`(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2023
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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` UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI
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`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
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`THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
` No. 22–915. Argued November 7, 2023—Decided June 21, 2024
`
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` Respondent Zackey Rahimi was indicted under 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(8), a
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` federal statute that prohibits individuals subject to a domestic violence
`restraining order from possessing a firearm. A prosecution under Sec-
`
` tion 922(g)(8) may proceed only if the restraining order meets certain
`statutory criteria. In particular, the order must either contain a find-
`ing that the defendant “represents a credible threat to the physical
`
`
` safety” of his intimate partner or his or his partner’s child,
`§922(g)(8)(C)(i), or “by its terms explicitly prohibit[ ] the use,” at-
`tempted use, or threatened use of “physical force” against those indi-
`viduals, §922(g)(8)(C)(ii). Rahimi concedes here that the restraining
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`order against him satisfies the statutory criteria, but argues that on
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` its face Section 922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment. The District
`Court denied Rahimi’s motion to dismiss the indictment on Second
`Amendment grounds. While Rahimi’s case was on appeal, the Su-
` preme Court decided New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen,
`
`
` 597 U. S. 1 (2022). In light of Bruen, the Fifth Circuit reversed, con-
` cluding that the Government had not shown that Section 922(g)(8) “fits
`
`
` within our Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” 61 F.
`
`
` 4th 443, 460 (CA5 2023).
`Held: When an individual has been found by a court to pose a credible
` threat to the physical safety of another, that individual may be tempo-
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`
`rarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment. Pp. 5–17.
`(a) Since the Founding, the Nation’s firearm laws have included reg-
`
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` ulations to stop individuals who threaten physical harm to others from
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` misusing firearms. As applied to the facts here, Section 922(g)(8) fits
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`within this tradition.
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` The right to keep and bear arms is among the “fundamental rights
`necessary to our system of ordered liberty.” McDonald v. Chicago, 561
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`UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI
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`Syllabus
`U. S. 742, 778. That right, however, “is not unlimited,” District of Co-
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`lumbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 626. The reach of the Second Amend-
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`ment is not limited only to those arms that were in existence at the
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`Founding. Heller, 554 U. S., at 582. Rather, it “extends, prima facie,
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`to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were
`not [yet] in existence.” Ibid. By that same logic, the Second Amend-
`ment permits more than just regulations identical to those existing in
`1791.
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`Under our precedent, the appropriate analysis involves considering
`whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles
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`that underpin the Nation’s regulatory tradition. Bruen, 597 U. S., at
`
`26–31. When firearm regulation is challenged under the Second
`Amendment, the Government must show that the restriction “is con-
`
`sistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”
`Bruen, 597 U. S., at 24. A court must ascertain whether the new law
`
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`is “relevantly similar” to laws that our tradition is understood to per-
`mit, “apply[ing] faithfully the balance struck by the founding genera-
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`tion to modern circumstances.” Id., at 29, and n. 7. Why and how the
`regulation burdens the right are central to this inquiry. As Bruen ex-
`plained, a challenged regulation that does not precisely match its his-
`torical precursors “still may be analogous enough to pass constitu-
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`tional muster.” Id., at 30. Pp. 5–8.
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`(b) Section 922(g)(8) survives Rahimi’s challenge. Pp. 8–17.
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`(1) Rahimi’s facial challenge to Section 922(g)(8) requires him to
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`“establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
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`would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745. Here,
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`Section 922(g)(8) is constitutional as applied to the facts of Rahimi’s
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`own case. Rahimi has been found by a court to pose a credible threat
`to the physical safety of others, see §922(g)(8)(C)(i), and the Govern-
`ment offers ample evidence that the Second Amendment permits such
`individuals to be disarmed. P. 8.
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`(2) The Court reviewed the history of American gun laws exten-
`
`sively in Heller and Bruen. At common law people were barred from
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`misusing weapons to harm or menace others. Such conduct was often
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`addressed through ordinary criminal laws and civil actions, such as
`prohibitions on fighting or private suits against individuals who
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`threatened others. By the 1700s and early 1800s, though, two distinct
`legal regimes had developed that specifically addressed firearms vio-
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`lence: the surety laws and the “going armed” laws. Surety laws were
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`a form of “preventive justice,” 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the
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`Laws of England 251 (10th ed. 1787), which authorized magistrates to
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`require individuals suspected of future misbehavior to post a bond. If
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`an individual failed to post a bond, he would be jailed. If the individual
`did post a bond and then broke the peace, the bond would be forfeit.
