`
`In the
`Supreme Court of the United States
`
`MICHELLE K. LEE, UNDER SECRETARY OF
`COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
`AND DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES PATENT AND
`TRADEMARK OFFICE,
`
`v.
`
`SIMON SHIAO TAM,
`
`Petitioner,
`
`Respondent.
`
`On Writ Of CertiOrari tO the United StateS
`COUrt Of appealS fOr the federal CirCUit
`
`BRIEF OF THE RUTHERFORD INSTITUTE
`AND CONSUMERS’ RESEARCH AS AMICI
`CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
`
`John w. whIteheaD
`DougLas r. MCKusICK
`the rutherforD InstItute
`1440 Sachem Place
`Charlottesville, VA 22901
`(434) 987-3888
`
`Joseph CoLangeLo
`ConsuMers’ researCh
`1801 F Street NW
`Washington, DC 20006
`(202) 898-0459
`
`Megan L. Brown
`Counsel of Record
`Joshua s. turner
`ChrIstopher J. KeLLy
`Dwayne D. saM
`John t. LIn
`wILey reIn LLp
`1776 K Street NW
`Washington, DC 20006
`(202) 719-7000
`mbrown@wileyrein.com
`
`Counsel for Amici Curiae
`
`December 16, 2016
`269873
`
`A
`
`(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859
`
`
`
`i
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
`
`TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
`
`INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
`
`SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
`
`ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
`
`I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT APPLIES
`TO THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK
`REGISTRATION REGIME. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
`
`
`
`A. Trademarks, Like NAACP, Catholics For
`Choice, And Black Lives Matter, Express
`Identity And Ideas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
`
`
`
`B. Trademark Registration Is Not A
`Subsidy Program, A Funding Limit,
`Or “Government Speech” Exempt
`From The First Amendment. . . . . . . . . . . . .9
`
`
`
`II. THE DISPARAGEMENT BAR IS A
`DISCRETIONA RY A ND FICK LE
`HECKLER’S VETO, ANATHEMA TO
`THE FIRST AMENDMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`
`
`ii
`
`A. The Constitution Requires The
`Government To Reject The Heckler’s
`Veto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
`
`
`
`B. Section 2(A) Provides Government
`Officials Unlimited Discretion To
`Burden Speech They Dislike, Yielding
`Incoherent Decisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
`
`
`
`III. THE DISPARAGEMENT BAR FAILS
`
`ANY LEVEL OF REVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
`
`A. Str ict Scr utiny Dooms Section
`2(A)’s Cont ent A nd View poi nt
`Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
`
`
`
`B. T he Dispa ragement Ba r Fa i ls
`Intermediate Scrutiny Because An
`Interest In Preventing Offense Is Not
`Substantial, And The Bar Does Nothing
`Other Than Chill Expression . . . . . . . . . . .24
`
`
`
`CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
`
`Table of Contents
`
`Page
`
`
`
`iii
`
`FEDERAL CASES
`
`44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,
`
`517 U.S. 484 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6, 23
`
`Agency for Int’l Dev. v.
`Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc.,
`133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1, 5, 9
`
`
`
`Ashcroft v. ACLU,
`
`542 U.S. 656 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
`
`Bartnicki v. Vopper,
`
`532 U.S. 514 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
`
`Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens,
`
`496 U.S. 226 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
`
`Bishop v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
`660 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (W.D. Ark. 2009), aff’d,
`
`
`373 F. App’x 649 (8th Cir. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
`
`Boos v. Barry,
`
`485 U.S. 312 (1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
`
`Brandenburg v. Ohio,
`
`395 U.S. 444 (1969). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
`
`Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
`Public Service Commission,
`447 U.S. 557 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
`
`
`
`City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,
`
`507 U.S. 410 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
`
`TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
`
`Page
`
`
`
`iv
`
`City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co.,
`
`486 U.S. 750 (1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
`
`Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
`Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
`472 U.S. 749 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
`
`
`
`Edenfield v. Fane,
`
`507 U.S. 761 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25
`
`Edwards v. District of Columbia,
`
`755 F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir. 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
`
`Forsyth Cty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement,
`
`505 U.S. 123 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
`
`In re Geller,
`
`751 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
`
`Grayned v. City of Rockford,
`
`408 U.S. 104 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
`
`Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v.
