throbber
No. 15-446
`
`IN THE
`Supreme Court of the United States
`
`CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,
`
`v.
`
`MICHELLE K. LEE,
`
`Petitioner,
`
`Respondent.
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
`COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`
`BRIEF OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR
`OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AS AMICUS
`CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF NEITHER PARTY
`AS REGARDS THE FIRST QUESTION
`PRESENTED, WITH NO POSITION AS TO
`THE SECOND QUESTION PRESENTED
`
`NOAH J. MOSS
`45 Broadway, Suite 520
`New York, New York 10006
`(858) 344-1207
`
`Of Counsel
`
`JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III
`Counsel of Record
`Member, Committee on Patents
`The Association of the Bar of
`the City of New York
`PATENT COUNSEL GROUP LLP
`The Commonwealth Building
`2045 North 15th Street, Suite 205
`Arlington, Virginia 22201
`(703) 338-7090
`john.g.mills3@patentcounselgroup.com
`
`Counsel for Amicus Curiae
`The Association of the Bar
`of the City of New York
`(For Additional Counsel See Inside Cover)
`
`264433
`
`

`
`AARON L.J. PEREIRA
`BUCHANAN INGERSOLL
`1290 Avenue of the Americas
`New York, New York 10104
`(212) 440-4400
`
`TIMOTHY P. HEATON
`TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP
`875 Third Avenue
`New York, New York 10022
`(212) 704-6000
`
`RYAN S. OSTERWEIL
`DAY PITNEY LLP
`Seven Times Square
`New York, New York 10036
`(212) 297-5800
`
`Counsel for Amicus Curiae
`The Association of the Bar
`of the City of New York
`
`

`
`i
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`TABLE OF CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
`
`TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
`
`I. STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS
` CURIAE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
`
`II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
`
`III. ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
`
`A. The Broadest Reasonable Interpretation
`Standard Causes Inconsistent Interpretation
`Of Patent Claims Depending On Whether
`The Claim Is Adjudicated By The PTO
`Or By The Federal District Courts . . . . . . . . . . .3
`
`
`
`1. History And Purpose Of Broadest
`R e a s o n a b l e I n t e r p r e t a t i o n
`(“BRI”) Standard at the PTO . . . . . . . . . . . .3
`
`
`
`2. The Alternative Standard Applied In
`
`U.S. District Court Litigation . . . . . . . . . . . .6
`
`3.
`
`
`
`I n s t a n c e s W h e r e T h e T w o
`Different Standards Of Review Had
`Dramatically Different Results As
`To The Same Patent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
`
`

`
`ii
`
`Table of Contents
`
`B. C o n g r e s s D i d N o t I m p l i c i t l y
`Approve The Broadest Reasonable
`Interpretation Standard In Enacting The
`America Invents Act (AIA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
`
`
`
`Page
`
`1. AIA Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
`
`2. The PTO’s Cited Authority Does Not
`
`Confer Authority For BRI . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
`
`3. The PTO’s Limited Amendment
`P r a c t i c e I n I PR Po s t - G r a n t
`Proceedings Is Not Consistent With
`BRI’s Use In General PTO Examination
`Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
`
`
`
`C. The PTO Does Not Have The Authority
`To Enact Regulations Setting Forth
`The Standard By Which Claims Will Be
`Construed In Post-Grant Proceedings. . . . . . . .18
`
`
`
`1. No Deference Should Be Given To
`The PTO For The BRI Rule Under
`The Chevron Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
`
`
`
`2. The BRI Standard Is A Substantive
`Rule With Substantive Effect And The
`PTO Should Not Be Granted Chevron
`Deference To Implement This Rule
`In Inter Partes Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
`
`
`
`CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
`
`

`
`iii
`
`TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
`
`Page
`
`CASES
`
`Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett,
`
`494 U.S. 638 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
`
`Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg,
`
`932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
`
`Ariosa Diagnostics v. Isis Innovation,
`
`2014 WL 4381564 (P.T.A.B. 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
`
`Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc.,
`
`73 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
`
`Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v.
`Univ. of Illinois Foundation,
`402 U.S. 313 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
`
`
`
`Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l,
`
`508 U.S. 83 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11, 12
`
`Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
`Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
`467 U.S. 837 (1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
`
`
`
`Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc.,
`
`402 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7
`
`Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
`
`441 U.S. 281 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
`
`

