Case 6:20-cv-00856-ADA-JCM Document 22 Filed 11/24/20 Page 1 of 28
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
`WACO DIVISION
`
`Cub Club Investment, LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`Apple Inc.,
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`§
`
`Civil Action No. 6:20-CV-856-ADA-JCM
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`
`
`DEFENDANT APPLE INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS
`
`
`
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00856-ADA-JCM Document 22 Filed 11/24/20 Page 2 of 28
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1
`
`BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`Factual Background .................................................................................................2
`
`Procedural History ...................................................................................................4
`
`LEGAL STANDARD ..........................................................................................................5
`
`ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................5
`
`A.
`
`Cub Club has not stated a claim for copyright infringement (Count I). ..................5
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Copyright does not protect the idea of applying skin tones to emoji. ..........7
`
`Copyright does not protect human features or color variations. ..................9
`
`Cub Club does not state a claim for copyright infringement of any
`protectable element of its copyrighted works. ...........................................11
`
`B.
`
`Cub Club fails to state a claim for trade dress infringement (Count II). ...............14
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`“The insertion of emoji into messages” is a functional task that
`cannot qualify for trade dress protection. ..................................................15
`
`Cub Club has not alleged secondary meaning. ..........................................19
`
`C.
`
`Cub Club’s state law claims (Counts III, IV, and V) should be dismissed. ...........19
`
`CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................20
`
`
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`V.
`
`
`
`ii
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`

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`Case 6:20-cv-00856-ADA-JCM Document 22 Filed 11/24/20 Page 3 of 28
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`CASES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
`
`Abdin v. CBS Broad. Inc.,
`971 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2020).......................................................................................................10
`
`Allied Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. CDL Mktg., Inc.,
`878 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1989) ...................................................................................................15
`
`Am. Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc.,
`807 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986)...................................................................................................17
`
`Amazing Spaces, Inc. v. Metro Mini Storage,
`608 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2010) ...................................................................................................20
`
`Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
`35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994) ...................................................................................................12
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...................................................................................................................5
`
`Matter of ATP Oil & Gas Corp.,
`888 F.3d 122 (5th Cir. 2018) .....................................................................................................5
`
`Aurora World, Inc. v. Ty Inc.,
`No. 09-cv-08463, 2011 WL 13176413 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2011) ..........................................20
`
`Bayco Prod., Inc. v. Lynch,
`No. 10-cv-1820, 2011 WL 1602571 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2011) .................................14, 16, 18
`
`Blehm v. Jacobs,
`702 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2012) ...............................................................................................10
`
`Busti v. Platinum Studios, Inc.,
`No. 11-cv-1029, 2013 WL 12121116 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2013) ............................................6
`
`Cat & Dogma, LLC v. Target Corp.,
`No. 19-cv-1002, 2020 WL 4810962 (W.D. Tex. July 23, 2020) ...............................................6
`
`Chhim v. Univ. of Texas at Austin,
`836 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) .................................................................................5
`
`Cory Van Rijn, Inc. v. Cal. Raisin Advisory Bd.,
`697 F. Supp. 1136 (E.D. Cal. 1987) ...................................................................................13, 14
`
`
`
`iii
`
`

`

`Case 6:20-cv-00856-ADA-JCM Document 22 Filed 11/24/20 Page 4 of 28
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`
`
`Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. Fortune Dynamic, Inc.,
`No. 15-cv-769, 2015 WL 12731929 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2015) ................................................15
`
`Enchant Christmas Light Maze & Mkt. Ltd. v. Glowco, LLC,
`958 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2020) ...................................................................................................12
`
`Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc.