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`2
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`3
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`Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)
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`Syllabus
`Surety laws could be invoked to prevent all forms of violence, including
`spousal abuse, and also targeted the misuse of firearms. These laws
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`often offered the accused significant procedural protections.
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`The “going armed” laws—a particular subset of the ancient common
`law prohibition on affrays, or fighting in public—provided a mecha-
`nism for punishing those who had menaced others with firearms. Un-
`der these laws, individuals were prohibited from “riding or going
`armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons, [to] terrify[ ] the good peo-
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`ple of the land.” 4 Blackstone 149. Those who did so faced forfeiture
`of their arms and imprisonment. Prohibitions on going armed were
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`incorporated into American jurisprudence through the common law,
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`and some States expressly codified them. Pp. 9–13.
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`(3) Together, the surety and going armed laws confirm what com-
`mon sense suggests: When an individual poses a clear threat of physi-
`cal violence to another, the threatening individual may be disarmed.
`Section 922(g)(8) is not identical to these founding-era regimes, but it
`does not need to be. Like the surety and going armed laws, Section
`922(g)(8)(C)(i) applies to individuals found by a court to threaten the
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`physical safety of another. This prohibition is “relevantly similar” to
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`those founding era regimes in both why and how it burdens the Second
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`Amendment right. Id., at 29. Section 922(g)(8) restricts gun use to
`check demonstrated threats of physical violence, just as the surety and
`going armed laws do. Unlike the regulation struck down in Bruen,
`Section 922(g)(8) does not broadly restrict arms use by the public gen-
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`erally.
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`The burden that Section 922(g)(8) imposes on the right to bear arms
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`also fits within the Nation’s regulatory tradition. While the Court does
`not suggest that the Second Amendment prohibits the enactment of
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`laws banning the possession of guns by categories of persons thought
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`by a legislature to present a special danger of misuse, see Heller, 554
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`U. S., at 626, Section 922(g)(8) applies only once a court has found that
`the defendant “represents a credible threat to the physical safety” of
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`another, §922(g)(8)(C)(i), which notably matches the similar judicial
`determinations required in the surety and going armed laws. Moreo-
`ver, like surety bonds of limited duration, Section 922(g)(8) only pro-
`hibits firearm possession so long as the defendant “is” subject to a re-
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`straining order. Finally, the penalty—another relevant aspect of the
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`burden—also fits within the regulatory tradition. The going armed
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`laws provided for imprisonment, and if imprisonment was permissible
`to respond to the use of guns to threaten the physical safety of others,
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`then the lesser restriction of temporary disarmament that Section
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`922(g)(8) imposes is also permissible.
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`The Court’s decisions in Heller and Bruen do not help Rahimi. While
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`Section 922(g)(8) bars individuals subject to restraining orders from
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`4
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`UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI
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`Syllabus
`possessing guns in the home, Heller never established a categorical
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` rule that the Constitution prohibits regulations that forbid firearm
`possession in the home. Indeed, Heller stated that many such prohi-
`bitions, like those on the possession of firearms by “felons and the men-
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` tally ill,” are “presumptively lawful.” Heller, 554 U. S., at 626, 627,
`n. 26. And the Court’s conclusion in Bruen that regulations like the
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`surety laws are not a proper historical analogue for a broad gun licens-
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` ing regime does not mean that they cannot be an appropriate analogue
`for a narrow one. Pp. 13–15.
`(4) The Fifth Circuit erred in reading Bruen to require a “histori-
`
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`cal twin” rather than a “historical analogue.” 597 U. S., at 30. The
`panel also misapplied the Court’s precedents when evaluating
`Rahimi’s facial challenge. Rather than consider the circumstances in
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`which Section 922(g)(8) was most likely to be constitutional, the panel
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`instead focused on hypothetical scenarios where the provision might
`raise constitutional concerns. P. 16.