`
`iv
`
`Cited Authorities
`
`Page
`
`Festo Corp. v.
`Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
`535 U.S. 722 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
`
`
`
`Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc.,
`
`2012 WL 761712 (N.D. Cal. 2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
`
`Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc.,
`
`721 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
`
`Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc.,
`
`582 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8, 9
`
`Google, Inc. v. Whitserve LLC,
`
`2014 WL 4537504 (P.T.A.B. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
`
`Idle Free Systems, Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc.,
`
`2013 WL 5947697 (P.T.A.B. 2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
`
`In re Baxter,
`
`678 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8, 9
`
`In re Buszard,
`
`504 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
`
`In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies,
`
`2014 WL 2738339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) . . . . . . 14-15, 16, 18
`
`In re Cuozzo Speed Techs.,
`
`793 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
`
`

`
`v
`
`Cited Authorities
`
`Page
`
`In re Prater,
`
`415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
`
`In re Reuter,
`
`670 F.2d 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
`
`In re Yamamoto,
`
`740 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5, 12
`
`In re Zletz,
`
`893 F.2d 319 (Fed. Cir. 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
`
`Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,
`
`358 F.3d 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
`
`Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., Inc.,
`
`355 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`
`517 U.S. 370 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11, 12, 18
`
`McClain v. Ortmayer,
`
`141 U.S. 419 (1891) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
`
`Merck & Co. v. Kessler,
`
`80 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
`
`Microsoft v. i4i,
`
`131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
`
`

`
`vi
`
`Cited Authorities
`
`Page
`
`Morton v. Ruiz,
`
`415 U.S. 199 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`
`134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
`
`Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
`
`415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
`
`SAP America v. Versata Development Group,
`
`107 U.S.P.Q.2d 1097 (P.T.A.B. 2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
`
`SAP America, Inc. v. Versata, Inc.,
`
`2014 WL 1252847 (P.T.A.B. 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . .10, 12
`
`Stevens v. Tamai,
`
`366 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
`
`Tafas v. Doll,
`
`559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19, 20
`
`Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
`
`135 S. Ct. 831 (2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
`
`United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co.,
`
`317 U.S. 228 (1942) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
`
`Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc.,
`
`717 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 11, 12
`
`

`
`vii
`
`Cited Authorities
`
`Page
`
`Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,
`
`90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
`
`Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v.
`Hilton Davis Chem. Co.,
`520 U.S. 17 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7, 20
`
`
`
`STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES
`
`5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
`
`5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22
`
`35 U.S.C. § 120. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
`
`35 U.S.C. § 282. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
`
`35 U.S.C. §§ 311-319 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
`
`35 U.S.C. § 311(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
`
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
`
`

`
`viii
`
`Cited Authorities
`
`Page
`35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(9). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316(d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 17
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6, 17
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
`
`35 U.S.C. § 324(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
`
`35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
`
`35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
`
`35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
`
`35 U.S.C. § 326(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
`
`35 U.S.C. § 326(d)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
`
`35 U.S.C. § 326(e). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
`
`37 C.F.R. § 1.121 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
`
`

`
`ix
`
`Cited Authorities
`
`Page
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.121 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
`
`37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6, 17
`
`2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
`
`H.R.Rep. No. 112–98, pt. 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
`
`IPR 2013-00249, Paper 32, September 9, 2014 . . . . . . .21
`
`Leahy-Smith A merica Invents Act, Pub.
` L. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). . . . . . . . . . . . .2, 14
`
`M.P.E.P. § 714. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
`
`M.P.E.P. § 2111. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
`
`O f f i c e Pa t e n t T r i a l P r a c t i c e G u i d e ,
`
`77 F.R. 48756-57 (August 14, 2012) . . . . . . . . . 4, 17, 18
`
`Patent Act § 2(b)(2)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
`
`Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit
`a Run for its Money: Challenging Patents at the
` PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235 (2015) . . . . . . . .13
`
`