`323 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2003) ...................................................................................................12
`
`Express Lien, Inc. v. Handle, Inc.,
`No. 19-cv-10156, 2020 WL 1030847 (E.D. La. Mar. 3, 2020) ...................................15, 18, 19
`
`Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
`499 U.S. 340 (1991) ...............................................................................................................5, 6
`
`Fernandez-Montez v. Allied Pilots Assoc.,
`987 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1993) .....................................................................................................5
`
`Fin. Info. Inc. v. Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc.,
`808 F.2d 204 (2nd Cir. 1986).....................................................................................................9
`
`Folkens v. Wyland Worldwide, LLC,
`882 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2018) .....................................................................................................8
`
`Harvey Cartoons v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc.,
`645 F. Supp. 1564 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) .........................................................................................14
`
`ID7D Co. v. Sears Holding Corp.,
`No. 11-cv-1054, 2012 WL 1247329 (D. Conn. Apr. 13, 2012) ...............................................17
`
`Interlink Prod. Int’l, Inc. v. HDS Trading Corp., Inc.,
`No. 15-cv-1642, 2015 WL 12840378 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 2015) .................................................14
`
`Kaisha v. Lotte Int’l Am. Corp.,
`No. 15-5477, 2019 WL 8405592 (D.N.J. July 31, 2019), aff’d sub nom. Ezaki
`Glico Kabushiki Kaisha v. Lotte Int’l Am. Corp., 977 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2020) ......................17
`
`Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, Inc.,
`12 F.3d 527 (5th Cir. 1994) .......................................................................................................6
`
`U.S. ex rel. Lam v. Tenet Healthcare Corp.,
`481 F. Supp. 2d 673 (W.D. Tex. 2006) ......................................................................................3
`
`Laney Chiropractic & Sports Therapy, P.A. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
`866 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 2017) .......................................................................................14, 15, 18
`
`Lennar Homes of Tex. Sales & Mktg., Ltd. v. Perry Homes, LLC,
`117 F. Supp. 3d 913 (S.D. Tex. 2015) .....................................................................................12
`
`
`
`iv
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`

`

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`
`
`Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc.,
`616 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2010), as amended on denial of reh’g (Oct. 21, 2010) .......8, 10, 11, 12
`
`McGee v. Benjamin,
`No. 08-cv-11818, 2012 WL 959377 (D. Mass. Mar. 20, 2012) ........................................11, 13
`
`Nola Spice Designs, L.L.C. v. Haydel Enters., Inc.,
`783 F.3d 527 (5th Cir. 2015) .......................................................................................5, 6, 7, 10
`
`Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus.,
`972 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1992) ...................................................................................................20
`
`Pretty in Plastic, Inc. v. Bunn,
`793 F. App’x 593 (9th Cir. 2020) ............................................................................................12
`
`Profade Apparel, LLC v. Rd. Runner Sports, Inc.,
`No. 18-cv-1254, 2020 WL 5230490 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2020)................................................17
`
`Progressive Lighting, Inc. v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc.,
`549 F. App’x 913 (11th Cir. 2013) ..........................................................................................12
`
`Randolph v. Dimension Films,
`630 F. Supp. 2d 741 (S.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d, 381 F. App’x 449 (5th Cir. 2010) 6, 8, 11, 13, 14
`
`Roxtec, Inc., v. Wallmax S.R.L.,
`No. 17-cv-2105, 2018 WL 3870013 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2018) .............................................17
`
`Rucker v. Harlequin Enters., LTD.,
`No. 12-cv-1135, 2013 WL 707922 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2013) ................................................10
`
`Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prod. Co.,
`791 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1986) ...................................................................................................15
`
`Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. VanDam, Inc.,
`159 F.3d 739 (2d Cir. 1998).....................................................................................................11
`
`Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp.,
`517 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2008) .................................................................................................20
`
`Taylor v. IBM,
`54 F. App’x 794, 2002 WL 31845220 (5th Cir. 2002) ..............................................................6
`
`Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. State Farm Lloyds,
`791 F.3d 561 (5th Cir. 2015) .............................................................................................14, 15
`
`TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc.,
`532 U.S. 23 (2001) ...................................................................................................................16
`
`
`
`v
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`

`

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`
`
`Tropic Ocean Airways, Inc. v. Floyd,
`598 F. App’x 608 (11th Cir. 2014) ..........................................................................................19
`
`Ultraflo Corp. v. Pelican Tank Parts, Inc.,
`845 F.3d 652 (5th Cir. 2017) ...................................................................................................20
`
`Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc.,
`293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) .....................................................................................6
`
`Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros.,
`529 U.S. 205 (2000) ...........................................................................................................15, 19
`
