`(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2020
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`
`
` Syllabus
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` CEDAR POINT NURSERY ET AL. v. HASSID ET AL.
`
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE NINTH CIRCUIT
` No. 20–107. Argued March 22, 2021—Decided June 23, 2021
`
`A California regulation grants labor organizations a “right to take ac-
`
`
`cess” to an agricultural employer’s property in order to solicit support
`for unionization. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §20900(e)(1)(C). The regula-
`
`tion mandates that agricultural employers allow union organizers onto
`their property for up to three hours per day, 120 days per year. Or-
`ganizers from the United Farm Workers sought to take access to prop-
`
`erty owned by two California growers—Cedar Point Nursery and
`
`Fowler Packing Company. The growers filed suit in Federal District
`Court seeking to enjoin enforcement of the access regulation on the
`
`grounds that it appropriated without compensation an easement for
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`union organizers to enter their property and therefore constituted an
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`unconstitutional per se physical taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth
`Amendments. The District Court denied the growers’ motion for a pre-
`liminary injunction and dismissed the complaint, holding that the ac-
`
`cess regulation did not constitute a per se physical taking because it
`did not allow the public to access the growers’ property in a permanent
`and continuous manner. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for
`the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and rehearing en banc was denied over dis-
`
`sent.
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`
`
`Held: California’s access regulation constitutes a per se physical taking.
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`Pp. 4–20.
`
`(a) The growers’ complaint states a claim for an uncompensated tak-
`
`ing in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 4–17.
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`
`
`
`(1) The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the
`States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: “[N]or shall pri-
`
`vate property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
`When the government physically acquires private property for a public
`use, the Takings Clause obligates the government to provide the owner
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`

`2
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`CEDAR POINT NURSERY v. HASSID
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`
`Syllabus
`with just compensation. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Ta-
`
`hoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U. S. 302, 321. The Court assesses
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`such physical takings using a per se rule: The government must pay
`
`
`for what it takes. Id., at 322.
`
`
`A different standard applies when the government, rather than ap-
`propriating private property for itself or a third party, instead imposes
`
`regulations restricting an owner’s ability to use his own property. Id.,
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`
`at 321–322. To determine whether such a use restriction amounts to
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`a taking, the Court has generally applied the flexible approach set
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`forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S.
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`104, considering factors such as the economic impact of the regulation,
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`its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and
`the character of the government action. Id., at 124. But when the
`government physically appropriates property, Penn Central has no
`place—regardless whether the government action takes the form of a
`regulation, statute, ordinance, or decree. Pp. 4–7.
`
`
`
`(2) California’s access regulation appropriates a right to invade
`the growers’ property and therefore constitutes a per se physical tak-
`ing. Rather than restraining the growers’ use of their own property,
`the regulation appropriates for the enjoyment of third parties (here
`union organizers) the owners’ right to exclude. The right to exclude is
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`“a fundamental element of the property right.” Kaiser Aetna v. United
`
`States, 444 U. S. 164, 179–180. The Court’s precedents have thus
`treated government-authorized physical invasions as takings requir-
`ing just compensation. As in previous cases, the government here has
`appropriated a right of access to private property. Because the regu-
`lation appropriates a right to physically invade the growers’ prop-
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`erty—to literally “take access”—it constitutes a per se physical taking
`under the Court’s precedents. Pp. 7–10.