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`(5) Finally, the Court rejects the Government’s contention that
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`Rahimi may be disarmed simply because he is not “responsible.” The
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`Court used this term in Heller and Bruen to describe the class of citi-
`zens who undoubtedly enjoy the Second Amendment right. Those de-
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`cisions, however, did not define the term and said nothing about the
`status of citizens who were not “responsible.” P. 17.
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`61 F. 4th 443, reversed and remanded.
`ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion for the Court, in which ALITO,
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`SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ.,
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`joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KAGAN, J.,
`joined. GORSUCH, J., KAVANAUGH, J., BARRETT, J., and JACKSON, J., filed
`
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`concurring opinions. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
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` Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
` Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
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` pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 22–915
`_________________
` UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. ZACKEY RAHIMI
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
`[June 21, 2024]
`CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the
`Court.
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`A federal statute prohibits an individual subject to a do-
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`mestic violence restraining order from possessing a firearm
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`if that order includes a finding that he “represents a credi-
`ble threat to the physical safety of [an] intimate partner,”
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`or a child of the partner or individual.
`18 U. S. C.
`§922(g)(8). Respondent Zackey Rahimi is subject to such an
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`order. The question is whether this provision may be en-
`forced against him consistent with the Second Amendment.
`
`I
`A
`In December 2019, Rahimi met his girlfriend, C. M., for
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`lunch in a parking lot. C. M. is also the mother of Rahimi’s
`young child, A. R. During the meal, Rahimi and C. M. be-
`gan arguing, and Rahimi became enraged. Brief for United
`States 2. C. M. attempted to leave, but Rahimi grabbed her
`by the wrist, dragged her back to his car, and shoved her in,
`causing her to strike her head against the dashboard.
`When he realized that a bystander was watching the alter-
`cation, Rahimi paused to retrieve a gun from under the pas-
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`2
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`UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI
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`Opinion of the Court
`senger seat. C. M. took advantage of the opportunity to es-
`cape. Rahimi fired as she fled, although it is unclear
`whether he was aiming at C. M. or the witness. Rahimi
`later called C. M. and warned that he would shoot her if she
`reported the incident. Ibid.
`
`
`Undeterred by this threat, C. M. went to court to seek a
`restraining order. In the affidavit accompanying her appli-
`
`
`cation, C. M. recounted the parking lot incident as well as
`other assaults. She also detailed how Rahimi’s conduct had
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`endangered A. R. Although Rahimi had an opportunity to
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`contest C. M.’s testimony, he did not do so. On February 5,
`2020, a state court in Tarrant County, Texas, issued a re-
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`straining order against him. The order, entered with the
`consent of both parties, included a finding that Rahimi had
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`committed “family violence.” App. 2. It also found that this
`violence was “likely to occur again” and that Rahimi posed
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`“a credible threat” to the “physical safety” of C. M. or A. R.
`Id., at 2–3. Based on these findings, the order prohibited
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`Rahimi from threatening C. M. or her family for two years
`or contacting C. M. during that period except to discuss
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`A. R. Id., at 3–7. It also suspended Rahimi’s gun license
`for two years. Id., at 5–6. If Rahimi was imprisoned or
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`confined when the order was set to expire, the order would
`instead terminate either one or two years after his release
`date, depending on the length of his imprisonment. Id., at
`6–7.
`
`In May, however, Rahimi violated the order by approach-
`ing C. M.’s home at night. He also began contacting her
`through several social media accounts.
`
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`In November, Rahimi threatened a different woman with
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`a gun, resulting in a charge for aggravated assault with a
`deadly weapon. And while Rahimi was under arrest for
`that assault, the Texas police identified him as the suspect
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`in a spate of at least five additional shootings.
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`The first, which occurred in December 2020, arose from
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`Rahimi’s dealing in illegal drugs. After one of his customers
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`3
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` Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)
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`Opinion of the Court
`“started talking trash,” Rahimi drove to the man’s home
`and shot into it. Brief for United States 3. While driving
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`the next day, Rahimi collided with another car, exited his
`vehicle, and proceeded to shoot at the other car. Three days
`later, he fired his gun in the air while driving through a
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`residential neighborhood. A few weeks after that, Rahimi
`was speeding on a highway near Arlington, Texas, when a
`truck flashed its lights at him. Rahimi hit the brakes and
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`cut across traffic to chase the truck. Once off the highway,
`he fired several times toward the truck and a nearby car
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`before fleeing. Two weeks after that, Rahimi and a friend
`were dining at a roadside burger restaurant. When the res-
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`taurant declined his friend’s credit card, Rahimi pulled a
`gun and shot into the air.
