(Slip Opinion)
`
`OCTOBER TERM, 2022
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
`NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`Syllabus
`
`MALLORY v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO.
`CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA,
`EASTERN DISTRICT
`No. 21–1168. Argued November 8, 2022—Decided June 27, 2023
`Robert Mallory worked for Norfolk Southern as a freight-car mechanic
`for nearly 20 years, first in Ohio, then in Virginia. After he left the
`company, Mr. Mallory moved to Pennsylvania for a period before re-
`turning to Virginia. Along the way he was diagnosed with cancer. Be-
`cause he attributed his illness to his work at Norfolk Southern, Mr.
`Mallory sued his former employer under the Federal Employers’ Lia-
`bility Act, 45 U. S. C. §§51–60, a federal workers’ compensation scheme
`permitting railroad employees to recover damages for their employers’
`negligence. Mr. Mallory filed his lawsuit in Pennsylvania state court.
`Norfolk Southern—a company incorporated in Virginia and headquar-
`tered there—resisted the suit on the basis that a Pennsylvania court’s
`exercise of personal jurisdiction over it would offend the Due Process
`Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Norfolk Southern noted that
`when the complaint was filed, Mr. Mallory resided in Virginia, and the
`complaint alleged that Mr. Mallory was exposed to carcinogens only in
`Ohio and Virginia. Mr. Mallory pointed to Norfolk Southern’s presence
`in Pennsylvania, noting that Norfolk Southern manages over 2,000
`miles of track, operates 11 rail yards, and runs 3 locomotive repair
`shops in Pennsylvania. In fact, Norfolk Southern has registered to do
`business in Pennsylvania in light of its “ ‘regular, systematic, [and] ex-
`tensive’ ” operations there. 266 A. 3d 542, 562; see 15 Pa. Cons. Stat.
`§411(a). And Pennsylvania requires out-of-state companies that reg-
`ister to do business in the Commonwealth to agree to appear in its
`courts on “any cause of action” against them. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
`§5301(a)(2)(i), (b). By complying with this statutory scheme, Mr. Mal-
`lory submitted, Norfolk Southern had consented to suit in Pennsylva-
`nia on claims just like his.
` The Pennsylvania Supreme Court sided with Norfolk Southern.
`
`
`
`

`

`2
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`
`MALLORY v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO.
`
`Syllabus
`That court found that the Pennsylvania law—requiring an out-of-state
`firm to answer in the Commonwealth any suits against it in exchange
`for status as a registered foreign corporation and the benefits that en-
`tails—violates the Due Process Clause.
`Held: The judgment is vacated, and the case remanded. This case is con-
`trolled by Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Min-
`ing & Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93. Much like the Missouri law that the
`Court in Pennsylvania Fire found to comport with the Due Process
`Clause, the Pennsylvania law at issue here provides that an out-of-
`state corporation “may not do business in this Commonwealth until it
`registers with” the Department of State. 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. §411(a).
`Among other things, Pennsylvania law is explicit that “qualification as
`a foreign corporation” shall permit state courts to “exercise general
`personal jurisdiction” over a registered foreign corporation, just as
`they can over domestic corporations. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5301(a)(2).
`Norfolk Southern has complied with this law since 1998, when it reg-
`istered to do business in Pennsylvania. Norfolk Southern applied for
`a “Certificate of Authority” from the Commonwealth which, once ap-
`proved, conferred on Norfolk Southern both the benefits and burdens
`shared by domestic corporations, including amenability to suit in state
`court on any claim. For more than two decades, Norfolk Southern has
`agreed to be found in Pennsylvania and answer any suit there.
` Pennsylvania Fire held that suits premised on these grounds do not
`deny a defendant due process of law. Mr. Mallory no longer lives in
`Pennsylvania and his cause of action did not accrue there. But none
`of that makes any difference. To decide this case, the Court need not
`speculate whether any other statutory scheme and set of facts would
`suffice to establish consent to suit. It is enough to acknowledge that
`the state law and facts before the Court fall squarely within Pennsyl-
`vania Fire’s rule.
` In the proceedings below, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court seemed
`to recognize that Pennsylvania Fire dictated an answer in Mr. Mal-
`lory’s favor but ruled for Norfolk Southern because, in its view, inter-
`vening decisions from this Court had “implicitly overruled” Pennsylva-
`nia Fire. See 266 A. 3d, at 559, 567. That was error. As this Court
`has explained: “If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a
`case,” as Pennsylvania Fire does here, a lower court “should follow the
`case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of
`overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Amer-
`ican Express, Inc., 490 U. S. 477, 484. This is true even if the lower
`court thinks the precedent is in tension with “some other line of deci-
`sions.” Ibid. Pp. 10–12.
`266 A. 3d 542, vacated and remanded.
`
`