`United States,
`527 U.S. 173 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
`
`
`
`In re Gyulay,
`
`820 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
`
`In re Heeb Media, LLC,
`
`89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1071 (T.T.A.B. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
`
`Heffron v.
`Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,
`452 U.S. 640 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
`
`
`
`Cited Authorities
`
`Page
`
`
`
`v
`
`Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
`Lee,
`505 U.S. 672 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
`
`
`
`Leathers v. Medlock,
`
`499 U.S. 439 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
`
`In re Lebanese Arak Corp.,
`
`94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1215 (T.T.A.B. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
`
`Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez,
`
`531 U.S. 533 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
`
`In re McGinley,
`
`660 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (Rich, J., dissenting). .25
`
`In re Old Glory Condom Corp.,
`
`26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216, 1993 WL 114384
`
`(T.T.A.B. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
`
`Members of City Council of L.A. v.
`Taxpayers for Vincent,
`466 U.S. 789 (1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
`
`
`
`Miller v. California,
`
`413 U.S. 15 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
`
`Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,
`
`524 U.S. 569 (1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
`
`Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson,
`
`283 U.S. 697 (1931) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
`
`Cited Authorities
`
`Page
`
`
`
`vi
`
`New Hampshire v. Maine,
`
`532 U.S. 742 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
`
`Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n,
`
`475 U.S. 1 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
`
`Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum,
`
`555 U.S. 460 (2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
`
`Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley,
`
`408 U.S. 92 (1972). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
`
`Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse,
`
`112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
`
`Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse,
` No. 15-1874, 2015 WL 6854402
`
`(4th Cir. Nov. 6, 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2, 20
`
`R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
`
`505 U.S. 377 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
`
`Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
`
`135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5, 21
`
`Regan v. Taxation With Representation of
`Washington,
`461 U.S. 540 (1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
`
`
`
`Reno v. ACLU,
`
`521 U.S. 844 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
`
`Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind of N.C., Inc.,
`
`487 U.S. 781 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
`
`Cited Authorities
`
`Page
`
`
`
`vii
`
`Rosenberger v.
`Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia,
`515 U.S. 819 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
`
`
`
`Rumsfeld v.
`Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc.,
`547 U.S. 47 (2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
`
`
`
`Rust v. Sullivan,
`
`500 U.S. 173 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1, 9, 11
`
`Saia v. New York,
`
`334 U.S. 558 (1948). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
`
`Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, Ala.,
`
`394 U.S. 147 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
`
`Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
`Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
`502 U.S. 105 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 21-22, 23, 25
`
`
`
`Snyder v. Phelps,
`
`562 U.S. 443 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1, 15, 21
`
`Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
`564 U.S. 552 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
`
`
`In re Squaw Valley Dev. Co.,
`
`80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1264 (T.T.A.B. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 18
`
`Street v. New York,
`
`394 U.S. 576 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
`
`Cited Authorities
`
`Page
`
`
`
`viii
`
`In re Tam,
`
`785 F.3d 567 (Fed. Cir. 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
`
`In re Tam,
`
`808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4, 5
`
`Texas v. Johnson,
`
`491 U.S. 397 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
`
`Thomas v. Collins,
`
`323 U.S. 516 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) . . . . . .22
`
`Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
`
`393 U.S. 503 (1969). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
`
`Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
`
`512 U.S. 622 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