`
`1
`
`I. STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS
`CURIAE
`
`The Association of the Bar of the City of New York
`(“Association”), through its Committee on Patents,
`submits this amicus curiae brief in response to the
`Court’s January 15, 2016 Order granting Cuozzo Speed
`Technologies, LLC’s (“Cuozzo” or “Petitioner”)’s petition
`for certiorari and setting forth the questions presented
`above. The Association fi les this brief in accordance with
`Rule 37 of this Court, and supports the position of neither
`party. The parties to the appeal have consented to the
`fi ling of this amicus brief.1
`
`The Association is a private, non-profi t organization of
`more than 24,000 members who are professionally involved
`in a broad range of law-related activities. Founded in 1870,
`the Association is one of the oldest bar associations in the
`United States. The Association seeks to promote reform
`in the law and to improve the administration of justice at
`the local, state, federal and international levels through
`its more than 150 standing and special committees. The
`Committee on Patents (“Patents Committee”) is a long-
`established standing committee of the Association, and its
`membership refl ects a wide range of corporate, private
`practice and academic experience in patent law. The
`participating members of the Committee are dedicated
`
`1. No party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part.
`No party or party’s counsel or no person – other than the amicus
`curiae, its members, or its counsel – contributed money that
`was intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.
`Further, Petitioner consented by blanket consent to the fi ling of
`this amicus curiae brief and Respondent’s written consent is being
`fi led herewith.
`
`

`
`2
`
`to promoting the Association’s objective of improving the
`administration of the patent laws.
`
`II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`
`The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”)
`instituted Inter Partes Review (IPR) proceedings before
`the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) to adjudicate
`the validity of prior-issued U.S. patents in conformance
`with the provisions of the America Invents Act (AIA).
`Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, § 6,
`125 Stat. 284 (2011). Unlike existing procedures for
`adjudicating patent validity in federal district courts,
`which apply the plain and ordinary meaning to claim
`terms during claim construction, the PTO applies the
`broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) approach for
`construing the claim language of a challenged patent.
`This use of different standards by federal district courts
`on the one hand, and the PTO on the other, has proved
`to be problematic and has resulted in documented cases
`of confl icting interpretations of the same patent claims,
`depending on whether these claims are before a federal
`court or before the PTO.
`
`The AIA did not explicitly approve, or expressly
`direct, the application of the BRI standard for construing
`patent claims in post-grant proceedings. Accordingly,
`the PTO should not be granted Chevron deference to
`implement BRI in the IPR post-grant proceedings. In view
`of the differing standards for patent claim construction of
`an issued patent and the lack of evidence demonstrating
`the legislature’s intent to implement different standards,
`the Court should fi nd that the PTO and the federal courts
`should apply the same standard to construe and interpret
`
`

`
`3
`
`patent claims to give certainty to patent applicants and
`patent owners as well as the public on the limits of patent
`protection.
`
`III. ARGUMENT
`
`A. The Broadest Reasonable Interpretation
`Standard Causes Inconsistent Interpretation
`Of Patent Claims Depending On Whether The
`Claim Is Adjudicated By The PTO Or By The
`Federal District Courts
`
`1. Histor y And Purpose Of Broadest
`Reasonable Interpretation (“BRI”)
`Standard at the PTO
`
`The paramount issue in resolving patent disputes
`and defi ning patent rights is the determination of the
`scope of patent claims. Clarity in claim scope is of the
`utmost importance because the claims set forth all to
`which the patentee is entitled while apprising the public
`of what is still open to them. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
`Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002);
`see also McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891);
`see also SAP America v. Versata Development Group,
`107 U.S.P.Q.2d 1097, 1105 (P.T.A.B. 2013).
`
`When patent applications are initially examined,
`the Examiners at the PTO afford the proposed claim
`language of a given patent application the “broadest
`reasonable interpretation” (hereinafter, “BRI”). This
`BRI standard is the PTO’s approach for determining
`the scope and breadth of pending patent claims during
`patent prosecution (i.e., before patents have issued).
`
`

`
`4
`
`This standard ascribes to proposed patent claims “the
`broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the
`specifi cation,” but does not utilize other intrinsic evidence,
`including the prosecution history, or other evidence
`extrinsic to the application. Manual of Patent Examining
`Procedure (“M.P.E.P.”) § 2111. The PTO also uses BRI
`in most reissue, ex parte, and inter partes reexamination
`proceedings, and post-grant proceedings under the AIA,
`such as the IPR proceeding at issue here. By applying
`a BRI standard during IPR post-grant proceedings,
`the PTO treats previously granted patents in the same
`manner as pending applications. In re Reuter, 670 F.2d
`1015, 1019 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (reissue proceedings); 37 C.F.R.
`§ 42.100(b); Offi ce Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed.
`Reg. 48756, 48766 (Aug. 14, 2012).
`
`The BRI standard is appropriate in the patent
`prosecution context because it aids the definition of
`claim scope by casting a wide net in order to capture as
`much prior art as is necessary to determine whether to
`grant the patent. During patent prosecution, unlike in
`post-grant patent review, the claims of pending patent
`applications may be liberally amended by the applicant,
`and amendments may also be entered in conjunction with
`the applicant by the Examiner through an Examiner’s
`amendment. 37 C.F.R. 1.121; Manual of Patent Examining
`Procedure (M.P.E.P.) § 714.
`
`At this early stage of the patent application process, the
`PTO liberally allows amendments to claim language, even
`if that amendment were to have the effect of broadening a
`claim’s scope. United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co.,
`317 U.S. 228, 234 (1942). The PTO admits broad claim
`construction under BRI during the examination process
`
`