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`The police obtained a warrant to search Rahimi’s resi-
`dence. There they discovered a pistol, a rifle, ammunition—
`and a copy of the restraining order.
`B
`Rahimi was indicted on one count of possessing a firearm
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`while subject to a domestic violence restraining order, in vi-
`olation of 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(8). At the time, such a viola-
`tion was punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment (since
`amended to 15 years). §924(a)(2); see Bipartisan Safer
`Communities Act, Pub. L. 117–159, §12004(c)(2), 136 Stat.
`1329, 18 U. S. C. §924(a)(8). A prosecution under Section
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`922(g)(8) may proceed only if three criteria are met. First,
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`the defendant must have received actual notice and an op-
`portunity to be heard before the order was entered.
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`§922(g)(8)(A). Second, the order must prohibit the defend-
`ant from either “harassing, stalking, or threatening” his
`“intimate partner” or his or his partner’s child, or “engaging
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`in other conduct that would place [the] partner in reasona-
`ble fear of bodily injury” to the partner or child.
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`§922(g)(8)(B). A defendant’s “intimate partner[s]” include
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`his spouse or any former spouse, the parent of his child, and
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`4
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`UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI
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`Opinion of the Court
` anyone with whom he cohabitates or has cohabitated.
`
`§921(a)(32). Third, under Section 922(g)(8)(C), the order
`must either contain a finding that the defendant “repre-
`sents a credible threat to the physical safety” of his intimate
`
`partner or his or his partner’s child, §922(g)(8)(C)(i), or “by
`its terms explicitly prohibit[ ] the use,” attempted use, or
`threatened use of “physical force” against those individuals,
`§922(g)(8)(C)(ii).
`
`Rahimi’s restraining order met all three criteria. First,
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`Rahimi had received notice and an opportunity to be heard
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`before the order was entered. App. 2. Second, the order
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`prohibited him from communicating with or threatening
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`C. M. Id., at 3–4. Third, the order met the requirements of
`Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i), because it included a finding that
`
`Rahimi represented “a credible threat to the physical
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`safety” of C. M. or her family. Id., at 2–3. The order also
`
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`“explicitly prohibit[ed]” Rahimi from “the use, attempted
`use, or threatened use of physical force” against C. M., sat-
`isfying the independent basis for liability in Section
`922(g)(8)(C)(ii). Id., at 3.
`
`Rahimi moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that
`Section 922(g)(8) violated on its face the Second Amend-
`ment right to keep and bear arms. No. 4:21–cr–00083 (ND
`Tex., May 7, 2021), ECF Doc. 17. Concluding that Circuit
`precedent foreclosed Rahimi’s Second Amendment chal-
`
`lenge, the District Court denied his motion. Rahimi then
`pleaded guilty. On appeal, he again raised his Second
`Amendment challenge. The appeal was denied, and Rahimi
`petitioned for rehearing en banc.
`
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`While Rahimi’s petition was pending, this Court decided
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`New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S.
`1 (2022). In Bruen, we explained that when a firearm reg-
`
`ulation is challenged under the Second Amendment, the
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`Government must show that the restriction “is consistent
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`with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”
`Id., at 24.
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`

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`5
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` Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)
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`Opinion of the Court
`In light of Bruen, the panel withdrew the prior opinion
`
`and ordered additional briefing. A new panel then heard
`oral argument and reversed. 61 F.4th 443, 448 (CA5 2023).
`Surveying the evidence that the Government had identi-
`fied, the panel concluded that Section 922(g)(8) does not fit
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`within our tradition of firearm regulation. Id., at 460–461.
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`Judge Ho wrote separately to express his view that the
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`panel’s ruling did not conflict with the interest in protecting
`people from violent individuals. Id., at 461–462 (concurring
`
`opinion).