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`
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`(3) The view that the access regulation cannot qualify as a per se
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`taking because it does not allow for permanent and continuous access
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`24 hours a day, 365 days a year is insupportable. The Court has held
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`that a physical appropriation is a taking whether it is permanent or
`temporary; the duration of the appropriation bears only on the amount
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`of compensation due. See United States v. Dow, 357 U. S. 17, 26. To
`
`
`be sure, the Court in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
`
`
`458 U. S. 419, discussed the heightened concerns associated with “[t]he
`permanence and absolute exclusivity of a physical occupation” in con-
`trast to “temporary limitations on the right to exclude,” and stated that
`
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`“[n]ot every physical invasion is a taking.” Id., at 435, n. 12. But the
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`regulation here is not transformed from a physical taking into a use
`
`restriction just because the access granted is restricted to union organ-
`izers, for a narrow purpose, and for a limited time. And although the
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`3
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`Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
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`Syllabus
`Board disputes whether the access regulation appropriates an ease-
`ment as defined by California law, it cannot absolve itself of takings
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`liability by appropriating the growers’ right to exclude in a form that
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`is a slight mismatch from state property law.
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`
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`PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, does not cut
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`against the Court’s conclusion that the access regulation constitutes a
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`per se taking. In PruneYard the California Supreme Court recognized
`a right to engage in leafleting at the PruneYard, a privately owned
`shopping center, and the Court applied the Penn Central factors to
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`hold that no compensable taking had occurred. 447 U. S., at 78, 83.
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`PruneYard does not establish that limited rights of access to private
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`
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`property should be evaluated as regulatory rather than per se takings.
`
`Restrictions on how a business generally open to the public such as the
`PruneYard may treat individuals on the premises are readily distin-
`guishable from regulations granting a right to invade property closed
`to the public. Pp. 10–15.
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`
`
`(4) The Court declines to adopt the theory that the access regula-
`tion merely regulates, and does not appropriate, the growers’ right to
`exclude. The right to exclude is not an empty formality that can be
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`modified at the government’s pleasure. Pp. 15–17.
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`(b) The Board’s fear that treating the access regulation as a per se
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`physical taking will endanger a host of state and federal government
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`activities involving entry onto private property is unfounded. First, the
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`Court’s holding does nothing to efface the distinction between trespass
`and takings. The Court’s precedents make clear that isolated physical
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`invasions, not undertaken pursuant to a granted right of access, are
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`properly assessed as individual torts rather than appropriations of a
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`property right. Second, many government-authorized physical inva-
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`
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`sions will not amount to takings because they are consistent with
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`longstanding background restrictions on property rights, including tra-
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`ditional common law privileges to access private property. See Lucas v.
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`
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`South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1028–1029. Third, the
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`government may require property owners to cede a right of access as a
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`condition of receiving certain benefits, without causing a taking. Un-
`
`der this framework, government health and safety inspection regimes
`will generally not constitute takings. In this case, however, none of
`these considerations undermine the Court’s determination that the ac-
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`cess regulation gives rise to a per se physical taking. Pp. 17–20.
`923 F. 3d 524, reversed and remanded.
`ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS,
`ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. KAVANAUGH, J.,
`
`filed a concurring opinion. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
`which SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ., joined.
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`

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` Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
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`Opinion of the Court
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
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` corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 20–107
`_________________
`
` CEDAR POINT NURSERY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
` VICTORIA HASSID, ET AL.
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`[June 23, 2021]
`CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the
`Court.
`
`A California regulation grants labor organizations a
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`“right to take access” to an agricultural employer’s property
`
`in order to solicit support for unionization. Cal. Code Regs.,
`
`tit. 8, §20900(e)(1)(C) (2020). Agricultural employers must
`allow union organizers onto their property for up to three
`
`
`hours per day, 120 days per year. The question presented
`is whether the access regulation constitutes a per se physi-
`cal taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
`I
`
`
`The California Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975
`gives agricultural employees a right to self-organization
`and makes it an unfair labor practice for employers to in-
`
`terfere with that right. Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §§1152, 1153(a)
`(West 2020). The state Agricultural Labor Relations Board
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`has promulgated a regulation providing, in its current form,
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`that the self-organization rights of employees include “the
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`right of access by union organizers to the premises of an
`agricultural employer for the purpose of meeting and talk-
`
`ing with employees and soliciting their support.” Cal. Code
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`

`

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` CEDAR POINT NURSERY v. HASSID
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Regs., tit. 8, §20900(e). Under the regulation, a labor or-
`ganization may “take access” to an agricultural employer’s
`property for up to four 30-day periods in one calendar year.