`
`United States v. Stevens,
`
`559 U.S. 460 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
`
`Virginia v. Hicks,
`
`539 U.S. 113 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
`
`Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate
`Veterans, Inc.,
`135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12, 13
`
`
`
`Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the
`Supreme Court of Ohio,
`471 U.S. 626 (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
`
`
`
`Cited Authorities
`
`Page
`
`
`
`ix
`
`CONSTITUTIONS
`
`U.S. Const. Amend. I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
`
`FEDERAL STATUTES
`
`15 U.S.C. § 1052 (Lanham Act) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
`
`15 U.S.C. § 1127 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
`
`39 U.S.C. § 403. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
`
`T R A D E M A R K R E G I S T R A T I O N S A N D
`APPLICATIONS
`
`ACLU, Registration No. 1,876,597 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
`
`AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
` Registration No. 1,902,649 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
`
`BLACK LIVES MATTER, U.S. Trademark
` Application Serial No. 87,098,620 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
`
`CATHOLICS FOR CHOICE, Registration
` No. 2,796,790 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3, 7
`
`COCA-COLA, Registration No. 4,019,547 . . . . . . . . . . .13
`
`COCAINE, Registration No. 1,340,874 . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
`
`DYKEDOLLS, Registration No. 3,254,737 . . . . . . . . . .19
`
`DYKE NIGHT, Registration No. 4,146,588. . . . . . . . . .19
`
`Cited Authorities
`
`Page
`
`
`
`x
`
`DYKES ON BIKES, Registration No. 3,323,803. . . . .19
`
`FAGDOG, Registration No. 2,828,396 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
`
`FAGDOG, Registration No. 2,926,775 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
`
`FAGDOG, Registration No. 3,174,475 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
`
`FAGDOG, U.S. Trade Application Serial 19
` No. 75/950,535 (filed Mar. 1, 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
`
`FAGDOG, U.S. Trade Application Serial
` No. 76/454,927 (filed Sept. 25, 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
`
`FAG FOREVER A GENIUS!, U.S. Trademark
`A p p l i c a t i o n S e r i a l No . 8 6 / 0 8 9 , 51 2
`(filed Oct. 11, 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
`
`
`
`FAGOUT!,U.S. Trademark Application Serial
` No. 86/107,041 (filed Oct. 31, 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
`
`GANJA UNIVERSITY, U.S. Registration
` No. 4,070,160 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
`
`HONKEY KONG, Registration No. 4,388,702 . . . . . . . .3
`
`LEGALIZE ACID, Registration No. 4,395,633 . . . . . .3
`
`MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN, Registration
` No. 5,020,556. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
`
`NAACP, Registration No. 1,188,182 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
`
`Cited Authorities
`
`Page
`
`
`
`xi
`
`NATIONA L A S SOCI ATION FOR THE
`ADVANCEMENT OF HISPANIC PEOPLE,
` Registration No. 2,523,711 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
`
`PHAG, Reginstration No. 4,135,694 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
`
`QUEER PAL FOR THE STRAIGHT GAL,
` Registration. No. 4,699,581. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
`
`QUEER FOLK, Registration No. 4,742,269 . . . . . . . . .19
`
`TEA PARTY PATRIOTS, Registration
` No. 4,296,739. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
`
`THAT’S SO GAY, Registration No. 4,555,924 . . . . . . . .3
`
`THINK ISLAM, Registration No. 4,719,002 . . . . . . . .13
`
`WAL-MART, Registration No. 1,783,039 . . . . . . . . . . .13
`
`WHITE LIVES MATTER, U.S. Trademark
` Application Serial No. 87,121,838. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
`
`THE YIDZ, U.S. Trademark Application Serial
` No. 77/784,282 (filed July 18, 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . 19-20
`
`OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`About Us, Cat hoL IC s f or ChoIC e, http://
`w w w. c a t h o l i c s f o r c h o i c e . o r g / a b o u t /
` default.asp (last visted Dec. 13, 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
`
`Cited Authorities
`
`Page
`
`
`
`xii
`
`K. Mettler, Why SPLC says White Lives Matter
`is a hate group but Black Lives Matter is not,
`Washington Post Online (Aug. 31, 2016) https://
`www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/
`wp/2016/08/31/splc-the-much-cited-designator-
`of-hate-groups-explains-why-white-lives-
` matter-is-one/?utm_term=.262ed7c2408b . . . . . . . . .8
`
`NCCB/USCC President Issues Statement on
`Catholics for a Free Choice (May, 10, 2000)
`available at http://www.usccb.org/news/2000/00-
`123.cfm (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
`
`
`
`Cited Authorities
`
`Page
`
`
`
`1
`
`INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
`
`The Rutherford Institute is an international civil
`liberties organization headquartered in Charlottesville,
`Virginia. Founded in 1982 by its President, John W.
