government relies largely on Williamson
`County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of
`
`——————
`When the agency brought its enforcement action against petitioners,
`however, it did not seek to recover reserve-tonnage raisins from the
`2002–2003 and 2003–2004 crop years. Rather, it sought monetary
`penalties and reimbursement. Petitioners could not argue in the face of
`such agency action that the Secretary was attempting to take raisins
`that had already been harvested and sold. Instead, petitioners argued
`that they could not be compelled to pay fines for refusing to accede to
`an unconstitutional taking.
`5The Government notes that petitioners did not own most of the rai-
`sins that they failed to reserve and argues that petitioners would have
`
`no takings claim based on those raisins. See Brief for Respondent 19.
`We take no position on the merits of petitioners’ takings claim. We
`simply recognize that insofar as the petitioners challenged the imposi-
`tion of monetary sanctions under the Marketing Order, they raised
`
`their takings-based defense in their capacity as handlers. On remand,
`
`the Ninth Circuit can decide in the first instance whether petitioners
`may raise the takings defense with respect to raisins they never owned.
`
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`

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` 11
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`
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` Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172 (1985). Brief for Respondent
`21–22 (“Just compensation need not ‘be paid in advance
`of, or contemporaneously with, the taking; all that is re-
`quired is that a ‘reasonable, certain and adequate provision
`for obtaining compensation’ exist at the time of the taking’”
`(quoting Williamson County, 473 U. S., at 194)). In that
`case, the plaintiff filed suit against the Regional Planning
`Commission, claiming that a zoning decision by the Com-
`mission effected a taking of property without just compen-
`sation. Id., at 182. We found that the plaintiff ’s claim
`was not “ripe” for two reasons, neither of which supports
`the Government’s position.
`
`First, we explained that the plaintiff ’s takings claim in
`Williamson County failed because the plaintiff could not
`show that it had been injured by the Government’s action.
`Specifically, the plaintiff “ha[d] not yet obtained a final
`decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance
`
`
`and subdivision regulations to its property.” Id., at 186.
`Here, by contrast, petitioners were subject to a final agency
`order imposing concrete fines and penalties at the time
`they sought judicial review under §608c(14)(B). This was
`
`clearly sufficient “injury” for federal jurisdiction.
` Second, the Williamson County plaintiff ’s takings claim
`
`was not yet ripe because the plaintiff had not sought
`“compensation through the procedures the State ha[d]
`provided for doing so.” Id., at 194. We explained that
`“[i]f the government has provided an adequate process
`
`for obtaining compensation, and if resort to that process
`yields just compensation, then the property owner has no
`
`claim against the Government for a taking.” Id., at 194–
`195 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
`Stated differently, a Fifth Amendment claim is premature
`until it is clear that the Government has both taken prop-
`erty and denied just compensation. Although we often
`refer to this consideration as “prudential ‘ripeness,’” Lucas
`v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1013
`
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`

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`12
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`
`HORNE v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
`
`Opinion of the Court
`(1992), we have recognized that it is not, strictly speaking,
`
`jurisdictional.6 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v.
`Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection, 560 U. S. ___,
`___, and n. 10 (2010) (slip op., at 24, and n. 10).
`Here, the Government argues that petitioners’ takings
`
`
`claim is premature because the Tucker Act affords “the
`requisite reasonable, certain, and adequate provision for
`obtaining just compensation that a property owner must
`pursue.” Brief for Respondent 22. In the Government’s
`view, “[p]etitioners should have complied with the order,
`and, after a portion of their raisins were placed in reserve
`to be disposed of as directed by the RAC, . . . sought com-
`pensation as producers in the Court of Federal Claims
`for the alleged taking.” Id., at 24–25. We disagree with
`
`
`the Government’s argument, however, because the AMAA
`provides a comprehensive remedial scheme that with-
`draws Tucker Act jurisdiction over a handler’s takings
`claim. As a result, there is no alternative “reasonable,
`
`certain, and adequate” remedial scheme through which
`petitioners (as handlers) must proceed before obtaining
`review of their claim under the AMAA.7
`
`The Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over Tucker
`
`Act claims “founded either upon the Constitution, or any
`Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive de-
`partment.” 28 U. S. C. §1491(a)(1). “[A] claim for just
`compensation under the Takings Clause must be brought
`to the Court of Federal Claims in the first instance, unless
`——————
`6A “Case” or “Controversy” exists once the government has taken
`private property without paying for it. Accordingly, whether an alter-
`native remedy exists does not affect the jurisdiction of the federal court.
`
` 7That is not to say that a producer who turns over her reserve-
`tonnage raisins could not bring suit for just compensation in the Court
`
` of Claims. Whether a producer could bring such a claim, and what
`impact the availability of such a claim would have on petitioners’
`takings-based defense, are questions going to the merits of petitioners’
`defense, not to a court’s jurisdiction to entertain it. We therefore do not
`address those issues here.
`
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`

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`
`Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Congress has withdrawn the Tucker Act grant of jurisdic-
`
`tion in the relevant statute.” Eastern Enterprises, 524
`
`U. S., at 520 (plurality opinion); see also United States v.
`Bormes, 568 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 5) (where “a
`statute contains its own self-executing remedial scheme,”
`a court “look[s] only to that statute”). To determine
`whether a statutory scheme displaces Tucker Act jurisdic-
`tion, a court must “examin[e] the purpose of the [statute],
`
`the entirety of its text, and the structure of review that it
`establishes.” United States v. Fausto, 4