`§§20900(e)(1)(A), (B). In order to take access, a labor organ-
`
`ization must file a written notice with the Board and serve
`
`a copy on the employer. §20900(e)(1)(B). Two organizers
`per work crew (plus one additional organizer for every 15
`workers over 30 workers in a crew) may enter the em-
`ployer’s property for up to one hour before work, one hour
`
`during the lunch break, and one hour after work.
`§§20900(e)(3)(A)–(B), (4)(A). Organizers may not engage in
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`disruptive conduct, but are otherwise free to meet and talk
`with employees as they wish. §§20900(e)(3)(A), (4)(C). In-
`terference with organizers’ right of access may constitute
`an unfair labor practice, §20900(e)(5)(C), which can result
`in sanctions against the employer, see, e.g., Harry Carian
`
`
`Sales v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 39 Cal. 3d 209,
`231–232, 703 P. 2d 27, 42 (1985).
`
`
`Cedar Point Nursery is a strawberry grower in northern
`California.
`It employs over 400 seasonal workers and
`around 100 full-time workers, none of whom live on the
`
`property. According to the complaint, in October 2015, at
`five o’clock one morning, members of the United Farm
`Workers entered Cedar Point’s property without prior no-
`tice. The organizers moved to the nursery’s trim shed,
`where hundreds of workers were preparing strawberry
`plants. Calling through bullhorns, the organizers disturbed
`operations, causing some workers to join the organizers in
`a protest and others to leave the worksite altogether. Cedar
`
`Point filed a charge against the union for taking access
`
`without giving notice. The union responded with a charge
`of its own, alleging that Cedar Point had committed an un-
`
`fair labor practice.
`
`Fowler Packing Company is a Fresno-based grower and
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`shipper of table grapes and citrus. It has 1,800 to 2,500
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`3
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` Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
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`Opinion of the Court
`employees in its field operations and around 500 in its pack-
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`ing facility. As with Cedar Point, none of Fowler’s workers
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`live on the premises. In July 2015, organizers from the
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`United Farm Workers attempted to take access to Fowler’s
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`property, but the company blocked them from entering.
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`The union filed an unfair labor practice charge against
`Fowler, which it later withdrew.
`
`
`Believing that the union would likely attempt to enter
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`their property again in the near future, the growers filed
`suit in Federal District Court against several Board mem-
`bers in their official capacity. The growers argued that the
`access regulation effected an unconstitutional per se physi-
`
`cal taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by
`appropriating without compensation an easement for union
`organizers to enter their property. They requested declar-
`atory and injunctive relief prohibiting the Board from en-
`forcing the regulation against them.
`
`The District Court denied the growers’ motion for a pre-
`liminary injunction and granted the Board’s motion to dis-
`miss. The court rejected the growers’ argument that the
`access regulation constituted a per se physical taking, rea-
`soning that it did not “allow the public to access their prop-
`
`erty in a permanent and continuous manner for whatever
`reason.” Cedar Point Nursery v. Gould, 2016 WL 1559271,
`
`*5 (ED Cal., Apr. 18, 2016) (emphasis deleted). In the
`court’s view, the regulation was instead subject to evalua-
`tion under the multifactor balancing test of Penn Central
`
`Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978),
`which the growers had made no attempt to satisfy. Cedar
`
`Point Nursery v. Gould, 2016 WL 3549408, *4 (ED Cal.,
`June 29, 2016).