`
`We granted certiorari. 600 U. S. ___ (2023)
`
`II
`
`When a restraining order contains a finding that an indi-
`vidual poses a credible threat to the physical safety of an
`intimate partner, that individual may—consistent with the
`Second Amendment—be banned from possessing firearms
`while the order is in effect. Since the founding, our Nation’s
`firearm laws have included provisions preventing individu-
`als who threaten physical harm to others from misusing
`firearms. As applied to the facts of this case, Section
`922(g)(8) fits comfortably within this tradition.
`A
`
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`We have held that the right to keep and bear arms is
`
`among the “fundamental rights necessary to our system of
`
`ordered liberty.” McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 778
`(2010). Derived from English practice and codified in the
`
`Second Amendment, the right secures for Americans a
`means of self-defense. Bruen, 597 U. S., at 17. The spark
`
`that ignited the American Revolution was struck at Lexing-
`ton and Concord, when the British governor dispatched sol-
`diers to seize the local farmers’ arms and powder stores. In
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`the aftermath of the Civil War, Congress’s desire to enable
`the newly freed slaves to defend themselves against former
`Confederates helped inspire the passage of the Fourteenth
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`6
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`UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI
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`Opinion of the Court
`Amendment, which secured the right to bear arms against
`
`
` interference by the States. McDonald, 561 U. S., at 771–
`776. As a leading and early proponent of emancipation ob-
`served, “Disarm a community and you rob them of the
`means of defending life. Take away their weapons of de-
`fense and you take away the inalienable right of defending
`liberty.” Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 1967 (1868)
`(statement of Rep. Stevens).
`
`“Like most rights,” though, “the right secured by the Sec-
`
`ond Amendment is not unlimited.” District of Columbia v.
`Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 626 (2008). In Heller, this Court held
`
`that the right applied to ordinary citizens within the home.
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`Even as we did so, however, we recognized that the right
`
`was never thought to sweep indiscriminately. “From Black-
`stone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and
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`courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to
`keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner
`whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” Ibid. At the found-
`ing, the bearing of arms was subject to regulations ranging
`
`from rules about firearm storage to restrictions on gun use
`
` by drunken New Year’s Eve revelers. Act of Mar. 1, 1783,
`1783 Mass. Acts and Laws ch.13, pp. 218–219; 5 Colonial
`Laws of New York ch. 1501, pp. 244–246 (1894). Some ju-
`risdictions banned the carrying of “dangerous and unusual
`weapons.” 554 U. S., at 627 (citing 4 W. Blackstone, Com-
`
`mentaries on the Laws of England 148–149 (1769)). Others
`
`forbade carrying concealed firearms. 554 U. S., at 626.
`
`In Heller, our inquiry into the scope of the right began
`with “constitutional text and history.” Bruen, 597 U. S., at
`
`
`22. In Bruen, we directed courts to examine our “historical
`
`tradition of firearm regulation” to help delineate the con-
`tours of the right. Id., at 17. We explained that if a chal-
`lenged regulation fits within that tradition, it is lawful un-
`
`der the Second Amendment. We also clarified that when
`the Government regulates arms-bearing conduct, as when
`
`the Government regulates other constitutional rights, it
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`7
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` Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)
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`Opinion of the Court
`bears the burden to “justify its regulation.” Id., at 24.
`
`Nevertheless, some courts have misunderstood the meth-
`odology of our recent Second Amendment cases. These
`precedents were not meant to suggest a law trapped in am-
`
`ber. As we explained in Heller, for example, the reach of
`the Second Amendment is not limited only to those arms
`
`that were in existence at the founding. 554 U. S., at 582.
`Rather, it “extends, prima facie, to all instruments that con-
`stitute bearable arms, even those that were not [yet] in ex-
`istence.” Ibid. By that same logic, the Second Amendment
`
`permits more than just those regulations identical to ones
`that could be found in 1791. Holding otherwise would be as
`
`
`mistaken as applying the protections of the right only to
`muskets and sabers.
`
`As we explained in Bruen, the appropriate analysis in-
`
`volves considering whether the challenged regulation is
`consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory
`tradition. 597 U. S., at 26–31. A court must ascertain
`whether the new law is “relevantly similar” to laws that our
`tradition is understood to permit, “apply[ing] faithfully the
`balance struck by the founding generation to modern cir-
`cumstances.” Id., at 29, and n. 7. Discerning and develop-
`ing the law in this way is “a commonplace task for any law-
`yer or judge.” Id., at 28.