`
`5
`
`because a narrow claim interpretation (rather than BRI)
`may not capture prior art that would be implicated were
`the applicant to amend its claims through a broadening
`amendment. Throughout the patent prosecution process,
`the patent applicant enjoys a robust right to amend claim
`language “to reduce the possibility that, after the patent is
`granted, the claims may be interpreted as giving broader
`coverage than is justifi ed.” In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393,
`1404-05 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
`
`The Federal Circuit has long agreed that the use of the
`BRI standard and the applicant’s robust right to amend
`claims of a pending patent application go hand in hand.
`The court has reasoned that, because the applicant has
`the ability to make amendments to correct claim language
`or adjust the scope of claim protection as needed, the
`BRI approach serves both the public interest and the
`applicant’s interest since applicants are not foreclosed
`from obtaining coverage for their invention with express
`claim language. In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1572
`(Fed. Cir. 1984). The PTO examiner and the applicant,
`in the give and take of the examination and amendment
`process, “work toward defi ning the meets and bounds of
`the invention to be patented.” In re Buszard, 504 F.3d
`1364, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing In re Zletz, 893 F.2d
`319, 321-22 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
`
`In comparison, during IPR post-grant proceedings
`before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”), which
`occurs after a patent has been granted by the PTO, the
`patent holder has only a very limited opportunity to amend
`granted claims—specifi cally the AIA limits a post-grant
`patent holder to only a single opportunity to amend claim
`language during an IPR proceeding. 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)
`
`

`
`6
`
`(1); 37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)(3). The AIA further specifi es
`that a patent holder may only amend claim language with
`the permission of the PTO, and only after an exceptional
`showing that the amendment overcomes all prior art of
`record. Id. The AIA also bars a patent holder from fi ling
`an amendment to broaden a patent claim during an IPR
`post-grant proceeding. 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(3).
`
`2. The Alternative Standard Applied In U.S.
`District Court Litigation
`
`In contrast to the BRI standard applied by the PTO
`during patent examination and post-grant proceedings
`under the AIA, the federal district courts apply a standard
`for claim construction that gives claim language its
`“ordinary and customary” meaning and construes the
`meaning of a claim term to be “the meaning that the
`term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art
`in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips v. AWH
`Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). To
`determine the “ordinary and customary” meaning of a
`disputed claim term, federal courts begin with intrinsic
`evidence: the claims, specification, and prosecution
`history. Id. at 1313-14. Intrinsic evidence is critical because
`it “constitute[s] the public record of the patentee’s claim,
`a record on which the public is entitled to rely.” Vitronics
`Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir.
`1996). The specifi cation “is the single best guide to the
`meaning of a disputed term.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315.
`
`The “ordinary and customary” standard for construing
`claim language stems from a court’s requirement to
`“assign a fi xed, unambiguous, legally operative meaning
`to the claim.” Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d
`
`

`
`7
`
`1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Liquid Dynamics
`Corp. v. Vaughan Co., Inc., 355 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed.
`Cir. 2004)). This requirement to defi ne a fi xed zone of
`patent protection must be made through the objective
`test of the claim language itself, the language of the
`supporting disclosure, the prosecution history, and the
`intrinsic evidence; not through the broadest reasonable
`interpretation. This Court has explicitly recognized “the
`role of claims in defi ning an invention and providing public
`notice,” Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis
`Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997), and, to that end, federal
`district courts apply an objective claim construction
`standard that is, practically, more narrow than the
`BRI standard employed at the USPTO. Indeed, this
`Court has recently affi rmed that “a patent is invalid for
`indefi niteness if its claims, read in light of the specifi cation
`delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to
`inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art
`about the scope of the invention. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
`Instruments, Inc, 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014).
`
`3.
`
`Instances Where The Two Different
`Standards Of Review Had Dramatically
`Different Results As To The Same Patent
`
`Given the differing standards of claim construction—
`on the one hand, “BRI” used by the PTO during the patent
`examination and post-grant proceedings under the AIA
`and, on the other hand, the “ordinary and customary”
`meaning used by the federal district courts—the same
`patent claim may have two or more different meanings
`depending on the tribunal in which the claim is being
`reviewed.
`
`