`
`A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
`cuit affirmed. The court identified three categories of regu-
`
`latory actions in takings jurisprudence: regulations that
`impose permanent physical invasions, regulations that de-
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`4
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` CEDAR POINT NURSERY v. HASSID
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`Opinion of the Court
`prive an owner of all economically beneficial use of his prop-
`erty, and the remainder of regulatory actions. Cedar Point
`
`Nursery v. Shiroma, 923 F. 3d 524, 530–531 (2019). On the
`court’s understanding, while regulations in the first two
`
`
`categories constitute per se takings, those in the third must
`be evaluated under Penn Central. 923 F. 3d, at 531. The
`court agreed with the District Court that the access regula-
`tion did not fall into the first category because it did not
`“allow random members of the public to unpredictably trav-
`erse [the growers’] property 24 hours a day, 365 days a
`year.” Id., at 532. And given that the growers did not con-
`tend that the regulation deprived them of all economically
`beneficial use of their property, per se treatment was inap-
`propriate. Id., at 531, 534.
`
`
`Judge Leavy dissented. He observed that this Court had
`never allowed labor organizers to enter an employer’s prop-
`erty for substantial periods of time when its employees
`lived off premises. Id., at 536; see Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,
`502 U. S. 527, 540–541 (1992); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
`
`
`
`Co., 351 U. S. 105, 113 (1956). As he saw it, the regulation
`constituted a physical occupation and therefore effected a
`per se taking. 923 F. 3d, at 538.
`
`
`The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc. Judge Ikuta
`dissented, joined by seven other judges. She reasoned that
`the access regulation appropriated from the growers a tra-
`ditional form of private property—an easement in gross—
`and transferred that property to union organizers. Cedar
`
`
`Point Nursery v. Shiroma, 956 F. 3d 1162, 1168, 1171
`(2020). The appropriation of such an easement, she con-
`cluded, constituted a per se physical taking under the prec-
`edents of this Court. Id., at 1168.
`
`
`We granted certiorari. 592 U. S. ___ (2020).
`
`II
`A
`
`The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable
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`

`5
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` Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, pro-
`vides: “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
`
`without just compensation.” The Founders recognized that
`
`the protection of private property is indispensable to the
`promotion of individual freedom. As John Adams tersely
`
`put it, “[p]roperty must be secured, or liberty cannot exist.”
`
`Discourses on Davila, in 6 Works of John Adams 280
`(C. Adams ed. 1851). This Court agrees, having noted that
`protection of property rights is “necessary to preserve free-
`
`dom” and “empowers persons to shape and to plan their own
`
`destiny in a world where governments are always eager to
`
`do so for them.” Murr v. Wisconsin, 582 U. S. ___, ___ (2017)
`(slip op., at 8).
`
`When the government physically acquires private prop-
`erty for a public use, the Takings Clause imposes a clear
`
`and categorical obligation to provide the owner with just
`
`compensation. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v.
`
`Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U. S. 302, 321 (2002).
`The Court’s physical takings jurisprudence is “as old as the
`
`Republic.” Id., at 322. The government commits a physical
`
`taking when it uses its power of eminent domain to formally
`condemn property. See United States v. General Motors
`Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 374–375 (1945); United States ex rel.
`TVA v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266, 270–271 (1943). The same
`
`is true when the government physically takes possession of
`property without acquiring title to it. See United States v.
`
`Pewee Coal Co., 341 U. S. 114, 115–117 (1951) (plurality
`
`opinion). And the government likewise effects a physical
`taking when it occupies property—say, by recurring flood-
`ing as a result of building a dam. See United States v. Cress,
`243 U. S. 316, 327–328 (1917). These sorts of physical ap-
`
`propriations constitute the “clearest sort of taking,”
`Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U. S. 606, 617 (2001), and
`
`we assess them using a simple, per se rule: The government
`
`must pay for what it takes. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U. S., at
`322.
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`

`6
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` CEDAR POINT NURSERY v. HASSID
`
`Opinion of the Court
`When the government, rather than appropriating private
`
`
`property for itself or a third party, instead imposes regula-
`tions that restrict an owner’s ability to use his own prop-
`erty, a different standard applies. Id., at 321–322. Our ju-
`risprudence governing such use restrictions has developed
`
`more recently. Before the 20th century, the Takings Clause
`was understood to be limited to physical appropriations of
`property. See Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 576 U. S.