`Williams v. 3DExport,
`No. 19-12240, 2020 WL 532418 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 3, 2020) ...............................................7, 10
`
`STATUTES
`
`15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) ...................................................................................................................15
`
`17 U.S.C. § 102(b) ...........................................................................................................................5
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) .......................................................................................................................20
`
`REGULATIONS
`
`37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a).......................................................................................................................11
`
`
`
`
`
`vi
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`Case 6:20-cv-00856-ADA-JCM Document 22 Filed 11/24/20 Page 7 of 28
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`
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
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`Copyright protects only the expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves. Plaintiff Cub
`
`Club Investment has filed an action that contravenes that bedrock legal principle. This case is
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`about “emoji,” which are small graphical images made available in text-messaging and similar
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`applications, sometimes depicting a representation of a human body part, like a hand making a
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`thumbs-up signal. Cub Club alleges it has obtained copyright registrations for several body-part
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`emoji, each in five different shades, to approximate the naturally occurring variation in humans’
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`skin tones. Apple offers its own body-part emoji, in a different suite of five colors, featuring
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`different renditions of the real-world objects depicted: differently contoured fingers, differently
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`angled thumbs, and so on. Cub Club asserts that Apple’s emoji infringe the copyrights in Cub
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`Club’s emoji, on the theory that Cub Club’s exclusive rights prevent anyone else from offering
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`emoji depicting the same body part as Cub Club’s emoji, in five different hues. That contention
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`is incorrect as a matter of law. It depends on the premise that Cub Club owns a copyright in the
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`idea of chromatically varying emoji, irrespective of whether an alternative rendition of the same
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`concept implements the idea differently. Because the Copyright Act and resulting judicial doctrine
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`are crystal clear that Cub Club’s exclusive rights do not in fact preclude others from implementing
`
`the idea of emoji with different skin tones—the very activity Cub Club says gives rise to liability
`
`here—Cub Club’s copyright infringement allegations fail to state a claim.
`
`Cub Club’s trade dress claim, and its related state law claims, fare no better. Trade dress,
`
`like a trademark, merits legal protection only when it (1) is non-functional and (2) serves as an
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`indicator of the source of goods or services. Cub Club fails to sufficiently allege either. To the
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`contrary, the “dress” that the Complaint accuses Apple of having copied is plainly functional: a
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`smartphone interface that lets users select and insert emoji “when sending messages on an Apple
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`iPhone.” And the Complaint includes no factual allegations at all suggesting that any aspect of
`
`
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`

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`
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`Cub Club’s emoji product has acquired secondary meaning in the minds of consumers, as the law
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`requires.
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`Because the Complaint is legally deficient on its face, Apple respectfully asks the Court to
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`dismiss it in its entirety.
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`II.
`
`BACKGROUND
`A.
`
`Factual Background1
`
`In 2013, Katrina A. Parrott’s daughter had an idea—that it would “be nice to have emoji
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`that look like the person sending them.” (Compl. ¶ 7.) Despite emoji being “ubiquitous” on both
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`smartphones and social media platforms, there were limited color options for emoji at that time.
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`(Id.) Spurred by her daughter’s idea, Mrs. Parrott saw an opportunity to build a business while
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`promoting the concept of diversity in emoji. (Id. ¶¶ 7–8.) To do so, she founded Cub Club
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`Investment, LLC and created iDiversicons, which she
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`describes as “the world’s first diverse emoji.” (Id.
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`¶ 7.) Cub Club then released the iDiversicons
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`application on the Apple App Store on October 11,
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`2013. (Id. ¶ 8.) The application allows users to insert
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`iDiversicons emoji into text messages using the
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`keyboard interface shown to the right. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 73.)
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`After launching the iDiversicons app, Mrs. Parrott joined a consortium that deals with
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`standardization of emoji throughout the technology industry, called “Unicode.”2 She became
`
`
`1 For purposes of this motion, Apple accepts the Complaint’s allegations as true.