`

`
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`Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)
`
`Syllabus
`
`3
`
` GORSUCH, J., announced the judgment of the Court, delivered the opin-
`ion of the Court with respect to Parts I and III–B, in which THOMAS,
`ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, and JACKSON, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect
`to Parts II, III–A, and IV, in which THOMAS, SOTOMAYOR, and JACKSON,
`JJ., joined. JACKSON, J., filed a concurring opinion. ALITO, J., filed an
`opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. BARRETT, J.,
`filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KAGAN and KA-
`VANAUGH, JJ., joined.
`
`

`

`
`
`Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
`Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
`pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`No. 21–1168
`_________________
`ROBERT MALLORY, PETITIONER v. NORFOLK
`SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO.
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
`PENNSYLVANIA, EASTERN DISTRICT
`[June 27, 2023]
` JUSTICE GORSUCH announced the judgment of the Court
`and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts
`I and III–B, and an opinion with respect to Parts II, III–A,
`and IV, in which JUSTICE THOMAS, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR,
`and JUSTICE JACKSON join.
` Imagine a lawsuit based on recent events. A few months
`ago, a Norfolk Southern train derailed in Ohio near the
`Pennsylvania border. Its cargo? Hazardous chemicals.
`Some poured into a nearby creek; some burst into flames.
`In the aftermath, many residents reported unusual symp-
`toms.1 Suppose an Ohio resident sued the train conductor
`seeking compensation for an illness attributed to the acci-
`dent. Suppose, too, that the plaintiff served his complaint
`on the conductor across the border in Pennsylvania. Eve-
`ryone before us agrees a Pennsylvania court could hear that
`lawsuit consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Four-
`teenth Amendment. The court could do so even if the con-
`ductor was a Virginia resident who just happened to be
`passing through Pennsylvania when the process server
`——————
`1 See U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, East Palestine, Ohio
`Train Derailment (June 21, 2023), https://www.epa.gov/east-palestine-
`oh-train-derailment.
`
`

`

`2
`
`
`MALLORY v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO.
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`caught up with him.
` Now, change the hypothetical slightly. Imagine the same
`Ohio resident brought the same suit in the same Pennsyl-
`vania state court, but this time against Norfolk Southern.
`Assume, too, the company has filed paperwork consenting
`to appear in Pennsylvania courts as a condition of register-
`ing to do business in the Commonwealth. Could a Pennsyl-
`vania court hear that case too? You might think so. But
`today, Norfolk Southern argues that the Due Process
`Clause entitles it to a more favorable rule, one shielding it
`from suits even its employees must answer. We reject the
`company’s argument. Nothing in the Due Process Clause
`requires such an incongruous result.
`I
` Robert Mallory worked for Norfolk Southern as a freight-
`car mechanic for nearly 20 years, first in Ohio, then in Vir-
`ginia. During his time with the company, Mr. Mallory
`contends, he was responsible for spraying boxcar pipes
`with asbestos and handling chemicals in the railroad’s
`paint shop. He also demolished car interiors that, he al-
`leges, contained carcinogens.
` After Mr. Mallory left the company, he moved to Pennsyl-
`vania for a period before returning to Virginia. Along the
`way, he was diagnosed with cancer. Attributing his illness
`to his work for Norfolk Southern, Mr. Mallory hired Penn-
`sylvania lawyers and sued his former employer in Pennsyl-
`vania state court under the Federal Employers’ Liability
`Act, 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§51–60. That law
`creates a workers’ compensation scheme permitting rail-
`road employees to recover damages for their employers’
`negligence. See Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Sorrell, 549
`U. S. 158, 165–166 (2007).
` Norfolk Southern resisted Mr. Mallory’s suit on constitu-
`tional grounds. By the time he filed his complaint, the com-
`
`