`
`351, 360 (2015); Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 551
`(1871). In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393
`
`(1922), however, the Court established the proposition that
`“while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if reg-
`ulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Id.,
`at 415. This framework now applies to use restrictions as
`
`varied as zoning ordinances, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Re-
`alty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 387–388 (1926), orders barring the
`
`mining of gold, United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co.,
`357 U. S. 155, 168 (1958), and regulations prohibiting the
`sale of eagle feathers, Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 65–66
`(1979). To determine whether a use restriction effects a
`taking, this Court has generally applied the flexible test de-
`veloped in Penn Central, balancing factors such as the eco-
`nomic impact of the regulation, its interference with rea-
`sonable investment-backed expectations, and the character
`of the government action. 438 U. S., at 124.
`
`
`Our cases have often described use restrictions that go
`
`“too far” as “regulatory takings.” See, e.g., Horne, 576 U. S.,
`at 360; Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 527 (1992). But
`that label can mislead. Government action that physically
`appropriates property is no less a physical taking because
`it arises from a regulation. That explains why we held that
`
`an administrative reserve requirement compelling raisin
`
`growers to physically set aside a percentage of their crop for
`the government constituted a physical rather than a regu-
`latory taking. Horne, 576 U. S., at 361. The essential ques-
`
`tion is not, as the Ninth Circuit seemed to think, whether
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`

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`7
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` Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`the government action at issue comes garbed as a regula-
`tion (or statute, or ordinance, or miscellaneous decree). It
`is whether the government has physically taken property
`for itself or someone else—by whatever means—or has in-
`stead restricted a property owner’s ability to use his own
`property. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U. S., at 321–323. When-
`ever a regulation results in a physical appropriation of
`
`property, a per se taking has occurred, and Penn Central
`has no place.
`
`
`
`B
`The access regulation appropriates a right to invade the
`
`growers’ property and therefore constitutes a per se physi-
`cal taking. The regulation grants union organizers a right
`to physically enter and occupy the growers’ land for three
`hours per day, 120 days per year. Rather than restraining
`the growers’ use of their own property, the regulation ap-
`propriates for the enjoyment of third parties the owners’
`right to exclude.
`
`
`The right to exclude is “one of the most treasured” rights
`of property ownership. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
`
`CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 435 (1982). According to Black-
`
`stone, the very idea of property entails “that sole and des-
`potic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
`external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right
`
`of any other individual in the universe.” 2 W. Blackstone,
`
`Commentaries on the Laws of England 2 (1766). In less
`exuberant terms, we have stated that the right to exclude
`is “universally held to be a fundamental element of the
`
`property right,” and is “one of the most essential sticks in
`the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
`
`property.” Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164,
`
`176, 179–180 (1979); see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S.
`374, 384, 393 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n,
`483 U. S. 825, 831 (1987); see also Merrill, Property and the
`Right to Exclude, 77 Neb. L. Rev. 730 (1998) (calling the
`
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`

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` CEDAR POINT NURSERY v. HASSID
`
`Opinion of the Court
`right to exclude the “sine qua non” of property).
`
`Given the central importance to property ownership of
`the right to exclude, it comes as little surprise that the
`Court has long treated government-authorized physical in-
`vasions as takings requiring just compensation. The Court
`has often described the property interest taken as a servi-
`
`tude or an easement.
`
`For example, in United States v. Causby we held that the
`
`invasion of private property by overflights effected a taking.