`
`Why and how the regulation burdens the right are cen-
`tral to this inquiry. Id., at 29. For example, if laws at the
`founding regulated firearm use to address particular prob-
`
`lems, that will be a strong indicator that contemporary laws
`imposing similar restrictions for similar reasons fall within
`a permissible category of regulations. Even when a law reg-
`ulates arms-bearing for a permissible reason, though, it
`may not be compatible with the right if it does so to an ex-
`
`tent beyond what was done at the founding. And when a
`challenged regulation does not precisely match its histori-
`cal precursors, “it still may be analogous enough to pass
`constitutional muster.” Id., at 30. The law must comport
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`8
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`UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI
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`Opinion of the Court
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` with the principles underlying the Second Amendment, but
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` it need not be a “dead ringer” or a “historical twin.” Ibid.
`
` (emphasis deleted).1
`
`B
`
`Bearing these principles in mind, we conclude that Sec-
`
`tion 922(g)(8) survives Rahimi’s challenge.
`1
`
`Rahimi challenges Section 922(g)(8) on its face. This is
`the “most difficult challenge to mount successfully,” be-
`cause it requires a defendant to “establish that no set of cir-
`
`cumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”
`
`United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987). That
`means that to prevail, the Government need only demon-
`strate that Section 922(g)(8) is constitutional in some of its
`applications. And here the provision is constitutional as ap-
`plied to the facts of Rahimi’s own case.
`
`Recall that Section 922(g)(8) provides two independent
`
`bases for liability. Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) bars an individual
`from possessing a firearm if his restraining order includes
`a finding that he poses “a credible threat to the physical
`safety” of a protected person.
`Separately, Section
`922(g)(8)(C)(ii) bars an individual from possessing a fire-
`
`arm if his restraining order “prohibits the use, attempted
`use, or threatened use of physical force.” Our analysis
`starts and stops with Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) because the
`Government offers ample evidence that the Second Amend-
`
`ment permits the disarmament of individuals who pose a
`credible threat to the physical safety of others. We need not
`——————
`1We also recognized in Bruen the “ongoing scholarly debate on
`
`whether courts should primarily rely on the prevailing understanding of
`an individual right when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in
`
`1868 when defining its scope (as well as the scope of the right against the
`
`
`Federal Government).” 597 U. S., at 37. We explained that under the
`
`circumstances, resolving the dispute was unnecessary to decide the case.
`Id., at 37–38. The same is true here.
`
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`Opinion of the Court
`decide whether regulation under Section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) is
`
` also permissible.
`
`9
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`
`2
`This Court reviewed the history of American gun laws ex-
`
`
` tensively in Heller and Bruen. From the earliest days of the
`common law, firearm regulations have included provisions
`
`
`barring people from misusing weapons to harm or menace
`others. The act of “go[ing] armed to terrify the King’s sub-
`
` jects” was recognized at common law as a “great offence.”
`
` Sir John Knight’s Case, 3 Mod. 117, 118, 87 Eng. Rep. 75,
`
`76 (K. B. 1686). Parliament began codifying prohibitions
`against such conduct as early as the 1200s and 1300s, most
`notably in the Statute of Northampton of 1328. Bruen, 597
`
`
`U. S., at 40. In the aftermath of the Reformation and the
`
` English Civil War, Parliament passed further restrictions.
`
`The Militia Act of 1662, for example, authorized the King’s
`agents to “seize all Armes in the custody or possession of
`any person . . . judge[d] dangerous to the Peace of the King-
`dome.” 14 Car. 2 c. 3, §13 (1662); J. Greenlee, The Histori-
`cal Justification for Prohibiting Dangerous Persons From
`Possessing Arms, 20 Wyo. L. Rev. 249, 259 (2020).
`
`
`The Glorious Revolution cut back on the power of the
`Crown to disarm its subjects unilaterally. King James II
`
`had “caus[ed] several good Subjects being Protestants to be
`disarmed at the same Time when Papists were . . . armed.”
`
`1 Wm. & Mary c. 2, §6, in 3 Eng. Stat. at Large 440 (1689).