`2 The Unicode Consortium is a non-profit corporation founded in 1991 that, through its Unicode
`Technical Committee, develops and maintains the Unicode Standard. (See generally Compl.
`¶¶ 11–14.) The Unicode Standard specifies the visual representation of text or symbols in software
`used for digital communications. (See generally Compl. ¶ 11); The Unicode Consortium, https://
`unicode.org/consortium/consort.html. When device manufacturers use the Unicode Standard,
`2
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`
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`involved with the Unicode Technical Committee “to raise awareness among technology leaders
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`about digital diversity and inclusion issues.” (Id. ¶ 11.) As part of that latter effort, Mrs. Parrott
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`submitted multiple proposals to the Unicode Technical Committee advocating for the adoption of
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`emoji with skin-tone variation by the Unicode Standard. (Id. ¶¶ 11–14.) Mrs. Parrott also
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`presented her proposals at multiple Unicode Technical Committee Meetings, pushing the
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`Committee to incorporate the iDiversicons emoji into an updated Unicode Standard for emoji with
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`skin-tone variation. (Id.)
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`While attending one Unicode Technical Committee meeting in May 2014, Mrs. Parrott met
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`Apple Senior Software Engineer Peter Edberg. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 26.) After they met, Mr. Edberg
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`reviewed the iDiversicons website and Mrs. Parrott gave him a thumb drive with a sampling of
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`iDiversicons emoji (id. ¶¶ 26, 29)—that is, the same emoji Mrs. Parrott was pushing the entire
`
`Unicode Technical Committee to adopt (id. ¶¶ 11, 14, 43). Around the same time, Mr. Edberg
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`helped Mrs. Parrott set up a meeting with Apple’s then-Senior Director for Frameworks and Fonts,
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`Celia Vigil, “to explore partnership opportunities between Apple and [Cub Club].” (Id. ¶¶ 27–28.)
`
`Mr. Edberg also shared with Ms. Vigil the sampling of iDiversicons emoji he had received from
`
`Mrs. Parrott. (Id. ¶ 30.)
`
`
`unique text and emoji sent from one manufacturer’s devices will result in the equivalent text and
`emoji being displayed on another manufacturer’s devices, and vice versa. See generally The
`Unicode Consortium, https://unicode.org/consortium/consort.html. Although the Complaint
`extensively references the Unicode Consortium, Unicode Technical Committee, and Unicode
`Standard (Compl. ¶¶ 11–14, 16, 20–22, 26, 32, 37, 43), it does not explain any of this information.
`Apple thus provides it for context, which the Court can either take judicial notice of or disregard.
`See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Lam v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 481 F. Supp. 2d 673, 680 (W.D. Tex. 2006)
`(taking judicial notice of facts that “are both generally known and capable of accurate
`determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned” when ruling
`on motion to dismiss).
`
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`3
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`
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`Mrs. Parrott and Mr. Edberg remained in touch over the following months, corresponding
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`about the Unicode Standard, Mrs. Parrott’s iDiversicons app, and Mrs. Parrott’s efforts related to
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`representations of diversity on mobile platforms. (Id. ¶¶ 37–38.) Mr. Edberg remained supportive
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`of Mrs. Parrott throughout that time, responding to technical questions she posed (id. ¶ 41), and
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`giving her feedback on a paper she had written entitled “Mobile Diversity Research” (id. ¶ 39).
`
`On October 23, 2014, Mr. Edberg told Mrs. Parrott that Ms. Vigil did not see an opportunity
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`for Apple to partner with Cub Club, and that Apple would be relying on its “own human interface
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`designers to develop diverse emoji based on iDiversicons® emoji.” (Id. ¶ 42.) Notwithstanding
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`that news, Mrs. Parrott continued to participate in the Unicode Technical Committee, giving
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`another presentation to the Committee on October 28, 2014, this time on “using a color modifier
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`pallet[te] to implement the five skin tone options for diverse emoji.” (Id. ¶ 43.)