`

`
`
`3
`
`Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`pany observed, Mr. Mallory resided in Virginia. His com-
`plaint alleged that he was exposed to carcinogens in Ohio
`and Virginia. Meanwhile, the company itself was incorpo-
`rated in Virginia and had its headquarters there too.2 On
`these facts, Norfolk Southern submitted, any effort by a
`Pennsylvania court to exercise personal jurisdiction over it
`would offend the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
`Amendment.
` Mr. Mallory saw things differently. He noted that Nor-
`folk Southern manages over 2,000 miles of track, operates
`11 rail yards, and runs 3 locomotive repair shops in Penn-
`sylvania. He also pointed out that Norfolk Southern has
`registered to do business in Pennsylvania in light of its
`“ ‘regular, systematic, [and] extensive’ ” operations there.
`266 A. 3d 542, 562 (Pa. 2021); see 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. §411(a)
`(2014). That is significant, Mr. Mallory argued, because
`Pennsylvania requires out-of-state companies that register
`to do business in the Commonwealth to agree to appear in
`its courts on “any cause of action” against them. 42 Pa.
`Cons. Stat. §5301(a)(2)(i), (b) (2019); see 266 A. 3d, at 564.
`By complying with this statutory scheme, Mr. Mallory con-
`tended, Norfolk Southern had consented to suit in Pennsyl-
`vania on claims just like his.
` Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sided with
`Norfolk Southern. Yes, Mr. Mallory correctly read Pennsyl-
`vania law. It requires an out-of-state firm to answer any
`suits against it in exchange for status as a registered for-
`eign corporation and the benefits that entails. 266 A. 3d, at
`561–563. But, no, the court held, Mr. Mallory could not in-
`voke that law because it violates the Due Process Clause.
`Id., at 564–568. In reaching this conclusion, the Pennsyl-
`vania Supreme Court acknowledged its disagreement with
`the Georgia Supreme Court, which had recently rejected a
`——————
`2 After Mr. Mallory commenced this suit, Norfolk Southern relocated
`its headquarters to Georgia. See Brief for Respondent 5.
`
`

`

`4
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`MALLORY v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO.
`
`Opinion of the Court
`similar due process argument from a corporate defendant.
`Id., at 560, n. 13 (citing Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. McCall,
`312 Ga. 422, 863 S. E. 2d 81 (2021)).
` In light of this split of authority, we agreed to hear this
`case and decide whether the Due Process Clause of the
`Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from requiring an
`out-of-state corporation to consent to personal jurisdiction
`to do business there. 596 U. S. ___ (2022).3
`II
` The question before us is not a new one. In truth, it is a
`very old question—and one this Court resolved in Pennsyl-
`vania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining &
`Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93 (1917). There, the Court unani-
`mously held that laws like Pennsylvania’s comport with the
`Due Process Clause. Some background helps explain why
`the Court reached the result it did.
` Both at the time of the founding and the Fourteenth
`Amendment’s adoption, the Anglo-American legal tradition
`recognized that a tribunal’s competence was generally con-
`strained only by the “territorial limits” of the sovereign that
`created it. J. Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws
`§539, pp. 450–451 (1834) (Story); see also United States v.
`Union Pacific R. Co., 98 U. S. 569, 602–603 (1879). That
`principle applied to all kinds of actions, but cashed out dif-
`ferently based on the object of the court’s attention. So, for
`example, an action in rem that claimed an interest in im-
`movable property was usually treated as a “local” action
`that could be brought only in the jurisdiction where the
`property was located. 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on
`——————
`3 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not address Norfolk Southern’s
`alternative argument that Pennsylvania’s statutory scheme as applied
`here violates this Court’s dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. See 266
`A. 3d, at 559–560, nn. 9, 11. Nor did we grant review to consider that
`question. Accordingly, any argument along those lines remains for con-
`sideration on remand.
`
`