`By way of rebuke, Parliament adopted the English Bill of
`
`Rights, which guaranteed “that the Subjects which are
`
`Protestants, may have Arms for their Defence suitable to
`
`their Conditions, and as allowed by Law.” §7, id., at 441.
`But as the document itself memorialized, the principle that
`arms-bearing was constrained “by Law” remained. Ibid.
`
`Through these centuries, English law had disarmed not
`only brigands and highwaymen but also political opponents
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`10
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`Opinion of the Court
`and disfavored religious groups. By the time of the found-
`ing, however, state constitutions and the Second Amend-
`ment had largely eliminated governmental authority to dis-
`arm political opponents on this side of the Atlantic. See
`
`Heller, 554 U. S., at 594–595, 600–603. But regulations tar-
`
`geting individuals who physically threatened others per-
`sisted. Such conduct was often addressed through ordinary
`
`criminal laws and civil actions, such as prohibitions on
`
`fighting or private suits against individuals who threatened
`others. See 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
`
`
`England 145–146, 149–150 (10th ed. 1787) (Blackstone); 3
`
`id., at 120. By the 1700s and early 1800s, however, two
`distinct legal regimes had developed that specifically ad-
`dressed firearms violence.
`The first were the surety laws. A form of “preventive jus-
`
`tice,” these laws derived from the ancient practice of frank-
`pledges. 4 id., at 251–253. Reputedly dating to the time of
`Canute, the frankpledge system involved compelling adult
`men to organize themselves into ten-man “tithing[s].” A.
`
`Lefroy, Anglo-Saxon Period of English Law, Part II, 26 Yale
`
`L. J. 388, 391 (1917). The members of each tithing then
`
`“mutually pledge[d] for each other’s good behaviour.” 4
`Blackstone 252. Should any of the ten break the law, the
`
`remaining nine would be responsible for producing him in
`
`court, or else face punishment in his stead. D. Levinson,
`Collective Sanctions, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 345, 358 (2003).
`Eventually, the communal frankpledge system evolved
`
`into the individualized surety regime. Under the surety
`
`laws, a magistrate could “oblig[e] those persons, [of] whom
`
`there is a probable ground to suspect of future misbehav-
`iour, to stipulate with and to give full assurance . . . that
`
`such offence . . . shall not happen[,] by finding pledges or
`securities.” 4 Blackstone 251. In other words, the law au-
`thorized magistrates to require individuals suspected of fu-
`ture misbehavior to post a bond. Ibid. If an individual
`
`failed to post a bond, he would be jailed. See, e.g., Mass.
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`Opinion of the Court
`Rev. Stat., ch. 134, §6 (1836). If the individual did post a
`bond and then broke the peace, the bond would be forfeit. 4
`
`Blackstone 253.
`
`
`Well entrenched in the common law, the surety laws
`could be invoked to prevent all forms of violence, including
`spousal abuse. As Blackstone explained, “[w]ives [could]
`demand [sureties] against their husbands; or husbands, if
`
`necessary, against their wives.” Id., at 254. These often
`took the form of a surety of the peace, meaning that the de-
`fendant pledged to “keep the peace.” Id., at 252–253; see R.
`Bloch, The American Revolution, Wife Beating, and the
`
`Emergent Value of Privacy, 5 Early American Studies 223,
`
`232–233, 234–235 (2007) (Bloch) (discussing peace bonds).
`Wives also demanded sureties for good behavior, whereby a
`
`husband pledged to “demean and behave himself well.” 4
`Blackstone 253; see Bloch 232–233, 234–235, and n. 34.
`
`While communities sometimes resorted to public sham-
`ing or vigilante justice to chastise abusers, sureties pro-
`
`vided the public with a more measured solution. B.
`McConville, The Rise of Rough Music, in Riot and Revelry
`in Early America 90–100 (W. Pencak, M. Dennis, & S. New-
`
`man eds. 2002). In one widely reported incident, Susannah
`Wyllys Strong, the wife of a Connecticut judge, appeared
`before Tapping Reeve in 1790 to make a complaint against
`her husband. K. Ryan, “The Spirit of Contradiction”: Wife
`
`Abuse in New England, 1780–1820, 13 Early American
`
`Studies 586, 602 (2015). Newspapers carrie