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`On April 9, 2015, Apple released its “first
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`diverse emoji . . . using the five skin tone keyboard
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`modifier pallet[te]” shown here. (Id. ¶ 46.) A cursory
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`comparison between the particular five colors in Cub
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`Club’s emoji and the particular five colors in Apple’s
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`emoji reveals that they are not the same five colors. (See id. ¶ 52.)
`
`B.
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`Procedural History
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`Five years later, Cub Club sued. According to Cub Club, the “five skin tone version[s]” of
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`Apple’s emoji infringe Cub Club’s copyrights “covering emoji with five skin tones.” (Id. ¶¶ 9, 52,
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`65.) Cub Club also alleges Apple infringed its trade dress in the “designs and appearances of the
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`iDiversicons emoji,” such as the keyboard that allows users to insert emoji with different skin
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`tones. (Id. ¶¶ 17–18, 74.) In light of the foregoing, Cub Club asserts claims for federal copyright
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`infringement (Count I); federal trade dress infringement under the Lanham Act (Count II); unfair
`4
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`

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`
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`competition (Count III); misappropriation (Count IV); and unjust enrichment (Count V). Apple
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`has filed a motion to transfer this case to the Northern District of California, Dkt. 21, and now also
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`moves to dismiss.
`
`III. LEGAL STANDARD
`
`Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must be dismissed when it does not “contain sufficient
`
`factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Matter of
`
`ATP Oil & Gas Corp., 888 F.3d 122, 126 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
`
`697 (2009)). To determine whether dismissal is warranted, the Court accepts as true the well-
`
`pleaded allegations in a complaint and construes those facts in the plaintiff’s favor. Fernandez-
`
`Montez v. Allied Pilots Assoc., 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993).3 The Court does not, however,
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`“credit conclusory allegations or allegations that merely restate the legal elements of a claim.”
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`Chhim v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). If a complaint’s
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`well-pleaded allegations do not show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
`
`unlawfully,” or do not identify a violation of any law at all, the complaint must be dismissed. Id.
`
`(quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678).
`
`IV. ARGUMENT
`A.
`
`Cub Club has not stated a claim for copyright infringement (Count I).
`
`“Not all copying . . . is copyright infringement.” Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
`
`Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). That is because “[t]he copyright does not protect ideas; it protects
`
`only the author’s particularized expression of the idea.” Nola Spice Designs, L.L.C. v. Haydel
`
`Enters., Inc., 783 F.3d 527, 552 (5th Cir. 2015); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (“In no case does
`
`copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea[.]”). This well-
`
`
`3 Internal quotation marks and citations omitted throughout unless otherwise noted.
`5
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`

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`Case 6:20-cv-00856-ADA-JCM Document 22 Filed 11/24/20 Page 12 of 28
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`
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`established principle, known as the idea-expression distinction, reflects the fact that “copyright
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`law assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon
`
`the ideas and information conveyed by a work.” Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d
`
`791, 800 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (quoting Feist, 499 U.S. at 349). Because of this principle,
`
`“where all that has been copied is plaintiff[’s] idea, there is no copyright infringement.” Busti v.
`
`Platinum Studios, Inc., No. 11-cv-1029, 2013 WL 12121116, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2013)
`
`(quoting Taylor v. IBM, 54 F. App’x 794, 2002 WL 31845220, at *1 (5th Cir. 2002)).
`
`To state a claim for copyright infringement, then, a plaintiff must do more than simply
`
`allege copying. Instead, the plaintiff must advance plausible, non-conclusory allegations of
`
`copying of the protectable elements of its copyrighted work—that is, the author’s particularized
`
`expression rather than the underlying ideas that gave rise to the author’s expression. See Randolph
`
`v. Dimension Films, 630 F. Supp. 2d 741, 746 (S.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d, 381 F. App’x 449 (5th Cir.
`
`2010).
`
`When evaluating a claim for copyright infringement based on “copyrighted work[s] [that]
`
`contain[] unprotectable elements, the first step is to distinguish between protectable and
`
`unprotectable elements of the copyrighted work[s]” and “‘filter out . . . unprotectable elements of
`
`plaintiff’s copyrighted materials.’” Nola Spice, 783 F.3d at 550 (quoting Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v.