`
`8
`
`In Fresenius USA v. Baxter Int’l, the Federal Circuit
`reviewed the same claims twice, once on appeal from the
`district court, and once on appeal from the PTO, each time
`with divergent outcomes. In the fi rst instance, the claims
`were appealed from a district court where they were
`interpreted under the “ordinary and customary” meaning
`standard and, under this standard, the court on appeal
`affi rmed the validity of the patent claims. Fresenius USA,
`Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1302 (Fed. Cir.
`2009). The court held that the claim language, “means
`for delivering the dialysate to a dialysate compartment
`of hemodialyzer,” interpreted by its ordinary meaning,
`was not shown in the structure corresponding to the
`means-plus-function claims of the prior art. Id. at 1299.
`The Federal Circuit reviewed the lower court’s claim
`construction de novo and found the disputed claims valid
`over all prior art of record. Id. at 1302. On remand, the
`district court then granted the patentee $9.305 million
`in patent infringement damages. Fresenius USA, Inc. v.
`Baxter Int’l, Inc., 2012 WL 761712, at * 16 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
`
`In the second instance, the Federal Circuit again
`reviewed the same patent and identical claim language,
`only this time on appeal from a PTO reexamination
`procedure. The Federal Circuit again reviewed the
`claim language de novo and this time upheld the PTO’s
`determination made under a BRI standard that the very
`same claims were unpatentable and invalid as obvious over
`the prior art. In re Baxter, 678 F.3d 1357, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir.
`2012). The Federal Circuit affi rmed the PTO Examiner’s
`fi nding in reexamination, under the BRI standard, that
`the claim limitation “means for delivering the dialysate”
`was obvious and invalid in view of new prior art of record,
`prior art that was notably absent from the record when the
`
`

`
`9
`
`court reviewed the district court claim construction under
`the “ordinary and customary” standard. Id. at 1364. As a
`practical matter, the fact that certain prior art references
`were captured under the BRI standard (which were absent
`before the district court) is directly attributable to the
`broader claim construction standard employed by the
`PTO during the reexamination proceedings, in contrast to
`the narrower claim construction employed before federal
`district courts. Compare In re Baxter, 678 F.3d at 1366
`(applying M.P.E.P. § 2111 Claim Interpretation; Broadest
`Reasonable Interpretation) with Fresenius USA, Inc.,
`582 F.3d at 1302 (reviewing a district court’s construction
`of disputed claim language under the “ordinary and
`customary meaning” standard).
`
`Finally, after the Federal Circuit upheld the PTO’s
`invalidation of Baxter’s patent—the very same patent that
`the Federal Circuit had earlier upheld—an appeal from
`the district court’s damages award reached the Federal
`Circuit, which then vacated the damages award. Fresenius
`USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1347 (Fed.
`Cir. 2013). Judge Newman dissented, stating in part:
`
`The loser in this tactical game of commercial
`advantage and expensive harassment is the
`innovator and the public, for it is now notorious
`that any invention of commercial value is ripe
`for not only protracted litigation but consecutive
`reexamination until the patent falls, or the
`patent or the patentee expires. The stability
`that is the foundation of the rule of law is lost,
`along with the patent-supported incentive to
`create and produce new things to public benefi t
`
`Id. at 1354 (Newman, J, dissenting).
`
`