`Whitehead, the Institute specializes in providing legal
`representation without charge to individuals whose civil
`liberties are threatened and in educating the public
`about constitutional and human rights issues. Attorneys
`affiliated with the Institute have represented parties
`and filed numerous amicus curiae briefs in the federal
`Courts of Appeals and Supreme Court. The Rutherford
`Institute works to preserve the most basic freedoms of our
`Republic, including the limits placed on government by
`the First Amendment. The Rutherford Institute opposes
`governmental action to burden or censor speech for the
`purpose of protecting the subjective sensibilities of part
`of the audience.
`
`The Rutherford Institute has helped develop key
`First Amendment principles informing the reach of
`government power. See, e.g., Agency for Int’l Dev. v.
`Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013);
`Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011); Snyder
`v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
`173 (1991). The Rutherford Institute participated in the
`case below, and in a case raising similar issues in the
`Fourth Circuit, Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, No. 15-
`
`1. Both Petitioner and Respondent have consented to the
`filing of this brief, as evidenced by the letters on file with this
`Court. Pursuant to Rule 37.6, the undersigned hereby affirm that
`no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part and
`no person other than amici or their counsel made a monetary
`contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
`
`
`
`2
`
`1874, 2015 WL 6854402 (4th Cir. Nov. 6, 2015), because
`this dispute involves the government’s claim to power to
`judge speech based on viewpoint and content, free from
`First Amendment scrutiny.
`
`Consumers’ Research is an independent educational
`organization whose mission is to increase the knowledge
`and understanding of issues, policies, products, and
`services of concern to consumers and to promote the
`freedom to act on that knowledge without unnecessary
`government interference. Consumers’ Research believes
`that the cost, quality, availability, and variety of goods and
`services available to American consumers are improved
`by greater knowledge and freedom. Consumers have a
`strong interest in receiving non-deceptive commercial and
`other economically motivated speech, which regularly is
`mixed with political and policy ideas. Promoting a robust
`marketplace—of goods and ideas—free from unnecessary
`government control is paramount. Consumers’ Research is
`concerned about the government’s theory of its discretion
`to use the trademark regime to discriminate against
`viewpoints and content, potentially stifling a robust
`marketplace of ideas.
`
`Amici believe that “above all else, the First Amendment
`means that the government has no power to restrict
`expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
`matter, or its content.” Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408
`U.S. 92, 95 (1972). The government cannot arrogate to
`itself the freedom to disfavor certain messages by turning
`the federal trademark registration into a Heckler’s Veto.
`
`
`
`3
`
`SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
`
`The Lanham Act’s “disparagement” bar has been
`turned into a weapon against disfavored views, to protect
`groups from perceived offense. The government does not
`deny that it is deciding whether to confer the benefit of
`trademark registration based on whether it believes a
`trademark would cause offense. Instead, the government
`claims that its subjective and inconsistent treatment of
`words and phrases does not affect speech at all.
`
`This is nonsense. Trademarks are protected speech. A
`trademarked name, word, phrase, logo, or design can do far
`more than inform customers or denote origin. As described
`below, registered trademarks cover the waterfront
`of expression: TEA PARTY PATRIOTS 2 political
`organization, MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN3 slogan,
`CATHOLICS FOR CHOICE4 advocacy group, THAT’S
`SO GAY5 news sites, LEGALIZE ACID6 accessories, and
`HONKEY KONG7 band shirts. These examples belie the
`government’s position that trademarks “are not inherently
`expressive.” Pet. Br. at 47. Indeed, the United States has
`argued that trademarks are not intended to “editorialize”
`on culture, politics or philosophy. United States’ Mot.
`for Summ. J. at 1, 24, Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse,
`
`2. Registration No. 4,296,739.
`
`3. Registration No. 5,020,556.
`
`4. Registration No. 2,796,790; see infra at 10.