`328 U. S. 256 (1946). The government frequently flew mil-
`itary aircraft low over the Causby farm, grazing the
`treetops and terrorizing the poultry. Id., at 259. The Court
`observed that ownership of the land extended to airspace
`that low, and that “invasions of it are in the same category
`as invasions of the surface.” Id., at 265. Because the dam-
`ages suffered by the Causbys “were the product of a direct
`
`invasion of [their] domain,” we held that “a servitude has
`
`been imposed upon the land.” Id., at 265–266, 267; see also
`Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260
`
`U. S. 327, 330 (1922) (government assertion of a right to fire
`coastal defense guns across private property would consti-
`tute a taking).
`
`
`We similarly held that the appropriation of an easement
`effected a taking in Kaiser Aetna v. United States. A real-
`estate developer dredged a pond, converted it into a marina,
`
`and connected it to a nearby bay and the ocean. 444 U. S.,
`at 167. The government asserted that the developer could
`not exclude the public from the marina because the pond
`
`had become a navigable water. Id., at 168. We held that
`
`the right to exclude “falls within [the] category of interests
`
`that the Government cannot take without compensation.”
`Id., at 180. After noting that “the imposition of the naviga-
`tional servitude” would “result in an actual physical inva-
`sion of the privately owned marina” by members of the pub-
`lic, we cited Causby and Portsmouth for the proposition that
`
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`8
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`Opinion of the Court
`“even if the Government physically invades only an ease-
`ment in property, it must nonetheless pay just compensa-
`tion.” 444 U. S., at 180.
`In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., we
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`made clear that a permanent physical occupation consti-
`tutes a per se taking regardless whether it results in only a
`trivial economic loss. New York adopted a law requiring
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`landlords to allow cable companies to install equipment on
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`their properties. 458 U. S., at 423. Loretto alleged that the
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`installation of a ½-inch diameter cable and two 1½-cubic-
`foot boxes on her roof caused a taking. Id., at 424. We
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`agreed, stating that where government action results in a
`“permanent physical occupation of property, our cases uni-
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`formly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation,
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`without regard to whether the action achieves an important
`public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the
`owner.” Id., at 434–435.
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`We reiterated that the appropriation of an easement con-
`stitutes a physical taking in Nollan v. California Coastal
`Commission. The Nollans sought a permit to build a larger
`home on their beachfront lot. 483 U. S., at 828. The Cali-
`fornia Coastal Commission issued the permit subject to the
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`condition that the Nollans grant the public an easement to
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`pass through their property along the beach. Ibid. As a
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`starting point to our analysis, we explained that, had the
`Commission simply required the Nollans to grant the public
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`an easement across their property, “we have no doubt there
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`would have been a taking.” Id., at 831; see also Dolan, 512
`U. S., at 384 (holding that compelled dedication of an ease-
`ment for public use would constitute a taking).
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`More recently, in Horne v. Department of Agriculture, we
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`observed that “people still do not expect their property, real
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`or personal, to be actually occupied or taken away.” 576
`U. S., at 361. The physical appropriation by the govern-
`ment of the raisins in that case was a per se taking, even if
`a regulatory limit with the same economic impact would not
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` CEDAR POINT NURSERY v. HASSID
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`Opinion of the Court
` have been. Id., at 362; see supra, at 6. “The Constitution,”
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`we explained, “is concerned with means as well as ends.”
`576 U. S., at 362.
`The upshot of this line of precedent is that government-
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`authorized invasions of property—whether by plane, boat,
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`cable, or beachcomber—are physical takings requiring just
`compensation. As in those cases, the government here has
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`appropriated a right of access to the growers’ property, al-
`lowing union organizers to traverse it at will for three hours
`a day, 120 days a year. The regulation appropriates a right
`to physically invade the growers’ property—to literally
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`“take access,” as the regulation provides. Cal. Code Regs.,
`tit. 8, §20900(e)(1)(C). It is therefore a per se physical tak-
`ing under our precedents. Accordingly, the growers’ com-
`plaint states a claim for an uncompensated taking in viola-
`tion of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
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`The Ninth Circuit saw matters differently, as do the
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`Board and the dissent. In the decision below, the Ninth
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`Circuit took the view that the access regulation did not
`qualify as a per se taking because, although it grants a right
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`to physically invade the growers’ property, it does not allow
`for permanent and continuous access “24 hours a day, 365
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`days a year.” 923 F. 3d, at 532 (citing Nollan, 483 U. S., at
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`832). The dissent likewise concludes that the regulation
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`cannot amount to a per se taking because it allows “access
`short of 365 days a year.” Post, at 11 (opinion of BREYER,
`J.). That position is insupportable as a matter of precedent
`and common sense. There is no reason the law should ana-
`lyze an abrogation of the right to exclude in one manner if
`it extends for 365 days, but in an entirely different manner
`if it lasts for 364.