`
`Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 533–34 (5th Cir. 1994)). Only then can the Court
`
`“ascertain whether the defendant infringed protectable elements of those materials.” Id. (quoting
`
`Kepner-Tregoe, 12 F.3d at 533–34); see, e.g., Cat & Dogma, LLC v. Target Corp., No. 19-cv-
`
`1002, 2020 WL 4810962, at *2 (W.D. Tex. July 23, 2020) (granting motion to dismiss copyright
`
`claims after “‘filter[ing] out unprotectable elements, and compar[ing] the remaining protectable
`
`expression with the allegedly infringing’ work”) (quoting Nola Spice, 783 F.3d at 550 n.6).
`
`
`
`6
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`Case 6:20-cv-00856-ADA-JCM Document 22 Filed 11/24/20 Page 13 of 28
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`
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`Here, three elements of Cub Club’s works are relevant to the Court’s analysis. First, there
`
`is the idea of taking an emoji representing a human body part and making it available in five
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`different colors. Second, there is the selection of body parts as emoji, ab initio. And third, there
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`is the particular rendition of those body parts—both in the contours of the shapes, and in the five
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`specific colors selected. Cub Club alleges infringement only of the first—the idea of body-part
`
`emoji appearing in five colors. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 9 (copyrights “covering emoji with five skin
`
`tones”); id. ¶ 11 (presenting iDiversicons proposal for “five skin tone emoji standard”); id.
`
`(presenting iDiversicons “solution of using a color modifier pallet[te] to implement the five skin
`
`tone options on digital keyboards”); id. ¶ 16 (alleging Mrs. Parrott created “five skin tone emoji”);
`
`id. ¶ 46 (accusing Apple of releasing “its first diverse emoji . . . using the five skin tone keyboard
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`modifier pallet[te]”); id. ¶ 49 (accusing Apple of releasing “at least four versions of its emoji with
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`five skin tone options”).) But because copyright does not protect such ideas, Cub Club’s claim
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`fails. See Williams v. 3DExport, No. 19-12240, 2020 WL 532418, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 3, 2020)
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`(granting motion to dismiss because, inter alia, “even if [Plaintiff] was the first to think up the
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`anime, . . . he could not lay claim to all anime that ever was or will be produced”). Even if Cub
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`Club had alleged infringement of the latter two elements, it would fare no better. As explained
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`below, naturally occurring human characteristics are not copyrightable either, and the Complaint
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`itself establishes that Apple did not copy the actual lines Cub Club used to draw its emoji, or its
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`choice of which body parts to feature. In sum, Cub Club has not alleged and cannot allege any
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`infringement of the protectable aspects of its emoji. It has therefore failed to state a claim.
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`1.
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`Copyright does not protect the idea of applying skin tones to emoji.
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`The fundamental, fatal flaw of Cub Club’s copyright claim is that it is based entirely on
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`the contention that Apple infringed the idea of applying five skin tones to emoji that represent
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`human body parts. Cub Club alleges its copyright protects “emoji with five skin tones” (Compl.
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`Case 6:20-cv-00856-ADA-JCM Document 22 Filed 11/24/20 Page 14 of 28
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`¶¶ 9, 16.); Mrs. Parrott created iDiversicons as “the world’s first diverse emoji” (Compl. ¶ 7);
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`iDiversicons has a “mission of bringing diverse emoji to the world” with a “five skin tone emoji
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`standard” (id. ¶ 11); and Mrs. Parrott is recognized as the “creator of five skin tone emoji” (id.
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`¶ 16). Cub Club then claims that Apple infringes its copyrights because “Apple’s five skin tone
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`version[s]” of various body-part emoji infringe Cub Club’s “five skin tone” versions of emoji
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`depicting the same body part. (Id. ¶ 52; see also id. ¶ 46 (“On April 9, 2015, Apple released its
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`first diverse emoji (‘Accused Products’) using the five skin tone keyboard modifier pallet[te].”).)