`

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`5
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`Opinion of the Court
`the Laws of England 117–118, 294 (1768). Meanwhile, an
`in personam suit against an individual “for injuries that
`might have happened any where” was generally considered
`a “transitory” action that followed the individual. Id., at
`294. All of which meant that a suit could be maintained by
`anyone on any claim in any place the defendant could be
`found. Story §538, at 450.
` American courts routinely followed these rules. Chief
`Justice Marshall, for one, was careful to distinguish be-
`tween local and transitory actions in a case brought by a
`Virginia plaintiff against a Kentucky defendant based on a
`fraud perpetrated in Ohio. Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148,
`162–163 (1810). Because the action was a transitory one
`that followed the individual, he held, the suit could be main-
`tained “wherever the [defendant] may be found.” Id., at
`158, 161–163; see also, e.g., Livingston v. Jefferson, 15
`F. Cas. 660, 663–664 (No. 8,411) (CC Va. 1811) (opinion of
`Marshall, C. J.); Peabody v. Hamilton, 106 Mass. 217, 220–
`221 (1870); Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462, 468–470 (1813).
` This rule governing transitory actions still applies to nat-
`ural persons today. Some call it “tag” jurisdiction. And our
`leading case applying the rule is not so old. See Burnham
`v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Marin, 495 U. S. 604
`(1990). The case began with Dennis Burnham’s business
`trip to California. Id., at 608 (plurality opinion). During
`his short visit, Mr. Burnham’s estranged wife served him
`with a summons to appear in California state court for di-
`vorce proceedings. Ibid. This Court unanimously approved
`the state court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Mr.
`Burnham as consistent with the Due Process Clause—and
`did so even though the Burnhams had spent nearly all their
`married life in New Jersey and Mr. Burnham still resided
`there. See id., at 607–608, 616–619; id., at 628 (White, J.,
`concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at 635–
`639 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 640 (Ste-
`vens, J., concurring in judgment).
`
`

`

`6
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`MALLORY v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO.
`
`Opinion of the Court
` As the use of the corporate form proliferated in the 19th
`century, the question arose how to adapt the traditional
`rule about transitory actions for individuals to artificial
`persons created by law. Unsurprisingly, corporations did
`not relish the prospect of being haled into court for any
`claim anywhere they conducted business. “No one, after all,
`has ever liked greeting the process server.” Ford Motor Co.
`v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 592 U. S. ___, ___
`(2021) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op.,
`at 7). Corporations chartered in one State sought the right
`to send their sales agents and products freely into other
`States. At the same time, when confronted with lawsuits
`in those other States, some firms sought to hide behind
`their foreign character and deny their presence to defeat
`the court’s jurisdiction. Ibid.; see Brief for Petitioner 13–
`15; see also R. Jackson, What Price “Due Process”?, 5 N. Y.
`L. Rev. 435, 438 (1927) (describing this as the asserted right
`to “both be and not be”).
` Lawmakers across the country soon responded to these
`stratagems. Relevant here, both before and after the Four-
`teenth Amendment’s ratification, they adopted statutes re-
`quiring out-of-state corporations to consent to in-state suits
`in exchange for the rights to exploit the local market and to
`receive the full range of benefits enjoyed by in-state corpo-
`rations. These statutes varied. In some States, out-of-state
`corporate defendants were required to agree to answer suits
`brought by in-state plaintiffs. See, e.g., N. Y. Code Proc.
`§427 (1849); 1866 Wis. Laws ch. 1, §86.1; Md. Ann. Code,
`Art. 26, §211 (1868); N. C. Gen. Stat., ch. 17, §82 (1873). In
`other States, corporations were required to consent to suit
`if the plaintiff ’s cause of action arose within the State, even
`if the plaintiff happened to reside elsewhere. See, e.g., Iowa
`Code, ch. 101, §1705 (1851); 1874 Tex. Gen. Laws p. 107;
`1881 Mich. Pub. Acts p. 348. Still other States (and the fed-
`eral government) omitted both of these limitations. They
`required all out-of-state corporations that registered to do
`
`