`To begin with, we have held that a physical appropriation
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`is a taking whether it is permanent or temporary. Our
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`cases establish that “compensation is mandated when a
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` Cite as: 594 U. S. ____ (2021)
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`Opinion of the Court
`leasehold is taken and the government occupies property
`for its own purposes, even though that use is temporary.”
`Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U. S., at 322 (citing General Motors
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`Corp., 323 U. S. 373; United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327
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`U. S. 372 (1946)). The duration of an appropriation—just
`like the size of an appropriation, see Loretto, 458 U. S., at
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`436–437—bears only on the amount of compensation. See
`United States v. Dow, 357 U. S. 17, 26 (1958). For example,
`after finding a taking by physical invasion, the Court in
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`Causby remanded the case to the lower court to determine
`“whether the easement taken was temporary or perma-
`nent,” in order to fix the compensation due. 328 U. S., at
`267–268.
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`To be sure, Loretto emphasized the heightened concerns
`associated with “[t]he permanence and absolute exclusivity
`of a physical occupation” in contrast to “temporary limita-
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`tions on the right to exclude,” and stated that “[n]ot every
`physical invasion is a taking.” 458 U. S., at 435, n. 12; see
`also id., at 432–435. The latter point is well taken, as we
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`will explain. But Nollan clarified that appropriation of a
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`right to physically invade property may constitute a taking
`“even though no particular individual is permitted to sta-
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`tion himself permanently upon the premises.” 483 U. S., at
`832.
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`Next, we have recognized that physical invasions consti-
`tute takings even if they are intermittent as opposed to con-
`tinuous. Causby held that overflights of private property
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`effected a taking, even though they occurred on only 4% of
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`takeoffs and 7% of landings at the nearby airport. 328
`U. S., at 259. And while Nollan happened to involve a le-
`gally continuous right of access, we have no doubt that the
`Court would have reached the same conclusion if the ease-
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`ment demanded by the Commission had lasted for only 364
`days per year. After all, the easement was hardly continu-
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`ous as a practical matter. As Justice Brennan observed in
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` CEDAR POINT NURSERY v. HASSID
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`Opinion of the Court
`dissent, given the shifting tides, “public passage for a por-
`tion of the year would either be impossible or would not oc-
`cur on [the Nollans’] property.” 483 U. S., at 854. What
`matters is not that the easement notionally ran round the
`clock, but that the government had taken a right to physi-
`cally invade the Nollans’ land. And when the government
`physically takes an interest in property, it must pay for the
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`right to do so. See Horne, 576 U. S., at 357–358; Tahoe-
`Sierra, 535 U. S., at 322. The fact that a right to take access
`is exercised only from time to time does not make it any less
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`a physical taking.
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`Even the Board declines to defend the Ninth Circuit’s ab-
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`solutist stance. It prudently concedes that “a requirement
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`that landowners grant an easement otherwise identical to
`the one in Nollan but limited to daylight hours, might very
`well qualify as ‘a taking without regard to other factors that
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`a court might ordinarily examine.’” Brief for Respondents
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`25–26 (quoting Loretto, 458 U. S., at 432; citation and some
`internal quotation marks omitted). But the access regula-
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`tion, it contends, nevertheless fails to