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`In short, Cub Club makes no secret that its copyright claim rises and falls on the copyrightability
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`of the idea of applying five skin tones to emoji. And because of that, its claim fails.
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`Copyright does not protect the idea of applying five different skin tones to emoji because
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`ideas are not copyrightable. “[I]deas, first expressed in nature, are the common heritage of
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`humankind, and no artist may use copyright law to prevent others from depicting them.” Folkens
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`v. Wyland Worldwide, LLC, 882 F.3d 768, 775 (9th Cir. 2018). “Otherwise, the first person to
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`express any idea would have a monopoly over it.” Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 904,
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`913 (9th Cir. 2010), as amended on denial of reh’g (Oct. 21, 2010). Yet that is exactly what Cub
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`Club is trying to do—assert an exclusive right over the general concept and practice of applying
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`different skin tones to emoji. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 9 (asserting copyrights “covering emoji with
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`five skin tones”).) Because copyright law does not afford Cub Club that right, its copyright
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`infringement claim must be dismissed. See Randolph, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 749 (dismissing
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`copyright infringement claim with prejudice and without leave to amend where plaintiff accused
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`defendant of infringing non-protectable aspects of her works).
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`The claim is equally deficient to the extent it is premised on the suggestion that the specific
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`number of colors in Cub Club’s emoji—five—is the thing about them that is copyrightable. That
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`is an equally abstract, unprotectable idea. To be sure, Cub Club could potentially assert a copyright
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`interest in its choice of particular colors A through E—at least to the extent that the colors were
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`themselves creative selections, rather than attempts to faithfully reprise features of the human body
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`(which Cub Club’s selections do in fact appear to have been, as discussed below). But the concept
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`of making five variants of a given work of creative expression is not, itself, part of what is protected
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`by the copyright in the creative expression. Cf. Fin. Info. Inc. v. Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc.,
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`808 F.2d 204 (2nd Cir. 1986) (holding that the listing of five facts concerning municipal bonds
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`calls lacked sufficient creativity to merit copyright protection).
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`2.
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`Copyright does not protect human features or color variations.
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`Cub Club does not allege that Apple infringes any other aspect of its copyrighted works,
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`presumably because it knows any such claim would fail. If Cub Club had made such an allegation,
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`the Court would first have to analyze what remains of Cub Club’s works once the unprotectable
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`idea of applying different skin tones to emoji is filtered out. Once that is done, what remains are
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`Cub Club’s emoji themselves—body parts in various natural poses, such as the pointed fingers,
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`thumb, and fist shown immediately below, along with the specific shades it chose for them:
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`(Compl. at 12–16.) The Court would then need to determine whether those remaining aspects of
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`Cub Club’s works were (a) protectable and (b) infringed. The answer to both questions is no.
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`Body Part Emoji. The use of body parts, in various natural shapes, is not copyrightable
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`because there is “no copyright protection in general human features.” Blehm v. Jacobs, 702 F.3d
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`1193, 1206 (10th Cir. 2012). “[E]veryday activities, common anatomical features, and natural
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`poses are ideas that belong to the public domain.” Id. at 1204. As a result, “arms, legs, faces, and
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`fingers [on cartoon figures] . . . are not protectable elements.” Nola Spice, 783 F.3d at 551 (quoting
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`Blehm, 702 F.3d at 1204) (alterations in original). “[S]tock similarities” in human depictions, like
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`“race, gender, and hair color,” are likewise unprotectable. Abdin v. CBS Broad. Inc., 971 F.3d 57,
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`67, 72 (2d Cir. 2020); see also Mattel, 616 F.3d at 916 (same); see, e.g., Rucker v. Harlequin
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`Enters., LTD., No. 12-cv-1135, 2013 WL 707922, at *1, *8 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2013) (copyright
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`does not protect decision to make book characters “black-haired, blue-eyed, ‘tall, dark, and
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`handsome,’” or “beautiful, with red hair and green eyes”).
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`In light of the foregoing, Cub Club’s copyrights do not extend to the adoption of emoji
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`that, as