`

`
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`7
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`Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`business in the forum to agree to defend themselves there
`against any manner of suit. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 22, 1867,
`14 Stat. 404; 1889 Nev. Stats. p. 47; S. C. Rev. Stat., Tit. 7,
`ch. 45, §1466 (1894); Conn. Gen. Stat. §3931 (1895). Yet
`another group of States applied this all-purpose-jurisdic-
`tion rule to a subset of corporate defendants, like railroads
`and insurance companies. See, e.g., 1827 Va. Acts ch. 74, p.
`77; 1841 Pa. Laws p. 29; 1854 Ohio Laws p. 91; Ill. Comp.
`Stat., ch. 112, §68 (1855); Ark. Stat., ch. 76, §3561 (1873);
`Mo. Rev. Stat., ch. 119, Art. 4, §6013 (1879). Mr. Mallory
`has collected an array of these statutes, enacted between
`1835 and 1915, in his statutory appendix. See App. to Brief
`for Petitioner 1a–274a.4
`
`——————
`4 Norfolk Southern and the dissent observe that some state courts ap-
`plied these laws narrowly. Brief for Respondent 43–44; post, at 11–12,
`and n. 4 (BARRETT, J., dissenting). But, as we will see in a moment, oth-
`ers did not. Part III, infra. Even state courts that adopted narrowing
`constructions of their laws did so by invoking statutory interpretation
`principles and discretionary doctrines. Notably, neither Norfolk South-
`ern nor the dissent has identified a single case (or any other source) from
`this period holding that all-purpose jurisdiction premised on a consent
`statute violates the Due Process Clause. Indeed, some of the decisions
`they cite presumed just the opposite. See, e.g., Camden Rolling Mill Co.
`v. Swede Iron Co., 32 N. J. L. 15, 17–18 (1866) (a law like Pennsylvania’s
`“could be judicially adopted” consistent with due process if clearly ex-
`pressed); Sawyer v. North Am. Life Ins. Co., 46 Vt. 697, 706–707 (1874)
`(similar). Nothing in this body of case law, then, comes close to satisfying
`Norfolk Southern’s burden of establishing that consent statutes like
`Pennsylvania’s “ ‘offen[d] some principle of justice so rooted in the tradi-
`tions and conscience of our people as to be ranked’ ” among those secured
`by the Due Process Clause. Medina v. California, 505 U. S. 437, 445–
`448 (1992). In saying this much, we hardly suggest, as the dissent sup-
`poses, that the practice of States or their courts is irrelevant. Post, at 11,
`n. 3. Our point is simply that Norfolk Southern has not met its burden
`of showing that original and historic understandings of due process fore-
`close consent statutes.
`
`

`

`8
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`
`MALLORY v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO.
`
`Opinion of the Court
`III
`A
` Unsurprisingly, some corporations challenged statutes
`like these on various grounds, due process included. And,
`ultimately, one of these disputes reached this Court in
`Pennsylvania Fire.
` That case arose this way. Pennsylvania Fire was an in-
`surance company incorporated under the laws of Pennsyl-
`vania. In 1909, the company executed a contract in Colo-
`rado to insure a smelter located near the town of Cripple
`Creek owned by the Gold Issue Mining & Milling Company,
`an Arizona corporation. Gold Issue Min. & Milling Co. v.
`Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Phila., 267 Mo. 524, 537, 184
`S. W. 999, 1001 (1916). Less than a year later, lightning
`struck and a fire destroyed the insured facility. Ibid. When
`Gold Issue Mining sought to collect on its policy, Pennsyl-
`vania Fire refused to pay. So, Gold Issue Mining sued. But
`it did not sue where the contract was formed (Colorado), or
`in its home State (Arizona), or even in the insurer’s home
`State (Pennsylvania). Instead, Gold Issue Mining brought
`its claim in a Missouri state court. Id., at 534, 184 S. W., at
`1000. Pennsylvania Fire objected to this choice of forum. It
`said the Due Process Clause spared it from having to an-
`swer in Missouri’s courts a suit with no connection to the
`State. Id., at 541, 184 S. W., at 1002.
` The Missouri Supreme Court disagreed. It first observed
`that Missouri law required any out-of-state insurance com-
`pany “desiring to transact any business” in the State to file
`paperwork agreeing to (1) appoint a state official to serve as
`the company’s agent for service of process, and (2) accept
`service on that official as valid in any suit. Id., at 543, 184
`S. W., at 1003 (internal quotation marks omitted). For
`more than a decade, Pennsylvania Fire had complied with
`the law, as it had “desir[ed] to transact business” in Mis-
`souri “pursuant to the laws thereof.” Id., at 545, 184 S. W.,
`at 1003. And Gold Issue Mining had served process on the
`
`