`
`5. Registration No. 4,555,924.
`
`6. Registration No. 4,395,633.
`
`7. Registration No. 4,388,702.
`
`
`
`4
`
`112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015) (No. 14-cv-1043) (Dkt.
`No. 109) (“USMSJ”). Indeed, the government’s position
`that certain trademarks are “disparaging” or “offensive”
`confirms that trademarks do convey messages.
`
`“The First Amendment is a limitation on government
`. . . . Its design is to prevent the government from
`controlling speech.” Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness,
`Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 695 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
`concurring in judgment). The First Amendment requires
`the government to “show that its action was caused by
`something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort
`and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
`viewpoint.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
`393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
`
`Tam’s proposed trademark was denied by the PTO.
`Why? Not because the mark was inaccurate or misleading
`or violated someone’s intellectual property interests. The
`government denied Tam the beneficial trademark status
`routinely afforded others solely because some government
`employees considered “the Slants” to be “offensive” or
`“disparaging” to a subset of Asians.
`
`Tam challenged the decision, and after a panel of
`the Federal Circuit found itself constrained to uphold
`the denial, the en banc Federal Circuit sua sponte
`granted rehearing. The Federal Circuit held that the
`disparagement clause of section § 2(a) of the Lanham
`Act is unconstitutional. The court properly determined
`that § 2(a) should be subject to strict scrutiny because
`it abridges speech based on content and viewpoint. In
`re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Under
`strict scrutiny, ‘“[c]ontent-based laws—those that
`
`
`
`5
`
`target speech based of its communicative content—are
`presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only
`if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored
`to serve compelling state interests.”’ Id. (quoting Reed v.
`Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015)). The Federal
`Circuit found that § 2(a) is content-based because its
`application depends on the topic discussed and message
`conveyed. Id. at 1335. The court noted that the USPTO
`“reject[ed] marks under § 2(a) when it [found] the marks
`refer[red] to a group in a negative way, but it permit[ted]
`the registration of marks that refer[red] to a group in a
`positive, non-disparaging manner.” Id. at 1336.
`
`The United States has chosen to defend the Lanham
`Act by embracing its new role as the arbiter of taste,
`making the high-minded claim that the government should
`not be required to associate with crude or demeaning
`messages—commercial or otherwise. The United
`States’ position undermines the core role of the First
`Amendment as a check on government power, which this
`Court has applied vigorously. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227
`(burdening “speech because of the topic discussed or the
`idea or message expressed” is subject to “strict scrutiny”);
`Agency for Int’l Dev., 133 S. Ct. at 2332 (viewpoint-based
`spending condition received First Amendment scrutiny).
`
`Trademark registration is being transformed into a
`Heckler’s Veto to burden messages in an effort to shield
`third parties’ claimed sensibilities. This is anathema to
`the First Amendment. This Court should get the PTO
`out of the business of policing offense and confirm that
`the power of government is not properly deployed to pick
`winners and losers on the playing field of expression or
`commerce. The market, and consumers, benefit from
`robust and vibrant expression.
`
`
`
`6
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT APPLIES TO THE
`FEDERAL TRADEMARK REGISTRATION
`REGIME
`
`A. Trademarks, Like NAACP, Catholics For
`Choice, And Black Lives Matter, Express
`Identity And Ideas.
`
`Trademarks are any combination of expression—
`words, symbols, colors or package designs—used to
`identify and distinguish a good or service produced by one
`source from those of other sources. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
`While there can be debate over what level of protection
`applies, trademarks are “speech” protected by the First
`Amendment.8
`
`8. The line between commercial and political speech is difficult
`to draw, see, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475
`U.S. 1, 10–11 (1986), but “core” commercial speech is characterized
`by a “proposal of a commercial transaction.” City of Cincinnati
`v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 422–23 (1993); see also
`Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527
`U.S. 173, 184 (1999); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of
`the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985). Where fully
`protected speech mixes with commercial speech, higher scrutiny
`should apply, see 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,
`501 (1996), and where “the component parts of a single speech are
`inextricably intertwined . . . we apply our test for fully protected
`expression.” Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781,
`796 (1988). Thus, if a trademark simply identifies goods or services
`for a commercial transaction, it might be appropriate to follow the
`standard of review established in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
`v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). In this case,
`however, the expressive use of trademarks makes them subject to
`strict scrutiny.