`
`10
`
`Similarly, in Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP America,
`Inc., the Federal Circuit and the PTO reviewed identical
`patent claims and, again, reached divergent results after
`applying different standards for claim construction. In
`Versata Software, the parties maintained competing claim
`interpretations for the claim term “pricing adjustment.”
`Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc., 717 F.3d 1255,
`1263 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In the fi rst instance, the Federal
`Circuit affi rmed the lower court’s claim construction,
`which interpreted the “ordinary and customary” meaning
`of the term “pricing adjustment” to be “a denormalized
`number that may affect the determined price.” Id. at
`1263. The court then upheld the lower court’s holding
`that the disputed patent claims, interpreted under the
`“ordinary and customary” meaning standard, were valid
`and infringed, meriting a large damages award. Id. at
`1263-64.
`
`In the second instance, the accused infringer initiated
`a petition for a Covered Business Method (CBM) post-
`grant review proceeding under the AIA to challenge
`the validity of the same claim language, only this time
`using the PTO’s post-grant review proceedings before
`PTAB. The PTAB construed the same patent claims,
`including the term “pricing adjustment,” under the BRI
`standard for claim construction to determine whether
`the claims were patent-eligible and otherwise valid
`over the prior art. SAP America, Inc. v. Versata, Inc.,
`2014 WL 1252847, at * 6 (P.T.A.B. 2014). Under the BRI
`standard, the PTAB construed the same claim term
`“pricing adjustment” to mean “a price modifi cation that
`is not limited to denormalized numbers.” Id. (emphasis
`added). In view of this opposite claim construction, PTAB
`held that the disputed claims were more likely than not
`invalid and unpatentable in view of the prior art. Id. at
`
`

`
`11
`
`*15. Thus, the different claim construction standards used
`by PTAB (“broadest reasonable interpretation” or “BRI”)
`and the federal district courts (“ordinary and customary
`meaning”) led to opposite claim interpretations and,
`ultimately, divergent rulings.
`
`Under these different standards of review, the
`claims of a single patent in litigation may be given one
`interpretation before the PTO and an entirely different
`interpretation in district court litigation and on appeal.
`Such divergent outcomes undermine the principle of
`uniformity in patent law and the foundation of validity
`of patent rights. Markman v. Westview Instruments,
`Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390-91 (1996) (citing Blonder-Tongue
`Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313
`(1971)). The differing standards also create ineffi ciencies
`in resolving patent disputes that are critical for technology
`development and commercial investment. Cardinal
`Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, 508 U.S. 83, 100-102 (1993).
`For example, a patent owner who fi les suit to prevent
`infringement in a district court—where claims are often
`interpreted during a Markman hearing, see Markman,
`517 U.S. at 371—may, under the AIA, have that case
`stayed pending the result of the PTO’s IPR post-grant
`proceeding. The interpretation and construction of the
`claim terms in the Markman hearing under the “ordinary
`and customary” meaning standard may be different
`from (or even—as in Fresenius and Versata Software—
`contradictory to) the construction of the same claims by
`the PTAB under its BRI standard.
`
`Notably, in Versata Software, the district court’s
`claim construction was issued four years prior to the
`Federal Circuit’s decision affi rming that construction
`and validating the patent, and then the PTO’s claim
`
`

`
`12
`
`construction resulted in an opposite ruling a year later.
`Such protracted proceedings and seemingly haphazard
`results underscore the essential problem of using different
`standards of review in IPR proceedings before the
`PTAB versus post-grant appeal proceedings in federal
`court and, plainly, leads to an ineffi cient use of judicial
`resources. See Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP America,
`Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, Case 2:07-cv-
`00153-CE, Doc. 203, fi led 5/19/09 (E.D. Tex. 2009); 717
`F.3d 1255, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2013); and SAP America, Inc.
`v. Versata, Inc., 2014 WL 1252847, at * 6 (P.T.A.B. 2014).
`Instead, uniformity in the standard of review for post-
`grant patent claims and the application of principles of
`estoppel and stare decisis as between multiple claim
`construction rulings by and between the various tribunals
`would support judicial efficiency. See Markman, 517
`U.S. at 391. Conversely, the differing claim construction
`standards currently employed by the PTAB and federal
`district courts with respect to post-grant patent claims
`not only undermine the stated goal of uniformity in patent
`law, Id. but also the fi nality of judgments with respect to
`particular post-grant patent claims, Cardinal Chem. Co.,
`508 U.S. at 100-102, as well as the Patent Act’s statutory
`presumption that all patents granted by the PTO are
`valid as against potential infringers and the public. In re
`Yamamoto, 740 F.2d at 1570-72.
`
`In order to prevent the confusion of divergent holdings
`and interpretations of the same claim language, the
`PTO during IPR proceedings and the district courts
`should use the same claim construction standard. As one
`commentator notes:
`
`

`
`13
`
`[T]he use of two standards, one for the court
`and one for the PTAB, creates considerable
`inefficiency. If both tribunals used the
`same rule, the PTAB could dispense with
`claim construction in any case in which the
`district court had already interpreted claims.
`Conversely, construction by the technologically
`sophisticated experts at the PTAB would
`provide a wealth of information to district
`courts later considering the same or related
`claim

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