`

`
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`9
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`Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`appropriate state official, just as the law required. See id.,
`at 535, 184 S. W., at 1000.
` As to the law’s constitutionality, the Missouri Supreme
`Court carefully reviewed this Court’s precedents and found
`they “clearly” supported “sustain[ing] the proceeding.” Id.,
`at 569, 576, 184 S. W., at 1010, 1013; see id., at 552–576,
`601, 184 S. W., at 1005–1013, 1020–1021. The Missouri Su-
`preme Court explained that its decision was also supported
`by “the origin, growth, and history of transitory actions in
`England, and their importation, adoption, and expansion”
`in America. Id., at 578–586, 184 S. W., at 1013–1016. It
`stressed, too, that the law had long permitted suits against
`individuals in any jurisdiction where they could be found,
`no matter where the underlying cause of action happened
`to arise. What sense would it make to treat a fictitious cor-
`porate person differently? See id., at 588–592, 600, 184
`S. W., at 1016–1018, 1020. For all these reasons, the court
`concluded, Pennsylvania Fire “ha[d] due process of law, re-
`gardless of the place, state or nation where the cause of ac-
`tion arose.” Id., at 576, 184 S. W., at 1013.
` Dissatisfied with this answer, Pennsylvania Fire turned
`here. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Holmes had
`little trouble dispatching the company’s due process argu-
`ment. Under this Court’s precedents, there was “no doubt”
`Pennsylvania Fire could be sued in Missouri by an out-of-
`state plaintiff on an out-of-state contract because it had
`agreed to accept service of process in Missouri on any suit
`as a condition of doing business there. Pennsylvania Fire,
`243 U. S., at 95. Indeed, the Court thought the matter so
`settled by existing law that the case “hardly” presented an
`“open” question. Ibid. The Court acknowledged that the
`outcome might have been different if the corporation had
`never appointed an agent for service of process in Missouri,
`given this Court’s earlier decision in Old Wayne Mut. Life
`Assn. of Indianapolis v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8 (1907).
`But the Court thought that Old Wayne had “left untouched”
`
`

`

`10
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`MALLORY v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO.
`
`Opinion of the Court
`the principle that due process allows a corporation to be
`sued on any claim in a State where it has appointed an
`agent to receive whatever suits may come. 243 U. S., at 95–
`96. The Court found it unnecessary to say more because
`the company’s objections had been resolved “at length in the
`judgment of the court below.” Id., at 95.
` That assessment was understandable. Not only had the
`Missouri Supreme Court issued a thoughtful opinion. Not
`only did a similar rule apply to transitory actions against
`individuals. Other leading judges, including Learned Hand
`and Benjamin Cardozo, had reached similar conclusions in
`similar cases in the years leading up to Pennsylvania Fire.
`See Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222
`F. 148, 150–151 (SDNY 1915) (Hand, J.); Bagdon v. Phila-
`delphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N. Y. 432, 436–437,
`111 N. E. 1075, 1076–1077 (1916) (Cardozo, J.). In the
`years following Pennsylvania Fire, too, this Court reaf-
`firmed its holding as often as the issue arose. See, e.g., Lou-
`isville & Nashville R. Co. v. Chatters, 279 U. S. 320, 325–
`326 (1929); Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,
`308 U. S. 165, 175 (1939); see also Robert Mitchell Furni-
`ture Co. v. Selden Breck Constr. Co., 257 U. S. 213, 215–216
`(1921); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 20 (1928).
`B
` Pennsylvania Fire controls this case. Much like the Mis-
`souri law at issue there, the Pennsylvania law at issue here
`provides that an out-of-state corporation “may not do busi-
`ness in this Commonwealth until it registers with” the De-
`partment of State. 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. §411(a). As part of
`the registration process, a corporation must identify an “of-
`fice” it will “continuously maintain” in the Commonwealth.
`§411(f ); see also §412(a)(5). Upon completing these require-
`ments, the corporation “shall enjoy the same rights and
`privileges as a domestic entity and shall be subject to the
`
`