`
`
`
`7
`
`Trademarks are used for more than mere commercial
`transactions. Marks routinely serve to convey group
`identity, including racial, religious, national, political and
`gender affiliations. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
`UNION,9 ACLU,10 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR
`THE ADVANCEMENT OF HISPANIC PEOPLE,11 and
`NAACP12 convey to consumers and the public messages
`about group values and identity. Some might take offense,
`see, e.g., Bishop v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 2d
`1004, 1010 (W.D. Ark. 2009) (person considered t-shirt
`emblazoned with the NAACP as “offensive clothing”),
`aff’d, 373 F. App’x 649 (8th Cir. 2010), but such offense
`confirms that the trademarks convey meaning.
`
`Religious groups—devout and dissenting—register
`trademarks. Consider Catholics for Choice, a dissenting
`group whose mission is “to serve as a voice for Catholics
`who believe that the Catholic tradition supports a woman’s
`moral and legal right to follow her conscience in matters
`of sexuality and reproductive health.”13 Many Catholics,
`including church leadership, take grave “offense” at
`
`9. Registration No. 1,902,649.
`
`10. Registration No. 1,876,597.
`
`11. Registration No. 2,523,711 (cancelled Sept. 26, 2008 for
`failure to file a Declaration of Continued Use).
`
`12. Registration No. 1,188,182.
`
`13. Abo ut Us, Ca t hoL IC s f or C hoIC e, http://w w w.
`catholicsforchoice.org/about/default.asp (last visited Dec. 13, 2016).
`See CATHOLICS FOR CHOICE, Registration No. 2,796,790, for
`“[p]romoting public awareness of political and ethical issues in the
`fields of reproductive rights, women’s rights, family planning, and
`sexually transmitted diseases.”
`
`
`
`8
`
`the claimed affiliation and characterization of church
`beliefs.14 Could the PTO—free from any First Amendment
`scrutiny—deny registration to Catholics for Choice on
`the basis that it might “disparage or falsely suggest a
`connection with” Catholicism or bring Catholic belief “into
`contempt, or disrepute?” The answer, most assuredly, is
`“no.”
`
`Likewise, social justice and political movements
`register trademarks. It would be difficult to justify
`government discretion to deny registration for BLACK
`LIVES MATTER15 or WHITE LIVES MATTER16 on
`the ground that they are offensive, though both have
`been criticized.17 But as explained below, the United
`States argues that the Lanham Act empowers the PTO
`to evaluate speech and burden it based on the subjective,
`potential reaction of third parties.
`
`14. NCCB/USCC President Issues Statement on Catholics
`for a Free Choice (May, 10, 2000) (“the use of the name Catholic
`as a platform for promoting the taking of innocent human life and
`ridiculing the Church is offensive not only to Catholics, but to
`all who expect honesty and forthrightness in public discourse.”)
`available at http://www.usccb.org/news/2000/00-123.cfm (last visited
`Dec. 13, 2016).
`
`15. Serial No. 87,098,620.
`
`16. Serial No. 87,121,838.
`
`17. See, e.g., K. Mettler, Why SPLC says White Lives Matter
`is a hate group but Black Lives Matter is not, Washington
`Post Online (Aug. 31, 2016) https://www.washingtonpost.com/
`news/morning-mix/wp/2016/08/31/splc-the-much-cited-designator-
`of-hate-groups-explains-why-white-lives-matter-is-one/?utm_
`term=.262ed7c2408b
`
`
`
`9
`
`B. Trademark Registration Is Not A Subsidy
`Program, A Funding Limit, Or “Government
`Speech” Exempt From The First Amendment.