`

`
`
`11
`
`Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`same liabilities, restrictions, duties and penalties . . . im-
`posed on domestic entities.” §402(d). Among other things,
`Pennsylvania law is explicit that “qualification as a foreign
`corporation” shall permit state courts to “exercise general
`personal jurisdiction” over a registered foreign corporation,
`just as they can over domestic corporations. 42 Pa. Cons.
`Stat. §5301(a)(2)(i).
` Norfolk Southern has complied with this law for many
`years. In 1998, the company registered to do business in
`Pennsylvania. Acting through its Corporate Secretary as a
`“duly authorized officer,” the company completed an “Appli-
`cation for Certificate of Authority” from the Commonwealth
`“[i]n compliance with” state law. App. 1–2. As part of that
`process, the company named a “Commercial Registered Of-
`fice Provider” in Philadelphia County, agreeing that this
`was where it “shall be deemed . . . located.” Ibid. The Sec-
`retary of the Commonwealth approved the application, con-
`ferring on Norfolk Southern both the benefits and burdens
`shared by domestic corporations—including amenability to
`suit in state court on any claim. Id., at 1. Since 1998, Nor-
`folk Southern has regularly updated its information on file
`with the Secretary. In 2009, for example, the company ad-
`vised that it had changed its Registered Office Provider and
`would now be deemed located in Dauphin County. Id., at 6;
`see 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. §4144(b) (1988). All told, then, Nor-
`folk Southern has agreed to be found in Pennsylvania and
`answer any suit there for more than 20 years.
` Pennsylvania Fire held that suits premised on these
`grounds do not deny a defendant due process of law. Even
`Norfolk Southern does not seriously dispute that much. It
`concedes that it registered to do business in Pennsylvania,
`that it established an office there to receive service of pro-
`cess, and that in doing so it understood it would be amena-
`ble to suit on any claim. Tr. of Oral Arg. 62; post, at 2
`(ALITO, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment);
`
`

`

`12
`
`
`MALLORY v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO.
`
`Opinion of the Court
`post, at 2–3 (JACKSON, J., concurring). Of course, Mr. Mal-
`lory no longer lives in Pennsylvania and his cause of action
`did not accrue there. But none of that makes any more dif-
`ference than the fact that Gold Issue Mining was not from
`Missouri (but from Arizona) and its claim did not arise
`there (but in Colorado). See Pennsylvania Fire, 267 Mo., at
`537, 184 S. W., at 1001. To decide this case, we need not
`speculate whether any other statutory scheme and set of
`facts would suffice to establish consent to suit. It is enough
`to acknowledge that the state law and facts before us fall
`squarely within Pennsylvania Fire’s rule. See post, at 2–4
`(opinion of ALITO, J.).
` In the proceedings below, the Pennsylvania Supreme
`Court seemed to recognize that Pennsylvania Fire dictated
`an answer in Mr. Mallory’s favor. Still, it ruled for Norfolk
`Southern anyway. It did so because, in its view, interven-
`ing decisions from this Court had “implicitly overruled”
`Pennsylvania Fire. See 266 A. 3d, at 559, 567. But in fol-
`lowing that course, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
`clearly erred. As this Court has explained: “If a precedent
`of this Court has direct application in a case,” as Pennsyl-
`vania Fire does here, a lower court “should follow the case
`which directly controls, leaving to this Court the preroga-
`tive of overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de Quijas
`v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U. S. 477, 484
`(1989). This is true even if the lower court thinks the prec-
`edent is in tension with “some other line of decisions.”
`Ibid.5
`——————
`5 The dissent stresses that Pennsylvania’s statute does not use the
`word “consent” in describing the jurisdictional consequences of registra-
`tion. When the dissent finally comes around to addressing Pennsylvania
`Fire at the end of its opinion, it fleetingly seeks to distinguish the deci-
`sion along the same lines—stressing that words like “agent” and “juris-
`diction” do not appear “in Norfolk Southern’s registration paperwork.”
`Post, at 5, 17, and n. 8. But, as the dissent itself elsewhere acknowledges,
`“ ‘[a] variety of legal arrangements have been taken to represent express
`or implied consent to’ ” personal jurisdiction consistent with due process.
`
`

`

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`13
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`Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`IV
` Now before us, Norfolk Southern candidly asks us to do
`what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could not—overrule
`Pennsylvania Fire. Brief for Respondent 36–38. To smooth
`the way, Norfolk Southern suggests that this Court’s deci-
`sion in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310
`(1945), has already done much of the hard work for us. That
`decision, the company insists, seriously undermined Penn-
`sylvania Fire’s foundations. Brief for Respondent 34–36.
`We disagree. The two precedents sit comfortably side by
`side. See post, at 4 (opinion of ALITO, J.).
`A
` Start with how Norfolk Southern sees things. On the
`company’s telling, echoed by the dissent, International Shoe
`held that the Due Process Clause tolerates two (and only
`two) types of personal jurisdiction over a corporate defend-
`ant. First, “specific jurisdiction” permits suits that “ ‘arise
`out of or relate to’ ” a corporate defendant’s activities in the
`forum State. Ford Motor Co., 592 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op.,
`at 5–6). Second, “general jurisdiction” allows all kinds of
`suits agains