`
`Trademark registration offers substantial benefits,
`the denial of which places applicants at a legal and financial
`disadvantage. As a result, the government finds itself
`squarely in the heartland of cases that confirm that the
`First Amendment imposes limits on government action,
`even where the issue is a benefit to which the recipient
`otherwise “has no entitlement.” Agency for Int’l Dev.,
`133 S. Ct. at 2328 (citation omitted); accord Rumsfeld v.
`Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006)
`(“‘[T]he government may not deny a benefit to a person
`on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected
`. . . freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that
`benefit.’”) (citations omitted).
`
`To avoid this, Petitioner argues that its discretionary
`review for offense is simply a “criterion for participation
`in a federal program, not a restriction on speech” at all.
`Pet. Br. at 25. It analogizes § 2(a) to cases that afford
`government leeway to limit support for speech with
`which it does not want to be associated. This attempt
`fails. The government’s theory would free vast and varied
`government activity from First Amendment scrutiny.
`
`Government programs conveying a message may
`make viewpoint-based funding decisions to ensure that
`the government’s message is neither garbled nor distorted
`by the grantee. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S.
`533, 541 (2001) (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
`Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)); see also Rust, 500
`U.S. at 194 (“[A] program dedicated to advance certain
`
`
`
`10
`
`permissible goals . . . necessarily discourages alternative
`goals”). The trademark registration process is designed
`to permit private parties to conduct commerce; it is not a
`program designed to convey the government’s message.
`
`The government tries to transform this regime
`into “government speech” by asserting that “owners of
`registered marks are issued certificates in the name of
`the United States, and the government publishes the
`marks and transmits registration information to foreign
`countries.” Pet. Br. 12. This borders on silly. Ministerial
`registration-related activities, like publication in the
`register and the delivery of a certificate, are unlike cases
`in which Congress seeks to control how federal dollars
`are used by private recipients.
`
`Any other conclusion would turn a variety of personal
`and commercial expression into government speech simply
`because they involve registration or interaction with the
`government, such as the use of a government seal. See
`Pet. Br. at 48. Consider a couple untenable implications:
`Could a state deny birth certificates to parents if it finds a
`newborn’s name to be offensive, say by virtue of “cultural
`appropriation”? No. Would the Postal Service, authorized
`to carry first-class mail, 39 U.S.C. § 403, be justified in
`refusing to transmit a letter bearing the government’s
`stamp and insignia if it found the name of the addressee
`disparaging or because the sender was a designated “hate
`group”? No. These hypotheticals underscore the absurdity
`of the government’s casual reclassification of speech as the
`government’s, simply because the government performs
`administrative or ministerial tasks that assist the speech
`in some way.
`
`
`
`11
`
`Trademark registration bears scant resemblance
`to the funding schemes cited by the Petitioner. First,
`although trademark registration confers benefits,
`federal funds are not one. Second, unlike the government
`programs that promote a specific message, Congress did
`not establish trademark registration to further a message
`that requires favoring a viewpoint. C.f. Rust, 500 U.S. at
`192 (permitting a government family-planning program
`to limit abortion-related speech); Nat’l Endowment for
`the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (permitting the
`National Endowment for the Arts to subsidize certain
`artistic expression over others).
`
`Even if Section 2(a) were a subsidy program, the First
`Amendment limits its power to discriminate between
`viewpoints. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation
`of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983) (stating that the
`government may not aim subsidies “at the suppression
`of dangerous ideas”); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439,
`447 (1991) (“[D]ifferential taxation of First Amendment
`speakers is constitutionally suspect when it threatens
`to suppress the expression of particular ideas or
`viewpoints”). Imposing burdens on speakers based on the
`content of their speech “may effectively drive certain ideas
`or viewpoints from the marketplace.” Simon & Schuster,
`Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
`U.S. 105, 116 (1991). That is what the government tries to
`accomplish with the disparagement bar; to use its power
`to register trademarks to burden speech it finds offensive.
`The government cannot have it both ways. If it wants to
`treat the disparagement bar as a subsidy, Pet. Br at 29,
`it must abide the limitations on that power.
`
`
`
`12
`
`The government seeks final refuge in Walker v.
`Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S.
`Ct. 2239 (2015) to claim